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ABSTRACT 
Biodiversity loss is an important issue for New Zealand: for the domestic environment, economy and 
society, but also for New Zealand as a member of the international community. Biodiversity offset 
banking is making an important contribution to addressing such issues in a number of countries 
around the world. Developing the ability to participate and take advantage of possible benefits requires 
comprehensively understanding both the fundamental principles and varying concepts, and supports 
the analysis necessary for New Zealand to progress towards offset banking. New Zealand can learn 
much from observing and investigating overseas models and use them as valuable templates. California 
and New South Wales provide examples of potential policies and frameworks (both economic and 
social) to establish and operate successful offset banking systems.  
Discussions of offset banking, both in theory and practice, frequently concern the potential failings of 
the system. These issues can be conceptualised as various forms of risk. Considering offset banking as 
sustainable development, this thesis addresses such risks to reflect the tripartite biological, financial 
and social framework of sustainable development. Biologically, risk is in the potential biodiversity 
outcomes are inadequate, unexpected or undesirable. Scientific uncertainty underlies this, both 
inherently and from the limits of current scientific disciplines. Through expanding scientific knowledge 
and experience, measures for reducing or accommodating the risk of uncertainty are emerging. 
Financial risk represents concerns that individual banks may lack the monetary support to achieve the 
specific biodiversity conservation required for the site. Also the system of interacting banks, bankers 
and traders may fail to produce financial outcomes that support effective and efficient biodiversity 
conservation over the breath of the scheme. Social risk lies in the potential that societies’ individuals 
conduct themselves in ways that conflict with achieving biodiversity conservation through malfeasance 
or negligence.  Additionally, there is social risk that an offset banking system fails to respond 
appropriately to broader society and human, such as equity and intergenerational justice.  
Here, deliberating these risks is primary to appreciating how design elements and emergent properties 
minimize risks. Given comprehensive understanding, components of a system can be designed and 
allow informed policy, regulations and rules to offer successful risk mitigation. For this reason policy, 
rules and regulations observed within California and New South Wales helps to discuss this and 
establish guidance for New Zealand offset banking design to draw upon. Californian systems are 
achieving promising conservation and continued growth; New South Wales’ Biobanking scheme is 
robustly designed and in its early stages. Each contrasts in design and carries varying criticisms. 
California has been observed as potentially shortcoming biologically, whereas New South Wales 
Biobanking has been questioned based on the strength and character of its economic underpinnings. 
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In addition to these considerations, New Zealand has significant societal perspectives to incorporate 
given current popular, socio-democratic conservation modus operandi.  
Identifying the three forms of risk present highlights the importance of allocating appropriate 
consideration and expertise to the biological, economic and social components of offset banking. 
Successful sustainable development, biodiversity conservation and risk mitigation may be achieved 
through designing mechanisms, regulations and governing policy for offset banking. New Zealand may 
therefore expand the success and application of current offsetting by taking guidance from examples 
and analysis presented here.  
 
Key words: Biodiversity conservation, New Zealand, Biobanking, Biodiversity offset, offset banking, 
credit trading, risk management, biological risk, financial risk, social risk, sustainable development, 
environmental policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 .0  ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION:  THE CHALLENGE OF THE 21 ST CENTURY.   
 
Biodiversity is declining in virtually ever region of the world at a rate previously un-encountered (Sala 
et al., 2000; Chapin III et al., 2000; Bishop et al., 2010). Exponential population growth, economic and 
technological advancement, and other aspects of global environmental change are driving extensive 
habitat loss, which is recognised as a primary cause of biodiversity decline (Lister 1997; Geneletti 
2003; Glennon and Porter 2007; Polasky et al., 2008). The consequences predicted from this are 
uncertain, but potentially catastrophic. A range of issues for human societies are predicted, as changes 
in the resources and services provided by natural ecosystems result from a reduction in the 
biodiversity which supports essential functions and processes. Issues predicted include incapacity for 
water purification and control of pest species populations, inadequate provision of food, shelter or fuel, 
and altered climate regulation increasing fire frequency and greater temperature extremes (Chapin III 
2000; O’Riordan and Stol-Kleenmann 2002).  The economic impacts from these issues such as crop 
failure, and social issues such as increases in poverty and geographic and cultural displacement, are 
an equally pressing cause for concern (Ki-Moon, 2010; Sukhdev 2010). This situation has begun to 
galvanise the prioritisation of biodiversity decline by individuals and communities alike, across regions, 
nations and international bodies (Costanza et al., 1997; Agius 2001; Hooper et al., 2005; Knight 
2005; Hillman and Instone 2010; Bishop et al., 2010). Addressing biodiversity decline and averting 
predicted negative impacts requires concerted action by all countries, from national and international 
perspectives, New Zealand being no exception (NZBS 2000; MfE 2007).  
 
Opinions differ within and between nations regarding the best solutions to pursue (Mebratu 1998; 
Statistics New Zealand 2009). Some consider that continued growth and progress of nations and 
societies should be maintained as a priority, accepting biodiversity decline as an unfortunate 
consequence (Housman 1992; Lehmann 1995; Mebratu 1998; Lloyd 2007). Alternative perspectives 
assert the prioritisation of biodiversity and environmental issues for reasons intrinsic, life supporting or 
philosophical, or as an irreplaceable resource base (Dobson 1999; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1992a,b; Mebratu 1998). The growing majority within this spectrum 
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acknowledge neither approach can be expected to dominant in the foreseeable future, so solutions 
integrating these perspectives are urgently required (Barrow 1995; Dobson 1999; ten Kate 2003, 
2003a; Bishop and Bayon 2004; Daly and Farley, 2004; Ginn 2005; Moran and Ostrom 2005; Lloyd 
2007; Engleman 2009). Offsetting is a mechanism proposed for improved environmental conservation; 
offset banking is one approach developing within this (Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
As a discussion of offset banking, this thesis is based on two underlying assumptions:  
Some arguments favour unrestricted development and resource consumption; others the immediate 
protection, preservation or restoration of the world’s remaining natural ecosystems, yet neither is 
expected to supersede the other within the foreseeable future. 
 
The supporters and critics of these competing arguments preclude this as universally supported 
assumption; existence of illegal, subversive or counter-productive behaviour besetting other 
compromised-based human systems stimulate debate of the balance of benefits of offsetting compared 
to such potential sources of failure (Anton, Fisk and Holstrom 2000; Lawton 2007; Burgin 2008; 
Walker et al., 2009). Discussion in the following chapters addresses the importance of this debate but 
as secondarily important to the potential opportunities within such an evolutionary and dynamically 
responsive system (Bekessy et al., 2010).  
 
The second assumption is therefore taken that: 
Potential misapplication, malfeasance, misuse should not detract from the merit of investigation and 
endeavour in itself. 
 
1 .1  ENVIRONMENTAL COMPENSATION,  OFFSETT ING AND OFFSET BANKING 
 
The evolution of environmental compensation has given rise to the development of biodiversity 
offsetting (ten Kate 2003; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Ginn 2005; Foxall, Grigg and ten Kate, 
2005; Burgin 2008; Bayon, Carroll and Fox 2008; BBOP 2009c; Kiesecker et al., 2009a; Hillman and 
Instone 2010).  
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“The chief purpose and benefit of environmental compensation is to maintain environmental capital 
against depletion by cumulative developments that pass through the net of environmental planning 
regulations. Environmental compensation is directly related to the harm done in each case.”  
Memon and Skelton (2004) p. 179 
 
The term biodiversity offset broadly refers to actions with the purpose of addressing overall biodiversity 
loss caused by development activities (ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Memon and Skelton 2004; 
Ginn 2005; Burgin 2008; BBOP 2009c; PCoE 2010). When required, project proponents predict 
negative biodiversity impacts and undertaking actions to specifically compensate or offset1 this 
consequential, unavoidable damage. This typically involves conservation through preservation, 
restoration or creation of another area of biodiversity value, frequently after the project has been 
implemented (Burgin 2008; Mead 2008; BBOP 2009d). In best practice, offsets are not viewed as 
reducing environmental damage, but instead as a mechanism of adjusting the final net effect of the 
proposal on biodiversity and the environment to produce a neutral or positive conservation outcome 
(DEWR 2007; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010).  
 
Examples of offsetting attempts to date have not universally produced neutral or positive 
environmental outcomes, or adequately accounted for residual impacts (Redmond et al., 1996; 
Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Brown and Lant, 1999; Robertson and Hayden, 2008; Mead 2008; 
Fleischer and Fox 2008; Bekessy et al., 2010; Hillman and Instone 2010). Within the United States, 
where some of the first offsetting was established, several studies have reviewed the process and 
concluded that in many instances, biodiversity loss has failed to be adequately offset through lack of 
implementation or unsuccessful conservation actions, among other reasons. Offsetting therefore does 
not offer guaranteed outcomes, making it extremely challenging to effectively address negative 
development impacts and produce truly neutral or positive net outcomes (De Weese 1994; Lawhead 
1997; Brown and Lant, 1999; Robertson and Hayden 2008; Fleischer and Fox 2008; Walker et al., 
2009; Bekessy et al., 2010). 
 
Offset banking has been developed to offer specific improvements in biodiversity offsetting outcomes, 
as one option under offsetting, and the broader environmental conservation umbrella (Marsh 1996; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “	  
2 Note also principle 16 from the Rio Declaration (1992) which states that: “National Authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
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Heal 2000; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Mead 2008; Robertson and Hayden, 2008; Carroll Fox, and 
Bayon 2008; USFWS 2009; Hillman and Instone 2010; eftec IEEP et al., 2010). Developed from earlier 
offsetting programs, offset banking is an alternative path to address residual development impacts, 
potentially increasing implementation capacity and to satisfy offset objectives prior to impacts occurring 
(Lawhead 1997; Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008; Hartig and Drechsler 2009; USFWS 2009; Bekessy et 
al., 2010). Under proper design, benefits of offset banking include facilitating the protection of existing 
biodiversity values, creating an economical and practical framework for biodiversity restoration and 
recreation, and offering pre-emptive as opposed to reactionary impact mitigation for development 
projects (Hallwood 2007; Bekessy et al., 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  A range of contextually-
specific offset mechanisms will continue to significantly contribute to biodiversity conservation, with 
offset banking supplementing this range, offering additional and complementary benefits (Heal 2000; 
Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008; Hartig and Drechsler 2009; USFWS 2009; Bekessy et al., 2010; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010). 
 
1 .2  NEW ZEALAND’S CONSERVATION CONTEXT 
 
New Zealand has unique and vulnerable indigenous biodiversity (MfE 2007, 2007 a; Statistics New 
Zealand 2009). Maintaining New Zealand’s biodiversity is recognised as an important component of 
achieving sustainable development: 
 
“Biodiversity contributes essential products and services to human welfare and provides environmental 
and economic resilience. Maintaining biodiversity helps sustain the natural ecological processes on 
which life depends. It also underpins industries such as tourism and fishing. New Zealand has a large 
number of species that are found naturally only in this country, and is therefore a significant 
contributor to global biodiversity.” Statistics New Zealand (2009) p. 21 
 
Sadly, this flora and fauna has experienced extensive destruction with extinction of more than 31% of 
vertebrate fauna, and one of the highest rates of threatened species in the world (MfE 2007b). Over 
63% of native vegetation cover has been removed, only 10% of wetland areas remain, and more than 
1000 species are declining or threatened with extinction (MfE 2007; NZBS 2000; Hitchmough, Bull and 
Cormarty 2005). At least eight unique ecosystems are also under extinction threat, while a quarter of 
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the land area has been cleared by more than 90%, contributing to the loss of several native 
ecosystems (NZBS 2000; MfE 2007).  
 
“It is estimated that New Zealand has at least 80,000 native species. However deforestation, over-
harvesting, habitat destruction, pollution, and the introduction of exotic animals and plants threaten the 
survival of many native species. Between 2002 and 2005, the threat status worsened for 40 species 
and improved for only five. Of these 40 threatened species, 5 were previously classified as ‘not 
threatened’. In addition to these 40, seven were confirmed as extinct, although actual extinction may 
have occurred many years ago (see figure 2a). In 2005, New Zealand listed 2,788 native species and 
other taxonomic units (groups of organisms) as threatened (see figure 2b), up from 2,372 in 2002.” 
p. 22, Statistics New Zealand (2009) 
 
Awareness and appreciation for environmental conservation is substantial in New Zealand society. An 
extensive system of government-protected areas has been established. Approximately 30% of New 
Zealand's land mass is conserved for its environmental values and biodiversity (Memon and Skelton 
2004; Walker, Price and Stephenson 2008; MfE 2007). Despite a proud record of active 
environmentalism in society, extant flora and fauna continue to suffer from direct and indirect human 
impacts and numerous species require intensive management to remain above the extinction threshold 
(Atkinson and Cameron 1993; MfE 2007). Conservation of remaining values is therefore a high priority 
for New Zealanders (Walker et al., 2008; MfE 2007; Statistics New Zealand 2009).  
 
New Zealand’s island geography means it is heavily impacted by invasive pest species (Atkinson and 
Cameron 1993; Stephens 1999). The isolated, evolutionary history of New Zealand's biota has 
produced a number of species particularly vulnerable to the impacts of invasive species (NZBS, 2000; 
Norton 2009; MfE 2007a). Modern patterns of international human movement, and the significant 
roles of international trade and tourism in New Zealand are significant contributing factors and 
consequently the impact of invasive species is one of the most pressing conservation issues (Stephens 
1999; MfE 2007a,b;). Current technology means that invasive species management makes 
conservation in New Zealand necessarily intensive and on going (Norton 2009).  
 
 
	   18	  
1.3  THE CURRENT S ITUAT ION:  A  ROLE FOR B IODIVERSITY  OFFSETS 
 
Despite notable achievements, current conservation frameworks remain inadequate (Walker et al., 
2006; Walker, Price and Stephenson 2008; PCE 2010b). Productive/lowland ecosystems are poorly 
represented in the Public Conservation Estate, are in particular demand for agriculture and farming and 
predicted to be increasingly important for public infrastructure and housing in the future (MfE n.d.a; 
Memon and Skelton 2004; MfE 2007a). Significant biodiversity values are, sometimes exclusively found 
in lowland regions, predominantly in private ownership on valuable agricultural land and creating a 
significant gap in current protection and management (MfE 2001; Memon and Skelton 2004; PCoE 
2010; Walker Price and Stephens 2008).  
 
In recent years, large-scale development projects have received a society profile via popular media 
exposure, as groups concerned about the resulting environmental impacts contest decisions (Hinchey 
and Hogg 2009; Christensen 2010). Equally, New Zealand must also continue to make decisions to 
support development required by a robust economy for the growing populations (Statistics New 
Zealand 2009). Such development must also respond to the increasing pressures of climate change, 
necessitating novel renewable energy alternatives (Statistics New Zealand 2009).  Considerable project 
delays have been caused by lengthy environment court proceedings, absorbing significant time and 
money resources. Such inefficiencies drive the impetus for change and improvement in New Zealand’s 
biodiversity conservation today.  
 
New Zealand has shown a dichotomous approach to land-use and environmental conservation to date, 
which has shaped societal attitudes towards biodiversity and the environment. Conservation has 
primarily occurred under government control, on public land reserved exclusively for that purpose. 
Private land has remained dedicated to consumptive, productive and economical uses, with 
prioritisation of the rights of the private property owner (Meuk and Swaffield 2000). Such noticeable 
division between the consumptive resource use and its preservation and conservation is expressed in 
the NZBS (2000), with biodiversity management divided into three discrete categories: resource 
management, conservation management and bio-security management.  
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Given this context, opinion is divided over future conservation policy. Drawing on various social 
concerns, strong support exists for increased government funding of conservation programs and 
extending the public conservation estate; such government provision being the most desirable (or 
only) option for biodiversity conservation (Walker et al., 2009). Supporters of this position question the 
feasibility and integrity of conservation activities by private, commercial entities. This potential antipathy 
is observed in a number of other countries and regions internationally (ten Kate, 2004). An alternative 
view is that private individuals and corporate entities should be more involved in conservation activities 
on public and private land and be able to generate profit to sustain biodiversity conservation. 
Undesirable corporate examples of misuse and damage notwithstanding, successful, exemplary 
conservation and mitigation efforts are increasingly being demonstrated in New Zealand and 
internationally, showing significant potential for growth given an accommodating environment (BBOP, 
2009h; Norton 2009; Crowe and ten Kate 2010; Madsen, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010).  
 
1 .4  NEW ZEALAND’S INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
New Zealand’s biodiversity conservation is domestically significant, yet it is also increasingly important 
New Zealand responds to mounting international recognition of the global threat of biodiversity, driving 
pressure towards improved standards and best practices for biodiversity conservation within the 
international community (MEA 2003; Foxall, Grigg, ten Kate 2005; Bol’shakov, Lushchekina and 
Neronov, 2009; PwC 2010). New Zealand has been involved in several international initiatives on 
biodiversity conservation, originally through the Rio Earth Conference (1992), which formally 
established biodiversity’s importance and contribution to humanity and life on earth, and resulted in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), June 1992 (CBD 1992; eftec IEEP et al., 2010; see also 
Costanza et al., 1997; MEA 2003). This international agreement came into force on the 29th of 
December 2003, with New Zealand ratifying the agreement on the 16th of September that same year. 
New Zealand joins with other nation-states (“Contracting parties”) in recognising: 
“… the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, 
educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components… 
also of the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining systems of 
the biosphere…that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind…that 
States are responsible for conserving their biological diversity and for using their biological resources 
in a sustainable manner…that is vital to anticipate, prevent an attack the causes of significant 
reduction or loss of biological diversity at source…that the fundamental requirement for the 
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conservation of biological diversity is the in-situ conservation of ecosystem and natural habitats and 
the maintenance  and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings… 
determined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity for the benefit of present and future 
generations..”  p. 2 CBD, (1992) 
 
As signatory and party to the convention, New Zealand is bound to address the issues of biodiversity 
loss, recognise social, biological and economic components, and require sustainable use and 
protection (ten Kate 2003a; Foxall, Grigg and ten Kate, 2005; Burgin 2008; BBOP 2009b; Walker, 
Price and Stephenson 2008; Bol’shakov, Lushchekina and Neronov, 2009). The Articles stipulate the 
approaches necessary for achieving the Convention’s ideals, specifically: requirements at an 
organisational and governance level, improving information and monitoring of biodiversity stocks, and 
appropriate processes of conserving these stocks. New Zealand is expected to have mechanisms to 
protect existing values while also increasing areas of protection. Of particular relevance when 
considering offset banking, Article 11 specifies parties must2:  
 
“… adopt economica l ly  and socially sound measures that act as incent ives  for the conservation 
[of biodiversity].” p. 9 CBD (1992) emphasis added 
 
Article 14 requires the use of Impact Assessments to facilitate identification and consequential 
minimisation of adverse impacts from development projects. New Zealand law requires impact 
assessments under the Resource Management Act (RMA)(1991). The Convention’s articles address 
the financial support for biodiversity conservation, recognising that poverty and economic constraints 
represent a major impediment to environmental sustainability and conservation globally. While New 
Zealand does not have poverty and economic inequalities comparative on an international level, these 
provisions emphasise the pivotal influence of the underlying economic context. The NZBS (2000) 
highlighted the economic importance of biodiversity to the New Zealand economy, estimating that New 
Zealand’s biodiversity may be worth more than double the national gross domestic product (GDP)3 and 
reiterating biodiversity’s significant value and the economic relevance of conservation in New Zealand 
(NZBS 2000; Statistics New Zealand 2009 c.f. Costanza et al., 1997).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note also principle 16 from the Rio Declaration (1992) which states that: “National Authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.” Page 35, eftec, IEEP et al., 2010 	  
3 In 1994, the GDP was calculated at NZ$84 billion, with the total value of national biodiversity for that year estimated at NZ$230 billion. NZBS 2000	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Signatories to The Convention are bound to meetings (Conference of the Parties - COP) and to report 
progress in achieving compliance with the Articles. New Zealand has met many aspects of these 
requirements, particularly in comparison to some developing countries. However, The Convention 
includes additional expectations and formally establishes New Zealand’s biodiversity conservation 
obligations in the international political context. New Zealand’s strategies and policies for biodiversity 
conservation must be established with consideration for both international and domestic concerns and 
associated political, social and environmental perspectives. It is firmly within New Zealand’s best 
interests for international relations and reputation to uphold the obligations. Future conservation is 
predicted to become increasingly challenging, involving novel, unexpected and unpredicted pressures, 
so an offset banking system potentially has a role to aid meeting New Zealand’s obligations under the 
CBD, making active consideration and evaluation of offset banking relevant and timely (Crowe and ten 
Kate 2010).  
 
1 .5  PROGRESS UNDER THE CBD 
 
The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (NZBS) was produced in 2000 in order to fulfil part of New 
Zealand's requirements under The Convention on Biological Diversity. It established goals for the 
protection and preservation of national biodiversity, identified a range of actions required to reverse 
biodiversity loss nationally, and promoted sustainable use outside protected areas (MfE 2007). The 
third of its four primary goals4 addressed the need to conserve indigenous biological diversity within a 
comprehensive, representative range of New Zealand's habitats and alongside sustained and fully 
functioning ecosystems.  
 
The NZBS, as a non-statuary document, lacks strength to meaningfully contribute to conservation in 
New Zealand (Walker, Price and Stephenson 2008). It lacks clear or specific targets and specifies few 
measureable criteria to assess whether the range of intended outcomes have been reached.  While 
many of the goals and ideas compiled within the NZBS certainly direct New Zealand conservation 
towards admirable outcomes, this has been seen as amoung the only contribution it makes to the 
issues.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As specified in the NZBS (2000) 	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The CBD stipulates requirements for progress reporting, which the Third National Report on New 
Zealand and The Convention of Biological Diversity (2007) was produced to satisfy. The NZBS 
constitutes a significant basis of this report (MfE 2007). The report details a number of goals and 
targets that New Zealand has not yet reached 5. Given these shortcomings, there is room for 
improvement in New Zealand's efforts to satisfy The Convention.  
 
The 2007 MfE report discusses achievements in meeting requirements such as national-level targets, 
indicators, processes and frameworks legislatively supported for achieving and sustaining conservation 
on public conservation land managed by the Department of Conservation. However, when concerning 
values on private land, the report highlights areas where values are not currently adequately protected 
under current frameworks6. It also fails to provide details of a commensurate level of protection and 
provision relating to private lands when comparing frameworks applicable to those held under the 
public conservation estate.  
 
Requirements under The Convention and subsequent COPs include evidence of increases in the role of 
financial incentives to expand private involvement, and implementation of legislation for the 
development of market and non-market forces. The minimal description of these aspects within the 
report highlights gaps in meeting such requirements. It is in light of this that offsetting and offset 
banking requires closer consideration. Economic structures and financial incentives emphasised by the 
CBD will be of particularly importance in New Zealand, where, as the Report’s government-appointed 
author observes: 
 
“The size of the problem is far greater than the small NZ economy and population can afford” 
p. 171, MfE (2007) 
 
The report states that government funding is the only financial support for The Convention currently 
available, that implementing market-based subsidies is not supported under New Zealand's existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For example, note goal 11, target 2, target 4 as stated in the Report (2007).	  
6 For example, the report notes some difficulty adequately and appropriately accessing conservation on private land, such as Important Plant Areas identified in relation to national aims 
under Target 4 and the protection of 50% of the most important plant areas. 	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policies, and improved spending efficiency and technological advancements are preferred solutions 
(MfE 2007). Offset banking is particularly important to discuss given this context, as a market-based 
mechanism to diversify sources of finance for conservation by directing currently under-accessed 
revenue from the private development sector, and the potential for increased efficiency (Crowe and ten 
Kate 2010) (see Chapter 2 Section 2.1.4).  
 
1 .6  B IODIVERSITY  CONSERVATION AND OFFSETT ING IN  NEW ZEALAND:  CURRENT ROOM 
FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
The Resource Management Act (RMA)(1991) is New Zealand’s primary legislation protecting a diversity 
of environmental values that development on private land may impact and is New Zealand's most 
market-based mechanism available for biodiversity conservation (Jackson and Dickson 2007; Counsell, 
Evans and Mellsop 20107). Under this framework, consent-based offsets have occurred, as well as 
voluntary offsets independent of RMA consent requirements (BBOP 2009c; Norton 2009). There is a 
range of accompanying commentary, within New Zealand and internationally, suggesting that some 
aspects of current process and offset examples are unsatisfactory and require significant improvement 
and highlight potential issues and concerns requiring improved approaches (BBOP 2009c; Christensen 
and Burge 2010). Offset banking can contribute potential solutions to improve offsetting capabilities, 
advancing sustainable development by effectively mitigating negative development and economic 
impacts, and achieving important biodiversity conservation goals.  
 
1 .7  THE FUTURE OF CONSERVATION IN  NEW ZEALAND 
 
The context for New Zealand conservation presented in 21st century is one of unexperienced, rapid 
change. A competitive, fluctuating global economy underpinned by shifting international balances of 
power together with the urgency and pressures of global climate change create novel and significant 
challenges for New Zealand. Increasingly sustainable solutions are required to provide for a growing 
population (Statistics New Zealand 2009). Success requires innovation and pragmatism (Gunningham 
and Young 1997). It is becoming increasingly perilous to allow conservation and economy to compete 
for the limited resources they currently do. The partisan attitude of last century’s conservation efforts 
may require adjustment to a more synergistic approach of sustainable development (Meurk and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See also Brian Eastons’ 1998 analysis (Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010)	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Swaffield 2000). The shift in attitudes likely required, is a considerable hurdle for New Zealand society. 
Nevertheless, such shifts are essential to adopt new approaches presented, and to continue to 
respond to the pressures of both conservation and the wider economic environment, domestically and 
internationally.   
 
As signatories to the CBD, New Zealand is well-advised to follow international directions in focusing on 
the necessity and relevance of engaging commercial sectors in biodiversity conservation8, and 
addressing how the role of market incentives and financial mechanisms are increasingly adopted as 
being vital to environmental conservation on the international stage (Gunningham and Young 1997; 
Bishop et al., 2010). The business and economic issues resulting from continued biodiversity loss are 
of increasing international concern, with documents such as the TEEB (Bishop et al., 2010), and 
increasing business and media commentary, emphasising the importance of meeting biodiversity 
challenges and seriousness of the negative implications that are likely in the absence of action (Bishop 
et al., 2010; Anderson 2010; a; b). Continued access and power in trade, diplomatic relations, and 
New Zealand’s international reputation as a modern, forward moving country are pivotal to the 
geographically distant and export-driven economy. In the 21st century this must be given proper 
prioritisation against domestic concerns for biodiversity conservation and investigate developing an 
offset banking system in this context.  
 
1 .8  THESIS  OUTL INE 
 
This thesis firstly describes the processes and principles by which an offset banking system operates. 
By exploring offset banking systems in New South Wales, Australia and California, United States of 
America, I take these as valuable exemplars supporting the discussion of how optimal system design 
may occur in New Zealand. Observations, analysis and critiques of these examples alongside evaluation 
and consideration of the current discussion within academic literature provide valuable guidance and 
direction for approaches and mechanisms appropriate for a New Zealand scheme (Darbi et al., 2009; 
Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Adopting a system of offset banking requires design of economic 
mechanisms, implemented through policy and regulation (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). It represents a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Decision VIII/17, adopted March 2008 by COP8	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system of sustainable development and economic market-based trading, so appropriate capacity and 
understanding of these concepts is essential and is highlighted in Chapter Two.  
 
The process of designing policy and regulation represents a system of risk mitigation, with successful 
outcomes being a result of adequately mitigating and balancing risk: both risk of biodiversity loss that 
offset banking intends to address, and also risks that manifest from the sustainable development and 
economic approaches involved. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 discuss the distinct yet interdependent risks posed 
by biological systems, finance and economics, and the role of human involvement.  
 
The incorporation of these components - sustainable development, economic market mechanisms and 
risk mitigation - informs the process of offset banking design in New Zealand. Chapter 7 summarises 
the necessary requirements to enable New Zealand to take these directives and apply them to the 
development and implementation of an offset banking system.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS 
 
An international consensus is establishing around the importance and urgency of environmental and 
biodiversity issues, yet the optimal solutions are a source of active debate which sustainable 
development intends to resolve (Mebratu 1998; Dobson 1999; Harding 2006). Policy and regulation 
are required to support offset banking (Crowe and ten Kate 2011). Representative of modern 
environmental management broadly, offset banking occurs within the sustainable development 
paradigm so must be designed based on comprehensively understanding and adopting sustainable 
development principles (Saeed 2004; Hickie 2010; Nelson and Stenman 2007 Hanson 1995; Veld and 
Kraan 1991; Elliot 2009; Martin and ver Beek 2006). The application of economic theory and 
principles is also an inextricable component of credit trading under offset banking policy and so a firm 
foundation of accurate economic knowledge and understanding is necessary:  
 
“Habitat banking is entirely a product of the regulations that establish it, and hence the instrument 
design … and all other factors discussed above can be determined through analysis of optimal 
ecological and economic design.” 
p. 94 eftec, IEEP et al., (2010) emphasis added 
 
In this Chapter, I summarise theories and concepts relevant to establishing appropriate and informed 
the policy and regulation required to operate offset banking. While a system of free-market trading, 
regulation and policy are essential for successful implementation and this requires expert application of 
the economic and sustainable development concepts reviewed in this chapter.  
 
2 .0 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
 
The term sustainable development most popularly originates from the Bruntland Report (Our Common 
Future by the World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 43, Barrow 1995; Mebratu 
1998; Jacobs 1999; Harding 2006; Elliot 2009) that defines sustainable development: 
 
“Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.” p 67 
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This represented a formal recognition that economic systems and their growth must operate within due 
regard to considerations of the environment, in order to maintain both the economy and the 
environment itself, but also human welfare, in a sustainable manner that would provide for the future. 
Over the concept’s development, a variety of interpretations have been taken across academic 
disciplines, social debates and national and international contexts driven by alternate focuses on the 
three aspects - economy, environment and society - and how to both define, implement and achieve 
sustainable development outcomes (Dobson 1999; Jacobs 1999). Sustainable development represents 
an approach to address both the pressures of exponential population growth, and environmental and 
biodiversity degradation to prevent potentially negative future outcomes (Barrow 1995; Rodgers 1996; 
ten Kate 2003a; Daly and Farley 2004; Lloyd 2007). The popularised term has come to be 
represented as a goal, rather than as a process, whereby the resources of the natural, biophysical 
world are utilised in a manner not jeopardising their productive capacity into the future (Redclift 1992; 
Barrow 1995; Gilpin 2000; Elliot 2009).  
 
Sustainability recognises that some patterns of use irreversibly deplete resources, reducing their 
capacity to provide goods and services long term. Long-term provision is possible when resources are 
used sustainably; the inherent capacity for self-renewal and regeneration that characterises these 
resources is not compromised by current patterns of use (Redclift 1992; Barrow 1995; Gilpin 2000; 
Lee 2001). Analogies are drawn with interest and capital: 
 
“Sustainable yield means living off the interest, rather than the capital or stock of a resource.”  
p 90, Gilpin 2000. 
 
The World Bank’s Environmentally Sustainable Development (ESD) Triangle9 depicts the interwoven 
relationship social, economic and ecological systems (Gilpin 2000; Elliot 2009 see also Barrow 1995 
ten Kate 2003a; Ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004). These three systems must be considered 
together to achieve sustainability goals; each must achieve satisfactory individual functioning, but it is 
equally and vitally important that interactions and interdependencies between the systems are 
prioritised and maintained (Elliot 2009). Success or failure of one system in isolation jeopardises 
overall success so policy must respond to the need to balance all three (Harding 2006). Biodiversity 
offsetting and banking is a prime example of sustainable development: offset banking provides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Note also the definition of sustainable development that sees these three aspects as nested/concentric circles, the largest 
being the environment, then the social, then in the smallest centre, the economic (e.g. Mebratu 1998; Statistics New 
Zealand 2009) 
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perpetual protection and promotion of biodiversity resources along with income and occupation for 
current land-holders, without reducing potential benefits from development projects at the present 
time, (Rodgers 1996; Morris et al., 2006; Kiesecker et al., 2009a; Walker et al., 2009).  
 
Recognising links between the economy and society, and society and the environment, has been 
established in many disciplines for some time. Equal recognition of the links between environment and 
economy has been more recent and continues to develop; society’s unease in this integration is a 
familiar process as new ideas emerge (Ekins 1993; Gilpin 2000). As a result, trade-offs which 
sustainable balance requires are not unequivocally endorsed, stemming from conflicting perspectives 
on sustainable development principles. How necessary such tradeoffs are underlies debates over 
proffered benefits (Redclift 1992; Mebratu 1998; Dobson 1999). Sustainable development’s critics 
fundamentally question environmental tradeoffs, generating of much of the broader resistance to 
offsetting.  
 
Without embracing sustainable development, successful adoption of offset banking is unlikely and 
therefore discussions must include consideration of sustainable development as requisite. Arguably, 
sustainable development has emerged tamely in New Zealand government policy, so the necessity of 
understanding and embracing principles of sustainable development is a particularly relevant precursor 
to discussing adopting offset banking in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand 2009; PCE 2010b; 
Browning 2011). Harding (2006) summaries the requirements of policy and institutions for sustainable 
development: 
 
“Beyond these structural arrangements, economic and regulatory drivers also need to facilitate 
decisions in favour of sustainability outcomes. The right price needs to be paid for scarce natural 
resources, but with recognition of and means to treat, possible equity issues.” 
P. 235 Harding (2006) 
 
2 .0 .1 Eco log ica l  modern isat ion and susta inab le  deve lopment  
 
Discussions regarding policy, regulation, the role of government and the achievement of sustainable 
development have been described by Ecological Modernisation Theory (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; 
Fisher and Freudenburg 2001), borne from the social and political awakening to environmental issues 
developed during the 1970s (Barrow 1995; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; Fudge and Rowe 2001). 
	   29	  
Several instrumental international documents recognised the increasingly significant contribution and 
limitations of the biosphere. Publications such as The Bruntland Report, Our Common Future (1987) 
and the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, UNEP and WWF 1980), along with outcomes from the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) helped to establish 
sustainable development and environmentally-responsible governance at the local, regional and 
national level (Barrow 1995; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; Fudge and Rowe 2001; Elliot 2009; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010; Hickie 2010).  In describing The Brandt Report (1980) Barrow (1995) succinctly 
encompasses the importance of the combination between economics and the environment: 
 
“[The Brant Report was] … calling for a ‘new, holistic ethic in which economic growth and 
environmental protection go hand-in-hand.’ That may be one of the most crucial calls made in the 
twentieth century.” p 66 Barrow (1995) 
 
In parallel, Ecological Modernisation Theory concerns how societies, having expanded industrially and 
economically, inevitably recognise environment limitations. This may result in dramatic social, economic 
and/or industrial re-organisation to accommodate ideas of environmental sustainability - economic 
growth at the expense of the environment no longer deemed acceptable10 (Mol and Sonnefeld 2000; 
Editorial 2000; Fisher and Freudenburg 2001; Fudge and Rowe 2001; Loyd 2007). This is 
represented as five key changes or ‘clusters’ directly relating to policies for environmental 
management. Internationally, governments are moving towards policy with an ecologically modern 
framework (e.g. see Young et al. 1996; Elliot 2009), and these clusters provide a framework for the 
policy directions required to achieve sustainable development and a context for offset banking. (Table 
2.1)  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Note the U-Shaped Hypothesis: with initial economic growth human societies will deteriorate their environment to a 
certain point after which social and political reaction will drive pollution control and resource conservation efforts; long-term 
economic growth (as measured by GDP currently) reduces deterioration and lessens per capital environmental impacts 
(Gilpin 2000). Editorial (2000, Geoforum) summarize examples from research which support these observations, such as 
measures of GDP expansion and growth show to de-couple from rates of environmental damage (Sagoff 2007). This 
suggests an observable change in highly industrialised societies such as Germany and Sweden, regarding how their 
development moves towards a manner producing reduced environmental (and by proxy biodiversity) degradation and loss, 
alongside continued economic success. Examples such as these are used to support Ecological Modernization theory 
(Editorial 2000; Fudge and Rowe 2000). 
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Table 2.1 The Five ‘clusters’ of ecological economics. Clusters taken from Mol and Sonnefeld 2000. 
(See also Fisher and Freudenburg 2001; Fudge and Rowe 2001). 
Eco log ica l  
Modern izat ion 
‘c luster ’  
Descr ipt ion 
“Changing role of 
science and technology” 
Greater emphasis is placed on the role on innovation and technological 
advances to achieve environmental sustainability; such developments are 
specifically encouraged and facilitated by parallel processes of ecological 
modernization in government policy and society  
“Increasing importance 
of market dynamics and 
economic agents” 
Inclusion of market-based mechanisms, ideas of economic efficiency, 
entrepreneurial activity and trading principles into policy and institutions 
designed to drive reform. Inclusion of environmental sustainability in 
multiple and varied aspects of industry, economy and society at all stages 
of operation as drivers of increased sustainability. 
“Transformation of the 
role of the nation-state” 
Rather than government and extensive developed bureaucracy managing 
affairs of the environment and industry, these roles are increasingly 
decentralised and participatory, less reliant on bureaucracy and top-down 
control. Developing roles of NGO, environmentalist, industry and community 
groups in environmental regulation. 
“Modification in the 
position, role and 
ideology of social 
movements.” 
Increased role and efficacy of social movements, civil society and cultural 
institutions in decision-making and regulation for environmental reforms.  
“Changing discursive 
practices and emerging 
new ideologies” 
Shift in focus away from a dichotomous division of economic and 
environmental interests, with more focus on collaboration, interdisciplinary 
action and inclusive attitudes towards the two spheres.  
 
 
Contunuing biodiversity decline and suggestions of continually un-checked economic growth highlight 
the difficulties achieving sustainable development (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchinson 1992a;1992b; Elliot 
2009). Commentators question the accuracy of the concepts and the expectation of improved 
envrionmental awarenss and sustainable development (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001). Active civil 
societies and wider socail participation are suggeted to be key to achieving stronger ecological 
modernisation (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001; Fudge and Rowe 2001), and call attention to social and 
cultural apsects of environmental policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   31	  
2.1 ECONOMICS:  AN IMPORTANT ROLE 
 
Reflecting the three components of sustainable development, offset banking is a system of 
conservation, but equally a system of economics. It operates in a context where recognising the 
interdependence of the environment and the economy is increasingly undeniable (MacNeill 1995; 
Mebratu 1998; Hickie 2010; ten Kate 2003a; Darbi et al., 2009).  
 
All biodiversity conservation involves direct and indirect costs. Also, financial driers of economic growth 
and development are most often responsible for biodiversity loss (Ten Kate 2003; Ten kate, Bishop 
and Bayon 2004; PwC 2010; Wissel and Watzold 2010). As instrumental as the economy is in the 
problem, so it must be considered within proposed solutions (Gunningham and Young 1997). It is 
widely promoted (and equally disputed) that environmental problems may be addressed within 
economic frameworks (Hanley and Splash 1993; Gale and Barg 1995; Heal 2000; Gin 2005; Martin 
and ver Beek 2006). The TEEB Report (Bishop et al., 2010) acknowledges this: 
 
“TEEB has assembled much evidence that the economic invisibility of nature’s flows into the economy 
is a significant contributor to the degradation of ecosystems and the loss of biodiversity. This in turn 
leads to serious human and economic costs which are being felt now, have been felt for much of the 
last half-century, and will be felt at an accelerated pace if we continue ‘business as usual.’ ” 
p. 1 Sukhdev (2010) 
 
Economic theory occupies an extensive reach in academic, politics and governance. A diverse range of 
economic tools, mechanisms and systems has been successfully given rise across societies’ history in 
to important achievements and developments. Economics has informed conservation in a variety of 
ways and many argue it is possible to extend such potential and experience and contribute to solving 
current problems of sustainability and biodiversity decline (Gunningham and Young 1997; Heal 2000; 
Ginn 2005; Daily and Ellison 2004; Gale and Barg 1995; Martin and ver Beek 2006; Ring 2010). An 
increasing number of examples demonstrate individuals and businesses successfully solving 
environmental issues and conflicts, using economic market-based mechanisms (Costanza and Daly 
1987; Gale and Barg 1995;  Ginn 2005; Daily and Ellison 2002; Sagoff 2004; van Patten 2009; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010).  Tradable credits and banking are recent developments gaining considerable 
momentum with potential application to a range of environmental challenges (Aguis 2001; Pannell, 
McFarlane and Ferdowsian 2001; Ginn 2005; Sagoff 2004; Godal and Klaassen 2006; Hartig and 
Drechsler 2009; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). 
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Challenges remain in the process of applying economic theory to environmental issues. Increasing 
interaction of economics and ecology brings together experts unfamiliar with each other’s paradigm. 
Disjunction between systems, communication and ideas limits the flow of information necessary to 
support designing and operating optimal systems (Norton 1995). This is one of the major challenges 
facing approaches that combine economics and ecology, and may appear insurmountable. However, 
with increased understanding, knowledge-sharing and trans-disciplinary developments, systems such 
as offset banking have significant potential to address environmental issues (Crowe and ten Kate 
2010).  
 
Economics must be discussed and understood in order to assess how it can contribute, but also 
whether these contributions (and their intrinsic limitations) are capable of satisfying desired goals 
within a context such as biodiversity conservation. To appreciate how economics and biodivestity may 
be intergrated in credit trading under offset banking, it is beneficial to discuss the underlying 
assumptions and premises of economic theory. The instruments of economic theory directly inform, 
rather than replace, policy and regulation, together forming the foundation for any offset banking 
system implemented. 
 
“In practice, there is no strict dichotomy between [regulation and economic] instruments because 
economic instruments rely on a substantial underpinning of government regulation for effective 
implementation. [Tradable permits], for example, incorporate the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of 
market approaches but are supported by a degree of government regulation that reduce the risk of 
systematic breach.” 
p. 276 Gunningham and Young (1997) 
 
2 .1 .1 In troduct ion to  economics 
 
“Today the science of economics is regarded as being concerned with the allocation of resources, 
prices or unprices, between alternative individual and social uses; the distribution of output amoung 
individuals and groups; the ways in which production and distribution change over time; the effiencies 
and inefficiencies of economic systems; and the implications of sustainable development.” 
p. 2 Gilpin (2000) 
 
	   33	  
The economic system is a creation of human society, based upon human conventions, behaviour and 
culture (Gilpin 2000; Daly and Farley 2004). While initially this may suggest it cannot work with non-
human resources such as biodiversity, upon analysis this is one of the strengths of the economic 
model. As a human-created system, it is better designed to deal with those operating under the 
system: humans. A system based on human culture and behaviour, focusing on mediating human 
activities especially environmental impacts, is suggested to succeed where traditional efforts focused 
on controling the (human and natural) environment have been insufficent (Gunningham and Young 
1997; Daly and Farley 2004).  
 
Government decision-making under centralised environmental planning is a product of current 
knowledge and collection capapcities, and associated gaps or inaccuracies (Tullock 1991; Lawton 
2007; Ring 2010). In contrast, those making decisions in an economically-driven system are the 
individuals to whom the benefit ascribes, with superior access to knowledge of their desires, 
preferences and optimal choices for their welbeing, and behave based on this (Hanley and Splash 
1993; Gunningham and Young 1997; Ring 2010). Economists argue this is a superior distribution of 
information; individual, informed decisions are coordinated and aggregated through economic activity 
and the economy’s participants are in the optimal position to contribute to outcomes best serving their 
needs, which is translated to the wider society (Vald and Kraan 1991; Ekins, Hillman and Hutchunson 
1992; Daly and Farley 2004).  
 
2 .1 .2 Economic pr inc ip les :  e f f i c ient  a l locat ion  
 
Fundamentally, economics is a system designed to produce, allocate and distribute; provision is an 
external consideration. An economic system is concerned with the resources society has (both those 
provided by nature and the environment, or created by humans) and achieving the maximum outcome 
possible from the use of these via the most efficient allocation (Gilpin 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; 
Sagoff 2004; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010). Debate exists over what these outcomes should be, 
what society actually desires from these resources and how this may be achieved11, leading to multiple 
branches of economics (Dobson 1999; Anton, Fisk and Holstrom 2000).  
 
In the broadest sense desired outcomes may be defined as allocating resources, and the goods and 
services that they produce, in a manner that members of society most want, achieving the maximum 
level of  ‘welfare’ or ‘satisfaction’ and leaving the smallest gap possible between current allocation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note three categories of efficiency in Gilpin 2000; Also note Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010 - see footnote 10. 
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what is wanted or needed (Daly and Farley 2004; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010). This is the basis 
for efficacy, central to economics. Efficiency is achieved when the distribution of resources (goods, 
services, environmental, natural and human-made commodities) is such than no other distribution 
would make anyone better off, without making someone worse off, or that all ‘win-win’ opportunities are 
exploited12 (Gilpin 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Heal 2000; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010). This 
achieves maximal ‘welfare’ possible in contextual parameters (predominantly a function of the kind and 
amount of resources available). It is important to recognise that this does not consider the equity of 
this distribution; whether everyone has the same  (or the ‘right’) amount of such goods and services or 
if the resources are distributed in a way that is fair, just, allows access to all, or provides for the future 
generation. This approach only considers maximum welfare as an aggregation of individuals being 
satisfied (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Anton 2000; Fisk 2000; Light 2000; Sagoff 2004; 
Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010). Current global concern for biodiversity resources is one reflection 
of the dissatifaction in the manner the environment is allocated under exsisting economic sysytems, 
and a failure to arrive at the desired biodiversity outcomes (Anton, Fisk and Holstrom, 2000; Light 
2000; Hanna and Munasinghe 1995; Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey 2007; Harris 2007; Shields 
2008).  With these inadequacies in mind, new approaches and interactions between economy, society 
and the environment are sought.  
 
2 .1 .3 A new,  economic ,  perspect ive for  conservat ion  
 
The basis of economics - the pursuit of efficiency - contrasts with how environmental and biodiversity 
conservation has commonly been approached in the past (Gilpin 2000; Anton 2000; Daly and Farley 
2004). Discourse on social justice, equality, intergenerational equality, liberalism, socialism, welfare 
and human rights in the management of the environment, are seen to be relevant given the essential, 
life-supporting function of the environment (Dobson 1999; Anton 2000; Fisk 2000). The consensus 
comes from diverse origins, but for most, the environment and its values are viewed as intrinsically 
valuable in their own right, from their very existence, independent of any benefit or interaction and so 
value is placed on areas of nature being maintained as pristine or un-modified. As all humans benefit 
from biodiversity and the environment, it is important to ensure it can be enjoyed freely by all, without 
threat of removal (Costanza and Daly 1987; Einkin, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Costanza et al., 
1997; Joahnsson-Stenman 1998; Anton 2000; Beder 2000; Fisk 2000; MEA 2003; Donald 2003; 
Sagoff 2004; Doremus 2006; Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey, 2007; Muller 2007). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Specifically, this is Pareto Efficiency (Daly and Farley 2004; Gilpin 2000). See the GLOSSARY 
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The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy demonstrates significant non-use values in the New Zealand 
context, stating that:  
“Apart from the value of biodiversity in sustaining our present quality of life, to many people 
biodiversity has intrinsic value — the value of the variety of life in itself. As mentioned above, for 
Maori, indigenous biodiversity is an integral aspect of their world-view, and they have a special role and 
responsibilities as kaitiaki13 of our indigenous biodiversity. The responsibility of humans towards other 
living things and our obligations to future generations provide a strong moral basis for their 
conservation and underlie the requirements in the Convention on Biological Diversity.” 
p. 4 NZBS (2000) 
 
Much of New Zealand’s environmental protection has focused on ensuring these ‘intrinsic’ benefits are 
protected for reasons completely unrelated to money and the economy, favouring preservation and 
conservation over alternative, economically productive land uses as required.  Reflecting an egalitarian 
and democratic society, equality and social justice strives for the provision of environmental benefits to 
all of the current and future generations. Because everyone stands to benefit, the environment and 
biodiversity should not be the domain of a limited few. This has supported the majority of conservation 
in New Zealand occurring under government ownership, funding and management.  
 
Traditional efficiency-based economics operates independently to the environment’s intrinsic value and 
value to all of society, for which it has been criticised (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Anton, Fisk 
and Holstrom 2000; Light 2000; Sagoff 2004). Unrealistic expectations may preordain such 
dissatisfaction and criticism. Broader understanding of the functional potential and limitations of 
economics holds the key to addressing these issues. Economics may not offer universal solutions - 
rather it provides specific mechanisms to address specific issues. Failure to understand the constraints 
and conditions necessary for smooth functioning will limit what economics can offer. Increased 
interdisciplinary collaboration will support optimal application of economics to environmental issues and 
the realisation of the possible benefits that economics can offer.  
 
To adopt more ‘ecologically modern’ approaches such as offset banking, differences between economic 
theory and existing conservation paradigms must be reconciled. Economics may prove inappropriate in 
some situations but the magnitude of current trends in biodiversity loss cannot be ignored. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Maori term for ‘guardian’, p. 2 NZBS 2000  
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discipline may hold the key to valuable solutions but this will only possible if it is given proper 
consideration. It is for this reason that a consensus on the role of economic ideas is necessary to 
accompany New Zealand’s discussion of offset banking. Applying economics to the environment is an 
approach still being refined. It should not be viewed as comparable to, replacing, or superior to 
established paradigms of government-directed, socially-focused conservation, but as an alternative 
system, to be assessed under a different, framework of economics - principally, efficiency (Crowe and 
ten Kate 2010).  
 
2 .1 .4 Ef f ic ient  b iod ivers i ty  conservat ion 
 
Offset banking uses economics to achieve efficient allocation of land and money for conservation to 
achieve sustainable use of biodiversity (Gunningham and Young 1997; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010 e.g. 
Hartig and Drechsler 2009).  Efficiency is achieved when conservation would not occur any better 
under another process, than under offset banking. This may be financial efficiency, whereby, if the 
same amount of money could produce more conservation through an alternative or parallel 
conservation program (for example a national park system), then offset banking is not optimally 
efficient (Gunningham and Young 1997; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). 
 
Similarly, conservation is spatially efficient where conservation is conducted at locations whereby the 
maximum amount of biodiversity can be conserved based on finances allocated (Polasky et al., 2008; 
Hartig and Drechsler 2009). Certain locations in a landscape are more costly to conserve due to direct 
costs imposed by the input requirements of the specific site, or indirect opportunity costs realised as a 
result of forgoing other land-uses to pursue conservation (Polasky et al. 2008; Hartig and Drechsler 
2009).  
 
A successful offset banking system will achieve maximum conservation for given financial inputs, by 
locating biodiversity conservation efficiently in a landscape, and establishing the optimal price for 
biodiversity conservation (Gunningham and Young 1997). To achieve this, the right economic 
mechanisms, mediated via regulations, must be designed (Gunningham and Young 1997; Hartig and 
Drechsler 2009). This is explored further in Chapter 5. 
 
It is critical to understand that efficiency is the primary function of offset banking. Great care must be 
taken to ensure this is properly recognised, and that the achievement of efficient biodiversity 
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conservation does not automatically work against the requirement for biologically, environmentally or 
socially appropriate conservation at the same time. It is for this reason that offset banking must 
operate in a context of a multi-dimensional conservation framework, with a variety of mechanisms 
allowing biodiversity to respond to desires that biodiversity be efficient, but also just, equitable, 
comprehensive and precautionary (Gunningham and Young 1997; Hartig and Drechsler 2009; Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010). 
 
2 .1 .5 .  A l locat ion through the co-ord inat ion o f  ind iv idua l  cho ice 
 
Economics is based on the idea that society is made up of individuals, and if each can achieve their 
own satisfaction (and they are the ones in the best position to do this) then in aggregation, this will 
achieve it for society as a whole (Holstrom 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Sagoff 2004; Counsell, Evans 
and Mellsop 2010). Greatest ‘satisfaction’ or ‘welfare’ is achieved when maximal benefit is achieved at 
least possible cost to that individual, or at least a cost commensurate to the ensuing benefit. Through 
mechanisms of price, trade, and exchange within a free-market it is intended that individuals will make 
informed choices based on the balance of costs and benefits, thereby achieving their own satisfaction 
(Heal 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Sagoff 2004)14.  
 
“The logic behind this [tradable permit] approach is rather simple. In a perfectly competitive market, 
permits flow towards their highest valued use. Those that would receive lower value from using the 
permits (due to higher costs, for example) have an incentive to trade them to someone who would 
value them more. The trade benefits both parties. The seller reaps more from the sale than she could 
from using the permit, and the buyer gets more value form the permit than he pays for it.” 
p. 200 Tietenberg (2003) 
 
Economic systems use the consolidation/agglomeration of individual choice and satisfaction as 
achieving benefits on a society-wide scale, and therefore maximum possible ‘welfare’ and ‘satisfaction’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 There is an extensive body of literature concerned with how the concepts of human welfare, satisfaction, happiness and 
economic participation are considered within economics; argument suggests it is incomplete or inappropriate. For example 
see: Hanley and Splash 1993; Bockstael et al., 2000; Sagoff 2004; Ackerman, Heizerling and Massey 2007; Daly 2007; 
Johansson-Stenman 1998; Jorgensen, Jamieson and Martin 2010; Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1992; Binswanger 2006; 
Dean 2007; Dodds 1997; Ahuvia 2008; Chapin III et al., 2000 
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(Heal 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010)15. For this to occur, costs and 
benefits must be aligned in support (Ring 2010).    
 
2 .1 .6 Costs  and benef i ts  
 
Alignment occurs when individuals benefiting pay costs associated with reaping such benefits, and 
those who bear costs to provide these, can take some direct benefit in return (Heal 2000). Within 
offset banking, those profiting from degrading biodiversity (via profitable land-uses possible only after 
some level of biodiversity reduction) pay costs associated, by purchasing credits. As will be described 
in later chapters, these costs reflect what is required to sustain the benefits to society, whose members 
share none of the direct profit from the changed land use, but suffer loss from biodiversity reduction. 
Offset banking also provides a framework where those who provide benefit to society by preserving, 
restoring, protecting or enhancing biodiversity generate monetary benefit directly from these actions, 
so aligning benefit with the costs involved (Gunningham and Young 1997; Ring 2010). When costs and 
benefits are aligned, individuals are able, indeed expected, to make choices that maximise benefits and 
minimise costs, with economics supporting this across society as a whole (Gilpin 2000; Heal 2000; 
Daly and Farley 2004; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010).  
 
It is fundamental to appreciate the role and mobilisation of individual choice through economic systems 
such as trading under offset banking. It is a process where biodiversity conservation occurs because it 
is in the best interest of the individual, rather than through coercion previously applied through 
regulation, taxation or other mechanisms (Gunningham and Young 1997; Nelson and Sharman 2007; 
Hartig and Drechsler 2009). Consequently, if costs and benefits are misaligned then an individual’s 
best interest may not align with the interests of the overall system, so failing to provide desired societal 
benefits, such as biodiversity conservation (Hartig and Drechsler 2009).  
 
“A system of tradable property rights or credits offers significant potential for harnessing individual 
action to conserve biodiversity on private land, while providing the incent ive and income to do it.” 
p. 493 Agius (2001) emphasis added 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For an overview of opposition to traditional economic welfare, satisfaction and the assumptions of aggregated individual 
choice, see Sagoff 2000, 2004. 
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Understanding the pivotal role of costs, benefits and incentives for individual choices (and limitations 
consequently associated) may represent a departure from established conservation approaches (Ginn 
2005). It is for this reason that design of economic instruments is so influential, requiring the support 
of comprehensive economic knowledge. Inadequate regard for economics and its relevant capacities 
and limitations may be a source of disillusionment and dissatisfaction with offset banking, potentially 
leading to failure.  
 
2 .1 .7 The ro le  o f  pr ice 
 
Costs and benefits are closely related to prices and valuation, as the price of a good or service has 
direct implications for how its costs and benefits are viewed by individuals (Heal 2000). Properly 
aligning costs and benefits requires understanding and consideration of price and value in economics. 
Prices are conventionally expressed in monetary terms, with increases in money equating to increased 
benefit (Heal 2000). Credit trading within offset banking involves monetary pricing of biodivesity 
credits, which requires appreciation of how economic pricing and valuation works. Detailed analysis of 
the influences and interactions of consumer supply, producer demand and price within the economic 
market equation are beyond the scope of this discussion. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise 
that the price of a good or service is determined by the supply and demand for that good or service16 
(Gilpin 2000; Heal 2000; Daly and Farley 2004).   
 
As price represents the present balance between supply and demand, it provides a common platform 
for individuals to communicate the many aspects of valuation an individual may consider, so that goods 
and services may be traded under a common currency (Daly and Farley 2004). Price is taken to reflect 
value as highly beneficial goods and services are deemed to have high value. The higher an item is 
valued, as a function of the benefit obtained, the more individuals are willing pay for that item, 
increasing the market price as people are expected to pay more for things they demand (or prefer) 
more of (Hanley and Splash 1993; Heal 2000). It is most efficient to allocate items to those who 
benefit most greatly from them, as indicated by their willingness to pay a higher price for them (Daly 
and Farley 2004; Sagoff 2004). In real-world markets, the interaction between price, valuation, supply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “If demand for a good exceeds its supply, then its price rises, strengthening incentives to produce it. Conversly should 
supply of a good exceed the demand for it, then its price will fall, leading to less incentive for its production. If an input to 
production is scarce, then its price will rise, directing producers to both economise on its use and also to develop 
sustitutues.” p. 24 Heal (2000) 
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and demand is significantly more complex(Hanley and Splash 1993), yet this description is a useful 
starting point.  
 
2.1.8 Va luat ion 
 
Value of biodiversity, like all goods and services, has variously been estimated through association with 
financial returns surrounding its use, preservation or restoration (Heal 2000; O’Riordan and Stoll-
Keehmann 2002; Sagoff 2004; Ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Daily and Ellison 2005; Ginn 2005; 
van Patten 2009). This form of money-centred value is how other economically traded goods and 
services are categorised. Attaching dollar values to the environment and its many facets has occupied 
much economic research and literature (Hanley and Splash 1993; Mebratu 1998; Chapin III et al., 
2000; Gilpin 2000; Daily and Ellison 2002; Martin and ver Beek 2006) 
 
Two forms of value may be distinguished: value in trade being the money that biodiversity may be 
exchanged for (or could be purchased for); alternatively, value based on the importance the owner 
places on their use of biodiversity - referred to as non-use values (Hanley and Splash 1993; Donald 
2003; Sagoff 2004). It is assumed that trade with the free-market will align these values and the 
exchange value will equate to use and non-use values and be reflected as a market price (Heal 2000).  
 
Value judgements incorporate multiple influences, particularly when concerning the numerous 
components and aspects of biodiversity (Gilpin 2000; Day-Rubenstein and Frisvold 2001; Darbi et al., 
2009). For example, a tree may be important because of the money that the wood can be sold for, or 
the habitat it provides to birds that are important to recreationalists such as bird-watchers. The 
landscape values that the forest of trees contributes to may be valued by local communities for 
aesthetic values; by local tourisms operators generating income from tourists who consider the 
landscape important enough to travel to view, or for soil and water conservation benefits provided to 
downstream communities. The tree may provide fruit that is culturally significant to indigenous groups, 
or down-slope landowners may generate income from land-use possible because of the erosion-
prevention properties of the tree’s roots (Costanza et al., 1997; Heal 2000). For added complexity, 
there are those who advocate that as humans, all individuals derive some psychological, spiritual or 
emotional benefit from being close and having access to pristine natural ecosystems or components of 
those systems. Further, this benefit may even be derived from the mere knowledge that they exist, 
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irrespective of physical proximity. (Housman 1992; Costanza et al., 1997; Chapin III et al., 2000; Gipin 
2000; Agius 2001; Sagoff 2004; Lucht 2007). 
 
The variety of influences on valuation of biodiversity and other environmental components has resulted 
in a number of alternative methods to capture these in market prices. For example: costs to replace or 
recreate biodiversity values removed; costs to find human-made substitutions to provide the same 
benefit; financial losses that may result in the absence of biodiversity; the money that may be directly 
generated through various ‘uses’ of biodiversity (such as food, shelter, tourism etc.); and the financial 
representation of the benefit derived from biodiversity, have been used to define prices17 (Hanley and 
Splash 1993; Day-Rubenstein and Frisvold 2001; Daily and Ellison 2002; Ginn 2002; Heal 2005; 
Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey 2007). There has been much discussion as to the accuracy, 
limitations and appropriateness of these approaches (Costanza et al., 1997; Daily and Ellison 2002; 
O’Riordan and Stol-Kleemann 2002; Sagoff 2004; Martin and ver Beek 2006; Ackerman, Heinzerling 
and Massey 2007). Offset banking establishes a price for biodiversity through a composite of 
influences, specifically appropriate to the context of credit trading, (see Chapter 5, section 5.4.1 - 2).   
 
Valuation of nature expressed as a common price and determined by supply and demand of resources 
by individuals is the foundation of economic markets, and tradable credits in biodiversity. These are the 
mechanisms that coordinate economic efficiency. Consequently, economic markets have been charged 
by some as inadequately allocating environmental resoucres such as biodiversity (Ekin, Hillmand and 
Hutchison 1993; Anton, Fisk and Holstrom 2000; Agius 2001) This situation has been related to the 
way biodiversity is valued through pricing or lack of pricing of resources, and how demand and supply 
is able to allocate environmental resources such as biodivesity to achieve sustainable use (Housman 
1992; Hanley and Splash 1993; Costanza et al., 1997; Mebratu 1998; Gilpin 2000; Riordan and Stoll-
Keehmann 2002;  Sagoff 2004; Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey 2007; Christensen 2007; Darbi et 
al., 2009). As such, management of biodiversity via economic mechaninsms, requires proper 
understanding and regard for the role of price and valuation (Aguis 2001).  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For example see Costanza et al., 1997, and reviews. 
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2.2  ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 
 
Concepts described above (efficency, allocation, costs, benefits, pricing, valuation and individual 
choices) establish the basis of economics, however modern economic theory has divided into a number 
of branches, reflecting different perspectives relating to how economics may be developed to better 
serve societies interests (Costanza and Daly 1987; Ekins, Hillmand and Hutchison 1992; Daly 1997; 
Mc Daniel 2007; Ackerman, Heinzerling and Massey 2007; Muller 2007). Environmental economics 
applies economic principles to include environmental resources into markets, where previously external 
to established economic systems. Economic principles so allocate resources as efficiently as other 
goods and services, and (with appropriate cavetes) supporting conservative use (Gilpin 2000; Hanley 
and Splash 1993 also Sheilds 2008). From this, ecological economics focuses on achieving production 
and resource allocation in a sustainable manner (Costanza and Daly 1987; Daly and Farley 2004; 
Muller 2007). Traditional economics considers the environment an internal component of the economic 
system, providing resources and absorbing wastes around which the economy may expand 
exponentially. Ecological economics instead consideres the economy a component bound within a finite 
environment. The economy therefore has the potential to grow to a size that overwhelms the confines 
of the environment, restricting resource flow and waste absorption, and inevitably causing both 
environmental and economic collapse (Daly and Farley 2004; Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993) (See 
Figure 2.1) 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Two perspectives on the environment and the economy. Left: traditional economic 
perspective. Right: ecological economic perspective. Broken lines represent bounds of the 
environmental system; solid lines represent the bounds of the economic system. Black arrows denote 
economic expansion. Smaller grey arrows represent flows of resources from the environment to the 
economy, and flows of wastes from the economy to the environment. Based on figures 2.1 (page 18), 
2.3 (page 22) and 3.2 (page 51), Daly and Farley 2004 
The	  Environment	  The	  economy	  	  
Waste	  and	  resource	  flows	  	  Waste	  and	  resource	  flows	  	  The	  environment	  
The	  economy	  	  
	   43	  
 
Ecological Economics argues that traditional concepts fail to recognise these environmental limits, or 
consider the long-term provision of efficient allocation (Costanza and Daly 1987; Ekins, Hillman and 
Hutchinson 1993; Anton, Fisk and Holstrom, 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Christensen 2007; Muller 
2007). Traditional efficiency is about achieving the maximum under current conditions and so arguably 
disregards provision in the future. The finite nature of environmental resources requires recognition 
that certain patterns of use cause irreversible depletion, halts essential provision of goods and 
services, and compromises future provision (Costanza and Daly 1987; Daly and Farley 2004; Sagoff 
2007; Llyod 2007; Daly 2007; Bishop et al., 2010). Drawing on research, The Living Planet Report 
2000, by UNEP and the World Wildlife Fund finds that: 
 
“[The 1997] ecological footprint of the Earth’s population was at least 30% higher than the Earth’s 
biological reproductive capacity. This deficit is made up by consuming or drawing down natural capital, 
thus ‘borrowing from’ or perhaps ‘robbing’ the future.” 
p. 35 Daly and Farley 2004. 
 
Given the apparent speed of depletion and predicted consequences of complete resource exhaustion 
(opinions range from challenging to catastrophic) traditional economic efficiency is no longer 
considered optimal for managing natural resources, including biodiversity (Saeed 2004; Sagoff 2004; 
Daly and Farley 2004). Yet production and distribution may continue indefinitely if the system is 
constrained to maintain the system’s productive capacity, and voids depleting underlying resource 
stocks (Daly and Farley 2004). This is more aligned with environmental perspectives desiring 
sustainable development and providing for future generations. It requires establishing new parameters 
for economic growth with increasing focus on sustainable use of biodiversity.  
 
Introducing a system of tradable credits through offset banking imposes financial constraints to 
development, intending to restrict economic expansion to that not jeopardising long-term biodiversity 
provision. Expanding ecological economics hopes to contribute to designing economic mechanisms 
within offset banking systems, and offer mechanisms to achieve sustainable development.  
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2.3 ECONOMIC  EFF IC IENCY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN  NEW ZEALAND 
 
The Resource Management Act (RMA) (1991) is the basis for applying biodiversity offsets in New 
Zealand and seeks to achieve efficient allocation of biodiversity resources via market-based 
mechanisms (as opposed to central planning) to mitigate negative effects of resource use18 (Grundy 
and Gleeson 1996; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010). The RMA recognises three forms of 
efficiency19: Static efficiency is divided into allocative efficiency intending to achieve maximal net benefit, 
and productive efficiency that intends maximum output for a given resource input. The third form is 
dynamic efficiency: allocation that maximises benefits into the future through efficient investment and 
innovation.  
 
The increasing importance given to dynamic efficiency and sustainable development to provide for 
future generations is expressed in “Measuring New Zealand’s Progress using a Sustainable 
Development Approach” (Statistics New Zealand 2009). Here, efficient resource use is identified as a 
desired outcome, and sustainable development for New Zealand is defined as: 
 
“… development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development means ensuring that well-being is at 
least maintained over time. The principle of fairness within and between present and future generations 
should be taken into account in the use of environmental, economic, and social resources. Putting 
these needs into practice requires living within the limits of the natural environment.” 
p. 7, Statistics New Zealand (2009) 
 
New Zealand's desire to prioritise sustainable development and efficient resource use is also 
demonstrated in the RMA: 
 
“A position that maximises welfare, or equivalently the net benefit to society, is one that achieves 
economic efficiency.” 
Section 7(b) RMA, p. 5 Cousell, Evans and Mellsop (2010) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See http://www.mfe.govt.nz/rma/index.html (accessed 18/06/2011). 
19 C.f. three categories of efficiency in Gilpin 2000 “Productive efficiency, in which the output of goods and services is being 
provided for the least cost; allocative efficiency in which resources are being  allocated for the production of goods and 
services the community requires; and distributional efficiency, in which output is distributed in such a way that consumers 
would not wish … to spend their income in any other way…” page 9 
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Therefore, adopting sustainable development and economically efficient mechanisms has been 
established as a necessary and desirable focus for New Zealand’s future environmental management 
and biodiversity conservation (Grundy and Gleeson 1996; Jackson and Dickson 2007). Importantly, this 
establishes a suitable context within which a system such as offset banking may be developed.  
 
2 .4 SUMMARY:  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMICS  
 
Offset banking requires policy and regulation based on sustainable development and ecological 
modernization (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Given such context, offset banking intends to achieve 
biologically, economically and socially beneficial outcomes together. Without recognition of the 
integration required between economics, biology and society, and the tradeoffs made under 
sustainable development, policy and regulation for offset banking is likely to remain contentious and 
limited in its success. The right policy and regulation promotes optimal functioning in terms of 
conservation and economic viability (Gunningham and Young 1997). Robust understanding of both 
biodiversity and the economics behind market mechanisms are required; concepts the chapter 
describes must retain central focus within offset banking discussions. Economics has a pivotal role yet 
the path of continued exploration and understanding, and development of novel approaches, naturally 
attracts scrutiny and debate. With interaction and collaboration amongst the diverse disciplines towards 
comprehensive distribution of economic knowledge, the potential of economic approaches may be 
realized. Rather than be limited by constraints and instead apply and optimize the economic discipline, 
a comprehensive biological basis must be matched by proper regard for a firm understanding of 
economic theory, as a basis for all sustainable development intending to conserve biodiversity.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
BACKGROUND TO OFFSET BANKING:  BANKING IN CALIFORNIA AND  
NEW SOUTH WALES 
 
3 .0  OFFSET BANKING IN  CONTEXT 
 
To discuss devloping New Zealand offset banking, it is firstly important to understand scheme 
components within a broader biodiversity conservation context. Offset banking history and 
developments provide nessary background, expanded here by two case-study examples and 
applied as a basis for discussion within this thesis; specifically, Californian and New South 
Wales banking systems. Examples are used to demonstrate and analyse the practical 
application of offset banking concepts (Hartig and Drechsler 2009) 20. These case-studies are 
a learning resource, providing New Zealand with insight to inform the development of policy, 
regulation, risk management and mitigation. They highlight the advantages and disadvantages 
of design and implementation decisions (Brown and Lant, 1999; Agius, 2001; Nelson and 
Sharman 2007;  Burgin 2008; Carroll, 2008; Darbi et al., 2009; Davis 2009). In this chapter I 
provide a descriptive overview of the components of an offset banking scheme, drawing on 
how these are applied in exsisitng systems within California and New South Wales. 
 
3 .0 .1 The nature o f  the o f fset  bank ing system:  some genera l  
pr inc ip les 
 
The IEEP identifies banking systems as a form of environmental impact offsetting, specifically: 
 
“This project defines habitat banking as: A market where the credits from action with beneficial 
biodiversity outcomes can be purchased to offset the debit from environmental damage. 
Credits can be produced in advance of, and without ex-ante links to, the debits they 
compensate for, and stored over time.” 
p. 9 eftec, IEEP et al., (2010) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Around the world, many schemes have been or are, being developed and as a result, many terms are used to refer to 
these market-based offsets for examples of different terms see: Chomitz, Thomas and Brandao, 2004; Brown and Lant, 
1999; Agius, 2001; Burgin 2008; PwC 2010; eftec IEEP et al., 2010). This thesis uses the term offset banking as an 
encompassing term for all compensation or mitigation-realted enrionmental credit trading systems. For additional 
defintitions used in this thesis see the GLOSSARY 
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Offset banking schemes may operate on a local, regional, or national level based upon a 
common framework: credtis are genrated (or supplied) by regulating bodies granting tradable 
credits in recognition of identifyable, positive conservation actions (Agius 2001; Nelson and 
Sharman 2007; Wissel and Watzold 2010). Concurrently, those undertaking activities which 
result in negative environmental outcomes (e.g. land development such as subdivision, 
resource extraction, infrastructure building) are required to purchase these credits. This 
represents the demand within the system (Aguis 2001; Wissel and Watzold 2010). Credit trade 
between suppliers and project prponents functions as mitigation for unavoidable environmental 
impacts of a project (Albert and Wenzel 1996; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Mead 
2005;Darbi 2009; Wizzel and Watzold 2010; Moilanen et al., 2008). Financial returns from 
credits are structured to provide an income stream enabling perpetual protection and active, 
on-going management of the environmental values (Aguis 2001; Burgin 2008; Darbi et al., 
2009; EDO 2008c; 2010a). The overall system of trading credits is intended to produce a 
cumulative long-term outcome for the envrionment or biodiversity of a region; no-net-loss and 
net spatio-temporal gain are popular but not universal objectives.   
 
Whether such overall or long-term outcomes are possible, in theory or practice, is the source 
of much debate (McElfish and Nicholas 1996; Redmond et al.,  1996; Aguis 2001; Spieles, 
Coneybeer and Horn 2006; Hartig and Drechsler 2009; Palmer and Filoso 2009; van Patten 
2009; Walker et al., 2009; Bekessy 2010; Maron et al., 2010). There is also debate 
surrounding how varrious design features can be modified to better achieve market and 
conservation goals, and respond to broader societal concerns (Agius 2001; Shabman, Scodari 
and King 1996; Bekessy et al., 2010). Discussions presented here are not intended as 
arguments for or against offset banking or acceptability of offsetting overall; I consider instead 
the conditions undder which offset banking may or may not work. This importantly parallells 
wider societal, political and scientific debate discussing how economic activity, development 
impacts and the environment are best managed.  
 
Discussing offset banking system must consider opperational contexts (Aguis 2001; P Martin 
Pers. Comm. 2010). Many challenges face sustainable development and successful 
biodiversity conservation; credit trading mechanisms should be viewed as one approach. 
Numerous advantages are possible yet offset banking needs to be discussed in light of a suite 
of approaches required to address worldwide environmental concerns (Marsh et al., 1996; 
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McElfish and Nicholson 1996; Albrecht and Wenzel 1996; Doremus 2003; ten Kate 2009; 
Hartig and Drechsler 2009; Ring et al., 2010; Wissel and Watzold 2010). Offset banking policy, 
regulation and risk management mechanims offer specific biodiversity conservation outcomes. 
Additional desired outcomes may be best addressed through other approaches at various 
organisational levels, to complement offset banking (Gunningham and Young 1997). Literature 
extensively supports addressing overall biodiversity and environmental conservation through 
multiple, interactive and complementary approaches at a wide range of spacio-temporal scales 
(Ostrom 1999; Moran and Ostrom 2005; Burke 2001; Yang et al., 2009; Dietz et al., 2003). 
This important point is reiterated in later chapters, in particular when considering offset 
banking regulation and policy.  
 
3 .0 .2 Of fset  bank ing as a form of  b iod ivers i ty  o f fset ing 
 
Environmental and biodiversity offsets encompass a number of approaches based on 
principles of the economic market.  The intention is for development project operations to be 
brought into alignment with impacts on broader social and environmental values and 
associated costs. Offsetting represent attempts to internalise these costs by the body profiting 
from the environments’ exploitation and a mechanism whereby some of the previously private 
returns from the impacts can be directly focused back to biodiversity conservation (Goldman-
Carter and McCallie 1996; Aguis 2001; Saeed 2004; Burgin 2008; Curnow and Fitz-Gerald, 
2006; Bedward et al., 2009; Darbi et al., 2009; Suvantola 2009; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
Importantly, finance from these previously marginal sources supports the protective 
preservation of biodivese areas, but also generates funding to sustain the active management 
required increasingly recognised as essential to reach conservation goals unlikely to be 
acheived through preservation alone (Wilson et al., 2007). Such compensatory and mitigation 
approaches are referred to as biodiversity or environmental offsetting; a broad, umbrella term 
under which offset banking sits (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
Leading international research, consultation and best-practice development group Business 
and Biodiversity Offsets Program, (BBOP) define biodiversity offsets as21:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See also Pricewaterhouse Cooper (2010); eftec, IEEP et al., (2010) 
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“measurable conservation outcomes resulting from actions designed to compensate for 
significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project development after 
appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been taken. The goal of biodiversity 
offsets is to achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of biodiversity on the ground with 
respect to species composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and 
cultural values associated with biodiversity.” 
p. 8, BBOP (2009c) 
 
Given the variety of development projects and numerous environmental locations, each offset 
has unique characteristics (BBOP 2009; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010; Wissel and 
Watzold 2010). Each is specifically designed to the conditions of the project site, nature of 
impacts and values concerned. Conservation actions are designed specific to the contextual 
conditions. Many complex decisions must be made before either the development project or 
compensatory habitat can be successfully implemented. (Ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
Hallwood, 2007; Drechsler and Watzold 2008; Kieseker et al., 2009; BBOP 2009). Offset 
principles have been developed, such as those by BBOP or Norton (2009), that bring together 
and formalise the aims and objectives of implementing offsets. These provide a framework of 
how offsetting may be used to achieve optimal outcomes (see Appendix One: The Priniciples of 
Biodiveristy Offsetting) (Marsh, Sokolove and Rhodes 1996; ten Kate Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
Foxall Grigg and ten Kate 2006; see also Salzman and Rhul 2000; Wissel and Watzold 2010; 
PwC 2010). 
 
3 .1 H ISTORICAL ORIG INS OF OFFSET BANKING CONCEPTS 
 
For a number of years, independent offsetting projects have been implemented around the 
world, on various scales and with a broad range of characteristics (Marsh et al., 1996; ten 
Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Blundel 2006; Bedward et al., 2009; Darbi et al., 2009; Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010; Madsen, Carroll and Moore-Brands 2010; PwC 2010). These direct 
compensation and mitigation ideas led to the development of the banking concept, with the 
pioneering approaches being seen in the United States with wetland mitigation development 
(Marsh et al., 1996; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Blundell et al., 2006; Burgen et a. 
2008; Mead 2008;  Darbi eta l., 2009). The Mitigation Banking system currently operating in 
California and other parts of the United States constitutes the oldest and most established 
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environmental banking system (Memon and Skelton 2004; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 
2006). In response to public concern for the environment in the 1970s, momentum for 
enhanced protection of valuable natural habitat culminated in the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1972, known as the ‘Clean Water Act’ (CWA). This was the first piece of federal 
legislation that placed restrictions on the draining, degradation or development of wetland 
areas (McElfish and Nicholas 1996; Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses et al.  2001; 
Mead 2008).  
 
In order to obtain a permit allowing these actions, applicants must demonstrate that their 
project would result in no overall loss of wetland function or area; a requirement met through 
approved mitigation actions onsite or elsewhere (USEPA, undated; Committee on Mitigating 
Wetland Losses et al. 2001; USFWS Memo Guidance Calif. 2003; Wilkinson and Thompson 
2006; Environmental Law Institute 2007; Mead 2008; USWFS 2009). This requirement led to 
adoption of numerous mitigation projects, occurring independently and conducted directly by 
the developers causing the damage (hence the term ‘permittee-responsible mitigation’). 
Consequently, mitigation areas were commonly protected, enhanced or re-created in very small 
areas adjacent to the damaged wetland, selected by the developers themselves (USEPA, 
undated; Albrecht and Wenzel 1996; Race and Fonseca 1996; Lawhead 1997; Spieles 2005; 
Environmental Law Institute 2007; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Mead 2008; Darbi et al., 2009; 
EPA 2010).  
 
By the mid 1990s much criticism had been directed towards the overall environmental 
outcomes from this approach (De Weese 1994; Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Race and 
Fonseca 1996; Redmond et al., 1996; Lawhead 1997; Brown and Lant 1999; Aguis 2001; 
Robertson and Hayden 2008; Palmer and Filoso 2009). Early mitigation approaches and Act 
administration led many to conclude that despite the no-net-loss objectives, large areas of 
wetlands had been drained across the United States, with mitigation to account for this loss 
not achieving appropriate outcomes (for further discussion see of such risks see Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5) (De Weese, 1994; Marsh et al., 1996; Redmond et al., 1996; Brown and Lant 
1999; Memon and Skelton 2004; Mack and Micacchion 2006; Mead 2008; Roberston and 
Hayden 2008).  
 
Despite unsatisfactory outcomes and negative perceptions, these initial mitigation attempts 
offered a valuable opportunity to successfully redesign and re-legislate to ensure the effective 
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operation in the future (Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses et al. 2001). Attempting to 
increase the ecological value and conservation outcomes of future mitigation projects, 
agencies and regulators began directing mitigation requirements to larger sections of land, at 
locations other than the impact sites. Here conservation actions by multiple parties could be 
aggregated to provide superior economies of scale - ecologically and economically. 
Concurrently, between the mid- 1990s and the turn of the last decade, multiple federal 
guidance and policies were released addressing the notable shortcomings of previous 
mitigation processes22 (USEPA, undated; Redmond et al., 1996; Wilkinson and Thompson 
2006; Environmental Law Institute 2007). Such approaches represent the origin of mitigation 
banking; a system to improve the ecological outcomes of wetland mitigation (Gardner and 
Radwan 2005; Environmental Law Institute 2007).  
 
Currently more advanced, successful wetland banking is occurring in the United States,; 
aditional guidance’s, regulations and policy administration requiring significant improvement to 
previous quality and quantity in both process and outcomes (Troyon Environmental 
Consultants Inc undated; USEPA, undated; Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Gardner and 
Radwan 2005; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Robertson and Hayden 2008; Aguis 2001; Mak 
and Micacchion 2006; Kieseker et al. 2009; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010).  
 
3 .1 .1 Or ig in  o f  Conservat ion Bank ing:  focus on Ca l i forn ia   
 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA), the seminal and formative legislative instrument for 
conservation banking, was signed into law in 1973 (United States Department of the Interior 
1973; Studt and Sokolove 1996; The Katoomba Group 2008; Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008). 
Primarily designed to halt and reverse concerning rates of species decline in the United States, 
this Act created the process by which federally important species were legally recognised and 
categorised as being threatened or endangered, and created the illegality of ‘taking’ or 
harming of species23 (Studt and Sokolove 1996; Environmental Law Institute 2007). This also 
created the second piece of legislation (together with the CWA) that formed the basis of offset 
banking in the United States. Both originally created under legislation with independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Refer to Appendix Three: Acts, and other official policy documents in California and New South Wales. 
23 “Taking” is defined under the ESA as any harassment, harm, pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding, trapping, killing, 
capturing, collecting or an attempt to engage in any of these, in relation to any species on the Federal Endangered Species 
List (ESA 1972). 
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purposes, this explains why the United States systems have developed distinct mitigation and 
conservation banking systems. Those impacting wetlands come under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), while those impacting species were now 
answerable to the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) (ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
USFWS Memo. Guidance Calif. 2003; Environmental Law Institute, 2007).  
 
Consent to conduct activities limited by the ESA normally requires an Incidental Take Permit 
(ITP) which requires applicants demonstrate that no overall residual jeopardy to the continued 
existence of the species will occur as a result of the project (Studt and Sokolove 1996; USFWS 
Memo. Guidance Calif. 2003; Environmental Law Institute, 2007). In relation to the 
conservation banking that would develop, the FWS issues species take permits, approves 
conservation banks, and issues guidance and policy to guide the system operations. 
Subsequent regulations allowed for off-site conservation; by the developer themselves, the 
services of an in-lieu fee, or through purchase of credits from an approved Conservation Bank 
(ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Wilkinson and Thompson 2006; Wilkinson, Thompson and 
Thompson 2006; Environmental Law Institute 2007; Hallwood 2007; Crowe and ten Kate 
2010; see also Darbi et al., 2009).  
 
In 1995, the ESA was amended and Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) were introduced. A 
HCP describes:  
 
“…the anticipated, unavoidable impacts on species by the proposed project, including the 
type and amount of incidental take of each species to be covered under the plan, and how 
these impacts will be minimised and mitigated.” 
p. 20, Mead (2008) 
 
A Natural Community Conservation Plan (NCCP) is a larger-scale HCP; the concept originated in 
California under the Californian Department of Fish and Game, and is considered to have 
launched conservation banking in the state (Lawhead 1997). In San Diego County, a Multiple 
Species Conservation Plan was the first NCCP to be developed, incorporating multiple NCCP-
HCP’s and over 15 conservation banks for species such as the California gnatcatcher and 
multispecies credits for coastal sage scrub (Lawhead 1997; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 
2004).  Both HCPs and NCCPs have been used by state and federal agencies to identify where 
development is most appropriate and the location of high priority conservation habitat. This 
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has facilitated improved land-use planning by simultaneously allowing allocation of 
development land and providing for the mitigation of these impacts, and created a space for 
efficiently designed and optimally located conservation banks (Lawhead 1997; Mead 2008).  
 
With the two distinct regulations (the ESA and the CWA ) as foundations, California has two 
distinct systems of banking: Conservation Banking and Mitigation Banking. A Conservation 
Bank may be publically or privately owned land managed for its natural resource values, where 
the signatory to the banking agreement is legally bound to the regulating government agency, 
concerning specific species values or in some cases, ecosystem values (e.g. CDFG, USFWS, 
USACE) (Toyon Environmental Consultants Inc., undated; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
USFWS Memo. Guidance Calif. 2003; Nelson and Sharman 2007; USWFS 2009; Masden, Carroll 
and Moore Brands 2010). Mitigation Bank refers to a ‘wetland’ bank created to satisfy the 
wetland compensation requirements of the CWA and the regulatory approval of the USACE to 
mitigate drainage, filling or polluting wetland areas through mitigation of wetland function 
and/or acreage (United States Environmental Protection Agency, undated; USFWS Memo. 
Guidance Calif. 2003; CDFG 2009; Darbi et al. 2009; EPA 2010). In situations where multiple 
species are concerned, multiple agencies are consequently involved in authorising and 
overseeing the banking process including bank establishment, credit issuance and credit trade 
(Californian Government Department of Fish and Game, 2009). Under the banking structure in 
California the given level of species classification (county, state or federal) determines which 
agency is responsible for administrating the banking process. 
 
The EPA (1973) states that current Conservation Banks are required to comprise four distinct 
components (Robertson 2004)24: 
• “The bank site: the physical acreage restored, established, enhanced, or preserved; 
• The bank instrument: the formal agreement between the bank owners and regulators 
establishing liability, performance standards, management and monitoring requirements, and 
the terms of bank credit approval; 
• The Interagency Review Team (IRT): the interagency team that provides regulatory review, 
approval, and oversight of the bank; and  
• The service area: the geographic area in which permitted impacts can be compensated for at a 
given bank.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See EPA (2010) http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact16.html (accessed 18/06/2011) 
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3.1.2 Estab l ish ing the entrepreneur ia l  industry  and bank ing in  
the new century  
 
The establishment of enabling legislation, policy and guidance in the US has ignited a 
promising entrepreneurial conservation banking industry (McElfish and Nicholas, 1996; 
Redmond et al., 1996; Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
see also Roberston and Hayden 2008; Robertson 2004). The first ‘Entrepreneurial Banks’ and 
‘bankers25’ began in California in 1995. Numerous regulations, guidance’s and other influential 
documents have been issued at agency, state and federal levels26 since, and activity has 
rapidly increased. These aimed to improve the operation of the system and remove obstacles 
identified, such as via increasing uptake of the program (and hence conservation achieved as 
a result) through reducing approval time for smaller projects; encouraging inclusion and 
prioritisation of areas of high biodiversity value; encouraging entrepreneurial banking by 
private landowners and project proponents; and improving mitigation ratios to encourage 
banking more aggressively in identified priority conservation areas (Shabman, Scodari and 
King 1996). Recent estimates suggest more than 106 conservation banks have been created 
in California, with 23 in 10 other states conserving 111 species in total27. Many more 
mitigation banks for wetland impacts have been created, with 1137 stream and wetland banks 
(active, inactive, pending or sold out; 32 status unknown) recognised by Ecosystem 
Marketplaces’ 2011 Market Update28. Conservation and mitigation banking is now active in at 
least 37 states (ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Madsen et al., 2011).  
 
In 2000, the USACE, EPA, USFWS and NOAA issued guidance allowing the establishment of an 
in-lieu-fee program to enable developers to fulfil mitigation obligations financially in areas 
where the specific credits they required are not yet available (DECC 2006; Wilkinson and 
Thompson 2006; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004). As at the time, banks were taking many 
months or even years to develop to the point of credit sales, the in-lieu fee establishment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Private companies or individuals operate conservation or mitigation banks by purchasing land or land-rights then creating, protect ing 
or restoring conservation values to generate credits, subsequently selling these for a market-based priced to either public or private 
projects with mitigation requirements 
26 See APPENDIX THREE: Acts, and other official policy documents in California and New South Wales. 
27 Data according to us.speciesbanking.com/pages/dynamic/states.search.php# accessed 10th June 2011; The USACE 
tracking system RIBITS lists 921 bank and in-lieu-fee (ILF) sites across the United States, including active, pending, sold-out 
or terminated banks or ILF sites.  This number does not represent all banks however as there are some states yet to 
contribute their data to the system, and banks administered by FWS (i.e. conservation banks) are also currently in the 
process of being added so this number under-represents the total number of banks in the US.  
28 Madsen, Becca; Carroll, Nathaniel; Kandy, Daniel; Bennett, Genevieve, 2011.  State of the Biodiversity Markets Report: 
2011 Update.  In Press Available at: http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/xxxx expected 2nd June 2011. 
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helped over-come potential stagnating trade. Compared to permittee-responsible mitigation, it 
was intended that In-lieu-fee programs would better involve professional conservation 
personnel and therefore produce higher quality mitigation while aggregating smaller mitigation 
projects into areas of an ecologically-meaningful size (Wilkinson Thompson and Thompson 
2006; Darbi et al., 2009; Bendor 2009). Accredited in-lieu fee holders collect fees: either 
private non-profit conservation agencies (such as The Nature Conservancy, Ducks Unlimited 
and The Centre for Natural Lands Management29), or state, local government or other public 
entities (Wilkinson and Thompson 2006). Monies are then directed to suitable mitigation and 
conservation projects once enough money has been collected to produce effective results 
(Wilkinson, Thompson and Thompson 2006; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
Despite this sound rationale, the outcomes from in-lieu fee programs have been criticised and 
continue to be an issue of industry debate (Wilkinson and Thompson 2006; Wilkinson, 
Thompson and Thompson 2006; Bendor 2009; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010). A 
number of fee programs have failed to produce promised mitigation through lack of timely 
mitigation work, increasing land-prices devaluing the purchase/conservation power of the 
monies held, and poor regulatory over-site and enforcement. Sadly this occurs after the 
development impacts have been irreversibly completed, and thus introduces a significant 
temporal lag that banking is designed to address (Wilkinson, Thompson and Thompson 2006; 
Fleischer and Fox 2008; Denisoff, 2008; Bendor 2009). With recognition of the limitations of 
both permittee-responsible, and in-lieu-fee mitigation and conservation, entrepreneurial 
mitigation and conservation banking has become increasingly popular and robust, with more 
companies entering the market and existing companies continuing to grow and expand, from 
California throughout many other states. In 2008 growth was supported by the released of two 
important documents: “The New Rule” federally issued by the USACE, and clearer standards 
for permittee-responsible mitigation, In-lieu-fee, and mitigation/conservation banking enacted 
USFWS. The New Rule was interpreted by many as encouraging authorising agencies to prefer 
use of mitigation and conservation banks with the three options, to reflect the increased 
reliability in mitigation or conservation outcomes banks have come to provide. Confidence in 
the mitigation and conservation banking industry also increased with the issuance shortly after 
of a range of template documents for the establishment and operation of mitigation and 
conservation banks in the Public Notice issued collectively by USACE, USFWS, CDFG, California 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Center for Natural Lands Management http://cnlm.org/cms/; Ducks Unlimited http://www.ducks.org/; The Nature 
Conservancy http://www.nature.org/ 
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Resource Agency, NMFS, EPA and NRCS. Such progressive development provides useful 
background to how offset banking approaches have been refined and developed into current 
operating systems. This development process illustrates how the components of offset banking 
have come together. 
 
3 .2 D IST INGUISHING FEATURES OF THE OOFSET BANKING SYSTEM 
 
There are multiple parties or components present within an offset banking system, as detailed 
in Table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1 Parties with involvement, or potential involvement, in a offset banking scheme. See 
Glossary for definition of terms 
 
Party   Ro le (varr ies across schemes and areas of  operat ion) 
Regulator  The local, regional or state, or national administrative body over-seeing 
operations; usually assuming responsibility for the processing of 
applications for bank creation, credit issuing, credit purchasing and 
impacting project consent. They may also issue documents 
regulating/guiding scheme’s operation, and may be directly involved with 
management and enforcement e.g. funding, monitoring, trading 
requirements, and land tenure restrictions.  
Law-making/  
leg is lat ive 
body 
The government body producing legally binding law, statues and legislation 
creating the requirement for compensation of negative biodiversity impacts, 
authentication of biodiversity credit creation and trading to satisfy this (as 
the only, or one of various, options for compensation. See also Appendix 
Three: List of Acts and other official policy documents in California and New 
South Wales.) 
Of fset/  
Mi t igat ion/ 
Conservat ion 
Banker  
The signatory of the legal documents establishing the bank. The banker is 
issued with the credits and receives proceeds directly from the credit sales. 
This entity may or may not own the bank land or undertake the 
management depending on characteristics of the scheme’s design. 
Credi t  
Purchaser 
An entity (potentially public or private) required by regulation to purchase 
credits to obtain consent for a development project which negatively 
impacts biodiversity  
A commercial entity voluntarily purchasing credits to ameliorate negative 
biodiversity aspects associated with their operations, without being 
required to do so by law or regulation, but due to a ‘business case’, such 
as marketing, reputation and commercial access to resources or markets30.  
A private or public entity purchasing credits without being required to by law 
or regulation but utilising the system for the advancement of conservation 
goals. 
Consul tant  A private or public entity which may advise one or more of the parties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The business case for Biodiversity offsetting is presented in the BBOP Document: Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP). 2009. Business, Biodiversity Offsets and BBOP: An Overview. BBOP, Washington, D.C. See also TEEB 
– The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity Report for Business - Executive Summary 2010 from 
http://www.cbd.int/business/role/ accessed 10th June 2011 
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regarding issues of law, economics, finance, management, ecology, biology 
and conservation management, usually conducting biological/impact 
assessments and further monitoring as required.  
Land Owner Entity which hold ownership title to the area of bank land. According to the 
scheme, the bank owner may or may not be the biodiversity banker. The land 
owner may change over the bank’s life time. 
Land 
Manager 
Entity held responsible for conducting and co-ordinating activities required to 
maintain the continuing quality, integrity and perpetuity of the bank’s values. 
This role may be held by the land owner, a consultancy entity, the banker, or 
an independent entity specific to the task - profitable, non-profit, government, 
private or community-based. The requirement for perpetual active 
management of banked values is a characteristic of offset banking (Agius 
2001). 
 
3 .2 .1 The bank s i te :  aggregat ing va lues in to one area  
 
An important component of offset banking, distinguishing the systems from a location-specific 
offset, is the utilization of a ‘bank’ (bio-, conservation, species or mitigation) (Lawhead 1997; 
Martin and ver Beek 2006; Nauman, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008). The bank site is the physical 
geographical location of the biodiversity values to which credits have been awarded (Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010). The legal, organisational and operational structure of the banking 
process provides protection and preservation for an indefinite length of time and are ‘banked’ 
safely away, analogous to funds in a savings bank. The impact which the credits will ultimately 
be traded in relation to need not be defined at the time of bank-creation, similarly to how initial 
deposits into a savings account are independent of future purchases, yet prospective 
purchases drive decisions related to the funds (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). Offset banking values 
may be conserved, restored and protected prior to commencement of development project 
impacts, or even prior to any development plans (Redmond et al., 1996; ten Kate, Bishop and 
Bayon 2004; Darbi et al., 2009; Bendor 2009eftec, IEEP et al., 2010).  
 
An important part of offset banking is the abilty of the bank site to have credits available in 
advance, without waiting for a development project to fund conservation. This is because the 
abilty to sell credits for a market-based price provides security favoring finacial investment in 
bank sites without awaiting development to occur. Premptive bank creation avoids time lags: 
where degradation and threats to potentially banked values continue until a mitigation-
requiring project comes to fruition. Conservation can be done in a pre-emptive, preventative 
manner facilitating more effective conservation outcomes (Wissel and Watzold 2010). 
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Additionally, project proponents need not conduct lengthy and risky re-creation of values, nor 
wait for the conservation offset to be completed before the outcome can be assured. Presence 
of time-lags and uncertainly of conservation outcomes were significant criticisms of pioneering 
banking efforts (mack and Micacchion 2006; Wissel and Watzold 2010). Time-lag issues are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 section 4.1.1.2; it is important to note here that offset 
banking offers a mechanism to address such issues.  
 
A potential bank site may comprise multiple ecosystem types and multiple biodiversity values; 
accordingly a bank may be awarded one of many credit types (Aguis 2001; Crowe and ten 
Kate 2010). As credits may be created independent of impacting projects, credits from one 
bank may be sold to a number of purchasers requiring mitigation31, allowing conservation and 
mitigation for multiple impacts be aggregated in larger parcels of land (Albrecht and Wenzel 
1996; Redmond et al., 1996; USFWS Memo. Guidance. Calif. 2003; ten Kate, Bishop and 
Bayon 2004; Nelson and Sharman 2007). It is well documented in the ecological literature that 
larger geographic sections of ecosystems, as a rule, have higher functioning and biodiversity 
values than multiple smaller sections collectively (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Rodgers 
1996; Pankhurst et al., 2002; Spieles 2005; White 2008; Wissel and Watzold 2010).  
 
Alternatively, a developer may potentially purchase credits from multiple banks and/or bank-
sites. This allows mechanisms for both small packages of habitat such as important habitat 
corridors, and large expanses of landscape to be effectively and economically included under 
offset banking. Huxel and Hastings (1999) note the equal importance of mechanisms which 
support the protection of small patches, where environmental perturbations such as disease 
outbreaks may be of concern. The aggregation of biodiversity values, and the preservation of 
larger contiguous land areas provides superior outcomes via economies of scale (both 
ecological and economical), with less risk32 than can be achieved through individual, location-
specific offsetting (McElfish and Nichols 1996; Marsh and Young 1996; USFWS Memo. 
Guidance Calif. 2003; Mack and Micacchion 2006; Spieles, Coneybeer and Horn 2006; 
Roberston and Hayden 2008). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Note that individual credits may only be sold once, but that the total number of credits available at a bank site may be 
divided among more than one purchaser.  
32 For full discussion of risk see Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
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3.2.2.  The t rad ing o f  b iod ivers i ty  va lues 
 
As a market-based approach to biodiversity conservation, economic trading principles are 
fundamental to offset banking. The commodity - the biodiversity credit - is created, bought and 
sold by independent parties 33 (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 
2004; Moilanen et al., 2008; Nelson and Sharman 2007). In location-specific offsetting, 
mitigation is frequently achieved though customised negotiations, with a monetary figure 
agreed between parties involved and based on the specific context (Lawhead 1997; Walker et 
al., 2009; for examples see ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004;). Given the highly specific 
nature of many environmental impacts and the conservation activities required to mitigate 
them, it has proven difficult to measure mitigation decisions against each other. As a result, 
issues of transparency, accountability, credibility and replicability have been raised (Goldman-
Carter and McCallie 1996; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Nelson and Sharman 2007; EDO 
2008b; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
The use of a single metric such as a credit represents a more standardised method of 
measuring, monitoring, transacting and demonstrating outcomes. This makes the process 
more easily understood and observed by multiple parties, potentially reducing uncertainty 
around transactions, time-frames and labour costs. The benefits of a single metric, such as a 
credit, do not outweigh the difficulties surrounding metric design (Goldman-Carter and McCallie 
1996; Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Marsh and Young 1996; Steh, Tabatabai and 
Ambrose 2000; ten Kate 2003; Parks et al., 2003; see also EDO 2007a,b). Designing a 
system of commodity trading involves multiple components (Agius 2001; Crowe and ten Kate 
2010). In a trading market, credits represent units of gain from conservation actions, and are 
ideally established as legal property rights through legislation (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
Chapter 2, section 2.1.834 discusses how to place a monetary value on a credit once it has 
been created (i.e. quantification), and Chapter 4, section 4.6, discusses issues surrounding 
how to measure the components of an ecosystem and assign an appropriate credit value to 
aspects of biodiversity (i.e qualification). This challenge introduces questions regarding the 
observation and measurement of complex biodiversity values, and subsequently attaching a 
meaningful metric to those values that relates to other values at that, or other, locations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Discussion of economic theory related to offset banking, see Chapter 2. 
34 See also Chapter 5, section 5.4.1 
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(Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Marsh ,Sokolove and Rhodes 1996; Stein, Tabatabai and 
Ambrose 2000; Aguis 2001; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Possingham et al., 2007; Crowe and 
ten Kate 2010). These challenges are being met through various approaches, to varying 
degrees of satisfaction35 (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Aguis 2001; Darbi et al., 2009; 
Madsen, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010; see also ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010). 
 
3 .2 .3 No-Net-Loss and net  ga in as foundat ions 
 
Concepts of No-Net-Loss (NNL) and net-gain are important components of offsetting and 
offset banking; defining and directing credit transactions36 (Studt and Sokolove 1996; Albrecht 
and Wenzel 1996; Marsh, Sokolove and Rhodes 1996; ten Kate 2003; Nelson and Sharman 
2007; EDO 2007a; Fleischer and Fox 2008; Moilanen et al., 2008; Bendor 2009; Kiesecker et 
al., 2009a; eftec IEEP et al., 2010). As a function of the way transactions are conducted, 
values lost in one location through development and are replaced elsewhere in the landscape 
via the purchase of credits, resulting in a stable, or preferably increasing, level of ‘value’ over 
time. Concepts of NNL have proved contentious and debate centres around whether credit 
trading achieves NNL on a long term basis and how it depends on the activities generating 
credits37. (Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Brown and Lant 1999; Turner, Redmond and 
Zedler 2001; Hilderbrand, Watts and Randel 2005; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Walker et al., 
2009; Maron et al., 2010). (Albrecht and Wenzel, 1996; Environmental Law Institute 2007; 
Darbi et al., 2009; BBOP ODH 2009f; Maron et al., 2010). Achieving NNL is a foundation of 
offset banking  yet the principles to achieve this continue to be refined and developed (Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010).  
 
3 .2 .4 Broadening stakeho lder  par t ic ipat ion and engement  o f  
pr ivate  landowners 
 
Private land owners have an important and distinctive role to play in offsetting (Aguis 2001; O’ 
Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann 2002; Doremus 2006; Nelson and Sharman 2007; DECC 2006; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Economic theory supporting trading and market-based mechanisms: see Chapter 2. Discussion of privatization and 
commodification: see Chapter 5, section 5.2.5 
36 Note additional discussion on NNL in Chapter 4, section 4.1.1  
37This is further discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.1.1.4 
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EDO 2008b, 2009a). It is important to include private landowners through active involvement 
in biodiversity conservation, particularly those in rural areas with increased likelihood of having 
significant biodiversity values on their land (Froude 1999). Such values are often inaccesible 
to conservation programs outside regulatory or philanthropic mechanisms, and unavailable to 
government agencies due to private property rights; these may therefore be most vulnerable 
to clearance and degradation (Memon and Skelton 2004). Biodiversity conservation also 
directly competes with more economically favourable land uses such as agriculture, 
horticulture and livestock-raising, increasing threats of clearance further. The opportunity to 
generate income from conservation activities on private land creates incentives more attractive 
to a wider range of landowners not engaged by public-benefit or altruistic approaches, 
particularly when regulation is involved (e.g., through planning restrictions) (Gunningham and 
Young 1997; Doreum 1006; Agius 2001; Martin and ver Beek 2006; Golman et al., 2008; EDO 
2009a). Offset banking creates a mechanism able to access previolsy inaccessible values, 
offering competitive incentives to protect, restore and enhance, potentially expanding the 
biodiversity values under active management and strengthening the system’s contribution as a 
conservation mechanism (Gunningham and Young 1997; Agius 2001; Nelson and Sharman 
2007; DECC 2006; Crowe and ten Kate 2010; Wissel and Watzold 2010).  
 
Offset banking creates opportunities for credit traders, brokers and speculators, depending on 
the system’s design. (see for example Section 127ZZ, TSA NSW 1995; Masden, Carroll and 
Moore Brands 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Credits may be traded directly between 
landowner and developer, or through a central exchange or holding facility managed by 
governments or NGO’s or specifically created private companies (Agius 2001). There is also 
potential for credits to be brought by traders or speculators who would then sell them on for 
profit, speculating on a fluctuating credit price (should credit prices be designed to fluctuate38) 
(Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Increasing the buying and selling activity within a market 
increases levels of stability and success, enabling more conservation to be achieved with more 
parties and transactions involved (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Agius 2001; ten Kate, 
Bishop and Bayon 2004; Wissel and Watzold 2010).  
 
Additionally, there is potential that an area of land may be eligible (according to system rules 
and design) for both carbon credits and biodiversity credits (Walsh 1999; Aguis 2001; Crowe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For expansion on how credit price or trading protocol may respond to scarcity and other factors via flexibility in value, see 
Wissel and Watzold 2010. Also note discussion of credit pricing in section 5.4.1, Chapter 5. 
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and ten Kate 2010; Ring et al. 2010). Some suggest that allowing both credit types to be 
generated from one parcel of land may increase the environmental benefits of carbon trading 
activities by favouring more ecologically defensible practices while also making attractive to a 
wider range of groups and individuals as a result of potentialy increased financial revenue 
(Walsh 1999; Bekessy and Wintel 2008; Bekesy et al. 2010; Ring et al. 2010). Increasing 
participation in the scheme is essential to success, intending to conserve biodiversity values 
currently mismanaged or misrepresented under current approaches (Martin and ver Beek 
2006; BBOP 2009g). 
 
Offset banking offers novel and additional opportunities to attract and involve an extended 
range of stakeholders (Gunningham and Young 1997; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). NGO’s such 
as community groups and environmental and conservation organisations may be represented 
and actively involved by holding covenants/easements, operating in-lieu-fee funds, providing 
consultation and management expertise, purchasing or creating credits, and via involvement 
with enforcement and reporting (for example Centre for Natural Lands Management in 
California39 and the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart in New South Wales (Appendix 4); 
Gunningham and Young 1997;  ten Kate Bishop and bayon 2004; BBOP 2009g; Ring et al. 
2010; Teresa 2008; Mead 2008; Wilkinson and Thompson 2006; BBOP 2009g). Groups may 
also own and operate offset banks as private or charitable entities (for example, Ducks 
Unlimted40). Others such as schools, scouts or family trusts could have interests in purchasing 
credits for reasons of public and corporate image, or to advance an organisations 
conservation objectives. For example conservation groups, community groups, individuals 
interested in conserving biodiversity, and non-regulated companies aiming to benefit their 
environmental reputation (Gunningham and Young 1997; Wissel and Watzold 2010).  
 
Offset banking may therefore provide mechanisms and incentives for a wider group of people 
to show interest, through presenting conservation in a more identifiable credit format with 
increased appeal to those outside of the economic and environmental spheres (Martin and 
Verbeek 200641; BBOP 2009g).  Increased participation, further extending current 
engagement, may develop a representative and diverse body of stakeholders required to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 www.cnlm.org 
40 www.ducks.org 
41 Martin and Verbeek (2006) discuss how changes in individuals’ behavior are related to the provision of information, 
whereby “People are more able to absorb information about the environment if it is presented in ways that are consistent 
with their existing thinking and knowledge.” Page 38 
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appropriately represent society’s interests (Gunningham and Young 1997; BBOP 2009g; 
Smith undated; Marsh and Young 1996; ten Kate Bishop and Bayon 2004). Considerations of 
how social policy contributes to achieving conservation outcomes are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
An important strength comes from the potential to build upon exsisting government and non-
government conservation programs and projects potentially involving one or many of the 
potential stakeholders described above. Based on the intention to build upon current 
measures and increase overall conservation (DECC 2006), offset banking offers a way to 
improve information sharing, co-operation and capacity as stakeholders participate in one 
scheme with the potental to be more unified, strategic and integrated (Gunningham and Young 
1997; BBOP 2009g; Martin and Verbeek 2006). Offset banking therefore contributes to a 
suite of conservation measures offering a complementary, rather than replacement, process to 
increase biodiversity conservation success (Gunningham and Young 1997; McElfish and 
Nicholas 1996; DECC 2006; Doremus 2006; EDO 2009a; Ring et al., 2010; PwC 2010).  
 
3 .3 CASE-SUDY EXAMPLES 
 
As examples, California and New South Wales banking schemes provide appropriate 
frameworks to understand how offset banking works through their similarities and contrasts 
(eftec, IEEP et al., 2010)42. Descriptive overviews of these two systems are detailed below and 
summarised in Appendix Two: Summary table comparing the key components of New South 
Wales Biobanking, and Conservation Banking in California, USA. While many countries are 
currently developing frameworks to support banking systems, both California and New South 
Wales are useful examples for a New Zealand context as they are amongst the most developed 
worldwide (eftec, IEEP 2010; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 2009). The comparatively 
stable, westernised, mixed-economy countries compare directly with the New Zealand political 
context. Differences between the schemes offer additional insight and allow investigation and 
direct comparison between the many regulatory, political, legal and operational avenues that 
are open for New Zealand to pursue (c.f. research by Darbi et al., 2009). 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See APPENDIX TWO: Summary table comparing the key components of New South Wales Biobanking, and Conservation Banking in 
California, USA. 
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3.3.1 B iobank ing in  New South Wales ,  Austra l ia  -  an in t roduct ion 
 
NB: At time of research, the New South Wales Biobanking Scheme had been in operation for a 
notably shorter period of time compared to Californian systems and as such, limited literature 
is available on its operation. The State Government Department administering the scheme (The 
Department) provides the majority of information available about the scheme and is a 
significant source of the information discussed bellow. Additionally, much of the information 
provided bellow was collected via as series of Interviews conducted in Sydney in August 2010. 
Details of the organisations and interviewees are supplied in Appendix Four. 
 
The state of New South Wales in southeastern Australia has one of the world’s newest and 
most comprehensive conservation banking systems (DECC 2007; 2009g; Shields 2008; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010). The NSW State government established Biobanking within Part 7A of the 
Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, and in the “Biobanking Bill” in 2008 (The 
Threatened Species Conservation (Biodiversity Banking) Regulation 2008)(TSA 1995; DECC 
2007; TSR 2008; 2009i). This formalized biodiversity offsetting negotiation and initiated the 
Biobanking scheme (DECC 2009)43. The scheme focuses on being a measureable, consistent, 
secure, transparent and strategic system to respond to significant biodiversity loss on the east 
coast of NSW, predominantly in the face of extensive native vegetation clearing due to 
agriculture and urbanization pressure (Martin and ver Beek 1995; Agius 2001; DECC 2007; 
2009j; Farrier, Kelly and London 2007; Burgin 2008; Shields 2008; Gibbons et al. 2009; 
Suvantola 2009).  
3 .3.1.1 Credi t  types 
 
There are two kinds of credits traded in the NSW system (BAM 2008; DECC 2009i; Suvantola 
2009). Ecosystem credits correspond to specific vegetation and habitat types indigenous to 
NSW. Species credits are issued for species whose presence cannot reliably be predicted by 
ecosystem or vegetation type (DECC 2007; 2008; 2009i; EDO 2008). Numerous classifications 
of vegetation types occur within the two credit types. Each credit, or group of identical credits, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 “The Act includes requirements for agreements, statements, biodiversity credits, trust fund, enforcement, public 
registers. The Regulation provides additional rules for specific aspects of the scheme (such as fees, operation of Trust 
Fund, criteria for biobank sites)” DECCW 2009i.  See APPENDIX THREE: Acts, and other official policy documents in California and New 
South Wales. 
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is categorized based on CMA44 region, vegetation type, formation, surrounding vegetation, 
patch size and quality, producing a credit profile (BAM 2008). In NSW there are approximately 
1600 vegetation types, 99 vegetation classes, 12 vegetation formations, 14 CMA regions, 4 
classes of surrounding vegetation and 4 classes of patch size (NSW Vegetation Database). 
With 1600 different types this suggests that potentially, 1600 ecosystem credits, or credit 
profiles may be bought and sold.  
Multiple kinds of species credits may be created, each pertaining to a different threatened or 
endangered species (DECC 2007; Suvantola 2009). Threatened and endangered species in 
NSW are identified and listed through the procedures outlined in the Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 1995 (TSA 1995), and accessed via the Threatened Species Profile 
Database (BAM 2008). Currently this database lists 135 separate species therefore 
conceivably, 135 different species credits could be created (NSW Vegetation Database; TSA 
1995). In addition to this procedure, a developer may plan a project that potentially impacts a 
‘red flag’ area, which is an area of particular value or vulnerability to loss (EDO 1008c; 2010b; 
BAM 2008). This is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.3, Chapter 6. 
3.3.1.2 Credi t  purchase 
 
Scheme participation is initiated when land put forward for development is surveyed for 
potential areas of native vegetation that may be impacted. Environmental assessments indicate 
potential for participation in the Biobanking scheme (Agius 2001; TSA NSW 1995; Farrier and 
Langdon 2007; EDO 2008c; DECC 2009i). Currently the scheme is being run as a voluntary 
alternative to other legislatively required environmental impact procedures45 (Christensen 
2007; Suvantola 2009; DECC 2007, 2009i). A project that will result in impact upon 
threatened species or native vegetation requires consent from The Department and the 
Minister (Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995; Native Vegetation Act 2003). Consent 
application must evidentially demonstrate the impact site’s biodiversity values will be improved 
or maintained as a result of the project; this is termed ‘passing the improve or maintain test’ 
(IMT). Participation in the Biobanking scheme and the purchasing and retiring of credits 
contributes to the satisfaction of these requirements (TSA NSW Part 7A, Section 127ZJ 
1995/2007; Farrier and Langdon 2007; EDO 2008c).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 CMA: Catchment Management Authority. See GLOSSARY for terms. 
45 See APPENDIX THREE: Acts, and other official policy documents in California and New South Wales. 
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A specifically trained, independent Department-Accredited Assessor uses the Assessment 
Methodology and the Credit Calculator to conduct assessments of biodiversity values at a site 
(DECC 2009i). The methodology is based upon vegetation condition, built from the Habitat 
Hectares approach (ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; DECC 2009j), and is a central 
component specifically designed for the Biobanking scheme (BBOP 2009e; Suvantola 2009; 
see also Parkes, Newell and Cheal, 2003; McCarthy et al., 2004; Suvantola 2009). 
Measurements from the Assessment Methodology are made based on current values and 
compared to predicted values following development (development being either the activities 
creating the negative biodiversity impact, or the active conservation management increasing 
biodiversity on the Biobank site) (TSR 2008; BAM 2008; DECC 2009j; Suvantola 2009; see 
also Possingham 2007). Once completed, Assessment Methodology calculations are sent The 
Department to review and approve prior to a Biobanking Statement being issued. The 
Statement details the values being impacted on in number of credits and their associated 
characteristics or ‘profile’. This figure represents the credits the developer is required to 
purchase and retire to satisfy the ‘improve or maintain’ test required for development consent 
(Div. 6, S. 127ZJ, 127Zk TSA NSW 1995; Suvantola 2009; EDO 2008c).  
Included in the Biobanking Statement are any on-site conservation actions required. The 
Assessment Methodology requires that procedures to both avoid and limit as many on-site 
impacts - both direct and indirect - as economically practicable must have been undertaken in 
order to apply for a Biobanking Statement (S. 127ZN TSA 1995; BAM 2008; DECC 2009e). 
With the official Statement (or even preliminary reports) issued, the developer may then 
choose to redesign the planned development to reduce the environmental impact thereby 
reducing the number of credits required to purchase, or they may choose to accept the 
Biobanking statement and purchase requirements.  Once the Statement is accepted, the 
consent authority such as a Council or Department of Planning will incorporate this into the 
development consent, requiring the credits to be purchased and retired in a set timeframe, 
prior to impact commencement (DECC 2007; Suvantola 2009). 
3.3.1.3 Credi t  creat ion 
 
Biodiversity credits are created by a process initiated when landowners identify areas of 
existing biodiversity or areas where there is potential to restore or recreate past values (DECC 
2009i). An Accredited Assessor completes a formal assessment of these values and submits 
the required documents and calculations to DECC, in application of a Biobanking Agreement. 
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This document stipulates the current values of the proposed bank, the credit amounts to be 
awarded and their respective credit profiles, and the management actions required to maintain 
these values (EDO 2008c; TSA 1NSW 1995; Suvantola 2009). Credits issued by the 
Agreement reflect both the ecological values currently present, and values anticipated as a 
result of stipulated management actions predicted to increase the biodiversity values of the 
site, such as permanent legal protection over the land and protective measures such as 
fencing and stock removal (Currnow and Fitz-Gerald 2006; DECCW 2008c; EDO 2008c; 
Suvantola 2009).  
Once both the landowner and the Minister have signed the Agreement, the credits are 
considered issued and may be traded via registration on the appropriate register or direct to 
waiting developers or other interested parties. The Agreement is registered with the NSW 
Department of Lands on the property’s land title (DECC 2007) and represents a contractual 
agreement between the owner of the land and the Minister administrating the Threatened 
Species Act 1995, and therefore is a legally binding agreement for management and 
protection, in perpetuity, of the values identified within the document (Christensen 2007; DECC 
2009g; Suvantola 2009).   
3 .3.1.4 Credi t  t rade and pr ice 
 
Protocol for the trading of credits is detailed on the developer’s Biobanking Statement, where 
the credit profile specifies the CMA region or sub-region where the credits must be purchased 
(EDO 2008c; BAM 2008).  The Biobanking Assessment Methodology (BAM) describes the 
procedure for matching the credit profiles of Ecosystem Credits (BAM 2008; Suvantola 2009). 
Trade of species credits must be identical. Once the credit transaction is formalised, these 
credits will be retired. Credit retirement is an official change of status, preventing the credits 
being sold in the future, and is a requirement of the Biobanking Statement (TSA 1995; Nelson 
and Sharman 2007). This ensures biodiversity values are not sold multiple times, or offset 
multiple impacts; values are therefore protected and preserved for perpetuity while increasing 
the likelihood of satisfying the improve or maintain goal (DECC 2007; BAM 2008). All 
transactions and credit retirements are lodged on the public Biobanking Register, administered 
by The Department, as per legislative requirements (TSA 1995; DECC 2009i). These publically 
available databases are designed to enhance the transparency of the process and facilitate 
public and NGO inclusion. Other parties such as community groups, private individuals, trusts 
and independent companies may also voluntarily purchase and retire credits, independent of a 
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Biobanking Statement, for the purpose of furthering biodiversity conservation objectives (DEC 
2007; Suvantola 2009).  
Pricing of credits is not set by The Department, but is to be based on a combination of market 
forces of supply and demand, and costs related to the management plans and other 
characteristics specific to the values concerned (DECC 2007; 2009i; Suvantola 2009). The 
Department offers a spreadsheet document in order to enable assessment of approximate 
credit prices based on management costs. The minimum credit price is therefore set by the 
cost of meeting the ongoing of management obligations (i.e. the amount, per credit, required 
to meet the Total Fund Deposit). In addition, the credit sale price includes any costs 
associated with establishing the credits, at the bank owner’s discretion (DECC 2007; Suvnatola 
2009). This price may represent numerous considerations, including current supply and 
demand of credit profiles; direct, fixed costs such as legal, assessment and/or Department 
fees; and indirect costs such as opportunity cost, time discounting and land values. Within this 
there is room for the seller of the credits to incorporate any profit margin they seek (DECC 
2007; Suvantola 2009).  
This design allows that ecosystems with less intensive management (perhaps because the 
ecosystem is in good condition requiring only maintenance as opposed to establishment of 
values) would sell for a lower credit price (reflecting comparatively lower management costs). 
Conversely, a partly degraded ecosystem, or one which has potential to support more values 
than are currently present, has greater potential conservation gain per unit area, so more 
credits may be issued for that site. These considerations ensure that incentives are present, 
for both credit purchaser and creator, to bank established ecosystems and areas of highest 
value in currently in a landscape. While a higher credit price (such as for an area undergoing 
restoration) may produce a greater financial transaction at the point of credit sale, the majority 
of revenue will be directed to the Total Fund Deposit46 and so does not automatically equate to 
increased financial gain for the credit seller. The profit resulting from credit sales is a function 
of the time the credit takes to sell (due to opportunity cost) and demand in the market (viewed 
as the amount the market will bear) (Shabman, Skodari and King 1996; Marsh et al., 1996). 
Because the landowner is required to conduct specified management of the bank site to 
maintain the values banked, and well-established habitat typically requires less intensive 
management, landowners are expected to see the lower-priced but faster-selling credits from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See section 3 .3 .1 .6 ,  be low 
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established habitat as more desirable. These features of the scheme’s design align well with 
the broader conservation objectives of incentivising the protection of existing, high-quality 
biodiversity values, providing protection from alterative land uses. 
3.3.1.5 Incent ives for  preservat ion,  restorat ion and re-creat ion47 
 
Mechanisms described above may represent incentives for conservation of higher-quality 
habitat that are attractive from a credit purchaser’s perspective also. Purchasers required to 
mitigate specific development projects buy a prescriptive number and profile of credits, with 
little choice of credit purchase types (although choice between credit sellers may exist). With 
price as the final comparison point, the higher quality habitat is desired, on a per credit basis, 
as it is expected to be less costly (see above). Reduced complexity and less intensive 
management requirements reduce the cost of credits from a bank of pre-existing values. It 
also reduces the risk that the credits or bank site may be vulnerable to enforcement or 
compliance-related complications due to questionable restoration or similar required activities. 
Less time and money may be directed towards accounting for unknown outcomes and this 
could reduce the cost of banking values already established (for further discussion on risk and 
risk management in offset systems see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Should credits from preservation 
or protection of established ecosystems not be currently available this encourages the active 
restoration and recreation of these values at degraded sites, potentially increasing the level of 
biodiversity within an area (De Weese 1994; Suvantola O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann 2002; 
BBOP 2009e; Maron et al., 2010). Multiple aspects to management and credit price intend to 
establish a balance between active restoration and effective preservation of biodiversity values 
in a landscape, producing optimal biodiversity outcomes.  
3.3.1.6 The Trust  Fund 
 
Annual income to enable and support the perpetual management actions required of the 
landowner is provided by the Biobank Trust Fund, a perpetual, self-sustaining trust fund 
established at the point of credit sale (Division 8, S. 127ZW,ZX TSA 1995; Marsh and Young 
1996; EDO 2008c; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Suvantola 2009). During the initial years of the 
NSW Scheme a government department manages bank Trust Funds. As the scheme matures 
there is potential for these funds to be managed by other entities, public or private. The Total 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See Chapter 4 for discussions of no-net-loss and the role of both preservation and restoration/recreation in the offset 
banking system 
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Fund Deposit for each bank is managed as a separate entity and is calculated based on the 
management actions required for the bank (DECC 2007; Suvantola 2009). A designated 
portion of the interest earned from the Fund’s investment is returned to the landowner as an 
income stream for management; being dependant on the land owner/manager satisfying 
annual reporting requirements (DEC2007). Another designated portion is re-invested to 
maintain the purchasing power of the initial Deposit amount over time accounting for inflation, 
and to provide some resilience against market instabilities.  Additional payments may be made 
to the landowner if the interest returns over a certain threshold and certain conditions are met. 
Payments may be delayed or reduced should the interest returns fall below a minimum 
threshold.  
While the NSW system is young and few transactions have taken place48 to allow analysis of the 
scheme’s impact, The Department has gone to significant lengths to design a scheme aimed at 
both conservation outcomes and financial success. Great importance has been placed on the 
Assessment Methodology and Credit Calculator, used by both development projects and 
Biobank assessment, to ensure transparency and equity. A scheme of Compliance Assurance 
has been published, and mechanisms updating protocol, regulations, Assessment 
Methodology, and industry standards have been designed. The smooth, successful operation 
of the credit market is an observation yet to be made however the intensive input The 
Department has made to the establishment of the system is encouraging.  
 
3 .3 .2 Conservat ion and Mi t igat ion Bank ing in  Ca l i forn ia 
  
           3.3.2.1 Bank systems and types in Ca l i forn ia  
 
As previously described, both conservation (for species) and mitigation (for wetlands) banking 
systems are operating in California. Banks may be publicly or privately owned within an 
individual banking program (under the FWS or USACE respectively) and may be owned, 
maintained, operated and monitored by a private or public banker. All are overseen and 
regulated by specific regulating agencies (Darbi et al., 2009; Wilkinson and Thompson 2006). 
Banks may also operate in integrated public-private programs, where a government body 
takes responsibility for the tracking, monitoring and accounting of the banks, and employs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Refer to http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/bimspr/index.htm (accessed 10th June 2011) where the Biobanking 
registries provide up to date details of trades that have occurred. 
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private bank owners to conduct maintenance and monitoring. In both cases credits are sold 
direct to buyers, but in an integrated public-private program the government body is the credit 
seller. In an individual banking program, the private or public bank owner also sells the credits 
direct to purchasers (Denisoff, 2008). A third form of ‘banking’ is considered to be in-lieu-fee 
funds and in-lieu-fee mitigation programs, as described above (Wilkinson and Thompson 
2006; Denisoff, 2008; Darbi et al., 2009; Committee on Mitigating Wetland Losses, et al. 
2001; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
 
For conservation banks to gain approval, both the CDFG and the USWFS maintain three main 
requirements for banks (Mead 2008): 
1. The land is protected in perpetuity through acceptable conservation easements (covenants), 
which exist in perpetuity. Easements are restrictions on land-use rights, which in the banking 
case, restricts land-uses conflicting with the conservation objectives of the bank site (USWFS 
2009; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010). It is a requirement that easements be held 
by a third party (commonly a not-for-profit organisation or a government department - 
eligibility is determined based on enforcement capabilities) (The Katoomba Group 2008; 
Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Marsh, Sokolove and Rhodes 1996). For example, the 
conservation easement held by CDFG for the Carlsbard Highlands Conservation Bank (one of 
the first in California), allows CDFG to enter the property unrestricted to carry out monitoring 
and compliance assurance investigations, the power to restrict activities with impacts not 
contingent with the property’s conservation aims and the rights to the air, mineral and water 
resources that are required to sustain and protect the biodiversity values (Toyon 
Environmental Consultants Inc., undated; USFWS 2009).   
2. The land is managed in perpetuity to maintain conservation values and meet aims directed by 
regional conservation strategies, where available. Management actions range from the 
minimum requirement of maintaining fences, signs, rubbish control and security patrols, to 
active conservation inputs such as weed control, vegetation enhancement or breeding-site 
facilitation (Toyon Environmental Consultants Inc., undated). These perpetual management 
actions are detailed and stipulated in a long-term management plan (Studt, Sokolove and 
Rhodes 1996; USFWS 2009). Funds to support this management must also be provided in 
perpetuity, required prior to the sale of credits and usually provided through a non-wasting 
endowment similarly to the New South Wales Trust Fund mechanism described above (Marsh, 
Sokolove and Rhodes 1996; Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; USFWS 2009). The total fund 
deposit required must be provided upfront, or within a few (set) years of the bank opening, as 
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per the formal banking contact (See section 5.1.2 - 7, Chapter 5) (Carroll, Fox and Bayon 
2008; The Katoomba Group 2008; USFWS 2009). 
3. Credit pricing based on free market mechanisms. Strength of the conservation banking system 
is based on the requirement that credits are traded according to free-market principles (Toyon 
Environmental Consultants Inc., undated; Katoomba Group 2008; Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008; 
Californian Government Department of Fish and Game, 2009; Masden, Carroll and Moore 
Brands 2010). The sale price of the credits is determined by seller and constrained by the 
amount the buyer is prepared to pay. Price is naturally capped based on the competing costs, 
incurred if developers themselves conducted the conservation and mitigation actions. Credits 
are considered a “quantification of the species’ or habitat’s conservation values within a 
conservation bank” (p 25 Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008) and as such, the value of each credit 
is specific to the bank to which it pertains and the species/habitat within (USFWS 2009).  
 
             3 .3.2.2 The process of  bank creat ion 
 
The overall goal of the conservation banking industry is to further the objectives of the ESA; 
namely promote the recovery of endangered species. Conservation is defined in the ESA as:  
 
“… the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring about any 
endangered or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to 
the ESA are not longer necessary.” 
p. 10 Carroll, Fox and Bayon (2008) 
 
Credits may be quantified with the assistance of available conservation plans or strategies 
(Marsh, Sokolove and Rhodes 1996; Environmental Law Institute 2007). Relevant experts use 
numerous methodologies to compile the necessary reports relating to the values of the 
proposed bank site (or development impact site). These are submitted to the agencies for 
credit calculation, and must clearly define the methodology used. Approval may be processed 
when information is verified and the above conditions met. The banking arrangement is placed 
under contract through a Conservation Bank Agreement (as required by the USFWS) or a Bank 
Enabling Instrument (for Mitigation Banking under the USACE) (The Katoomba Group 2008)49. 
A Conservation Banking Agreement stipulates the credits the bank is authorised to sell, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 For templates see Carroll, Fox and Bayon (2008) and US Army Corps of Engineers Alexandria (2006) 
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exact geographic location of the bank site, the habitats and species expected to benefit from 
the conservation actions, and the ‘trading or service area’ that the credits from the bank can 
be sold within (US Army Corps of Engineers Alexadria 1996; USFWS 2003, 2009;). Some 
banks may be designed based on specific species credits, and purchasers would be buying 
these credits to offset impacts on specific listed species. Alternatively, banks may provide a 
habitat bank where purchasers are looking to offset impacts to specific habitat types, such as 
vernal pools, and not to offset impacts to specific species (e.g. Wildlands Inc. in Sacramento; 
Toyon Environmental Consultants Inc., undated).  
 
The management plan detail the land ownership and endowment status of the bank lands, 
parties taking responsibility for the management actions and the details of the Management 
Plan (Studt and Sokolove 1996; Toyon Environmental Consultants undated). Also specified are 
the management actions occurring before and after the establishment of the bank, the actions 
to be taken to maintain the values conserved and the monitoring and reporting to accompany 
these actions. Management Plans will also provide evidence of the supporting perpetual 
financial arrangements (the Endowment), as above (Toyon Environmental Consultants Inc. 
undated; Denisoff 2008; USFWS 2009).  
 
Together with Mitigation Banking, Conservation Banking in the United States has spurred 
development of a new industry and economy, particularly in California (ten Kate, Bishop and 
Bayon 2004; Bayon Carroll and Fox 2008; EPA 2010; Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 
2010). Earlier projects attracted some negative attention, directed at the original wetland 
mitigation banks (Mead 2008). Recent success, attributed to improvement and refinement 
upon past discrepancies, has attracted attention from multiple international interests looking to 
learn from the failures, and now recent successes (Bayon, Carroll and Fox 2008; USFWS 2009; 
EPA 2010). There is growing interest from investment institutions and investors not previously 
active in conservation now wanting to invest money in this developing industry (Masden, Carroll 
and Moore Brands 2010). Positive attention is not unfounded. Banks opened prior to 2000 
are sold out of credits (indicating a strengthening, active market for credits) and at least 
66,400 ha (164,000 acres) are estimated as protected and/or restored under a Conservation 
Banking Agreement. Transactions within the market are estimated to contribute to an overall 
mitigation market in excess of 1 billion US annually, making a substantial contribution to 
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California’s and the United States’ GDP50 (The Katoomba Group; Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008; 
EPA 2010). Conclusive, quantitative, scientifically robust evidence of the long-term 
environmental impacts of the scheme remains to be published at time of research (Wilkinson, 
Thompson and Thompson 2006; The Katoomba Group 2008), yet current operations offer 
substantial optimism for the conservation of the United States’ environments and ecosystems 
through biodiversity banking mechanisms (Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008; USFWS 2009; 
Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010). 
 
3 .4  IN SUMMARY:  THE OFFSET BANKING MODEL 
 
While demonstrating context-specific components, offset banking systems in both California 
and New South Wales demonstrate how the various components of offset banking may be 
brought together. Such examples illustrate how systems are established: a range of 
biodiversity-related credits are created, traded and regulated to mitigate residual negative 
environmental impacts of development projects, with a focus on achieving collective 
conservation outcomes. These observations of California and New South Wales provide 
valuable guidance to New Zealand in understanding the foundational components of offset 
banking. This supports analysis appropriate for contextually specific New Zealand design, and 
developing potential for an offset banking system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Note the 2010 publication by Masden, Carroll and Moore Brands, stating that there are 615 active or sold out banks 
currently, protecting or restoring 24,000 annually, representing a cumulative figure of 700,00 acres in total and estimates 
of total payments being made across the US being 2.4 Billion annually.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RISK WITHIN THE OFFSET BANKING SYSTEM (BIOLOGICAL RISK) 
 
4 .0  INTRODUCTION TO A TR IPART ITE FRAMEWORK OF OFFSET BANKING R ISK 
 
The term risk refers to the perceived likelihood of undesirable outcomes. Sustainable development 
systems such as offset banking are a response to risk: a solution offered to reduce biodiversity loss 
and the negative consequences that may result. However, if offset banking fails to deliver intended 
outcomes, then biodiversity values will still be lost. Such potential risk of offset banking, both perceived 
and present, requires consideration and must be addressed to make offset banking a successful 
sustainable development tool. Proper understanding of the origin and nature of risks within offset 
banking is essential.  
 
Poor decisions, management and conservation outcomes in the past have generated scepticism of new 
approaches with concern that they represent a situation where the stakes are high, and risk of failure is 
a great concern. The nature of this ‘risk’ debate can be broadly summarised as the likelihood that 
offset banking does not achieve the objectives intended, and fails to stop biodiversity loss (Bonnie and 
Wilcove 2008). Successful offsetting is based upon a comprehensive understanding and recognition of 
risk. With understanding, effective risk mitigation and management is possible. The following chapters 
(4, 5 and 6) address the many forms of risk present in offset banking (Gardner and Radwan 2005).  
 
Chapter 4 begins discussions from the perspective of the systems’ biological components. I introduce 
concepts of offset banking risk, first broadly categorising sources of risk within offset banking as 
potential loss of biodiversity (section 4.1) and risk present due to uncertainty in scientific knowledge 
(section 4.4.). This establishes a broader basis for the risk mitigation discussion following each of 
these overviews. Risk may also be present for financial/legal reasons or through the behaviour of 
humans or society; this is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Examples taken from the 
Californian and New South Wales systems illustrate mechanisms that are used in design and 
implementation of offset banking to address these risks.  
 
To discuss the risks presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 two important points must be recognised. First, 
biodiversity conservation must consider the ecological, economic and social background within which 
offset banking occurs to achieve maximum efficiency and efficacy within the system (Gunningham and 
Young 1997; Hartig and Drechsler 2009). This is the basis for conceptual division of Chapters 4, 5 and 
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6 - biological failure, financial failure and human failure - and reflects offset banking as a sustainable 
development mechanism. Environmental, economic and societal risks must be balanced so that 
maximisation of one of these aspects does not undesirably affect the others. Reducing risks within 
offset banking must be appropriate to the balance of sustainable development and is a fundamental 
context for risk mitigation discussions.  
 
Secondly, measures must consider risk relatively and comparatively. Discussion of risk must occur in 
the context of risks present in other options for biodiversity conservation more widely, rather than 
focusing on risk in isolation (Stephens 1999; Spieles 2005; Mack and Micacchion 2006; Bekessy et al., 
2010). Specifically, an alternative option may be to continue with current conservation practices and 
mechanisms. Another is to adopt some potentially risky but potentially beneficial sustainable 
development mechanisms such as offset banking. A third option may exist, where debate continues 
without final decisions, potentially carrying far greater risk as biodiversity loss irrefutably continues. 
This perspective is also important when considering offset banking for specific sites and development 
impacts. Perceived risks must be assessed based on alternatives present, giving particular regard to 
the risk of biodiversity loss because values are expected to continue to decline without conservation. 
Without development providing an offset opportunity, a status quo of no conservation can be expected 
to persist so values will continue to decline and the risk of biodiversity loss will be realised regardless.  
 
With this thesis’ context of implementing offset banking, I discuss offset banking tools as fundamental 
components of risk mitigation: each has been proposed, developed or applied with the underlying 
requirement that risk is reduced when it is applied, given informed understanding and consideration. 
Risk mitigation is the underlying requirement that links discussion of the offset banking components 
discussed in these chapters. Without adequate understanding of the reasons for applying these tools it 
is unlikely that they will be utilised with maximum efficiency, effectiveness and success. Recognising this 
is fundamental to properly applying offset banking tools. If risks within offset banking are approached 
through informed application of the mechanisms reviewed here, then offset banking is able to offer a 
sustainable development option where definable and manageable risks are outweighed by significant 
benefits, for overall success for biodiversity in the landscape.   
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4.0.1 Recognis ing prev ious losses:  why do banks fa i l?  
 
Examples of unsuccessful banking operations to date have demonstrated the distinct risk that a bank 
will fail to achieve suitable outcomes (Gardner and Radwan 2005). Some suggest the offsetting 
premise is inherently flawed; others have used unsuccessful examples as an opportunity to refine and 
progress the system for the future (DeWeese 1994; Redmond et al 1996; Turner, Redmond and Zedler 
2001; Robb 2002; Mack and Micacchion 2006; Hallwood 2007; Gibbons and Lindenmayer 2007; EDO 
2007b, 2008b).  
 
Studies have shown that projects may fail to reach ecological criteria and therefore mitigation 
outcomes (Spieles 2005; Spieles, Coneybeer and Horn 2006; Robertson 2004). Based on evaluation 
of ecological status of 45 wetland mitigation sites across 21 States of America, Spieles (2005) 
demonstrated shortfalls in appropriately meeting criteria (the prevalence of wetland vegetation, the 
pervasiveness of non-native species, and plant species richness) during study time frames, mostly 
between 5 - 10 years (Spieles 2005; Spieles, Coneybeer and Horn 2006).  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of ecological compliance assessments available in 1996 as reviewed by Spieles 
2005 p. 12 
Source State Data 
Allan and Feddma 1996 California 43% of 75 wetland mitigation banks met all 
success criteria 
Cole and Shafer 2002 Pennsylvania 62% of 13 mitigation sites were judged successful 
by authors 
Morgan and Roberts 2003 Tennessee 40% of 50 mitigation projects met the area 
requirements 
4% of 50 mitigation projects met all permit 
requirements 
Robb 2002 Massachusetts 64% all mitigation sites (various habitat types) 
successful 
Brown and Veneman 2001 Massachusetts 65% of 114 sites were in compliance 
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Table 4.2: Summary of findings from reviews of permit compliance 
Source State F ind ings 
Redmond et al., 1996 Composite 30% of required mitigation projects not 
implemented 
Low rates of compliance with mitigation plan 
27% of projects deemed ecologically successful 
Potential for ecological success in 63% (with 
remedial action) 
Turner, Redmond and Zelder 
2001 
Orange 
County, CA 
80 permits between 1985 - 93: 30 met permit 
conditions, 19 met some, 6 met none, 13 
uncompleted, 2 not attempted. 
Robb 2002 Indiana High rates of non-compliance 
Mack and Micacchion 2006; 
Committee on Mitigating 
Wetland Losses et al. (2001) 
Ohio Compliance rate of 66.6%; result of poor design, 
planning and/or inappropriate/insufficient 
management 
Race and Fonseca 1996 Florida High rates of non-compliance  
 
Studies have also discussed why such a shortfall in ecological criteria may have occurred, supported by 
a number of reviews of early wetland mitigation in the United States (Table 4.1) (Gardner and Radwan 
2005). McElfish and Nicholson (1996) contribute three possible reasons for failure. Firstly, the 
projects are improperly designed or constructed due to ill-informed decisions particularly surrounding 
soils, hydrology, plant selection, or offsite effects. Secondly, regulating agencies did not enforce or 
monitor to an adequate standard due to resources or leverage capacities (Hallwood 2007). Thirdly, 
damage sometimes occurred after the project was established; a result of human error (unintentional 
or intentional), or natural causes.  
 
Optimism is possible however. Successful examples have largely been attributed to many of the 
reasons favouring the offset banking approach: economies of scale and the consolidation of scientific, 
planning, management resources (Mack and Micacchion 2006). Importantly, some of this early 
evidence is based on examples independent of a truly free-market banking framework. If made 
possible, third-party bankers can assist mitigating risks identified in early failures. It is suggested they 
introduce more defined liability, easing enforcement and more stringent regulation of management 
plans. This allows earlier intervention where planned actions are poorly designed or ill-informed 
(Redmond et al., 1996). Comparative analyses have investigated the risk of bank failure in relation to 
failure within alternative offsetting approaches (Spieles 2005; Roberston and Hayden 2008; Mack and 
Micacchion 2006). Such research supports the opinion that while demonstrated risks are present in 
offset banking, it offers notable benefits and reduced risk of negative outcomes when analysed this 
way.  
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4.0.2 Contro l lab le  and uncontro l lab le  r isk  
 
When considering the biology-related components to the risk within an offset banking system, a 
primary issue is the broad concern that the biological values (i.e. the biodiversity) continue to be lost 
over the course of the schemes’ operation. There are many reasons why the biological components 
may fail in this way. Therefore there are also many measures possible to try and avert this failure and 
mitigate this risk. When considering a multitude of risks and responding measures it is valuable to 
distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable risks, so that the most appropriate and effective 
mechanisms are applied (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996).  
 
Controllable risks are those for which the margin of error is known51. The exact outcome may not be 
initially predicted with any more certainty, but the range of values it may take may be confidently 
estimated, supported by previous observation and/or empirical testing. Alternatively, in situations with 
limited information, such as when new approaches are being trailed, such parameters are unlikely to be 
known and the associated risk of failure may be considered uncontrollable. In these situations, not only 
is the final outcome uncertain, but there is limited knowledge regarding what the possible outcomes 
may be, the factors that influence the outcomes, or the relative likelihood of outcomes expected.  
 
Knowing the factors and likelihood related to different outcomes has direct implications for a decision-
maker’s capacity to implement risk mitigation measures. Offset banking decisions may include how 
many seedlings to plant, or how large an area to manage to achieve a desired biodiversity outcome. If 
information is available, risks are controllable and it may be possible to determine the number of 
seedlings or area of management large enough to reduce the risk where should realistic seedling or 
management failure occur, this can occur without significantly jeopardising biodiversity values overall. 
However, without information supporting calculations of expected failure, risks are deemed 
uncontrollable and it is not possible to calculate the increase in seedlings or area that effectively 
reduces the risk. Arguably, without appropriate knowledge, arbitrarily increasing seedlings or managed 
area actually increases risk, as there are more values that may be lost. It is possible to apply a similar 
analogy to decisions relating to financial and social aspects of biodiversity management, such as 
contract and employment selection, or expenditure and investment decisions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Note the distinction made by Daly and Farley (2004) where: “Risk: the known probability (relative frequency) of 
occurrences of an event. Risk is insurable. See Uncertainty…a situation in which we may know the range of possible 
outcomes but do not know the probability distribution of outcomes. Uncertainty is uninsurable. See risk [Glossary, pg. 439 
and 44]” (2004).   
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With adequate information and controllable risks, risk-mitigation techniques are available. In the 
absence of appropriate information, alternatives must be applied. Broadly, controllable risks may be 
mitigated through application of margins (such as number of seedlings planted, or units of area 
managed) that accommodates risk within the system to a level no longer threatening the broader aims. 
Uncontrollable risk may be mitigated by enforcement of rules or parameters, or interventionist 
approaches, such as seedling fertilisation or adaptive management and monitoring of the managed 
area. It is important to recognise these different manifestations of risk and corresponding responses, 
as the application of an inappropriate mechanisms is likely to be ineffective, or at worse, counter-
productive.  
 
Risks relating to previous failure and underlying uncertainties are exemplified here in relation to 
biological, financial and social concerns. The variety techniques for risk mitigation necessarily part of 
system design and operation address one but sometimes several of these components. Discussed 
bellow is risk and risk mitigation in relation to biological issues within offset banking.   
 
4.1 B IOLOGICAL RISK:  THE RISK OF LOSS 
 
4.1.1 The No-Net-Loss parad igm 
 
No Net Loss (NNL) is one of the most important concepts in offset banking as it is the primary way that 
risk of increased biodiversity loss is addressed (Bendor 2009).  It draws on the assumption that 
achieving a NNL policy will minimise the risk of biodiversity loss.  In many cases NNL is a scheme’s 
overarching goal (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). In some contexts intended outcomes extend to a net 
positive balance, or increase in biodiversity; terms net-gain, ecological lift or additionality are also used 
(Robertson 2004; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Under NNL, biodiversity lost due to negative 
development impacts are replaced through offset banking in a manner that ensures the overall balance 
of biodiversity is not reduced. While being the central tenet of the biodiversity offsetting and banking, 
the concept of NNL is also the most widely debated (Thom, Williams and Diefenderfer 2005; Fleischer 
and Fox 2008; Moilanen et al., 2008; Bendor 2009). Various principles, approaches and mechanisms 
have been developed and applied as a result. These are summarily described bellow as their proper 
application requires a competent understanding of how they work so potential misapplication and 
undesired outcomes can be avoided. 
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4.1.1.1 No Net  Loss in space:  the importance of  sca le   
 
To understanding how the NNL concept is applied, it is necessary to consider the spatial scale at which 
losses or gains are occurring. NNL may be considered on numerous levels of biodiversity such as: an 
individual member of a species, an individual impact, an individual offset banking site, the dynamics of 
a species’ population or metapopulation, at the level of the viability of the species or ecosystem over a 
landscape or more widely, or over an entire distribution (Bruggeman et al., 2009; Hartig and Drechsler 
2009).  
 
As offset banking facilitates the replacement of one patch of biodiversity by another in a differing 
location within a landscape, there is risk that although the values themselves will be inadequately 
replaced between sites, the landscape level processes and values will be altered, facilitating broader-
scale biodiversity loss and frustrating the NNL objective (Bruggeman et al., 2008; Palmer and Filoso 
2009; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010; Hillman and Instone 2010). Landcape-level processes such as 
fragmentation and connectivity; edge, buffer and matrix effects; heterogeneity, patch dynamics and 
dispersal have significant influence when considering the viability and existence of species (Huxel and 
Hastings 1999; Laurance et al., 2002; Sanderson et al., 2002; Burgman, Lindermayer and Mayer 
2005; Burgman et al., 2009; Hartig and Drechsler 2009; Samways Bazelet and Pryke 2010; Watts and 
Handley 2010). Consideration of NNL at one scale does not assure comprehensive NNL at another, so 
mitigation of risk though NNL principles is advised to consider multiple spatial scales (Robertson and 
Hayden 2008; BBOP 2009f; Bendor 2009). 
 
System dynamics modelling (Bendor, 2009) such as assessing NNL after aggregating multiple offsets 
across a landscape, has demonstrated how broader-scale perspectives more appropriately reflects 
whether NNL is being achieved. This analysis concluded that despite NNL occurring within individual 
projects, even small levels of loss can result in significant biodiversity losses when accumulated on 
aggregated scales (Bendor 2009). 
 
Offset banking encourages the consideration of NNL from broader cumulative and landscape levels, 
compared to non-banking offset approaches52. It holds potential as a mechanism to effectively mitigate 
risk of broad-scale biodiversity loss by providing superior economies of scale both biologically and 
economically (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). Offset banking supports forward planning and coordinated 	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decision-making with the aggregation of biodiversity so that important landscape-level processes, such 
as connectivity, larger patch sizes and optimal spatial configurations can be accommodated and 
maintained to the benefit of the biology and economics concerned (Huxel and Hastings 1999; 
Laurance et al., 2002; White 2008; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). Design of an offset banking system offers 
an approach to reduce risks posed by the multiple scales of ecology within biological systems.  
 
4.1.1.2  No Net  Loss in t ime:  tempora l  lags 
 
Risk of disparity between values banked and those they are designed to replace may also be viewed 
from a temporal perspective (Kiesecker et al. 2009; Hillman and Instone 2010). If the conservation 
actions are undertaken prior to or concurrently with the development’s impact on biodiversity, time lags 
may represent a significant risk (Robertson and Hayden 2008; Bedward et al. 2009; Bendor 200953). 
Generally, a development project destroys certain biodiversity values completely, almost 
instantaneously. Actions to offset this loss are initiated, yet mitigation involving restoration or re-
creation of biodiversity values will take time to produce replacement values because of the time 
required for biological process, such as translocation, dispersal, individual and population 
establishment, growth and reproduction to occur (Bendor 2009). It is not possible to reverse the 
damage of the impact if it is discovered some time later that the conditions of the mitigation project 
(bank or offset) have changed and no longer represent the values destroyed (Bekessy et al., 2010). A 
temporal gap introduces risk that some or all replacement values may be lost, or fail to be recreated 
due to chance, unpredicted elements or catastrophic disruptions (EDO 2008b; Robertson and Hayden 
2008; Bedward et al. 2009; Bendor 2009; Hammond-Deakin 2009; Bekessy et al., 2010). The risks 
posed by temporal gaps may be addressed within an offset banking system when credits are only 
available to offset impacts when the values meet appropriate levels and standards (Bendor 2009). 
Importantly, there also are circumstances in both case-study systems when credits may be issued prior 
to the conclusive establishment of these values54.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bendor 2009 summarizes temporal risk as three components: Temporal loss is comprised of three things 
1) time gap between actions; 2) time taken to restore; 3) risk that the site fails. 
54 While it is biologically desirable to demonstrate the existence of values prior to credit issuance and trade, there are some 
circumstances in which it is advantageous to issue and trade credits prior to fully replacement of values. This is an 
important aspect of risk mitigation, both biologically and financially and is discussed in section 5.6.3.1, Chapter 5. 
	   83	  
4.1.1.3  No Net Loss in the landscape:  the cumulat ive outcomes 
 
Whether NNL loss is achieved across various spatial and temporal scales is the focus of much debate. 
Critics of offsetting and offset banking actions to date suggest that NNL policies currently in place 
around the world may not deliver NNL at macro scales, such as over multiple years, or entire 
landscapes (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Hillman and Instone 2010). BBOP (2009e) raises concerns as 
to whether NNL will continue to be achieved over time and whole landscapes, as it depends on the 
policies and mechanisms that are used to achieve NNL. 
 
 As offset banking occurs over time and depending on the approaches employed, space within a 
landscape may be occupied either by patches of development (representing biodiversity removal) or 
the bank-site offsetting the impacts. Whether or not the final outcome achieves NNL once all space in a 
landscape is occupied by either land-use, depends on the actions employed under offset banking. 
Should each area unit of development be offset with one unit of area of biodiversity protection, the ‘end 
game’ landscape will be a composite of 50% development patches and 50% biodiversity patches; 
effectively only 50% of the biodiversity remains and consequently NNL is not achieved. Alternatively, if 
a unit of impact is offset with a unit of biodiversity that was not there previously (i.e. via restoration, 
enhancement or re-creation), BBOP argue that, within the bounds of ecological restoration and re-
creation science, a net balance of 0% habitat loss is possible through active restoration, not 
preservation alone (BBOP 2009e; Bekessy et al., 2010). Therefore debate concerning how to achieve 
NNL must consider a range of actions potentially included under offset banking (Bekessy et al., 2010).  
 
While the above argument may be based on NNL of habitat or biodiversity in unit area, it is possible to 
consider a situation where net area is reduced, but alternative conservation gains are made that 
produce an overall net increase more broadly in biodiversity values. This is of particular relevance in 
highly degraded areas, such as areas and ecosystems within New Zealand. Knowledge and 
understanding of the multiple scales of biology and biodiversity, and the importance of landscape level 
influences mean that increased species and habitat viability through improved gene-flow, increased 
breeding populations and other increases in fitness may be achieved through offset banking, and 
supporting NNL in biodiversity values despite a net loss of spatial area (Fleischer and Fox 2008).  
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4.1.1.4  Choice of  act ion to ach ieve NNL 
 
Conservation actions potentially applied under biodiversity offsetting such as preservation, protection, 
restoration, rehabilitation, enhancement, re-establishment, creation and recreation of biodiversity are 
debated in literature (Agius 2001; Spieles 2005; Spieles, Coneybeer and Horn 2006; Bonnie and 
Wilcove 2008; BBOP ODH 2009e; Bekessy et al., 2010). Given the differing potential of each to 
achieve NNL, prioritising these approaches in an offset banking system is of particular concern; also 
that specific conservation actions (e.g. tree-planting) be clarified according to these categories above 
(e.g. restoration versus rehabilitation). 
 
Kiesecker et al., (2009a) suggests that where development pressure threatens to increase removal of 
vegetation or draining of wetlands or other environmental degradation, it is very important to ensure 
that existing values do not succumb to these pressures. This accentuates the potential role for 
preservation such as increasing legal protection that reduces future development and risks posed by 
such impacts (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Kiesecker et al., 2009a).  
 
Walker, Price and Stephenson’s (2008) Index of Risk in New Zealand supported this conclusion with 
models demonstrating that the legal protection of land has a significant impact on the long-term 
existence of biodiversity values. Values located on private land under limited legal protection exhibit 
high levels of clearance and degradation so increasing the protection of such values is a pertinent 
focus. Preservation may not always be appropriate for achieving NNL however. If values concerned are 
under no threat of clearance or degradation, then protection and preservation may not achieve NNL 
(Fleischer and Fox, 2008). In the absence of the threat of destruction, preservation may still be 
relevant to consider where there is risk of degradation. Bonnie and Wilcove (2008) highlight that even 
under legislation restricting negative impacts to biodiversity there may be no impetus for landowners to 
prevent gradual decline. NNL in a landscape may be jeopardised by gradual decline of both protected 
and unprotected values, so appropriate steps must be taken to address this.  
 
Literature comparing the importance of preservation or restoration of biodiversity values suggests that 
optimally, conservation of biodiversity and avoidance of net loss at the landscape level ideally 
accommodates elements of both preservation and active restoration (Agius 2001; Bonnie and Wilcove 
2008; Maron et al., 2010).  This parallels recognition that achievement of banking objectives should 
not be assessed based on area alone (Turner, Redmond and Zedler 2001; Spieles 2005; Bendor 
2009; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Many aspects of the success or failure of early mitigation attempts in 
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the United States are assessed and discussed in literature, most importantly recognising that the 
consideration of NNL based exclusively on area lost versus area gained or preserved is inappropriate 
when the overall aim of offset banking is NNL of biodiversity values overall (Bendor 2009; Turner, 
Redmond and Zedler 2001; Spiele 2005; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
4 .1.1.5  Mi t igat ing r isks v ia  NNL pol icy :  internat ional  appl icat ions 
 
How does New South Wales’ policy address NNL? 
 
The NNL approach is widely adopted in international policies, such as California and New South Wales. 
The ‘improve or maintain’ test (IMT) within the Native Vegetation Act (2003) is introduced as the 
mechanism to achieve NNL in New South Wales, and requires the test to be satisfied (i.e. proposals to 
be considered ‘improving’ or ‘maintaining’ values) to allow development activities (Farrier, Kelly and 
London 2007; Hammond-Deakin 2009). Under this jurisdiction the improvement of the status quo is 
required in the first instance, with maintenance of values being the minimum acceptable standard (c.f. 
DEWR 2007).  
 
Section 3 states: “The objects of this Act are: 
(a) to provide for, encourage and promote the management of native vegetation on a regional basis in 
the social, economic and environmental interests of the State, and 
(b) to prevent broadscale clearing unless it improves or maintains environmental outcomes, and 
(c) to protect native vegetation of high conservation value having regard to its contribution to such 
matters as water quality, biodiversity, or the prevention of salinity or land degradation, and 
(d) to improve the condition of existing native vegetation, particularly where it has high conservation 
value, and 
(e) to encourage the revegetation of land, and the rehabilitation of land, with appropriate native 
vegetation, 
in accordance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development.” 
p. 2 NVA (2003) 
 
The Scheme’s Biodiversity Assessmen Methodology (BAM) prescribes the calculations to determine 
whether actions proposed meet the IMT. It specifies how to quantify the values concerned and how to 
calculate the number and type of credits that need to be traded (between project proponent and 
Biobank credit owner) for the IMT to be satisfied (EDO 2007b; Farrier Kelly and Langdon 2007). A 
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Biobanking Statement can only be issued, and development impacts be offset by purchasing credits, 
once this has occurred (Hammond-Deakin 2009). Whether satisfying this test achieves NNL and risk 
mitigation as intended depends on how BAM’s design calculates test outcomes. Should the 
methodology’s design or application fail to reflect actual improve or maintain realities, then it is unlikely 
to truly reflect NNL of values (EDO 2007b). In this way the BAM is the primary risk-mitigation 
mechanism in the New South Wales system, and a powerful determinate of whether NNL is achieved 
and risk of biodiversity loss is mitigated.  
 
How does California policy address NNL? 
 
Bendor (2009) describes NNL with policies in The United States: 
 
“In 1987, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened the National Wetlands 
Policy Forum (NWPF), a wide array of stakeholders whose goal was to ‘address major policy concerns 
about how the nation should protect and manage its valuable wetlands resources (National Wetlands 
Policy Forum, 1988, p. vii).’ The forum attempted to refocus United States wetland regulation towards 
a policy of ‘no net loss,’ recommending that: 
‘...the nation establish a national wetlands protection policy to achieve no overall net loss of the 
nation’s remaining wet- land base, as defined by acreage and function, and to restore and create 
wetlands, where feasible, to increase the quality and quantity of the nation’s wetland resource base 
(National Wetlands Policy Forum, 1988, p. 3).’ 
Since the NWPF, the policy goal of ‘no net loss’ of wetlands has become a driving force behind 
wetlands management throughout the United States (Hansen, 2006) … In 1990, the Corps and EPA 
formally endorsed no net loss…(Corps and EPA, 1990).” 
 
The 1990 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of the Army and the Environmental 
Protection Agency recognises that it may not be possible to achieve this at the scale of all individual 
projects, but instead focuses on achieving this on a nation wide, ‘wetland base’ scale (MOA 1990). 
This document states that the most appropriate way of establishing or measuring NNL is through the 
use of professional judgement of the environmental lost or gain resulting from considered projects, 
owing to the complexity and high variability of wetland values across the country. Based on this 
information, regulatory agencies then make the decision as to whether NNL has been satisfied (This is 
in contrast to the prescribed, standardised approach of the NSW BAM).  
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Rather than requiring NNL, conservation banking system focuses on improving the conservation 
outcomes of listed species, through  
“…the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or 
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer 
necessary.” p. 2 ESA (1973) 
 
Transactions must further the conservation goals of the species and not place the species’ continued 
existence in jeopardy through loss or reduction in the species’ chances of survival, instead of being 
concerned with area, extent or quality (ESA USFWS 1973). Threats posed to the species’ existence 
under a given development proposal should be considered in relation to the species’ specific 
conservation needs such as corridors or breeding habitat requirements. This is in line with other non-
area based perspectives, which suggest that a measure of biodiversity values may not be directly 
proportional to the unit area of land occupied by said values (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Fleischer and 
Fox 2008).  
 
4 .1 .2 Mechanisms for  ach iev ing NNL:  the Mi t igat ion H ierarchy 
 
To achieve NNL in light of previous failures, a range of mechanisms concerned with the ecological 
components of the process and outcomes have been put in place in offset banking systems around the 
world. Some mechanisms attempt to circumvent potential losses before they occur. Others seek to 
account for biological risks within decision-making and design so that the potential for failure causes 
minimal jeopardy to overall NNL. A primary mechanism is adherence to the Mitigation Hierarchy, widely 
promoted within industry, and strongly supported in literature (Robb 2002; BBOP 2009a; BBOP 
2009f; 2010; Darbi et al., 2009; Bekessy et al 2010 PcW 2010; Christensen and Burge 2010). As with 
other NNL policies, the assumption underlying the Mitigation Hierarchy is that strict adherence to this 
policy will greatly reduce the risk of overall biodiversity loss. 
 
The importance of this concept is represented in BBOP’s offsetting principles55; point 3 of 10 states: 
“Adherence to the mitigation hierarchy: A biodiversity offset is a commitment to compensate for 
significant residual adverse impacts on biodiversity identified after appropriate avoidance, minimization 
and on-site rehabilitation measures have been taken according to the mitigation hierarchy.” 
p 9, BBOP (2009f) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See APPENDIX ONE: The Principles of Biodiversity Offsetting as described by various sources 
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The mitigation hierarchy represents a way to limit the risk of spatial loss of biodiversity values (as 
discussed in section 4.1.1. NNL in space: the importance of scale) (PwC 2010; Naumann, Vorerk and 
Brauer 2008). The hierarchy stipulates that only residual, unavoidable losses to biodiversity are 
addressed through banking. Optimally, the least amount of destruction of values at the impact site will 
prevent a geographic area achieving NNL or net gain at the expense of another region. Maintaining as 
many values in situ as possible attempts to minimise spatial reorientation (as per section 4.1.3) that 
may detrimentally disrupt important landscape processes, and risking biodiversity loss and failure of 
NNL (Palmer and Filoso 2009). 
 
The hierarchy has been described by numerous different publications, with varying terminology and 
through a range of interpretations (US FWS MOA 1990; Brown and Lant 1999; Koppel and Peters 
2004; EIL 2007; Moilanen et al., 2008; Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008; BBOP 2009a; Darbi et 
al., 2009; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). The Convention on Biological Diversity also recognises the 
significance of the mitigation hierarchy. Parties must include an unambiguous requirement for 
application of the mitigation hierarchy to achieve NNL and to be guided by the best practice 
established by BBOP (UNEP 2010).  
 
As an example of one approach, BBOP 2009a56 considers that: 
“The mitigation hierarchy is defined as: 
(a) Avoidance: measures taken to avoid creating impacts from the outset, such as careful spatial or 
temporal placement of elements of infrastructure, in order to completely avoid impacts on certain 
components of biodiversity. This results in a change to a ‘business as usual’ approach. 
(b) Minimisation: measures taken to reduce the duration, intensity and / or extent of impacts that 
cannot be completely avoided, as far as is practically feasible. 
(c) Rehabilitation / restoration: measures taken to rehabilitate degraded ecosystems or restore cleared 
ecosystems following exposure to impacts that cannot be completely avoided and / or minimised. 
(d) Offset: measures taken to compensate for any residual significant, adverse impacts that cannot be 
avoided, minimised and / or rehabilitated or restored, in order to achieve no net loss or a net gain of 
biodiversity. Offsets can take the form of positive management interventions such as restoration of 
degraded habitat, arrested degradation or averted risk, protecting areas where there is imminent or 
projected loss of biodiversity.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Note additional hierarchies in eftec, IEEP et al., 2010; PwC 2010; Darbi et al., 2009; Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 
2008 
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The term mitigation may be used to refer to the whole sequence of actions that are conducted within 
the hierarchy, or specifically related to particular step(s) (compare PwC 2010; BBOP 2009; Darbi et 
al., 2009). European perspectives most commonly consider mitigation to be the first two steps of 
avoidance and minimisation (Moilanen et al., 2008; see BBOP 2009 a, f; eftec, IEEP 2010). It is the 
final ‘mitigation’ step that offset banking is considered. In the North American context the term 
mitigation commonly refers specifically to the third step of offsetting and offset banking57 (MOA 1990; 
Robertson and Hayden 2008; Darbi et al., 2009; Moilanen et al., 2008; eftec, IEEP 2010).  
 
Notwithstanding different approaches to the mitigation hierarchy, a unifying characteristic is that offset 
banking should only be concerned with residual impacts remaining after the first two steps have been 
completed (EDO 2006a; Burgin 2008; Kiesecker et al. 2008; BBOP 2009a; Bekessy et al. 2010). It is 
incompatible with principles of NNL to consider offset banking as an isolated mechanism to address 
negative environmental impacts from development, without addressing avoidance and minimisation 
measures (BBOP 2009a; Darbi et al., 2009; Kiesecker et al., 2009; BAM DECC 2008).  
 
4.1.2.1  Apply ing the Mi t igat ion Hierarchy to min imise r isk :  making 
dec is ions to pr ior i t ise and progress.    
 
To apply the mitigation hierarchy to best effect there must be definition of how to progress through the 
steps. Decisions must be made about which of the range of avoidance, minimisation and mitigation 
actions to take (Christensen and Burge 2010). Actions considered need to be definitively attributed to 
a step in the hierarchy, so priorities may be established. Whether conservation actions such as land-
contouring, tree-planting or soil conservation are considered avoidance, minimisation or mitigation 
directly determines the priority actions should be conducted in. Prioritising actions incorrectly may 
mean the mitigation hierarchy is not properly applied, rendering NNL and risk-mitigation unsuccessful.   
 
Debate also surrounds how to clarify when it is appropriate to progress to the next step of the 
Mitigation Hierarchy, e.g. how is it established that an acceptable level of avoidance has occurred and 
minimisation should be then be addressed (Kisecker et al., 2008; Christensen and Burge 2010; PwC 
2010). Some perspectives support decision-making based on maximum benefit to a species or habitat 
where all possible actions should be taken at each step before proceeding to the next based on the 
assumption this represents the lowest risk and best possible outcome for biodiversity. At the extreme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See APPENDIX FIVE: Table comparing and distinguishing variation in definition of associated terms, across regions, and GLOSSARY for 
more on use of terms such as compensation. 
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of this perspective is complete avoidance by refraining from the development entirely (Christensen and 
Burge 2010). This is not in line with the additional sustainable development objectives however and 
forgoing some on-site measures of avoidance and minimisation in favour of offset banking may 
represent superior conservation gain when improved economies of scale, aggregation of ecological 
benefits, or the conservation of more valuable biodiversity is possible (White 2008; Kiesecker et al., 
2008; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). 
 
Actions within the hierarchy carry different costs and represent varying biodiversity gains. Choice of 
actions impact how much conservation gain is made for how much cost. Some perspectives support 
decisions based on economic efficiency: maximum gain possible for a given resources and financial 
input (MOA 1990; Kiesecker et al., 2008; Christensen and Burge 2010; see also DECCW). Alternatively, 
the degree to which impacts should be avoided may depend on the irreplaceably of the values 
concerned: highly irreplaceable values require higher prioritisation of avoidance measures (Kiesecker 
et al., 2008). Decision-making best occurs under the guidance of a strategic conservation plan 
(Kiesecker et al., 2008). Categorising a landscape based on development and conservation land-uses 
guided by prioritisation and broad-scale goals helps to identify areas where each step of the hierarchy 
(avoidance, minimisation and mitigation) can be optimally applied. Cumulative impacts may then be 
properly considered and offset options can be more flexible. Proponents argue this can increase 
assurances that decisions within the mitigation hierarchy can achieve NNL (Kiesecker et al., 2008). 
 
4.1.2.2  The Mi t igat ion H ierarchy in case stud ies 
 
How is the Mitigation Hierarchy applied in case study examples? 
 
New South Wales 
Operation within the step-wise mitigation hierarchy framework is an integral component of the 
Californian and New South Wales systems58.  New South Wales’ legislation requires adherence to a 
sequential process of mitigation and is an important component of the scheme’s success (EDO 2008b; 
see also DECCW).  
The BAM (DECC 2008) states: 
“The applicant for a Biobanking Statement is required to demonstrate that all cost-effective non-site 
measures to minimise any negative impacts of the development on biodiversity values are being, or will 	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be carried out (section 127ZL (4)(d) of the TSA Act). This includes both on-site and off-site (indirect) 
impacts. Before issuing a Biobanking Statement, the Director General must be satisfied that the 
applicant has demonstrated that all cost-effective on-site measures to minimise any negative impact of 
the development on on-site or off-site (indirect) biodiversity values are being or will be carried out. 
These measures may be included as conditions on a Biobanking Statement issued in respect of the 
development.” p. 7 BAM DECC (2008) 
 
Section 127ZK of the Threatened Species Act (1995), Section 127ZK, states:  
“(3) An application for a biobanking statement must be accompanied by… 
(b) a statement of any onsite measures that are proposed to be taken in connection with the 
development to minimise the impact of the development on biodiversity values” p. 89 
 
Additionally, under Section 127ZL of the same act: 
“In addition, the Director-General may refuse an application for the issue of a biobanking statement: 
… (d) if, in the opinion of the Director-General, the applicant has not demonstrated that all cost 
effective onsite measures to minimise any negative impact of the development on biodiversity values 
are being or will be carried out” p. 90 
 
Requirement to demonstrate prior minimisation measures is also included in provisions relating to red-
flag alternation59 and deferred retirement of credits60 (DECC 2008) however the first step of the 
hierarchy is not as extensively considered in New South Wales’ legislation.  
 
California 
In the United States, official documents require the following of a process identifiable as the mitigation 
hierarchy (USFSW 2003; MOA 1990; US Federal Register 60(228) 1995), termed ‘sequencing’ (Brown 
and Lant 1999). This is established under the CWA administering the wetland mitigation banking 
program (US Federal Register 60(228) 1995; MOA 1990; USFSW 2003): 
 
Part II (c) 1. “ Avoidance. Section 230.10(a) allows permit issuance for only the least 
environmentally damaging practicable alternative. The thrust of this section on alternatives is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For explanation of this term see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3 
60 This allows developers to purchase credits, but sell them on if they do not need them. This may occur if certain impacts 
were predicted at the initiation of the development, but did not come to pass. This may be a result of the nature of the 
development (inherent unpredictability) or operate as a mechanism to promote maximum on-site conservation measures by 
the development proponents. The more impact their development has, the more credits they will need to retire, the less 
they will be able to retain for re-sale and therefore return profit on. (DECC 2008). 
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avoidance of impacts. Section 230.10(a) requires that no discharge shall be permitted if there 
is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact 
to the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse 
environmental consequences. In addition, Section 230.10(a)(3) sets forth rebuttable 
presumptions that 1) alternatives for non-water dependent activities that do not involve 
special aquatic sites are available and 2) alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites 
have less adverse impact on the aquatic environment. Compensatory mitigation may not be 
used as a method to reduce environmental impacts in the evaluation of the least 
environmentally damaging practicable alternatives for the purposes of requirements under 
Section 230.10(a). 
2. Minimization. Section 230.10(d) states that appropriate and practicable steps to minimize 
the adverse impacts will be required through project modifications and permit conditions. 
Subpart H of the Guidelines describes several (but not all) means of minimizing impacts of an 
activity. 
Compensatory Mitigation. Appropriate and practicable compensatory mitigation is required for 
unavoidable adverse impacts which remain after all appropriate and practicable minimization 
has been required. Compensatory actions (e.g., restoration of existing degraded wetlands or 
creation of man-made wetlands) should be undertaken when practicable, in areas adjacent or 
continuous to the discharge site (on-site compensatory mitigation). If on-site compensatory 
mitigation is not practicable, off-site compensatory mitigation should be undertaken in the 
same geographic area if practicable (i.e., in close proximity and, to the extent possible, the 
same watershed). In determining compensatory mitigation, the functional values lost by the 
resource to be impacted must be considered. Generally, in-kind compensatory mitigation is 
preferable to out-of-kind. There is continued uncertainty regarding the success of wetland 
creation or other habitat development. Therefore, in determining the nature and extent of 
habitat development of this type, careful consideration should be given to its likelihood of 
success.” 
 
In the 1990 Memorandum of agreement between The Department of the Army and the Environmental 
Protection Agency states that in evaluating standard section 404 permit applications: 
 
“… information on all facets of a project, including potential mitigation, is typically gathered and 
reviewed at the same time. The Corps, except as indicated below, first makes a determination that 
potential impact have been avoided to the maximum extent practicable; remaining unavoidable impacts 
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will then be mitigated to the extent appropriate and practicable by requiring steps to minimize impacts, 
and, finally, compensate for aquatic resource values” Part II (c) 
 
This document also provides guidance as to how to determine when to progress through the steps, 
determining how much avoidance and minimisation is required prior to mitigation and banking based 
on the cost of the actions involved, the ability of current technology and logistics to deliver such 
actions.  
 
In the USFWS 2003 Memorandum on the guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of 
Conservation Banks, there is no reciprocal mention of the requirement for avoidance or minimisation 
within the conservation banking system (USFWS 2003 Memo. Guidance). Wetland mitigation aims for 
direct commensurate replacement whereas conservation banking aims more broadly to offset adverse 
impacts to species long-term conservation outcomes. USFWS (2003) recognition of this produces 
different policy goals and may explain the hierarchy’s absence. 
 
Notably, USFWS publications stipulate that conservation banking is not intended to be in place of 
avoiding and minimising effects on species onsite (USFWS 2009). They stipulate that banking is only 
approved for projects that would otherwise be approved (as they have satisfied other environmental 
and non-environmental criteria) but the on-site mitigation, if required, would be less ecologically 
advantageous compared to participation in conservation banking. Therefore, it is intended that banking 
may not be required if all possible avoidance and minimisation has already occurred (USFWS 2009).  
 
4.1.3 Approaches to  ach iev ing NNL:  restr ic t ions p laced on t rades v ia  
mi t igat ion rat ios 
 
When values are exchanged through offset banking credit trading, NNL may or may not occur. Rules 
governing such trades have commonly been put in place to mitigate this risk. In response to concerns 
detailed above regarding spatial re-arrangement and the balance of biodiversity values between 
regions, spatial limits have been placed on trading transactions within both the Californian and NSW 
systems. 
 
In California, each credit issued is accompanied by a description of its geographic trading area. Credits 
may only be sold to offset impacts occurring within this area. The area is defined by the regulatory 
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agencies and is influenced by the ecology of the values concerned such as species ranges, landscape-
level processes such as watersheds or formally recognised hydrological units, regional context and 
administrative or geopolitical considerations.  
 
In NSW, a credit profile accompanies each credit issued. This defines the nature of the credit, the 
specific ecosystem or species it relates to. Trading rules within the system stipulate that only matching 
credit-profiles may be traded. In some cases, exchanges can be made that offset an impact with a 
more valued or threatened credit type. It is intended that given the geographic nature of the 
parameters determining distribution of species and ecosystems, this will restrict the area over which 
trades are possible, without specifically defining geographic limitations.  
 
Other limits to spatial re-arrangement may be placed on credit trading via the use of ratios and these 
are widely used in biodiversity offsetting (Roberston and Hayden 2008; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008). 
Ratios have been calculated by dividing the present conservation values of a development site by the 
expected future conservation values of the banking area. For example, for one unit of lost biodiversity 
at the impact site, two units or more may be conserved through offset banking. This would be a 1:2 
mitigation ratio. (Robb 2002; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008Moilanen et al., 2008; Curnow and Fitz-Gerald, 
2006). Many different ratios have been developed, based on numerous policies, and are one way 
schemes differ in how they opperate and outcomes they produce. Consequently, ratios are at the 
centre of much of the debate surrounding offset banking (Brown and Lant 1999; Robb 2002; Walker et 
al. 2009;  Bonnie and Wilcove 2008).  
 
Ratios address risk mititgation through ensuring that if some element of bank is lost or unsuccessful, 
more values remain conserved than were destroyed at the impact site. The additional values included 
as a result of applying the trading ratio acts as a buffer, maintaining a satisfactory level of conservation 
for mitigation, despite loosing (or not acheiving) some banked values  (Shabman, Scodari and King 
1996; Walker et al., 2009). Therefore, the ratio used ideally relates directly to the level of risk present 
(ESFWS 2003; Turner 2005; Roberston and Hayden 2008; see also Toyon Environmental Consutants 
undated;). If there is a 50% risk of mitigation failure, then it is appropriate to conduct 50% additional 
mitigation to account for this, and apply a 1:2 ratio. However, significant prior knowledge is required to 
establish the risk of failure and derive the appropriate ratio (see Roberston and Hayden 2008).  
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4.1.3.1  Observat ion,  exper ience and conservat ion act ion choice regard ing 
rat ios  
 
One way of using prior information is via the application of ratios to account for failure of banks to meet 
compliance standards. Harper and Quigley (2006b) observed rates of mitigation [compliance] failure 
within Canadian Fisheries and calculated the ratio at which mitigation should be required so that overall 
outcomes for mitigation were likely. Their study identified significant rates of non-compliance and failure 
to mitigate, and calculated that to overcome the observed rates of failure, a 2.5:1 ratio of 
compensation was appropriate (see also Robb 2002).  
 
Observation from experience and/or research is important for selecting different ratios which may be 
applied to address other forms and levels of risk (Robb 2002; USFWS 2003; Roberston and Hayden 
2008; Toyon Environmental Consultants undated). Prior to creation, it can be extremely difficult to 
predict the likelihood that a particular mitigation bank fails, and how certain or uncertain such 
predictions are (Moilanen et al., 2009). The various actions that offset banking may carry different 
levels of uncertainty and risk of failure. This is because some actions (e.g. restorative, rehabilitative, 
enhancing or preservative actions) are more complex or technically difficult to conduct (Brown and 
Lant 1999; ELI 2007; Palmer and Filoso 2009; Toyon Environmental Consultants undated).  
 
Additionally, where there is knowledge and prior experience more is known about correct techniques 
and approaches, making positive outcomes far more likely than when applying untested approaches 
(McElfish and Nicholas 1996). This relates to controllable and uncontrollable risk where the various 
actions required will likely carry varying levels of risk, and have varying levels of certainty attached to 
such risks. If aspects of conservation techniques are untested, this form of uncertainty may mean that 
it may not be possible to estimate satisfactory ratios, so approaches other than trading ratios may be 
required (Walker et al., 2009).  
 
4 .1.3.2  Rat ios as mi t igat ion of  tempora l  r isk  
 
It has previously been common practice to apply ratios to account for temporal lags, as discussed 
above (Robb 2002; Roberston and Hayden 2008; Bendor 2009; Walker et al., 2009). The extent of 
this temporal gap depends on the actions involved with mitigation, so different ratios are often applied 
according to mitigation type. Preservation actions present limited temporal risk as the values 
concerned exist at time zero with any accompanying management actions being arguably less 
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speculative and unlikely to reduce values from current levels. Restoration, rehabilitating or 
enhancement activities present a greater level of risk, as there may be some temporal gap while 
actions effectively create biodiversity values commensurate with impacts (Toyon Environmental 
Consultants undated; Morris et al., 2006). When mitigation involves creating values not present at a 
given location, the temporal lag may be extensive. As there are no values currently present to assist 
establishment and creation, and none will exist if proposed actions are unsuccessful, this mitigation 
option represents the greatest level of risk (Morris et al. 2006; Walker et al. 2009).  
 
The presence of temporal risk often operates in addition to other forms of risk or uncertainty and so 
ratios may be additive. When combining multiple forms of risk within a trading ratio, it must be 
considered that preservation presents reduced temporal risk as values are already present in the 
landscape prior to impact and mitigation. Preservation also offers less risk reduction when biodiversity 
is lost, as preservation does not actively ‘add’ values to the landscape. Comparatively, restoration 
carries increased temporal risk, but equates to increased risk reduction as biodiversity values are 
actively increased, offering a superior balance to negative impacts. The complex way in which multiple 
forms of risk are expressed in mitigation ratios means that arriving at an appropriate mitigation ratio 
for a given setting is challenging and often debated (Brown and Lant 1999; Stein, Tabatabai and 
Ambrose 2000; Robb 2002; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Walker et al., 2009).    
 
4.1.3.3  Mul t ip ly ing,  d iscount ing and weight ing 
 
Ratios may also be applied in response to concerns that the values being traded between impact and 
offset sites are not commensurate (Nelson and Sharman 2007; Bendor 2009; Moilanen et al., 2009). 
The magnitude or nature of the gains made through mitigation may be deemed less valuable than the 
complete loss of values occurring at the impact site. Alternatively, policy alone may dictate that any loss 
of values must be considered to be more significant compared to any proposed gains (Bendor 2009). 
In this case, ratios may be adjusted through multipliers, discounting or weighting (Nelson and Sharman 
2007). These terms may be broadly defined as methods to adjust a given ratio up or down to account 
for increases or decreases in a range of risk types (for examples see, Nelson and Sharman 2007; 
BBOP 2009d, e, f; Bendor 2009; Moilanen et al. 2009; Bekessy et al. 2010; EDO 2010b). These 
additional adjustments may significantly increase the complexity of determining ratios, but increase 
flexibility, more effectively responding to diverse contexts.  
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4.1.3.4  Rat ios and trades based on area-uni ts :  for  example,  in  Ca l i forn ia 
 
Once ratios have been determined, the next step is to equate a unit of trade. Many trading units are 
suggested, with differing capacity to represent NNL of biodiversity. A common approach is to trade a 
unit of area such as feet, acres or hectares (Brown and Lant 1999; Stein, Tabatabati and Ambrose 
2000; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Bendor 2009; Toyon Environmental Consultants undated). Brown and 
Lant (1999) describe early mitigation banking arrangements where ratios were applied in lieu of 
adequate ecosystem assessment techniques and therefore based on area of wetland trade with ratios 
of 2:1 for restoration and up to 10:1 for preservation-only projects.  
 
California and the United States use a process of best professional judgement, along with an area-basis 
model, to determine ratios (USFWS 2003; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008). Mitigation ratios based on area 
are used at the Wildlands Mitigation Bank in Placer County, California (Toyon Environmental 
Consultants, undated). The bank comprises three phases of establishment, a total of 323 acres and a 
combination of restoration and creation of marsh, vernal pool and woodland ecosystems and multiple 
species. The regulating agencies, USACE and CDFG, stipulated that for newly created or less significant 
values a higher ratio was to be applied with more acres conserved per credit. As values were 
established and conservation outcomes became assured ratios were adjusted from 2 or 3 acres per 
credit, to 1:1 (Toyon Environmental Consultants, undated).  
 
Increasing the size of the bank area compared to the area of impact is an appropriate mechanism to 
address the temporal lags and associated risks. This is based on the prediction that increase in 
wetland size (area) directly increases wetland function. Assuming a logarithmic relationship, over time 
a large area of wetland will increases functionality at a faster rate than a smaller one (Bendor 2009; 
see also Turner 2005). 
 
4.1.3.5  A l ternat ives to area-based rat ios and trades:  an example f rom NSW 
 
Particularly when applied to non-wetland ecosystems, equating greater area with greater conservation 
value has underlain criticism of area-based trading and ratios, based on suggestions the area-based 
approach is less scientifically defensible and problematic regarding consistency, replication and 
transparency. Focus should instead be turned to functional assessment of values (Brown and Lant, 
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1999; Stein, Tabatabai and Ambrose 2000; Morris et al., 2006; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Burggeman 
and Jones, 2008; Moilanen et al., 2008; Robertson and Hayden, 2008).  
 
Breeding pairs of animals or specific habitat attributes, such as enough area for an individual burrow or 
territory, have been used as an alternative unit of trade (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008). The 220-acre 
gopher tortoise bank in Alabama sold over 60 credits by 2001, with credits issued based on how many 
individuals the proposed bank could support, and purchaser requirements based on how many gopher 
tortoises a proposed development would impact (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008). Similar arrangements 
have been put in place for Prairie dog and Red Cockaded Woodpecker banks (Bonnie and Wilcove, 
2008).  
 
Bonnie and Wilcove (2008) further suggest that in the presence of appropriate scientific knowledge, 
assessment may be optimally based upon survivability of the species and Population Viability Analysis 
(PVA), but note the high resource and financial costs involved with developing supporting information 
for this approach. Alternatively, measurement techniques such as the Integrated Functional Index can 
be combined with units of area to produce an ‘effective area’ unit and ratio for trade. 
 
What credit trading ratios are used in NSW? 
 
Credits are traded through the NSW scheme at a 1:1 ratio (see Chapter 3 for a description of the 
scheme). Credits relate to ecosystem or species values rather than unit area although the presence of 
exchange means that it is possible to make area-based calculations of ratios, as demonstrated in Box 
4.1. A location with biodiversity values may be assessed from the perspective of generating credits as 
a Biobank but may also be assessed to determine how many credits would be debited if the site were 
developed and the values removed. Two different credit calculations may potentially result. Comparing 
credit calculations on both sides of the trade in this way (credits to sell and to buy), and combining this 
with the physical area (unit size) of a specific unit of land, it is possible to observe a credit trading ratio 
for a given circumstance (see example Box 4.1). 
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Box 4.1 Credit trading and possible ratio calculation under the New South Wales Scheme 
Example A:  
One hectare of land contains a set of biodiversity values. It is assessed using the Credit Calculator and 
Assessment Methodology under a development proposal (creating a negative biodiversity impact). It is 
also assessed under a proposal to create a Biobank. As assessed, the development proposal requires 
the purchase of 100 credits under current policy and mitigation calculation processes. Alternatively, the 
same site and values equate to 10 credits if the site were established as a Biobank. Based on this, 
pursuing the one-hectare development and purchasing 100 credits required for impact mitigation 
would equate to the need to purchase 10 hectares for mitigation as when one hectare of the same 
biodiversity values is used as mitigation it has been calculated to generate only 10 credits for 
mitigation. To generate 100 credits in total, 10 hectares would therefore be needed (10 credits x 10 
Hectares = 100 credits). Based on assessment of equivalent values, each hectare impacted upon 
requires ten equivalent hectares to be employed in mitigation: establishing to a 10:1 mitigation ratio as 
a result of assessment and trading protocols.   
 
 
Therefore even without using explicitly stating ratios to guide the credit creation and trading process, 
ratios are still involved. It is therefore necessary to consider ratios within a system and those that best 
achieve desired NNL outcomes.   
 
4.2 R ISK AND THE ROLE OF SC IENT IF IC  UNCERTAINTY 
 
Risks present within offset banking can also result from uncertainty in the underlying science (EDO 
2007c; Burgin 2008; Palmer and Filoso 2009). Uncertainty and associated risk will remain an 
irremovable reality within offset banking system (BBOP 2009d). Continued attempts to reach a state 
with no risk of biodiversity loss may obscure the effectiveness of existing approaches. This is 
particularly pertinent given the race against time required. 
 
Restoration, creation and enhancement of ecosystems are the principle ways biodiversity values are 
increased in a landscape; the basis on which it is possible to strive for NNL alongside increasing 
development61 (Dobson et al., 1997; BBOP 2009d). It is suggested that to achieve NNL, levels of 
biodiversity must not only be conserved but also actively increased to properly account for extensive 
past damage to biodiversity and continued human population and resource consumption (Hilderbrand, 
Watts and Randle 2005; BBOP, 2009d). Ecological understanding is the basis on which offset banking 
is possible, however uncertainty and knowledge gaps associated with this field generates much of the 
risk of offset banking. As comparatively newer disciplines, ecology, conservation biology and 
restoration ecology have had a shorter time frame to make observations, develop understanding and 	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test theories (Wallington, Hobbs and Lister 1997; Hobbs and Morton 1999; O’Riordan and Stoll-
Keehmann 2002; Moore 2005; Turner 2005; Burgman et al., 2009). 
 
As scientific disciplines, ecology is focused on testing hypotheses and generating assumptions to 
produce models and predictions for real-world applications (Lister 1997; Dayton and Sala 2001; 
Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle, 2005; Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; Turner 2005; Moore et 
al., 2009). Accuracy and understanding is increasing through this process yet the intrinsic absence of 
complete knowledge creates uncertainty, translated to offset banking (Dobson et al., 1997; Burgin 
2008). Uncertainty in offset banking may come from measurement error or bias, natural variation, 
uncertainty within modeling and subjective interpretation (Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; 
BBOP 2009d). Both the existence and degree of uncertainty represent important yet distinctive 
challenges, although this is often poorly considered or communicated (Burgman, Lindenmayer and 
Elith 2005; Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005; Burgman et al., 2009). Risk mitigation is at best 
challenging, at worst improbable when levels of uncertainty are unknown (Hilderbrand, Watts and 
Randle 2005).  
 
Parma (1998) comments: 
“… worse than uncertainty itself is the fact that we tend to underestimate uncertainty.” 
p. 16 Parma (1998) 
 
Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith (2005) emphasise this, saying: 
"This topic [uncertainty] is important because unacknowledged uncertainty leads to optimistic 
expectations that cannot be satisfied, to the misdirection of scarce conservation resources, and to 
actions that are blind to substantial qualitative and quantitative uncertainties that, if they were 
apparent, would lead to different decisions." 
p. 2008 Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith (2005) 
 
Biological uncertainty is particularly relevant when viewed in comparison to the certainty of human 
processes, such as development. Projects that produce negative biodiversity impacts represent future 
projections that are considerably more fixed and certain due to the ability to control the components of 
the process. In contrast, many possible (both conceivable and inconceivable) future states are possible 
when considering biological systems (Dobson et al., 1997; Suding et al., 2004; Suding and Hobbs 
2008). Future outcomes are uncertain when interacting with biological systems such as via 
conservation actions, (Hobbs and Morton 1999; Andreasen et al., 2001; Nelson and Sharman 2007; 
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Hilderbrand et al. (2005) in Burgin, 2008; Bendor 2009; also see EDO 2007c). Relevant processes, 
systems and functions are unlikely to be fully understood with the same level of comprehension 
possible when considering human-created systems (Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005). Offset 
banking brings these two systems into close connection, emphasising this gap and potential biological 
losses.  
 
4 .2 .1 Eco logy and restorat ion sc iences as systems of  funct ions,  
processes and in teract ions 
 
Mechanisms are required to manage the risks resulting from uncertainty surrounding the biology that 
underpins offset banking. Appropriate recognition must be given to the underlying knowledge base with 
greater attention given to the importance and implications of any inadequacies. The ecological sciences 
have progressed from describing species, communities and ecosystems to the importance of 
underlying systems and processes and internal levels of hierarchy and complexity, with a desire for 
predictive capacity (Lister 1997; Hobbs and Morton 1999; Andreasen et al. 2001; Moore et al. 2005; 
Wallington, Hobbs and Moore 2005; Burgman et al. 2009).  
 
Biological interactions have developed as an important ecological theme highly relevant to offset 
banking as the active conservation involved requires directly intervening in interactions ([see Table 
4.3] Hobbs and Morton 1999; Chapin III et al., 2000; Andreasen et al., 2001; Fortin and Agrawal 
2005). To achieve desired outcomes, management actions predominantly involve enhancing positive 
interactions such as the interaction between a species and habitat vegetation, or decreasing negative 
ones such as weeds or animal pests (Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; Dobson et al., 2007).  
 
Accurate understanding of biological interactions is essential to successful offset banking. Interactions 
introduce additional complexity, making understanding systems more challenging (Moore et al., 2009). 
As such, the disciplines’ increase in knowledge and understanding to date has served to highlight 
science’s uncertainty regarding the ecological world (Agius 2001; Turner 2005). Uncertainty resulting 
from limited knowledge may lead to failure, as has been suggested in the past (see Hilberbrand, Watts 
and Randle 2005).  The resulting over-simplification of complex systems produces inappropriate 
concepts in turn supporting ineffective decisions, actions and consequently detrimental environmental 
outcomes (Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005).  
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What contributions can developments in scientific principles offer? 
 
Advancing ecological knowledge is instrumental to offset banking, reducing knowledge gaps, 
highlighting uncertainty and improving understanding. Better understanding promotes superior 
decision-making in turn reducing or better accommodating uncertainty. More importantly it may 
support improved conservation techniques able to deliver superior, more certain outcomes. Examples 
of such relevant developments in ecological understanding are summarised in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
Table 4.3: “Issues of central concern in current ecological thinking”. Such concepts represent the most 
up to date perspectives of how ecosystems work, so may indicate the most accurate and effective way 
to address ecosystem management and conservation. Taken from Moore et al., 2009. Page 20 
Issue Descr ipt ion 
1. Stability, disturbance, and multiple stable states Ecosystems are dynamic, open systems existing in 
a constant state of flux, usually without long-term 
stability. Disturbance constantly pushes 
ecosystems in alternative directions, and multiple 
stable states may exist concurrently. 
2. Nonlinear development and uncertainty Ecosystems are (cyclic) systems that are often 
subject to sudden, unpredictable change. 
Therefore, uncertainty is normal, and predictable 
end points to successional processes are rare. 
3. Openness, contingency, and heterogeneity Ecological systems are open, heterogeneous 
systems. Their structure and function are variable 
across multiple spatial and temporal scales and 
levels of organisation. The successional 
development of ecosystems is historically 
contingent depending on particular biophysical 
conditions. 
4. Levels of organisation Insights into the dynamic nature of ecological 
systems have meant a shift in emphasis from 
structure, and an emphasis on species, to the 
processes that maintain structure. Biodiversity 
must be considered beyond species to include a 
number of hierarchical levels (individual 
organisms, populations, communities, 
ecosystems, landscapes). 
5. Spatial scale and hierarchy theory Dominant ecosystem processes change with 
scale. However, the structure and overall behavior 
of ecosystems can be understood in terms of a 
few dominant processes. For example, biotic 
factors (e.g., individual species) are of central 
interest at intermediate spatial scales, rather than 
primary functions (e.g., transfers of energy, 
nutrients). 
6. Patchiness and landscape ecology Issues of variability across space and time, 
fragmentation, and natural resource problems at 
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large spatial and temporal scales suggest greater 
attention to landscape ecology. When ecological 
systems are recognised as open and 
heterogeneous, landscape-level patchiness has 
strong potential as a guiding conservation 
principle. 
7. Species richness and ecosystem function The maintenance of functional ecosystems is 
essential to sustain high species diversity, 
whereas the contribution of such diversity to 
ecosystem function is less clear. However, given 
the high societal value afforded biodiversity, 
increased efforts should be made to maintain the 
ecosystem processes on which it depends. 
8. Functional diversity and environmental change The attention to temporal variability in 
nonequilibrium ecology suggests an emphasis on 
species’ responses to environmental change. This 
approach unites the focus on particular biotic 
elements with one on the functional types of 
species present. The role of species with similar 
ecosystem effects but different responses may be 
one of the most important mechanisms for 
sustaining functional ecosystems in the long term. 
9. ‘‘Pristine’’ versus human-modified systems Human disturbances are now amongst the most 
important factors shaping ecosystem change. 
Therefore, biodiversity conservation must 
recognise the role of humans as primary agents 
of flux in ecosystems and as an integral 
component in ecological, evolutionary, and 
environmental processes. 
 
Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle (2005) suggest that assumptions created as a result of imperfect 
knowledge and unquantified uncertainty have created five principles or ‘myths’. To achieve more 
successful outcomes in offset banking these principles need to be addressed.  
 
Table 4.4 “The Myth of restoration and their core issues” Taken from Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005, 
page 3 of 11 
Restorat ion myth Core Issues Ways to address th is  v ia  Of fset  
bank ing 
Carbon Copy Community assembly 
predictable; a single endpoint 
exists 
Existing biodiversity is conserved, avoiding 
expectation of specific endpoints or 
assemblages 
Field of Dreams Sole focus on physio-chemical 
conditions; systems self-
organise 
Increased focus on good management of a 
range of biotic and abiotic components 
Fast Forward Succession and ecosystem 
development can be accelerated 
Long-term time frames concerned allow for 
natural time-scales  
Cook Book Methodology overused and not 
sufficiently validated 
Provides strategies for review and refinement of 
methodology based on practice (note NSW) 
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Command and Control: 
Sisyphus Complex 
Nature is controllable; treating 
symptoms will fix the problem.  
Directly addresses underlying issues of 
biodiversity reduction caused by development 
impacts 
 
4 .2 .2 The s ign i f i cance o f  under ly ing sc ient i f i c  data and the knowledge 
base and assoc ia ted r isk  management too ls  
 
Recognition of the potential issues introduced by underlying data is developing. Walker, Price and 
Stephens (2008) note that an inadequacy of supportive, comprehensive and robust biological datasets 
is an important issue in designing biodiversity conservation mechanisms in New Zealand. In NSW, 
current knowledge is the basis for the predictive models of spatio-temporal distribution of biodiversity 
values that produce the Threatened Species database, used for credit calculation (EDO 2007b; DECC 
2009j; Gibbons et al., 2009). The completeness and accuracy of this framework is a source of concern 
as this also underpins biodiversity valuation for Biobanking credits (EDO 2007b; Crowe and ten Kate 
2010). Parkes, Newell and Cheal (2003) also emphasise that the apparent capabilities of the 
Biobanking scheme are dependent on availability and incorporation of local, historical and other 
ecological information.  
 
To remain effective for valuing biodiversity for trading, underlying data must be actively refined and 
improved, as it is integral to the operation of the system (Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003; McCarthy et 
al., 2004; EDO 2007b; Crowe and ten Kate 2001). Underlying assumptions and theories must be 
actively tested, and transparent mechanisms to accommodate increases in knowledge and science 
must exist and be translated through to assessment methodologies used (EDO 2007b; Crowe and ten 
Kate 2010).  
 
4 .2 .3 B iod ivers i ty  and ecosystem assessment :  the ‘how’  and ‘what ’  o f  
measur ing va lues for  t radable  cred i ts   
 
Accurate measurement and assessment of biodiversity at a site is fundamental to assigning trading 
credits for offset banking (Hallwood 2007; Aguis 2001; Robertson 2004; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
Achieving NNL though market-based trading means the nature of the credits traded is pivotally 
important. For successful conservation, credits must accurately represent biodiversity values so that 
values traded pertain to those actually lost and created (McCarthy et al., (2004) Walker et al., 2009; 
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Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008). In the interests of trade, credits also need to be fungible, so 
attributes must be chosen which best represent this (BBOP 2009f; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010).  
 
Trading unsuitable credits undermines the achievement of NNL so defining trading credits presents 
significant risk (Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008; Crowe and ten Kate 2010; Gorrod and Keith 
2010). Risk is present when incorrect decisions are made as to what to measure (the chosen metric) 
and how to measure it (the assessment protocol) (Gorrod and Keith 2010). Deciding how to measure 
and what to measure in an ecological system or biodiversity presents a significant challenge 
(Andreasen et al., 2001; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Robertson 2004; BBOP 2009f; Crowe and 
ten Kate 2010). Creating accurate, fungible credits relies upon the ability to measure what is present 
currently, and the capacity to identify its existence elsewhere, in turn relying upon robust quantification 
processes (Agius 2001; Robertson 2004; Walker et al., 2009). 
 
Ecological assessment is also central to progressing ecological and biological knowledge and 
understanding the biodiversity of ecosystems (Halwood 2007; Nelson and Sharman, 2007; Bonnie and 
Wilcove 2008; Gibbon et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2009). Arguably, a fundamental prerequisite of 
understanding and predicting biological systems relies upon being able to accurately quantify the 
biodiversity of ecosystems concerned (Andreasen et al., 2001; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; 
Burgin 2008; Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008; Palmer et al., 2009; Walker et al., 2009).  
Biodiversity to be represented as a credit must first be defined, and in relation to the nature of 
biodiversity that best aligns with the scheme’s goal: an answer to the ‘no-net-loss’ of what question 
(Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Many definitions are used, but biodiversity may broadly be considered a 
complex collection of interacting and interdependent entities within hierarchical scales. Nowicki (1993 
pg. 65) is quoted: 
“…diversity does not imply that all components of the system are complex; it only implies that the 
system [structure, function, composition, interactions etc] itself is complex” 
p 126 Lister (1997). 
 
The challenge is therefore to represent both inherent complexities within biodiversity, and the biology 
of a complex system (Lister 2007; Agius 2001; ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004; Nelson and 
Sharman 2007; Possingham et al., 2007; Walker et al 2009). In addition to these challenges, 
assessment within offset banking must also include assurances of transparency, objectivity and 
replicability to optimally mitigate the broad range of risks that ecosystem measurement represents 
(Lister 1997; McCarthy 2004; EDO 2007b,c; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Gibbons et al., 2009; DECC 
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2009j). To ensure the scientific rigour of an assessment approach it is necessary to also assess the 
certainty of measurements taken via empirical testing and specific investigative assessment (McCarthy 
et al., 2004; EDO 2007b). 
 
An extensive range of methods to quantify biodiversity present at a given location have been adopted, 
refined and rejected to date, based on biological and ecological principles to varying degrees (For an 
overview see BBOP 2009e; also BBOP 2009f; and examples in: Adreasen et al., 2001; EDO 2007a; 
Limburg and Stainbrook 2007; Lister 2007; Burgin 2008; Fliescher and Fox 2008; BBOP 2009f; 
Gibbons et al., 2009). Those working to apply ecological understanding to ecosystem assessment for 
active offset banking markets emphasise how excessively analysing or refining systems can result in 
methodologies that are hard to understand, reducing their effectiveness and so increasing uncertainty 
when applied. This balances arguments above supporting complex measurement with the benefit from 
measurement systems that are easily understood. The absence of a universal, optimal approach may 
bear testament to attaining such a difficult balance (BBOP 2009c, f).  
 
4.2.3.1  Use of  benchmarks and b iod ivers i ty  surrogates 
 
Many measurement and assessment approaches utilise benchmarks, surrogates and indicators to take 
account of biodiversity values. These approaches are based on assumptions of relationships between 
limited information available and biodiversity values actually present, relying upon the strength of this 
information to make correct descriptions and predictions62 (Carignan and Villard 2002; McCarthy et al., 
2008; Grantham et al., 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). It is the reliance upon these assumptions 
that introduces the risks involved with benchmarks and surrogates. Inaccurate results are produced if 
assumed relationships are incorrect, oversimplified or the information available does not accurately 
represent biodiversity values present. As fundamentally scientific principles, these ‘assumed 
representation’ approaches are open to contention (Andelman and Fagan 2000).  
 
Benchmarks 
 
A ‘benchmark’ is a score given to a site to represent its biodiversity value and may be compared to 
other sites, the same site over time, or the same site under altered conditions resulting from actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Note McCarthy et al.’s (2004) discussion of the use of the ‘large tree’ attribute within Habitat Hectares methodology as 
an estimation or prediction of large hollow trees in an ecosystem and therefore habitat values for tree-hollow inhabiting 
species.  
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such as development or management (Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003; McCarthy et al., 2004; BBOP 
2009e,f63;). Benchmarks are established via the identification of biotic and abiotic attributes64, and are 
assumed to represent biodiversity at a site (McCarthy et al., 2004; BBOP 2009e,f). Benchmark values 
are also often used to rank or compare sites, based on a reference benchmark established as the 
optimum or desired condition (Andreasen 2001). In New South Wales, the reference benchmark has 
been established as the pre-European condition of that vegetation type, described via the Vegetation 
Benchmark Database (BAM 2008; Gibbons et al. 2009). The use of more appropriate, local, or 
scientifically advanced data instead is possible with relevant department approval (BAM 2008). A 
criticism raised against applying benchmarks is the comparison to reference conditions, where such a 
‘single’ state may represent an ill-chosen example or fail to recognise the intrinsic dynamism 
characteristic of biodiversity naturally. This has been a particular criticism of NSW’s selected reference 
state (Andreasen et al., 2001; McCarthy et al., 2004; Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005; EDO 
2007b). 
 
Importantly, benchmark values indicate what is and is not present at a given site, not conservation 
status or significance - recognising this difference is instrumental to the appropriate use of benchmarks 
(Parks, Newell and Cheal, 2003). As such, it may be necessary to combine the benchmark approach 
with further assessment for optimal application with a conservation system such as offset banking.  
 
Surrogates 
 
Benchmark attributes are used as surrogates, requiring them to be measureable and tangible. BBOP 
(2009f) defines surrogates (proxies) as:  
“…a measurable (sometimes quantifiable) and practical parameter that can be used as a substitute 
for a parameter that is too difficult (sometimes impossible) or expensive to measure directly.” 
 
Surrogates are used in many ecological measurement systems (e.g. Faith and Walker 1996). BBOP 
(2009f) recognises that surrogates cannot do justice to all components of biodiversity, but represent a 
practical approach, beneficial as a highly workable assessment method. Table 4.5 demonstrates how 
the Habitat Hectares Method uses attributes and benchmarks, based on categorisation and scoring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
64 In the Habitat Hectares method, (Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003), the following attributes or components are defined: 
Large trees, tree (canopy) cover, understory (non-canopy) strata, lack of weeds, recruitment, organic litter, logs, patch 
size, neighborhood and distance to core area. The final three components represent landscape context, and may be 
derived through use of maps or other information sources such as GIS techniques. 
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(Parkes, Newell and Cheal 2003). This example shows how measuring benchmark attributes is the 
basis of assumptions concerning overall ecosystem condition. 
 
Table 4.5 “Criteria and scores for the number of large trees present”. (Benchmark Attribute (Surrogate) = 
Large Trees) Taken from Parkes, Newell and Cheal (2003) Table 2, Page s32. See Tables 2 - 11 from Parks, 
Newell and Cheal (2003) for further examples as applicable to other attributes/components. * “Health of large 
trees assessed by estimating the proportion of expected canopy cover that is missing due to tree death, 
decline or mistletoe infestation.”  
 
Large Trees Level of Canopy Health (%)* 
>70% 30-70% <30% 
None present 0 0 0 
0 - 20% of the benchmark number of large trees 3 2 1 
20 - 40% of the benchmark number of large trees 4 3 2 
40 - 70$ of the benchmark number of large trees 6 5 4 
70 - 100% of the benchmark number of large trees 8 7 6 
> the benchmark number of large trees/ha 10 9 8 
 
Because plot and transect data is represented by categorises and scores, extensive natural variability 
in ecosystem characteristics may be better accommodated, reducing the risk posed by variation from 
subjective measurement. Yet this approach also carries risk that finer-scale differences and variability 
important to biodiversity may be obscured (Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003; McCarty et al., 2004). 
Weighting may be used to place greater importance on some attributes while adjustments for area 
relationships may also be included (Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003; see also Andreasen et al. 2000; 
BBOP 2009e).  
 
Presence of species may be used as biodiversity surrogates, yet this potentially over-simplifies 
relationships as it fails to reflect population size or viability. This potential discrepancy between actual 
species numbers, potential capacity of a specific habitat, and driven or intrinsic population variability 
introduces risk through inaccurate measurement (EDO 2007b). 
 
Indicators are another form of surrogates that reflect the importance of biodiversity operating as an 
integral system (Andreasen et al., 2001; Carignan and Villard 2002 see also Fleishman, Noss and 
Noon 2006; Harding 2006). Determining the integrity of such a system requires sustainability, 
resilience and ‘natural-ness’ to be evaluated. Exhaustive micro-level measurement may not capture 
these elements. The broader approach of surrogates and indictors therefore provides information 
more appropriate to sustaining biological systems and biodiversity (Meurk and Swaffield 2000; see 
also Faith and Walker 1996; Faith and Walker 1996a; Watts and Handley 2010).  
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Benchmarks, surrogates and indicators aim to reduce risks by improving ecosystem measurement and 
assessment, yet also introduce their own risks. Techniques rely on robust and comprehensive scientific 
knowledge and understanding of ecological relationships and interactions such as underlying structure, 
function and composition of the ecosystem concerned (Carignan and Villard 2002; McCarthy et al., 
2008). This means that if the supporting knowledge base is inadequate, inaccurate assessments can 
occur, as potential inaccuracies within benchmarks, surrogates or indicators are unlikely to be 
understood and addressed (McCarthy et al., 2004; EDO 2007b; Grantham et al., 2010). Applying such 
substitutes is therefore a balance between risks posed by inaccurate measurement, with requirement 
for efficient resource inputs. Given issues surrounding potential knowledge gaps, applying these 
systems requires additional risk management by giving importance to supporting building knowledge 
and data capacity.  
 
4 .2 .4 An example o f  ecosystem measurement :  New South Wales 
B iobank ing and the B iobank ing Assessment  Methodology.  
 
The capacity to accurately assess biodiversity is a primary mechanism to minimise potential risk of lost 
biodiversity values and as such, the New South Wales scheme has placed great importance on the 
BAM. It is a specifically developed, scientifically based, codified protocol to assess ecosystems and 
attribute credits. Development, application and strength of the Methodology is established via 
regulation and legislation. BAM is required to identify areas that are of high biodiversity value, quantify 
the effects of development impacts on biodiversity, and establish biodiversity credits based on 
management actions both current and future, on proposed Biobanking and development sites (TSR 
2008). The BAM was developed with input from scientists, practitioners, stakeholders and a Ministerial 
Reference Group, to be transparent, objective, operationally-feasible and scientifically-based in 
achieving the improve or maintain policy (DECC 2009j; Gibbons et al., 2009). 
 
It is based on ecological principles (Gibbons et al., 2009), recognising the importance of biodiversity 
structure, composition and function at a hierarchy of scales, representativeness in conservation and 
long-term conservation viability in consideration of resource limitations. The BAM considers seven 
criteria across a range of scales in assessing a site’s biodiversity values: 
“1. State and national priorities  
2. Regional value  
3. ‘Landscape Value’  
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4. ‘Site Value’ 
5. Threatened species 
6. Management actions 
7. The area (hectares) of the land to be developed (the development site) or managed for 
biodiversity (the Biobank site).”  
p. 8 DECC (2009j) 
 
DECC(W) 2008 describes the process of assessment as: 
“At each site, the assessment methodology will prescribe a number of plot surveys within each 
vegetation type to collect data on defined vegetation characteristics. Each plot survey will require data 
on prescribed vegetation attributes, including species richness, over-story cover, exotic species cover, 
hollow-bearing trees, fallen logs, etc. The presence of some threatened flora and fauna species will be 
predicted using habitat surrogates from the plot surveys, along with the responses to a series of 
geographic and site-specific questions. Additional surveys may also be needed to determine the 
presence and abundance of other threatened species not able to be predicted through habitat 
surrogates. The assessment will also include landscape-level measures to determine the number of 
credits required. These include the size of vegetation patches and the amount of vegetation cover that 
surrounds the development or biobank site.” p. 1 
 
As described, species are predicted to occur in certain defined habitat and vegetation types (of the 
1600 above) and ecosystem credits are issued which represent this. Predictions are based on 
knowledge of associations with vegetation and other habitat features, and distribution characteristics. 
This information is contained within the Threatened Species Profile Database and the Vegetation Type 
Database. In the absence of information for vegetation-based prediction, separate survey work is 
conducted and specific species credits are issued (DECC 2009j). To equate these measurements to 
tradable credits requires use of the specifically designed credit calculator. In this final step, the 
assessment of biodiversity attributes measured by BAM are translated and calculated into credit values 
(DECC(W) 2009j). BAM approach represents attempts to balance required outcomes of the system 
(NNL), and constraints posed by costs, supporting data, ease and effectiveness of implementation 
along with resource and knowledge limits  (BBOP 2009e; Possingham et al., 2009).  
 
When applying surrogates, benchmarks and a process of weighting and multiplying (DECCW 2009x), 
the choice of measurement design to accurately reflect biodiversity values represents a balance 
between multiple forms of inherent risk.  Specific surrogates applied within the system were selected 
based on desire to spread the risk of surrogacy use across multiple scales, and respond to resource 
and other constraints identified (EDO 2007b; Gibbons et al., 2009; Possingham et al., 2009). The 
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decision was made not to use species-based metrics due to resource constraints and issues of high 
temporal variability for a proportion of species (Gibbons et al., 2009). Use of indicator species was 
possible, but a lack of underlying supporting data restricted this. Alternatively, increased focus was 
given to vegetation structure as indicative of other biodiversity values.  
 
4 .2.4.1  Assess ing the success of  BAM 
 
Possingham et al., (2009) discuss how the BAM facilitates the achievement of NNL through trade and 
offset within Biobanking. One component of success is the robustness of scientific measurement of 
biodiversity values. The protocol of assessing NNL against multiple, varying criteria is observed as a 
strength of the methodology, appropriate in light of the multiple components and complexity of 
interactions (Andreasen et al., 2001). Distinguishing which taxa can and cannot be reliably predicted, 
particularly from vegetation type, is a positive innovation (BBOP 2009e; Possingham et al., 2009).  
While overall the methodology is an improvement in previous assessment methods (EDO 2007b; BBOP 
2009e), concerns and suggestions for improvement have been raised; particularly questioning 
underlying assumptions underpinning assessment decisions. An important component of the 
measurement capacity of BAM or any assessment approach is how well additional or updated 
knowledge could be incorporated (Possingham et al., 2009; McCarty et al., 2004). Possingham et al., 
(2009) also notes the importance of clearly defining what is being measured to enable assessment of 
how accurate the measurement is. In the NSW case, depending on the process followed, credits may 
represents a score or an entity, so credits may represent a type or an amount. Such ambiguity is not 
conducive to accurately representing biodiversity values in a unit, and therefore maintaining reliability 
with the measurement system.  
 
4.2.4.2  The BAM compared to Ca l i forn ian methodologies  
 
A single methodology analogous to the BAM of New South Wales Biobanking, is absent from the 
Californian system. Instead numerous methodologies are used in the banking process, reflecting the 
different agencies, ecosystems, regions and methods of operation (entrepreneurial, in-lieu-fee, public). 
By convention expert review, best professional judgement, and case-by-case review of assessments by 
the relevant agencies and personnel, quantify biodiversity values at a site (Robertson 2004). 
Methodological approaches to biodiversity assessment are a component of this in some cases and 
numerous methodologies have been developed and applied across all States in America (BBOP 2009f; 
Crowe and ten Kate 2010; Madsen, Carroll and Moore Brands 2010). Such variety exists predominantly 
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because methodologies have been designed specifically for clearly defined ecosystems (such as the 
specific wetland types of earliest banking).  
 
BBOP (2009f) provides a useful summation: 
“…the United States is home to perhaps the world’s most comprehensive set of methods for 
assessing projects’ impacts and offsets’ gains on wetlands, streams and listed endangered species. 
Many of these assessment methodologies involve rigorous and repeatable framework for analysis of 
ecosystem functionality that involve, and can demonstrate, consistent application not only at impact 
and offset sites but across many projects... However, while there is a trend towards the more common 
use of these more rigorous methods, in the large majority of cases (and the US authorities process 
some 70,000 to 80,000 decisions on wetland and stream mitigation a year) and particularly for small 
projects, loss/gain calculations are based on the acres of land impacted, couple with a simple 
ratio/multiplier and sometimes with an approximate estimate of the acres’ condition, based on expert 
review. This is testimony to the fact that, in practice, detailed ecological assessments are not always 
possible. The resources required for in depth survey and modelling may be limited or the scale of the 
proposed project might be such that comprehensive assessments are considered inappropriate. It is 
not unusual for assessments of ‘quality’ to be made on the basis of expert opinion.” 
p 74 BBOP ODH (2009f). 
 
California and New South Wales present contrasting approaches to biodiversity assessment and 
demonstrate the differences between ecosystem-based and species-based measurement. It has been 
debated internationally how best to arrive at an appropriate assessment process for offset banking and 
whether to adopt a species or ecosystem basis or an appropriate combination, as both have notable 
strengths and weaknesses to consider.  
 
4 .2 .5 The spec ies-based f ramework and p lace o f  spec ies l i s ts  in  
Ca l i forn ia  and New South Wales 
 
Accurately measuring ecosystem or site biodiversity is fundamental to minimising risk of biodiversity 
loss and achieving successful offset banking; it is relevant to evaluate using a species-based approach 
to achieve this. The species-focused approach supported by species listing-practices is central to the 
Californian system, and a component of New South Wales Biobanking. In New South Wales, the TSA 
(1995) provides a process of list-creation and establishes the Threatened Species Database. Both are 
	   113	  
used within the BAM to assess biodiversity values. The database lists species as critically endangered, 
endangered or vulnerable. It presents a range of information and descriptions pertaining to the 
species’ needs and ecological characteristics such as distribution and habitat requirements, and this 
information is used in decision-making regarding credit type calculation (BAM 2008). 
 
Bonnie and Wilcove (2008) note that, legally, in California and the United States:  
“… the success or failure of a conservation bank is determined by wether it fulfils the requirements for 
mitigation set forth in the ESA…” 
p. 55 Bonnie and Wilcove (2008) 
 
This represents how conservation banking in California is borne from legislation driven by an alternative 
objective: address public concern over accelerating loss of species icons, such as the bald eagle and 
the Grizzly bear, and protect and recover individual species (as prioritised on the Endangered Species 
List created under the same legislation: ESA 1973). Rather than ecosystem or biodiversity health 
overall, this perspective translates into how values at a bank si te are assessed, banks are established, 
credits are issued, and management and conservation is conducted. Success is typically monitored and 
evaluated based on the specific requirements of the particular listed species (Lambeck 1997). 
 
Support for a species-based approach may be political, cultural or social. The protection, measurement 
and management of specific species may also offer significant benefits to other components within a 
shared ecosystem. This is reflected in concepts such as umbrella, flag-ship, key-stone, key-ecosystem 
and indicator species: species are identified as having a unique capacity to perform functions and 
services that provide essential support (through varying mechanisms) to a range of other species 
(Lambeck 1997; Lister 1997; Hobbs and Morton 1999; Andelman 2000; Carroll 2010; Andreasen et 
al. 2001; Rubinoff 2001; Burggeman et al., 2009). Management focused upon one such species may 
offer widespread ecosystem gains, resulting in biodiversity and environmental conservation collectively 
as broad, expedient and efficient as possible (Faith and Walker 1996; 1996a; Lambeck 1997; 
Andreasen et al. 2001; Rubinoff 2001; Carignan and Villard 2002). 
 
Species listing supports conservation in many international examples and issues raised against 
species-focused offset banking mirrors debate surrounding perspectives for or against these species 
listing processes and the conservation that results (Mace and Lande 1991; O’Brien and Mayr 1991; 
Keith 1998; Lamoreux et al., 2003; Gippoliti and Amori 2007; Vie et al., 2009). Such arguments raise 
issues pertinent when considering species-based approaches to offset banking, so relevant aspects 
	   114	  
are therefore are discussed bellow (O’Brien and Mayr 1991; Freitag, Jaarsveld and Biggs 1997; 
Nicholopoulos 1999; Possingham et al., 2002; Roemer and Wayne 2003; Andelman Groves and Regan 
2004; Early and Thomas 2007; Environmental Law Institute 2007; Zhang and Zang 2007; Vie et al., 
2009; Brito et al. 2010).  
 
4 .2.5.1  D iscuss ing spec ies l is ts :  some re levant  cr i t iques  
 
While relevant to conserving species diversity, individual species or groups of species are increasingly 
being considered as only a subset of values deserving conservation (Bestelmeyer, Miller and Wiens 
2003; Bruggeman et al., 2009). Lists based on risk to individual species are argued to oversimplify 
biodiversity by excluding too many important biological and ecological components for effective 
conservation. Correlation between species diversity and other common measurement variables such as 
richness, abundance or distribution may significantly over-simplify actual relationships. Assumptions of 
community and ecosystem representativeness are likely erroneous as a result, consequently frustrating 
comprehensive biodiversity conservation (HurlbertBurg 1971; Conroy and Noon 1996; Chapin III et al., 
2000; Gotelli and Colwell 2001; Fleishman, Noss and Noon 2006; Bruggeman et al. 2009).  
 
Focus solely on limited species, units or taxa (via lists of threatened, indicator capacity or other 
categorisations) also fails to recognise and account for the context of conservation risks, status, and 
the interaction between threats and significantly limiting capacity for efficient mitigation as a result 
(Roemer and Wayne 2003; Moore et al., 2009; Burgman et al., 2009). As a component of this, scales 
of species-focused actions typically do not align with the intermediate and wider landscape scales 
optimal for overall biodiversity (see also Lambeck 1997).  
 
Potential bias in the listing process is likely transferred into conservation actions and priorities 
(Gemmell 2001Possingham et al., 2002; Gippoliti and Amori, 2007; Burgman et al., 2009; Mace and 
Lande 1991). Burgman et al., (2009) describes this: 
“The lists are uncertain, largely a consequence of a lack of knowledge regarding the conservation 
status of species. The lists do not reflect many of the real threats to biota, leaving non-descript taxa 
relatively poorly protected, and the risk of extinction does not account for varying difficulty in how 
species may be conserved or rehabilitated. Uncertainty leads to entities going unprotected until 
information can be gathered, creating a conservative bias in the composition of lists.” 
p. 6 Burgman et al., 2009 
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Finally, the process may divert significant time and money, inappropriately narrow the focus of 
conservation efforts, and involve high operational costs and challenges. All this reduces efficiency and 
can lead to counterintuitive decisions and outcomes that detract from overall environmental 
conservation (Roemer and Wayne 2003; Fleischer and Fox 2008; for example also see Mace and 
Lande 1991; Possingham et al., 2002; Gippoliti and Amori 2007; Burgman et al. 2009; Vie et al. 
2009).  
 
How does the species-based approach interact with offset banking? 
 
Species-focused measures have significant shortcomings when representing biodiversity broadly; when 
adopted within offset banking these issues are also introduced. Poor representation of biodiversity in 
offset banking can be expected to result in poor biodiversity conservation in the system. Fleischer and 
Fox (2008) suggest that the single-species focus present as a result of the application of ESA 
legislation in United States’ and Californian conservation banking, has led to management practices 
that have been narrowly focused (Hooper et al. 2005). As a result, management focused on achieving 
conservation gains for a specific species may involve practices potentially detrimental to other species 
themselves important to overall biodiversity, yet not otherwise recognised under a species-centric 
paradigm. 
  
Fleisher and Fox (2008) quote Carol Witham65 who states: 
“Most of the management plans I have seen don’t focus on individual actions into [consideration of] 
ecosystem integrity and function. If you manage for one species you can get cascading disasters where 
you react to one management mistake with another mistake.” 
p. 47 Fleischer and Fox (2008). 
 
With contentious issues surrounding the species-based approach, developments have been made in 
pplications to better achieve desired conservation outcomes (Vie et al. 2009).  For eample:  
“Increasing research on dynamic representation measure for species and on species ‘occupancy’ or 
‘persistence’ models which can provide a stronger evidence base for design and delivers of offsets to 
meet policy targets. These approaches reflect the fact that the greater the proportion of habitable area 
already lost, the more an additional hectare lost or gained matters. Similarly, the resilience of species’ 
population depends on whether they are in a healthy functioning state, or in a declining condition. Thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Private consultant and former President of the California Native Plant Society 
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a large reduction in population abundance from near carrying capacity might result in a small loss of 
persistence probability, but a similar (large) reduction to an already reduced population would cause a 
much greater loss of persistence probability.” 
p. 71 BBOP ODH (2009f) 
 
These and other developments are moving towards recognising species’ interactions and dynamic 
representation within a wider ecosystem, aligning with trends towards increasingly ecosystem-based 
approaches (Atkinson 1999; Naeem 2002; Possingham et al., 2002; Bol’shakov, Lushchekina and 
Neronov 2009). Incorporating improved species-based management into offset banking may offer 
better ways to conserve biodiversity, reducing the risk of undesirable biological outcomes.  
 
4 .2 .6 An ecosystem approach:  the importance o f  funct ion ing and 
stab i l i ty   
 
In the face of continued biodiversity loss, inadequacies of the species-listing approach have added to 
impetus for additional and alternative conservation approaches (Haeuber 1996; Gemmell 2001; 
Roemer and Wayne 2003). Progress within ecological disciplines has also increasingly directed 
conservation mechanisms towards units other than specific species (Bedward, Pressey and Keith 
1992; Carignan and Villard 2002; Naeem 2002; Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; Fleishman 
Noss and Noon 2006). ‘Ecosystem’ approaches are increasingly favoured (Moore 2001; Carignan and 
Villard 2002; Goldman et al., 2008; Bol’shakov, Lushchekina and Neronov 2009,66) where 
conservation and biodiversity management is designed and implemented with scale-appropriate, more 
ecologically representative management units such as species combinations, communities, ecosystems 
or landscapes (Haeuber 1996; Lambeck 1997; Sanderson et al. 2002; Geneletii 2003; Burgman, 
Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; Early and Thomas 2007; Samways, Bazelet and Pryke, 2010).  
 
The Firth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CBD (of which New Zealand is a signatory) gave 
international recognition to the value of the ecosystem approach (Table 4.6). Established as a superior 
approach to achieve Convention goals, the approach was recognised and adopted in a variety of 
international contexts, further inceasing potential within offset banking 67 (Bol’shakov, Lushchekina and 
Neronov, 2009)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Note discussion of the Ecosystem approach in New Zealand, by Atkinson 1999.  
67 See also The adoption of the Ecosystem approach in the Millennium Development Goals of the UN (Elliot, 2009) 
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Table 4.6 ”Principles of the ecosystem approach adopted at the Firth Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to CBD” Taken from Bol’shakov, Lushchekina and Neronov 2009, page 74 
 
# Pr inc ip le  o f  the  approach  
1 The objectives of management of land, water, and living resources are a matter of societal choice 
2 Management should be decentralized to the lowest appropriate level 
3 Ecosystem managers should consider the effects (actual or potential) of their activities on adjacent and other 
ecosystems 
4 Recognizing potential gains from management, there is usually a need to understand and manage the ecosystem in 
an economic context. Any such ecosystem-management program should: 
(a) reduce those market distortions that adversely affect biological diversity; (b) align incentives to promote 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use; (c) internalize costs and benefits in the given ecosystem to the 
greatest extent feasible. 
5 Conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning, in order to maintain ecosystem services, should be a priority 
tar- get of the ecosystem approach 
6 Ecosystems must be managed within the limits of their functioning 
7 The ecosystem approach should be undertaken on the appropriate spatial and temporal scales 
8 Recognizing the varying temporal scales and lag-effects that characterize ecosystem processes, objectives for 
ecosystem management should be set for the long term 
9 Management must recognize that change is inevitable 
10 The ecosystem approach should seek the appropriate balance between, and integration of, conservation and use of 
bio- logical diversity 
11 The ecosystem approach should consider all forms of relevant information, including scientific and indigenous and 
local knowledge, innovations, and practices 
12 The ecosystem approach should involve all relevant sectors of society and scientific disciplines 
 
The functional importance of a specific species’ presence is being progressively minimised when 
creating and maintaining biodiversity. This is being replaced by understanding the role ecosystem 
interactions, functions and processes in addition to specific structural, compositional and spatial 
attributes (Hobbs and Morton 1999; Chapin 2000; Gunderson 2000; Moore 2001; Slootweg and 
Kolhoff 2003; Fortin and Agrawal 2005; Hooper et al. 2005; Bruggeman et al. 2009). This directs 
focus to wider spatial scales in addition to (or replacing) species as units of conservation (Haeuber 
1996; Lambeck 1997; Sanderson et al. 2002; Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; Early and 
Thomas 2007; Samways, Bazelet and Pryke 2010).  
 
Landscape management is moving towards ecosystem-scale perspectives following recognition that 
single-species models fail to account for many of the components of value within a landscape (Haeuber 
1996; Lambeck 1997; Burgman, Lindenmayer and Elith 2005; Hartig and Drechsler 2009). Ecological 
processes at the landscape level are the focus of approaches such as the Landscape Equivalency 
Analysis (LEA), placing value on habitat patches by incorporating spatial arrangement, fragmentation 
impacts, and taking account of genetic processes such as migration, genetic drift and variation that 
have significant impact on species and wider biodiversity sustainability (Burggeman et al., 2009; Hartig 
and Drechsler 2009). The highly spatially-dependant nature of biodiversity requires dedicated 
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recognition for individual patches in a landscape, and adequate quantification of value in this context 
(Drechsler and Watzold 2008; Burggeman et al. 2009; Hartig and Drechsler 2009). Assessment for 
trading under LEA provides superior commensurability between the contribution patches make to 
recruitment, migration and genetic variability at a landscape scale, and therefore population viability 
and long-term sustainability of biodiversity where increasing development and habitat fragmentation is 
of concern (Bruggeman et al., 2009).  
 
Balancing the many conservation and biodiversity sustainability concerns, Lambeck (1997) counters 
criticisms of single-species approaches suggesting: 
“… we cannot ignore the requirements of the species if we wish to define the characteristics of a 
landscape that will ensure their retention. The challenge then is to find an efficient means of meeting 
the needs of all species, without studying each one individually.” 
p. 850 Lambeck (1997) 
 
This is relevant within offset banking schemes such as New South Wales’ where both ecosystem and 
species concerns are arguably represented with the intention of achieving balance between such 
considerations. Successful application of BAM and the achievement of desired biodiversity conservation 
of have yet to be observed and may be evident as the system matures. 
 
How can lessons from ecology aid mitigating biological risk in offset banking? 
 
Ecological research is emphasising the links between biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and stability 
(Lister 1997; Hobbs and Morton 1999; Gunderson 2000; Moore 2001; Hooper et al. 2005). Increased 
understanding of ecosystems is relevant as a primary step towards improved management of 
ecosystems, and hence reducing risk within offset banking (Hobbs and Morton 1999; Gunderson 2000; 
Hooper et al., 2005). Consider the current principles below, providing insight to enable risk mitigation 
through improved ecology. 
• Ecosystem properties are strongly influenced by the functional characteristics of 
species present via interactions, indicating that relative abundance poorly predicts the 
ecosystem value of a given species  
• Addition or subtraction of species have differing impacts dependant on the nature of 
the ecosystem concerned 
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• A greater number of species facilitates increased supply of ecosystem goods and 
services (Hooper et al., 2005).  
 
It also seems highly likely that combinations of species, rather than specific species, offer stabilisation 
and resistance to disturbance. When dealing with the larger spatial and temporal scales concerned in 
offset banking, this is even more important if risk of loss over time is to be minimised.  With a greater 
number of species present, management options are suggested to remain far more open to address 
risks that become apparent over time. Such options may be restricted if early decisions prioritise only 
those species immediately relevant (Hooper et al., 2005). 
 
Management under offset banking may take much from the ecosystem approach with design based on 
ecosystems being unified, interacting and interdependent entities, rather than managing aspects of a 
specific population (Haeuber 1996). From greater ecological understanding, optimal offset banking 
management will actively incorporate combinations of multiple species, biotic and non-biotic factors 
cross varying scales, habitat for species, other structural and compositional elements and functional 
and process parameters (Hobbs and Morton 1999; Moore 2001; Fortin and Agrawal 2005; Haeuber 
1996; Hartig and Drechsler 2009).  
 
4 .2.6.1  Choosing the best  approach:  compar ing spec ies and ecosystem-
based approaches wi th a summary cr i t ique of  the ecosystem approach 
 
In selecting the applicable approach of offset banking to best address risk of biodiversity loss, the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of the species and ecosystem approach must be taken 
into consideration. Table 4.7 summarises one such comparison, describing different measurement 
approaches according to wether a species or ecosystem approach is taken. As discussed regarding the 
species-based approach, there are advantages and disadvantages to an ecosystem-based approach 
that must be considered if management of biodiversity under offset banking is to represent minimal risk 
of lost values.  
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Table 4.7 “Some examples of what to measure and consider for species and for communities or 
habitats in order to achieve no net loss.” Taken from The Offset Design Handbook, BBOP 2009f p. 71 
For Spec ies For communi t ies/assemblages or  for  
habi tat  types:  
Which will be affected Which will be affected 
Structure of populations/metapopulations for key 
taxa affected 
Area (extent), distribution, ‘health’ or ‘quality’ 
(composition, structure, function). 
Balance of recruitment/mortality for affected 
populations 
Condition, as indicated by key structural and 
functional relationships such as height of 
vegetation, wetland hydrology, predator-prey 
relationships, etc. 
Distribution, abundance and levels of occupancy 
in landscape 
Strategic and functional context in the wider 
landscape context (e.g. connectivity, continuity). 
Scale or location required to maintain or enhance 
viability or persistence 
Scale or location required to maintain or enhance 
functional representation, viability or persistence 
 
An ecosystem approach may be advantageous as effective conservation occurs when threats are 
adequately addressed (Burgman et al., 2009; see also Gunningham and Young 1997). Threats occur 
as processes and systems, commonly with many interacting together at an ecosystem or landscape 
level. Focus should therefore be broadened beyond single species because some involved in 
threatening processes may not be listed. They are likely excluded from management and this 
‘patchiness’ or unequal conservation makes conserving a resilient landscape of biodiversity and 
minimising risk of loss less possible (Burgman et al., 2009).  
 
Kiesecker et al., (2009a) discuss an ecosystem-based approach to establishing biodiversity targets, as 
an alternative to highly challenging complete biodiversity assessment. The 'Coarse Filter' approach is 
suggested based upon ecosystems and mapped units of vegetation. A subsequent 'fine filter' approach 
may be applied to respond to the needs of specific species with specific requirements, extremely 
endemic or specialized species, or those of notable or listed conservation focus. An example of this 
dual approach in application is seen in the New South Wales system (as discussed below).  
 
Ecosystem approaches also have potential disadvantages68. Firstly, ecosystem-type definitions can be 
more ambiguous compared to species classifications as their definition or delineation is open to higher 
levels of subjectivity (Haeuber 1996). This therefore introduces the risk that the wrong classification is 
made, so the wrong management occurs (McIntyre and others, 2002 in Moore et al. 2009). Secondly, 
increased understanding of ecosystems and their processes, and the translation of this into more 
complex and specific metrics may be disadvantageous to a trading system (Ring 2010). Should this be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 For additional issues not covered here see Haeuber 1996 
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the case, mitigating risk by improving ecosystem assessment may be contrasted by introduction of 
more risk to the trading aspect of offset banking. More comprehensive and scientifically accurate 
ecosystem measurement makes it increasingly clear that the specificities of ecosystems and the 
increasing spatial contextually of specific sites means two site are less likely to be commensurate, 
especially with increasing distance. Another trade-off therefore occurs between increasing scientific 
accuracy and specificity and the fungibility needed for economic credit trade (Robertson 2004; Ring 
2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
 
“… the need to consider human behavior in metrics for market-based instruments is characterized by 
a trade-off: Ecological accuracy calls for a metric that is complex enough to capture all details of the 
relevant ecological processes, but socio-economic reality may suggest compromises towards more 
practical and robust metrics.” 
p. 280 Hartig and Drechsler (2009) 
 
Finally, critics caution applying ecosystem-based perspectives too broadly or exclusively without proper 
regard to the further work known to be required in the field. Uncertainty in current principles exists, and 
calls are made for further research (Lister 1997; Hooper et al., 2005). A focus on ecological attributes 
such as vegetation density or biogeochemical processes may be improved upon by increasing 
consideration instead, on ‘ecological capital’, connectivity and variability (Hilderbrand, Watts and 
Randle 2005). This contributes to resistance, resilience and processes of disturbance in systems as a 
path to improved conservation outcomes, in particular where restoration is concerned; suggestions 
that may offer a more biologically robust system, and reduced risk in offset banking.   
 
4 .2.6.2  Case study:  what  re levance does the ecosystem approach have in 
spec ies- focused Ca l i forn ia? 
 
The Californian system is species-focused. Banks and the associated credits issued to them are species 
credits - for example ‘fairy shrimp’ or ‘elderberry longhorn beetle’ credits. Bank sites therefore aim to 
establish habitat optimal for that specific species, as do long-term management plans, credit release 
criteria and monitoring programmes. Conservation actions taken under this program are likely to have 
positive flow-on effects to other species and aspects of the ecosystem. As the ESA is focused upon the 
recovery of species, a habitat may be focus of conservation e.g. the fairy shrimp and Vernal Pools in 
the Central Valley of California. Generally, species can be supported or recovered only with the active 
support of overall ecosystem functions and processes. In some cases however, a species may exist 
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adequately (in terms of credit requirements) without particular ecosystem functions and processes, or 
at very limited levels. Active management for overall ecosystem health and functioning is far less likely 
or beneficial to the bank so auxiliary non-target biodiversity values may suffer as a consequence. 
Species-specific management is frequently more intensive and targeted than that in the best interests 
of long-term, sustainable management of an ecosystem. Potential for margins of error, scientific 
uncertainty, constantly changing environments and catastrophic and unexpected natural events, 
increases these concerns. Ecosystem complexity and interdependency means failure to provide 
ecosystem components above in lieu of the needs of target species may significantly reduce 
biodiversity overall; individual species’ gains are unlikely to balance this out.  
 
Species-based conservation banking continues to be practiced with increasing activity in California yet 
movement and opinion within the industry is turning towards broadening the narrow, species-centric 
approach and moving towards more ecosystem approaches. While not observed over a long time 
frame, the New South Wales more ecosystem-based metric is attracting favour as a model for 
mitigation under both the CWA and the ESA. Current problems aligning the specific, contrasting 
objectives and origins of the acts would likely be better resolved under a similar, broader approach and 
echo previously mentioned challenges applying the ESA and CWA not originally designed for banking 
purposes.  
 
California and New South Wales highlight how species or ecosystem-based paradigms reflect 
overarching objectives of banking systems. The range of advantages and disadvantages each 
approach offers is best debated under consideration of specific offset banking contexts. Discussing 
both the species-focused and ecosystem-focused paradigms is central to understanding how an offset 
banking system may be designed and developed to address desired biodiversity outcomes variable 
across contexts, regions and countries. 
 
4 .2 .7 Transparency and sub ject iv i ty  w i th in  measurement approaches:  
b ias  
 
Finally, biologically and ecologically accurate measurement and assessment systems must limit bias.  
Bias may result through lack of transparency or introduction of subjectivity, potentially from many 
sources. Subjectivity and variation in values derived from estimates, measurements or observations are 
recognised as a form of risk (Gorrod and Keith 2008; McCarthy et al., 2004). Responding to 
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subjectivity risk requires a highly transparent, reliable and objective assessment protocol (Lister 1997; 
McCarthy et al., 2004; EDO 2008b, 2007b; Gorrod and Keith 2010). Subjectivity may occur through 
applying processes, representing variation in value judgements. This impacts the outcome as 
valuations are weighted differently each time assessment is conducted (Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003; 
McCarthy et al., 2004; EDO 2007b; Burgin 2008). This can produce unpredicted and unpredictable 
outcomes, as subjects’ numerous different decisions balance in unique ways (McCarthy et al., 2004; 
Burgin 2008).  
 
Offset banking requires an equivalent outcome to be produced from independent measurements and 
credit calculations.  It is essential to achieving NNL that appropriately stable level of value equivalency 
is maintained across multiple transactions (Robertson 2004; Nelson and Sharman 2007). If the 
equivalence of one transaction greatly exceeds the equivalence of another transaction, achievement of 
NNL will be highly variable, jeopardising the balance achieved over the whole scheme.  
 
Independent of the uncertainty surrounding the metrics, there is variability in how different practitioners 
collect data for the calculations and apply the methodology, which introduces a degree of subjectivity. 
The Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA) conducted a study investigating 
  
“Uncertainty in assessments of vegetation condition due to observer error in field estimates of 
vegetation attributes...[concluding that] … The results indicate that uncertainty in field estimates of 
site attributes may cause vegetation condition to be under- or over-estimated on all but highly 
degraded sites. The primary cause of observer variation in total vegetation condition scores was 
random error in raw estimates of vegetation attributes” 
p. 8, Gorrod and Keith (2010) 
 
Given the human component of implementing the measurement system, these requirements necessarily 
call for minimal complexity (Possingham et al., 2007; Parks, Newell and Cheal 2003; Hartig and 
Drechsler 2009). The more decisions and calculations humans are required to make, the more 
subjectivity may be incorporated, and the more room for human error. A biologically accurate and 
transparent, objective system is tested through implementation. If it fails to be implemented correctly, 
then the benefits of its biologically robust design are not realised (Andreasen 2001; Parks, Newell and 
Cheal 2003; McCarthy et al., 2004; Gibbons et al., 2009; Possingham et al., 2009).  
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4.3 LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT AND LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT PLANS 
 
Proper long-term management is a fundamental mechanism for addressing the variety of risks that 
threaten bank failure and jeopardize offset banking success (Marsh, Porter and Salvesen 1996; 
Redmond et al, 1996; Studt and Sokolove, 1996; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). The following describes 
the components of long-term management requiring consideration for successful long-term 
management: adaptive management, monitoring, contingencies for catastrophic events and adoption of 
the precautionary principle.  
 
Knowledge uncertainties and the possibility of multiple restoration outcomes necessitate continuous 
input to make the management adjustments likely required to achieve desired outcomes (Hilderbrand, 
Watts and Randle, 2005). Biologically robust Management Plans are needed to ensure adequate long-
term management69.  Relevant components include describing biotic and abiotic baseline conditions; 
stipulating management actions; specific objectives of the bank site, and administrative requirements 
relating to funding, monitoring and reporting to meet regulatory, contractual and conservation 
requirements (Hill 2008).  For example:  
“Biological management includes such activities as weed abatement through manual removal, spraying 
or fire; thatch reduction and weed abatement through grazing management; providing strategically 
located water troughs for livestock to reduce impacts to wetlands; and invasive species control 
methods such as draining stock ponds annually to reduce the impact of exotic bullfrogs. This section 
should be written by an experienced biologist who understands the ecology of the local area, and the 
needs of the species being provided for by the management.” 
p 103 Hill 2008 
 
In comparison, within the New South Wales Biobanking scheme, ‘standard’ and ‘additional’ 
management actions are stipulated in the BAM (DECCW 2008): 
“Standard management actions are: manage grazing for conservation, weed control, manage fire for 
conservation, manage human disturbance, retain regrowth and remnant native vegetation, 
replant/supplementary planting, retain dead timber, nutrient control, erosion control, retention of 
rocks…Additional management actions include control of feral, and/or overabundant native 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Note that a significant component of a successful and well-regarded long-term management plan is the provision for 
long-term financial support for the management actions. This is discussed in Section 5.1.2, and as such, the following 
discussion concerns the aspects of the management plan that pertain directly to biological values.   
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herbivores; 2) vertebrate pest management (pig foxes and other feral species); 3) nutrient control; 4) 
control of exotic species; 5) maintenance, or, reduction of natural flow regimes (where possible)” 
p 28 2009 Seminar, DECCW. 
 
For banks containing species credits: 
“Control of feral and/or overabundant native herbivores; vertebrate pest management - pigs; 
vertebrate pest management - foxes and/or miscellaneous species; nutrient control; control of exotic 
fish species; maintenance or reintroduction of natural flow regimes (where possible)” 
p 13 BAM 2008 
 
4.3.1 ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
 
Adaptable offset management plans may offer superior conservation outcomes (Marsh, Sokolove and 
Rhodes 1996; Parma 1998; Gibbons and Lindenmayer 2007; Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005; 
Fleischer and Fox 2008; Hill 2008). Under adaptive management, outcomes from current management 
actions inform future decisions and management directions (e.g. Parma 1998; McDonald-Madden et al. 
2010). This introduces capacity for learning, giving land managers the ability to change management 
to achieve better conservation (Parma 1998; Fleischer and Fox 2008; Teresa 2008; McDonald-
Madden et al. 2010).  
 
Adaptive management approaches may be passive or active (Parma 1998; McDonald-Madden et al. 
2010). Passive adaptive management refers to a management program whereby the outcomes of past 
management actions are assessed within the process of designing future management programs, as a 
point of protocol/policy (Parma 1998; McDonald-Madden 2010). Active adaptive management 
represents the combination of experimental science and conservation management. Building on the 
passive approach it involves specifically designing management actions so that outcomes provide 
answers to specific questions, testing existing assumptions. (Parma 1998; Hilderbrand, Watts and 
Randle 2005; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008) At the conclusion of a pre-defined management period, more 
specific and useful conclusions are possible than via passive observation alone. Investigation of cost-
effectiveness of may be included, as the various benefits may be directly comparable under a suitable 
design (Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005). 
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One criticism of previous failures has been the inability of management approaches to alter 
management practices (Parma 1998). A framework based on static objectives or specific biodiversity 
outcomes may be counter-productive to broader, actual conservation gains (Lister 1997; Gunderson 
2000; Fleischer and Fox 2008). Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle (2005) critique previous non-adaptive 
or ‘command-and-control’ approaches that assume the given management approach is appropriate 
and optimal, potentially ‘forcing’ an ecosystem in a desired direction via intensive and specific 
management. Not only is this held to be ineffective but introduces risk that the ecosystem may 
consequently develop in undesired ways (see also Gunderson 2000): 
 
“Ignoring uncertainty often results in surprise and failure, because we have not created a system 
capable of adapting or responding to future drivers or chance events, and we are unable to exert 
ultimate control over the system. An alternative approach would be designing for resilience by planning 
for surprise. Although we cannot anticipate all future events, we can manage and restore in ways that 
allow for uncertainty. Planning for resilience should allow systems a greater ability to deal with and 
recover from surprise and future change by focusing on a diversity of approaches, functions, and 
taxa.” 
p 7 of 11 Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005 
 
An advantage of adaptive management may be in capacity to better support resistance and resilience 
of ecosystems and biodiversity values which is fundamental long-term ecosystem existence and so 
providing perpetual mitigation (O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann 2002; Andreasen et al. 2001; Hooper et 
al. 2005). This is increasingly reflected in management decisions that consider approaches fostering 
resistance and resilience. Adaptive management is most importantly a component of conservation 
where on-going pest management is required. This is the case in New Zealand where invasive 
mammals require perpetual control, therefore most successful when allowed to adapt to the specific 
responses of the local pests. 
 
Uptake of adaptive management is restricted as a result of potentially costly balance between 
resources required and the inconsistency of remunerative outcomes, compared to more traditional 
approaches (Parma 1998; Teresa 2008). A careful balance must be struck between optimal actions 
based on current (limited) knowledge and risks associated with testing new or alternative approaches 
(McCarthy and Possingham 2006; McDonald-Madden et al. 2010). Additional design requirements to 
facilitate hypothesis-testing and conclusive outcomes, and the necessary supporting assessment all 
increase costs (Hilderbrand, Watts and Randle 2005). If results can be directly translated into superior 
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conservation outcomes then costs may be recouped. If conclusions fail to significantly change 
management practices then the increased certainty of action is unlikely to balance the non-trivial 
expenditure (Parma 1998). The benefits of bearing the costs of active adaptive management are much 
greater if knowledge is limited. When uncertainty is minimal the risks are lesser and a passive approach 
may be more cost-effective, and therefore favoured.  
 
4 .3 .2 Moni tor ing 
 
Long and short term monitoring is an integral component of adaptive management (Turner, Redmond 
and Zedler 2001; Spieles 2005; Spieles, Coneybeer and Horn 2006; Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Hill 
2008). In the process of bank establishment, short term monitoring is required to ensure necessary 
standards are met in relation to credits issued and may demonstrate the passing of thresholds or 
satisfying of criteria required. Long term monitoring aids in assuring continual maintenance of 
mitigation standards, and identifies problems or failure in a time frame that enables losses to be 
minimized. Should problems become apparent, more frequent monitoring should be temporarily re-
instated (Hill 2008).   
 
Commentators suggest that offset banking management should monitor biological indicators, 
completion of management actions, and management outcomes. Ideally, underlying assumptions of 
management decisions are considered given adaptive management above (Parma 1998; Bonnie and 
Wilcove 2008; Watts and Handley 2010). Indicators and surrogates may also be used in monitoring, 
endorsed in the CBD (Faith and Walker 1996; Watts and Handley 2010). As an example:  
“I used three metrics that should be common goals for all: the establishment of hydrophytic vegetation, 
the prevalence of non-native species, and the number of species per unit area. I suggest that these 
fundamental measures can be used to evaluate mitigation banks across eco-regions, mitigation 
methods, and geomorphic settings, and given the variability in performance standards and monitoring 
methods, these may be among the only measures common enough for a broad comparison.” 
p. 11 Spieles (2005) 
 
It is suggested that both management inputs and outputs should be measured as part of a monitoring 
program, reflecting both the outcome from the impact but also the processes associated (BBOP 
2009d). For example, the World Bank’s1998 ‘Guidelines for Monitoring and Evaluation for Biodiversity 
Projects’ (as cited by BBOP 2009d) recommends:  
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“A clear set of objectives or goals, including clearly stated questions on how these objectives could be 
reached; a clear set of indicators to measure progress towards project objectives; specific details on 
how and when monitoring and evaluation will take place, and who will undertake specific activities; 
identification of any training, capacity-building or financial resources that will be needed to ensure 
necessary activities are adequately carried out; identification of the intended audiences that will receive 
the results of an M&E plan; specific details on how information and results from M&E activities will feed 
back into project management decisions; identification of clear ‘decision points’ when negative trends 
lead to corrective actions in project implementation (World Bank 1998).” 
p. 86 BBOP (2009d) 
 
Choice of monitoring metric connects with debate regarding ecosystem measurement more broadly70. 
Monitoring metrics must be appropriate for a wide range of locations to maintain equity across sites 
and values in the system for NNL. Conversely, location-specific or permittee-responsible offsetting is 
usually designed to monitor specific values in relation to specific development impacts. Credit trading 
requires an alternative approach. A fungible, tradable credit needs monitoring that is also fungible, so 
performance of offset sites can be compared, assuring that credit standards are maintained. This is 
instead of comparing offsets against impact sites per se (as this has already been quantified through 
the credit trade). Monitoring for a credit trading system must focus on demonstrating commensurate 
standards between offset sites to make exchanging credits through trade reliable. At the same time, 
monitoring must also respond to specifics, being able to adequately accommodate the different 
species, structure and processes at different sites. Balancing both these requirements is difficult 
however, as metrics optimally situated to one location may be inappropriate or ineffective in another, 
requiring complex and challenging decisions to be made (Andreasen et al., 2001). 
 
4 .3 .3  Cont ingenc ies for  catastrophic  events  
 
Catastrophic events cannot be prevented; having a clear stance and protocol to address their 
occurrence offers the most efficient path to minimizing damage risks. Adequate provision for 
catastrophic events is an important part of management plans and overall offset design. Damage 
caused by catastrophic events risk the long-term success of a bank site and a common cause for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Metrics for monitoring may potentially have direct relation to the metric used to assess and measure the biodiversity 
values in the initiation of the banking process. Note BBOP’s (2009d) use of their ‘Key Biodiversity Components’ within the 
‘Key Biodiversity Components Matrix’, initially introduced within design applications, as appropriate inclusions in a 
monitoring and evaluation process.  
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concern (Marsh et al. 1996; Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996).  Any event occurring outside ‘normal’ 
or expected parameters might be considered catastrophic, with variable environmental outcomes 
possible. Such events may be naturally caused 71 such as floods, hurricanes, droughts, tornadoes, 
lighting strikes, temperature extremes, or non-climatic such as disease and pest outbreaks and 
geomorphic, tectonic or seismic occurrences. Human-derived events may include pollution, vandalism, 
accidental damage, fire and arson, and general error in judgment or negligence in preventing 
unwanted events72.    
 
Mitigating risk posed by catastrophic events concerns the assignment of liability (both causative and 
remedial), processes of remediation, and mechanisms of prevention. Liability may be ascribed on 
efficiency, effectiveness and implementation, or on enforcement capacity. The lack of predictability 
regarding the frequency and magnitude of natural events makes effective prediction and prevention 
extremely challenging, so planning for remedial action may be the best strategy. Limited predictive 
capacity may exist where there is data, such as records of flood frequency in a region. This raises 
further questions over whether to plan for the 100 or 1000-year flood, and what is a reasonable cost 
for preventative measures where technological limitations mean benefits are outweighed by significant 
costs (Goldman-Carter and McCallie, 1996).   
 
Difficulty assigning direct causative responsibility for natural events generates debate over who should 
pay for and conduct remedial actions. Assigning liability based on rationales other than causation has 
proved challenging and contentious. Impacts from catastrophic events may therefore be excluded from 
long-term management plans, for reasons of practicality, expediency or ecology. Some jurisdictions 
have chosen to treat catastrophic events as a natural part of the biological system, arguing that any 
negative impacts were equally likely to damage values irrespective of offset banking occurring, and so 
it is not a component of NNL to ameliorate such damage. If the bank site is established in perpetuity, it 
is reasonable to expect that time exists for damage from natural events to repair un-aided and 
maintaining long-term NNL.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The author recognizes that in cases such as global warning and climate change this distinction is markedly less defined, 
and in many cases synergistic interactions are present between natural and human-derived causes.  
72 Human-derived events not discussed in more detail here as they are considered generally more manageable as they 
occur in a less random manner so may be predicted based on factors such as the location and design of the bank or 
physical barriers or protection in place. Additionally, this capacity for prevention increases with experience over time. A 
similar assumption cannot be made for the prevention of natural events, such as hurricanes or lightning.  Where human 
error is involved, the management plan is a pivotal tool for defining liability, making remedial action more expedient, and 
increasing the incentive for active prevention.  The role of human error is discussed more in Chapter 6 
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4.3.4 The precaut ionary pr inc ip le  to  address r isk  
 
In the presence of uncertainty, there is risk that decision-making process may be delayed, or not occur 
at all and result in continued loss of value. This is a relevant concern in relation to offset site 
management decisions (Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Young et al., 1996; Burgin 2008; Smith 
n.d.; Elliot 2009). Under the precautionary principle, absence of unequivocal evidence should not delay 
management; management should instead continue, guided by principles of prevention and precaution 
(Harding 2006).  
 
“Full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent 
degradation of the environment.” p. 3 Smith (n.d.) 
 
In NSW, Justice Stein (Hon) has stated: 
“[the precautionary principle] is directed towards the prevention of serious or irreversible harm to the 
environment in situations of scientific uncertainty. Its premise is that where uncertainty exists 
concerning the nature or scope of environmental harm (whether this follows from politics, decisions or 
activities), decision makers should be cautious.” p 3 Smith (n.d.) 
 
Use of the precautionary principle to guide risk mitigation via mechanisms such as long-term 
management, planning and monitoring is widely promoted internationally as being in line with 
sustainable development and offers risk mitigation in systems such as offset banking (Harding 2006; 
Nelson and Sharman 2007; Burgin 2008). Under the precautionary principle, management actions and 
policy decisions are made with the intention to avoid unwanted or unintended situations. Decisions 
should be made with regard to certainty of outcome, and irreversibility of potential negative effects. 
This may reflect increased conservatism: stronger emphasis on avoidance, larger ratios, longer time 
frames and more stringently conservative guidelines and standards (Harding 2006).  Internationally, 
this is supported in the Rio Declaration (1992) (Elliot 2009): 
 
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation (Principle 15, Rio Declaration)” 
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4.4 SUMMARY:  B IOLOGICAL R ISK,  SCIENTIF IC UNCERTAINTY AND 
ECOSYSTEM MEASUREMENT 
 
No offset banking system can ever hope to eliminate biological risk from the system. The biological 
diversity within offset banking represents together both the most important goal of the system, 
(achieving no net loss of biodiversity), and the largest source of risk that jeopardizes this: sciences’ 
limited knowledge of biodiversity. Of many steps, the most important is accurate measurement and 
representation of biological values within offset banking. This in itself presents many challenges, yet 
with support by other mechanisms seen in Californian and New South Wales’ examples, significant 
progress is being made.  
 
Addressing risk through a multi-faceted framework is important. The most fundamental risk in offset 
banking originates because of the combination of environment, economy and society under sustainable 
development. While this chapter has discussed the risks associated with the biological components, 
these operate in tight combination with economic and social risks. Risk threatening the strength of one 
places significant threat on another. It is therefore dangerous to address risks, biological or otherwise, 
in isolation. 
 
The need for multiple components is an idea reflected in a portfolio approach. Practically, this occurs 
by spreading risk across a collection of banks, reflecting that to prevent increased loss conservation 
needs to occur across the landscape (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). Cost and responsibility is also spread 
across a number of development projects. In operation, the risk that this approach does not work is 
addressed by a collection, or portfolio, of mechanisms and measures. It is in a portfolio context that 
these measures should be viewed. They do not represent perfect solutions in themselves and it would 
be inappropriate to place the burden of mitigation with one approach; this in turn presents more risk. 
Measures discussed here instead contribute to a portfolio necessary to mitigate risk in an inherently 
inter-dependent and risky system.  
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CHAPTER F IVE 
F INANCIAL R ISK AND ENSURING FUNDING FOR CONSERVATION 
 
The risk posed by financial failure of the offset banking system is as fundamental a concern as that 
posed by biological failure. Proper financial underpinning of offset banking is integral under sustainable 
development principles. To achieve NNL, the system must generate adequate money for biodiversity 
conservation; it must also balance the economic costs of biodiversity loss with the environmental (and 
by extension, social) costs and encourage biodiversity conservation while discouraging biodiversity 
destruction. The finance and economis of the system are critical to ensuring this occurs, and are a 
source of risk that must be mitigated. In this chapter I will discuss the process of identifying financial 
risks present within offset banking as a precursor to the various mechanisms available to mitigate and 
minimise such risk. Given this understanding, risks associated with the finance and economics of offset 
banking may be managed so these do not jeopardise, but instead enhance, the biological and social 
benefits available through offset banking.  
 
5 .1  GENERATING ADEQUATE MONEY FOR CONSERVATION BY ENSURING F INANCIAL  
SUCCESS OF INDIV IDUAL BANKS  
 
5 .1 .1 Cred i t  Transact ions 
 
The first stage of ensuring that adequate financing is available to support an individual bank is 
ensuring a robust credit73 transaction. A credit’s primary financial function is to generate money to 
support the biodiversity conservation of the bank; this requires credits be sold and for an appropriate 
price. In turn, this requires the identification of a buyer, establishing an appropriate price and 
generating revenue via credit exchange. It then must be ensured that this money achieves 
conservation as intended. The correct credit price achieves little without available and willing 
purchasers yet an under-priced transaction is also undesirable. The economic free-market’s purpose is 
to balance such competition concerns. A system of multiple buyers and sellers efficiently addressing 
these issues is fundamental to offset banking and the market-based approach, so is the subject 
discussed below. 
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Credit sales must be unambiguous and explicit to ensure the money exchanged makes the intended 
conservation gains (Teresa 2008). Transactions that are poorly regulated introduce risk that banks 
and credits may be over-sold, where credits are sold for values that do not exist (Naumann, Vorwerk 
and Brauer 2008). A bank owner may overstate credits available, or the same credit may be sold to 
more than one party, mitigating more than one impact. Upon the second sale, the impact is considered 
mitigated, but the values have already been used in mitigation and so theoretically, these values no 
longer exist. In these cases, money is generated that does not contribute to conservation. Robust and 
enforced accounting processes, at the bank and higher administrative levels are required. A 
comprehensive and up-to-date credit-trading registry (with compulsory registration) is also necessary. 
Both efficiently manage risks to an individual bank site posed through by inappropriate credit 
transactions (Teresa 2008). 
 
5.1.2 Long-term fund ing:  endowment funds 
 
The second stage of financial risk management is to ensure long-term financial success of individual 
bank sites. With increased awareness of this importance, and more stringent requirements by 
governing bodies, effective mechanisms have been developed. Current best practice is an endowment 
fund, increasingly becoming an essential component: 
“Endowment funding is, in most cases the most efficient, cost-effective and pragmatic way to assure 
long-term management of a conservation bank. Properly structured, endowment funding can relieve 
the bankers of ongoing risks and long-term management responsibility for conservation banks.” 
p. 142, Teresa (2008) 
 
5 .1 .3 Management costs  and the in i t ia l  depos i t  
 
Money in an endowment fund is managed to ensure it produces perpetual revenue, while maintaining 
the capital base. The interest generated from an initial deposit returns income to sustain the offset 
bank, without the initial deposit itself being used. This fund addresses the risk posed by stochastic or 
unguaranteed funding for management as it provides an assured level of income over the long-term. 
 
A successful endowment fund requires both a correct initial deposit and correct financial management 
thereafter. Present-day judgements and predictions this requires may only be proved correct over 
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longer future time-spans, making errors harder to remedy and these challenging speculations. Best 
practice has developed to establish necessary requirements, costs, and final budgets:  
“It is possible to reduce the long-term costs of conservation land management to a single value - a 
financial calculation, in today’s dollars - which is the present value of all future costs associated with a 
project...” 
p. 135, Teresa (2008) 
 
The schedule of management actions are the basis for calculating the deposit required. Accurate 
projections are increasingly achievable with direction given from defined outcomes and experience. 
Potential risks remain however, requiring significant knowledge and planning to specify the 
management actions needed over extended future timeframes. The projected costs of these must also 
be estimated, with proper consideration of potential changes in technology, labour requirements, site 
conditions, or management best practice. Even with prior experience, the highly location-specific nature 
of management and associated costs mean final requirements are likely to vary considerably across 
locations, making generalised assumptions rare (Teresa 2008). Such considerations are particularly 
relevant where adaptive management is applied, and it is recognised these increase management costs 
(Teresa 2008). 
 
Management costs are a direct product of the intensity, frequency and expense of management 
actions, so the years immediately following bank establishment will require a higher income stream. 
During this period management is likely most intensive and frequent while values are established, 
particularly where restoration, recreation, enhancement or establishment is involved. A step-wise 
reduction in costs following an initially expensive phase may be appropriate. This is incorporated 
through the established management requirements being extrapolated over time, preceding 
calculations of the final deposit amount.  
 
 5 .1 .4 Ach iev ing proper  invest ing and spending 
 
Unfortunately, initial perception of simplicity in this process has resulted in examples of serious error74. 
Wide-ranging and varying costs have proved challenging to accurately estimate as many are not 
obviously related to specific management actions, such as indirect costs from labour-related levies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See for example the case of The Environment Trust discussed in Fleischer and Fox 2008, and The Ecosystems Land 
Mitigation Bank Corporation discussed in Gardner and Radwan 2005. 
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benefits and taxes, overheads for office and administration including legal, accountancy and secretarial 
work, and insurances and taxes (Teresa 2008). In addition, there will be costs associated with 
managing the invested capital including expert fees and transaction costs. Oversight of these can have 
a significant impact on the amounts required (Teresa 2008).  
 
Funding problems have also arisen when management outside of the established plan is required and 
which the endowment fund is unable to support. This occurs because of inaccurate management 
predictions or failure to account for unpredictable events. Two responses are possible: drawing 
additional funding from the capital base or reducing management actions to match current income 
risking both short and long term biodiversity decline (Teresa 2008). Multiple withdrawals from the 
capital base decrease its interest-earning capacity and the unsustainable income will be reduced to a 
point where management stops completely, risking decline of all values.  
 
With increasing focus on the perpetuity of values, the proper functioning of endowments over longer 
time frames has received more attention. The greater time-span income covers, the more critical 
capital maintenance required. This is because of the impact of interest, inflation and depreciation in the 
system and how these compound over time. Because the endowment process relies on the ability of 
the initial deposit to earn interest over time, calculation of the initial deposit is a function of the total 
management and operational costs, adjusted for the effects of interest rates (Teresa 2008). Accurate 
projection of future interest rates is an uncertain and highly technical process, as rates vary over time 
and investment portfolios.  
 
Different estimates and predictions may be used and the compounding nature of interest means that 
this variation has a significant effect on the amount required for the initial deposit. Applying incorrect 
rates can jeopardise the ability of the endowment to meet expectations, and respond to unexpected 
future conditions. Previous rates have in some cases been overestimated and the endowment has 
been unable to withstand market fluctuations that reduce interest rates too far or frequently below the 
predicted rate. The specific needs of endowments for conservation have demonstrated this to be a 
highly specific area of knowledge and highlighted the role for specialised endowment holders (Teresa 
2008).  
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A policy directing income expenditure is also required75. The amount available for annual spending is a 
function of the expected interest earned based on predicted rates. Earlier endowments assumed that 
total interest represented available spending income and failed to consider inflation and depreciation 
that reduce capital buying power over time and the capacity for the initial deposit to generate enough 
income to meet inflating costs. It is now best practice to allocate only a portion of the interest accrued 
each year for spending, with a designated portion being reinvested to maintain the capital. Establishing 
a non-wasting endowment manages the risk that inflation will reduce any money set aside now, for 
future conservation purposes. 
 
 5 .1 .5 Operat ing the endowment 
 
Following endowment design, the timing of the initial deposit must be considered. For maximum risk-
mitigation, the deposit should be secured prior to credits being sold (Teresa 2008). This is frequently 
challenging due to the substantial money concerned, and so the risk involved. Should the credits sell 
slowly or not at all, lost opportunity cost of the endowment fund is significant. This may have the 
potential to render the economic balance of the project untenable. However, if funds are deposited only 
after credits are sold, then the time between bank establishment, credit sales and endowment funding 
may be substantial enough that values decline because management is not funded (Teresa 2008). The 
timing of the endowment deposit (before, concurrently or after credit sales) must adequately mitigate 
risks to biodiversity values, without placing counter-productive and uneconomic burden on the bank 
owner.  
 
Responsibility for management and investment is most ideally externally assigned, preferably to a 
specialised, non-profit entity that invests the money on behalf of the steward, can take advantage of a 
more favourable tax status, and ensure transparency and impartiality in distributing the payments. 
Their independence allows an additional enforcement mechanism if management payments are made 
only when criteria are met by the bank site and bank owner.  
 
State and government entities or specialist private firms may take this role. The legal and fiscal 
implications of this are discussed below, noting contrasts between New South Wales and California. 
Social concerns may favour allocating to a private, non-profit entity. The provision of income for 
biodiversity conservation is expected to be seen as an incentive to private landowners, however it has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For example, CNLM adopts a 4.5% or less spending rate - based on collected data.  
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been suggested that the involvement of government in a landowners income may be perceived to 
introduce more, rather than less, risk to the private land-owner. It may detract from its perception as a 
free-market scheme and cause it to suffer some of the limited participation issues restricting current 
rebate and grant programs and potentially jeopardising essential scheme uptake.  
 
5 .1 .6 Long-term fund ing in  Case Stud ies 
 
New South Wales and California 
 
Table 5.1 (p. 139 - 141) compares differences and similarities within the long-term funding 
frameworks of California and New South Wales, reflecting the best practice becoming established. New 
South Wales’ Biobanking Trust Fund is a recent application of non-wasting endowments supporting 
long-term conservation, from practices long established in the United States. A non-wasting 
endowment fund is established as a requirement of establishing a conservation or mitigation bank in 
California. Improvements in design and professional expertise in this area has been fundamental to 
California’s success.  
 
The Centre for Natural Lands Management (CNLM) in Southern California is a highly regarded non-
profit, specialist bank stewardship organisation established in 1990. CNLM has contributed significantly 
to endowment practices across that state, in particular through systems developed for long-term 
management plans and costing. The demonstrated success of their business model makes a valuable 
template for illustrating how to manage long-term financial risk within offset banking, discussed bellow.  
 
Property Analysis Record (PAR) 
 
The Property Analysis Record, or PAR, is software developed for CNLM’s Endowment and Stewardship 
operations, now offered under licence by CNLM. The Model calculates a financial value for the long-
term biological and protection requirements of a bank project:  
 
“…first by establishing the long-term needs of the project by comparing a set of management 
possibilities against the actual condition and circumstances of the project…Second, PAR asks what 
can be done in the design or documentation of the project to reduce these…Third the PAR asks what 
tasks are necessary to offset the remaining threats to the project over time…With these assumptions, 
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the PAR prepares a task-based budget suitable for presentation as an annual cost, an average 
perpetual cost and as an endowment.” 
p. 136 Founder, Teresa (2008) 
 
The model recognises two time periods: ‘Initial and Capital’ and ‘Long-term On-going’ periods. The 
Initial and Capital period corresponds to the period of bank establishment, including any restoration, 
creation or other value-adding activities. The CNLM uses a 4-5 year time frame for this period, 
depending on the project. This may include land-acquisition costs, credit marketing and transaction 
fees and one-off labour costs. These costs are not included in the endowment calculations. Separate 
Initial and Capital (I&C) payment is required, preferably before the CNLM accepts stewardship. It may 
be paid over a schedule of instalments if appropriate adjustment is made for loss of earning and 
inflation over the repayment period. The PAR produces an annual budget and includes for the provision 
of three to five years of ongoing expenses to be included as a buffer for potential volatility of earnings. 
The PAR also includes a 10% allocation of all direct, indirect, overhead and insurance costs as a 
contingency allowance. It also adjusts all costs for inflation and discounts them for time.  
 
The PAR is a foundational component of the success of CNLM, which has established a laudable 
reputation and offers a range of ecosystem management and other services to augment the 
conservation/species banking industry. The PAR model is a proven approach to the long-term 
management of both management and financial requirements of a biodiversity bank, and is therefore 
an appropriate approach for application more widely in other schemes.  
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Table 5.1 Summary and comparison of features of the NSW and Californian long-term funding 
frameworks. See GLOSSARY for definition of terms. Tabl  5.1 Summary and comparison of features of the NSW and Californian long-term 
funding frameworks. See GLOSSARY for definition of terms. 
 Endowm
ent 
features 
Term
 used 
California 
New South Wales 
Endowment Fund 
BioBanking Trust Fund 
Requirement 
established 
The Memorandum of Guidance for the Establishment, Use and 
Operation of Conservation Banks in California (2003) (within 
others also) 
TSA 1995, Section 127ZW, X,Y; TSA Biobanking Regulation 
2008 Part 7 Section 29; individual bank requirements are in 
the Biobanking Agreement 
Parties with 
relationship to 
the endowment 
 
Stewart 
Receives payments from the 
endowment to fund management 
actions required of it.  
The Minister 
The State Government Minister who administers 
the TSA Act and appoints the Trust Fund 
Manager 
Endowment Holder 
The organisation managing, investing 
and distributing the endowment 
deposit and any earnings. May hold 
any other bank role and may be a 
non-profit/NGO or less commonly 
State agency. 
The Trust 
Fund 
Manager 
The person charged with investing and 
managing the Biobanking Trust Fund. May or 
may not be state entity. 
Easement Holder 
Could potentially gain access to 
endowment payments in order to fulfil 
the obligations of the easement. 
Bank- owner 
As a condition of receiving credits, is 
responsible for the initial deposit into the Trust 
Fund. 
Credit-seller 
Is responsible for funding the initial 
deposit of the endowment as a 
condition of being issued credits. May 
also be responsible for management 
until such time as the endowment is 
operational (i.e. fully funded and 
producing income to support 
management of the bank as required)  
Bank 
manager 
Receives annual payments from the Trust Fund 
that enable the long-term management 
required. Submits annual reports required in 
order to receive such payments.   
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Table 5.1 (Cont.) Summary and comparison of features of the NSW and Californian long-term  
funding frameworks. See GLOSSARY for definition of terms 
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Funds held as  
(Collective/separate) 
Held as individual funds, or as private collections, or as 
collections within private companies, or invested by the state 
Held as a collection of all funds from all banks in the State 
Initial deposit paid (when) 
On or before a date specified in Bank Agreement or in 
accordance with agency specifications. Commonly a sequential 
process aligned with credit sales. 
As Credits are transferred i.e. sold or retired. Must be made 
before the transaction is registered.  
Fund held by 
One of many entities, private or public, with the authority to do 
so.  
Funds held by the State in the Biobanking Trust Fund 
Managed by 
A person appointed by the endowment-holding entity (an 
employee or member). 
The Ministerially appointed Trust Fund Manager 1, Can also be 
the Environmental Trust as established under the The 
Environmental Trust Act 1998 
Payments made by 
Annual payments, from endowment entity to Bank Steward as per 
specific arrangements 
Annual payments made by the Trust Fund Manager; upon 
receipt of annual report; schedule specified in the Biobanking 
Agreement 
Management costs 
calculated by (who and 
how) 
Various methods applied based on entity responsible. For 
example, see PAR and CNLM (in text). Management and 
endowment procedures specified in Bank Agreement Documents, 
written by bank-owner representatives and approved by multi-
agency bodies.  
Landowner submits a completed Management Actions and 
Management Plan Template with the application for a 
Biobanking Agreement; Accredited Assessor Submits Credit 
Calculation report including management actions required for 
proposed credits. Final Agreement issued by DECC, states 
Management Plan, Schedule of payments and initial Trust 
Fund Deposit.  
Total Fund Deposit 
calculated by (who and 
how) 
Government and State entities governed by finance and 
investment law that applies to conservation easements, which 
limits their investment options and returns possible as state 
funds. Private entities are not restricted by these regulations.  
 
Determined by the Director-General of the Department 
administering the Act 
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Table 5.1 (Cont.) Summary and comparison of features of the NSW and Californian long-term funding 
frameworks. See GLOSSARY for definition of terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Invested guided by (rules)/ 
notable restrictions?  
Operate Credit Trading registry; stipulate the endowment fund 
must be paid; may be third party beneficiary to endowment; 
signatory to Banking Agreement detailing the Endowment. 
The TSA (1995) states that investments should be made in the 
same manner as under the Tustee Act 1925, and in regard to 
the Biobanking Regulation (TSA 2008) 
Role of State (and State 
agencies) 
   
If a third party beneficiary to an endowment and easement, an 
assigned government agency such as USFWS can directly 
manage or allocate the management of the endowment under 
certain eventualities 
Specify/approve management actions, plans, schedule of 
payments, initial Trust Fund Deposit via issue of Biobanking 
Agreement; appoint Trust Fund Manager - if state-filled (as 
currently) then also includes the duties of the Trust Fund 
Manager.  
Provision for amelioration 
access 
Best-practice requires the re-investment of the excess, to buffer 
future volatility 
Annual payments can be suspended by DECC. DECC can claim 
damages. Director-General may direct the Trust Fund Manager 
to use funds in a specified manner - potentially for 
amelioration.   
Provision for returns in 
excess of those 
required/expected 
Fund must be self-sustaining. Additional requirements not 
specified in regulatory documents.  
Where there is an operational surplus in excess of 30%
 (of all 
scheduled management payments), the bit above 30%
 may 
be paid to the bank site owner. (TSA Reg. 2008) 
Cost recovery 
Some bankers have chosen to re-invest more interest that 
required in agreements and have grown the endowment fund to 
be larger than minimum requirements from a desire to be better 
prepared to accommodate future economic uncertainty, or to 
expand management options and potential for the future.  
Participants in the scheme may be required to pay the Minister 
costs associated with operating the Fund, such as ensuring 
compliance and administration. 
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5.1.7 Endowments and long-term protect ion  
 
In addition to the framework outlined in Table 5.1, there are some other key features of the California 
scheme worth noting. These provide context for the differences between the two systems. An 
endowment may be invested and managed in many ways. Different investment profiles present varying 
levels of risk with varying levels of return. In California, state and federal laws regulate the fiscal and 
investment rights of local and state government agencies. They restrict allocation of money and 
structure investments to certain forms of low-risk investment. This limits returns possible when 
investing money such as endowment funds, in many cases to below what is reasonably necessary to 
sustain a banking operation (Teresa 2008). 
 
A private firm is less encumbered by restrictions than public bodies and is able to access investments 
and investment structures offering a significantly higher rate of return. Private firms are in a far better 
position to secure a higher income stream from the endowment deposit. Therefore, it is most common 
for endowments to be held in private, non-profit, specialist firms that may hold similar roles for 
foundations, charities, hospitals, universities or other such non-profit philanthropic organisations76.  
This presents a very different mode of operation compared to New South Wales where the endowment 
is government managed. In the absence of such limitations imposed upon government or agency 
investment and fiscal management, there is little impetus for many private firms to take on this role. 
This may be one reason that such a difference exists between the two examples.  
 
5.1.7.1  Easements 
 
In a chapter concerning financial risk, the discussion of the permanent protection of the bank site for 
conservation purposes may seem misplaced. However Californian land-rights structures, utilising 
easements, are an effective mechanism of managing financial risks associated with long-term funding 
of bank sites. The structure establishes a unique relationship between the bank, land and credit 
owners, the perpetual protection of the bank site and the perpetual management funding because it 
allows the severance of these multiple rights from the land-title holder (McElfish and Nicholas 1996; 
Carroll Fox and Bayon, Appendix II 2008; Gardner 2008). Rights to resources such as minerals or 
water are divided through the same approach. Banking credits may be analogously severed and sold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Note Commonfund www.commonfund.org and The Investment Fund for Foundations www.tiff.org 
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by a party other than the landowner or fee-title holder. Table 5.2 summarises how such rights may be 
distributed to a number of parties within a banking framework.  
 
Table 5.2: Parties and rights with potential involvement with the structure of conservation easements and 
endowments in California, under the conservation and mitigation banking system. ‘Banking documents’ 
refer to legal documents required for bank establishment (BEI/MOA/CBA). See GLOSSARY for abbreviations 
and definition of terms. 
Ent i ty  Role may be f i l led 
by 
Concurrent  ro les 
a l lowed/restr ic t ions on 
ro les 
R ights he ld 
Regulating 
agency 
The state and/or 
federal agency(s) that 
approve the bank 
Agencies may concurrently 
be endowment or easement 
holders, but more commonly 
third party beneficiaries. 
They may hold fee-title to 
the land if other rights have 
been severed, but this is not 
preferred.  
Jurisdiction as per legislation, 
regulations and guidance’s over 
the enforcement of banking 
documents (BEI/CBA/MOA) 
conditions. Also retains rights to 
access endowment and land 
under various mechanisms.  
Bank 
sponsor 
Private individual, 
company, NGO or non-
profit 
May concurrently hold land 
fee-title, and bank 
management positions 
Liabilities, financial or otherwise, 
as specified in banking 
documentation the bank 
sponsor signs. 
Credit owner Private individual, 
company, NGO or non-
profit 
Credits may be owned by the 
bank sponsor, land fee-title 
holder, bank manager or an 
independent buyer.  
Holds the rights to sell the 
credits issued in the banking 
documents, for profit. Credits 
may only be purchased once if 
used for mitigation.  
Fee-Title 
holder/ 
Land owner 
Private individual, 
company, NGO or non-
profit or a state 
agency.  
May concurrently own credits 
as the bank sponsor, and/or 
be the bank manager. 
Rights are highly specific, based 
on jurisdiction, easement 
conditions and conditions within 
banking documents, and other 
severance of rights relating to 
the land.  
Easement 
Holder 
Private entity, NGO, 
non-profit or State 
agency. 
 
May not be held in 
conjunction with any other 
role, except the in a position 
of bank manager. An entity 
may also be a third-party 
beneficiary to the easement 
typically a government 
agency or private non-profit 
organisation that can step in 
if the primary holder 
defaults. 
Rights necessary to uphold the 
conditions of the easement 
(such as rights to water and 
access etc.). Also the right to 
enforce the conservation 
easement against violation, e.g. 
trespass or vandalism (the right 
to enforcement may also be 
acquired through being third-
party beneficiary). 
Bank 
Manager 
Private individual or 
company, NGO or non-
profit.  
Role may be held 
concurrently with bank 
sponsor, land fee-title 
holder, easement holder, but 
Rights under contract of 
employment if an independent 
entity.  
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not the endowment holder.  
Endowment 
Holder 
An organisation or 
entity approved to hold 
endowments by the 
regulating agency 
(most commonly 
private, non-profit, but 
may be a state 
agency). 
Must be an independent 
entity i.e. cannot hold any 
other role, but may be 
concurrent with land 
stewardship/management. 
The right to hold, manage, 
invest and allocate the monies 
of the endowment fund for the 
purposes established in banking 
documents. Rights to access the 
fund may also be acquired by a 
third party beneficiary to the 
endowment 
 
This structure can also include severance of access rights and rights to enforce certain conditions 
(both restrictive and prescriptive) on the land, through the use of an easement placed with an 
additional, separate entity. Within California, the structure commonly places credits with the bank 
sponsor while the fee title is transferred to a non-profit organisation or state agency. In addition, an 
easement is granted to a separate party. Distinct from a covenant, an easement grants the easement 
holder both rights and responsibilities: the right to enforce the conditions of the easement in return for 
accepting liability for values specified within the conditions.  
 
Both a Management Plan and the Conservation Easement are signed as part of the legally binding 
Bank Agreement. A structure of state legislature, conservation easements go beyond traditional 
easements that allow restrictions on specific degrading land uses, grant rights to inspect and monitor 
the property in line with the easement’s conditions and objectives (Gardner 2008). As applied in 
conservation and mitigation banking in California, easement holders are further required to actively 
uphold these rights (i.e. rights cannot be waivered). These conservation easements stipulate the 
maintenance of the species or wetland values banked, and so the easement holder accepts liability to 
ensure these values in perpetuity. If the values are not maintained a specified third-party such as a 
government agency can direct the easement holder to do so under threat of withholding federal tax 
benefits or the right to hold future easements77 (Gardiner 2008).  
 
This easement structure minimises risk by enabling proper funding and long-term management 
because it places these responsibilities with entities most capable of fulfilling these specialised roles. It 
also minimises conflicting interest that may increase financial risk (see discussion of conflict of interests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 In cases of easement violation, the Grantee may bring a legal or equitable case against appropriate parties, to prevent or 
cease the violation, or to recover the costs of repairing the damage (see Appendix III, Carol, Fox and Bayon 2008). In 
California, the CFDG, Californian Attorney General or any other third-party to the easement may also take enforcement 
measures.  If a state agency is a third-party beneficiary to the easement and also the endowment fund, they can access the 
endowment for the purposes of enforcing the easement (i.e. make the management funds available as necessary if the 
current Steward fails in their obligations) (Teresa 2008).   
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in Chapter 7, sections 7.5 and 7.3). Further, the perpetual management and protection of the offset 
bank values may continue uninterrupted irrespective of land tenure, removing the risk that transfer of 
land ownership will jeopardise the conservation values. Finally, the most important way that this land-
rights structure mitigates financial risk is because it allows liability to be not only clearly established, 
but also severed from those unable to manage it reliably or efficiently.  
 
Clear ascription of liability accompanies clear placement of risk: those with liability take on certain risks. 
A primary step towards mitigating and addressing risk is assuring that risks lie unambiguously with 
those with the best capacity to manage them: from here, risk mitigation can be effectively undertaken. 
For example, the role of the endowment fund: the endowment is a response to ascription of liability and 
assumption of risk. The credit owner/bank sponsor is released from the liability of long-term 
management by signing the easement over to a third party easement holder as above. To reflect the 
benefit of the transfer of liability and risk, a financial cost (i.e. the endowment) must be associated. The 
endowment fund money represents compensation for the easement holder taking on the liability and 
risk of the easement, as there is an appropriate mechanism to manage the financial risk of this task -  
the endowment (McElfish and Nicholas 1996; Teresa, May 2010 Pers. Comm.).  
 
And so risk is mitigated; other parties do not carry long-term management risks as this has been 
clearly ascribed to the easement holder whereupon these risks are mitigated though the endowment 
process. Those carrying risk have the tools available to properly minimise them. In other contexts, such 
as New South Wales and potentially New Zealand, covenants may be used in place of endowments. This 
process involves similar perpetual protection mechanisms but does not ascribe any liability nor make 
provision for enforcement in the same manner.  This raises questions in both regions as to how specific 
rights and responsibilities may be ascribed to run perpetually with land transfers while accommodating 
the needs and risk burdens on landowners. This is ideally conducted in a manner ensuring those with 
conservation values on their land are able to conserve them though offset banking, rather than owners 
being discouraged by the perception of high-risk responsibilities (for more discussion regarding 
entrepreneurship, participation and incentives see Chapter Five, section 5.4.3 - 5.6.3.2)  
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5.2 Ensur ing success o f  many banks together :  funct ion ing in  an 
economic context   
 
The above mechanisms mitigate the financial risk surrounding an individual bank. All banks in a system 
are additionally exposed, as a collective group, to the risk of the economic system underpinning the 
scheme failing: the system does not generate the money needed for adequate conservation on a 
whole-scheme level. The market-based approach is intended to generate an optimum and efficient 
amount of money. In the context of conservation, where market-based offset banking is a novel 
paradigm, familiarity and expertise with the principles of the economic base may not be widespread or 
comprehensive, which challenges their effective implementation. However to create a successful 
economic market within which offset banking and credit trading is successful, a sound knowledge of 
economics and economic principles is essential. It is for this reason that important concepts are 
explained bellow: without these concepts in mind, design of an offset banking is at risk of financial 
failure as an economic system.   
 
Firstly, a market for trading credits must be established (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Such an economic 
market is concerned with the efficient distribution of goods and services (See Chapter 2: Sustainable 
development and the role of economics). Biodiversity and other offset credits represent some of the 
many environmental goods and services biodiversity provides. These goods are created legally and 
conceptually, as detailed previously, thus creating a commodity in an economic sense (Crowe and ten 
Kate 2010). With a commodity, a trading market may be established to influence and allocate market 
goods and services. This process requires the following aspects - market and non-markets, private and 
public goods - to be taken into consideration. 
 
5 .2 .1 Market  and non-market  goods 
 
Non-market goods are externalities as they cannot be allocated by market mechanisms, and so are 
excluded from market distribution (Gilpin 2000). Market goods are defined as resources that are rival 
and excludable (Table 5.3) (Anton, Fisk and Holstrom, 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Heal 2000; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010). Redefinition allows previously non-market goods, such as biodiversity goods and 
services, to be economically allocated establishing the relevance to the economic paradigm. 
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Goods and services are rival when use by one party reduces use potential use by others, and 
excludable when someone using the resource prevents use by another party. Physical properties of a 
particular good or service will determine the degree of rivalness. Certain natural resources cannot be 
considered rival, such as an aesthetic view, protective capabilities of a health ozone layer or oxygen 
production by a healthy forest (Anton, Fisk and Holstrom 2000; Daly and Farley 2004).  
 
 
Excludability is not a direct result of inherent physical properties. One individual’s exclusion from a 
resource because of another’s access does not necessarily occur because all or part of the resource 
as been directly consumed, but because the individual owner has been given the right to exclude 
others (Anton, Fisk and Holstrom 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Heal 2000). This right is created 
through human institutions such as law and law enforcement and is introduced through property rights 
(Hanna and Munasinghe 1995; Gilpin 2000; eftec IEEP et al., 2011). For example, a company may 
obtain rights to access land, to mine for minerals. This mining company is now able to exclude other 
mining companies, and other entities circumstantially, from accessing and using these minerals, even if 
the company does not consume or use all of the minerals themselves.  
 
5 .2 .2 Publ ic  and pr ivate goods 
 
Goods are public if access is freely available to all (Table 5.3) (Heal 2000; Gilpin 2000; Daly and Farley 
2004; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). While intrinsic properties of specific goods dictate their classification, 
human institutions influence this. Government taxes, subsidies and laws can make previously private 
goods publically provided, or previously public goods privately owned (Heal 2000; Gilpin 2000; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010). Some may be relevant to possible classifications of biodiversity. 
 
Locke’s early Labour Theory suggested that, in relation to natural resources specifically, the individual 
contributing the labour or input that resulted in those resources being turned into some useable good 
should therefore be the sole owner of that good or resource - a case of reaping what you sow (Anton 
2000). Technological advancement and innovation contributes to a society’s ability to make goods 
Table 5.3 Economic definition of types of goods (Adopted from Table 3.1 eftec, IEEP et al., 2010) 
 Exc ludable Non-exc ludable 
R iva l  Private goods (Market goods) Common goods (non-market goods) 
Non-Riva l  Club goods  Pure Public goods (non-market goods) 
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public or private. Improvements in television technology allow broadcasters to make television signals 
readable with certain privately-owned decoding equipment, turning previously public broadcasts into 
private goods for sale in the market (Anton 2000; Heal 2000; Daly and Farley 2004). Such an example 
illustrates how complex this distinction may be. The information content of the broadcast, the money 
financing it, the equipment and labour that created the broadcast may be publically or privately owned 
and also may be viewed as potentially having public benefits and costs, even if the elements are 
privately owned (Daly and Farley 2004). This may be compared with biodiversity, where specific 
components may (or may not) be made rival and excludable, requiring differing property rights to 
respond.  
 
Property rights and exclusion are a design component of offset banking, through regulation and 
legislation (Hanna and Munasinghe 1995; Gilpin 2000; Drechsler and Watzold 2008; eftec, IEEP et al., 
2010). These components of an economic market - goods being market or non-market, public or 
private - directly relate to managing financial risk in an offset banking system because if these concepts 
are not understood and properly accommodated though the design of an offset banking system, then 
proper economic functioning is unlikely and the overall objectives of offset banking will be jeopardised. 
The case-studies of New South Wales and California here illustrate how these concepts form an integral 
part of an effective offset banking system, and financial risk is minimised because proper economic 
functioning is possible.   
 
5 .2 .3 Case Stud ies 
 
Legislation may control exclusion and access to, interaction with and use of biodiversity and related 
resources. This is administered by the appropriate legal body and, as needed for offset banking, may 
include specific guidelines requiring permission prior to access. This enables banking in both California 
and New South Wales (Bruggeman et al., 2009).  
 
How is this achieved in California? 
 
While conservation banking is not a specific inclusion of the ESA, legislation creating exclusion enabling 
conservation banking is present (ESA 1973). 
“Wi th respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to the section of this Act, it 
is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to ... (B) Take any such 
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species with the United States of the terrestrial sea of the United States…with respect to any 
endangered species of plant listed pursuant to section 4 of this Act, it is unlawful for any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to - …(B) Remove and reduction to possession any 
such species from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on 
any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species…”  
Pg. 25 ESA 1973 
 
This means that public and private landowners planning to utilise development rights on private, state, 
tribal or federal land are excluded from actions in the manner described in the act, namely: 
“The term ‘Take’ [of an listed species] means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 
p. 3 ESA 1(973) 
 
The ESA has two sections pertaining to ‘take’. Section 7 pertains to Federal, state, local or tribal 
government projects, or activities on their behalf. Section 10 applies to private landowners and 
development on their property. In this way, the ESA specifies exclusion of specific parties, from specific 
land uses (Bruggeman et al., 2009). 
 
How is this achieved in New South Wales? 
 
In New South Wales, exclusion occurs through several Acts, namely the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act (EPA) (1979) and the National Parks and Wildlife Act (1974), which include specific 
restrictions regarding development of land, and interactions with endangered, threatened or critical 
flora and fauna. The Threatened Species Conservation Act (TSA) 1995 creates exclusion by prohibiting 
development based on resulting impacts on threatened, critically endangered, endangered, presumed 
extinct or vulnerable species, communities or habitats. Division One, Part 2 and 3 specify what the 
exclusion applies to by stating the process of defining the species and habitats. The Act further details 
how consent for development may be granted through Biobanking. The legal system and supporting 
police forces of the respective States provide necessary enforcement, as this exclusion is created 
through instruments of law (Feeny et al., 1990). Actions against these regulations are considered 
breaching the Act so are legal prosecutable.  
 
In New Zealand, exclusion provisions supporting market creation may be found within the Resource 
Management Act (1997). Here it is stated that: 
	   150	  
“Part 3 Duties and Restrictions under this Act. Land. Sec. 9: Restrictions on use of land (1) No person 
may use land in a manner that contravenes a national environmental standard unless…(2) No person 
may use land in a manner that contravenes a regional rule unless… (3) No person may use land in a 
manner that contravenes a district rule...” p. 67 
 
New Zealand therefore has some exclusion necessary for the creation of commodity and an offset 
banking credit-trading market.  
 
5 .2 .4 Trad ing cred i ts :  creat ing supply  and demand 
 
Optimally, financial trading of commodities occurs by the forces of supply and demand (in offset 
banking see eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). In offset banking it is argued that demand creates supply. 
Provided there is a reason for someone to purchase a credit, there is therefore a reason for someone 
to create one (mitigating factors to this are discussed below). Demand exists when purchasers receive 
actual benefit from buying offset banking credits, such as satisfying regulations and consent for a 
profitable development project. Recall that legislation and regulation in California and New South Wales 
creates excludability; benefits are consequently ascribed to the holder of the rights (the credit 
purchaser), generating demand and supply (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Palmer and Filoso 
2009; Wissel and Watzold 2010; Mead 2008; Hill 2008; Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008).  
 
In California, multiple Federal and state agencies have issued documents to this effect. The 
Memorandum on the Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Conservation Banks by the 
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington DC, (May 2nd 2003) states that, in 
relation to mitigation required under Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA:  
“Mitigation may include off-site protection of the listed species and its habitat and may take the form of 
purchasing credits in an approved conservation bank” 
 
It re-enforces that, as per an executive order of the State of California from the California Natural 
Resources Agency, policy implemented by the CDFG states (April 7th 1995):  
“A conservation bank is privately or publicly owned land managed for its natural resource values. For 
example, in order to satisfy the legal requirement for mitigation of environmental impacts from a 
development, a landowner can buy credits from a conservation bank, or in the case of wetlands, a 
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mitigation bank. Conservation banking legally links the owner of the bank and resource agencies, such 
as the Department of Fish and Game or the U .S. Fish and Wildlife Service.” 
 
The TSA (1995; TSR 2008) creating the New South Wales scheme represents a more streamline 
approach, stating in Section 127A (p. 66): 
 
“Establishment of biobanking scheme: 
(1) There is established by this Part a biodiversity banking and offsets scheme (the biobanking 
scheme).  
(2) The biobanking scheme has the following key elements: 
(a) The establishment of biobank sites on land by means of biobanking agreements entered 
into between the Minister and the owners of the lands concerned, 
(b) The creation of biodiversity credits in respect of management actions carried out or 
proposed to be carried out on or in respect of biobank sites that improve biodiversity values, 
(c) A system that enables those biodiversity credits, once created and registered, to be 
traded (including by being purchased by developers) and used as an offset against the impact of 
proposed development on biodiversity values, 
(d) The establishment of a biobanking assessment methodology, by order of the Minister 
published in the Gazette, for the purpose of determining both the number of biodiversity credits that 
may be created in respect of management actions or proposed management actions and the number 
of biodiversity credits that must be retired in connection with a development to offset the impact of the 
development and ensure that it improves or maintains biodiversity values.” 
 
These regulations create a demand - a reason for individuals to buy and sell credits. This facilitates 
participation such as in the entrepreneurial banking industry in California (Shabman, Scodari and King 
1996; Ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004). In the case of NSW, regulations specify the nature of 
production, supply, purchase and trade. Together with exclusivity, regulations create necessary supply 
and demand (Shabman, Scodari and King 1996; Palmer and Filoso 2009).  
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5.2.5 Des ign ing the commodi ty  for  t rade:  pr ivat isat ion 
 
In line with ensuring the success of many banks together through mitigating the risk of improper 
economic functioning, the commodity traded must be designed in a way minimises this risk and 
supports desired financial and economic outcomes. Through understanding the implications of design 
choices upon these outcomes, decisions may be made to best mitigate risks present.  
 
Given the influence of regulation and legislation as described above, many alternate commodities and 
markets may be created, each with distinct outcomes and implications (Ostrom et al., 2003; Tietenberg 
2003; Crowe and ten Kate 2010; Hickie 2010).  Much discussion occurs in literature and in society 
regarding privatisation and how private the commodities of biodiversity and the wider environment may 
be (Robertson 2004). Debate suggests that the degree of privatisation that occurs has direct 
implications for society’s ability to provide all the outcomes and end-points desired, not only the 
economic ones (Ostrom et al., 2003; Tietenberg 2003). A highly privatised market may allocate goods 
and services by the most efficient allocation possible under robust economics, but may fail to provide 
the justice, equitable distribution and social welfare that are also priorities (Ekins, Hillman and 
Hutchison 1992 a; b).  As sustainable development requires adequate provision for society’s needs 
also, this consideration is relevant.  
 
According to the design and choice of parameters of credit trading under offset banking potentially 
allows for different levels of privatisation. The level of private ownership in comparison to the extent of 
state ownership or control determines the level of privatisation the credits represents. As such, to 
varying degrees a balance of power is established between the economic forces of the market, and 
social provision through government control. The first way this may occur through the consideration of 
the nature of the values being privatised. In New South Wales, Dickie (2010 un pub.) argues that 
credits created under the TSA (1995; TSR 2008) are based on the management of the biodiversity 
values and this is the commodity created and traded in the system78.  
 
In New South Wales a credit recognises contractual obligations between the Minister and the bank 
owner relating to development rights and management requirements. The agreement binds the 
landowner to management that secures and potentially improves specific biodiversity values at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Credits are awarded based on specified management actions within the Biobanking Agreement which are predicted to 
equate to a given level of biodiversity gain (DECCW 2008c; Currnow and Fitz-Gerald 2006) 
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bank site, restricts any actions that cause damage, and records the agreement on the land-title to 
ensure perpetuity of the arrangement (TSA 2005; 2008; DECC(W) 2009a, g, i). Hickie argues that due 
to this structure, it is not the ecological community or threatened species being privatised, but the 
development rights and management actions (Hickie 2010 un pub.). Tietenberg (and Rose) (2003) 
support this, as they assert that tradable permit establishment is not privatisation of the resource per 
say in a traditional sense, rather the privatization of access to the resource. 
 
“The theoretical extension of this legal structure is that the Minister is obtaining a right to performance 
of management actions and not a transferal of native vegetation or species assets” 
p 34 Dickie (2010 un pub.) 
 
 
In this case, social values such as landscape and recreational enjoyment, provision for future 
generations, maintenance of genetic diversity for utilitarian and insurance reasons, and the intrinsic, 
non-use values of flora and fauna are not being privatised and the benefit to society is not being 
restricted to a single owner. Certain management obligations and costs, and the cost of destruction 
instead are considered privatised under Biobanking. It may be wholly appropriate for such costs and 
obligations in the context of negative development impacts to be assumed by specific entities rather 
than society in general. Hickie (2010 un pub.) therefore argues that privatisation under Biobanking 
may not interfere with social provision of the benefits of biodiversity, and should not be reason to 
refrain from further developing a credit-trading system. 
 
How privatised the credit is impacts upon the value potential traders give to the commodity, and 
consequently how it is traded. The greater restrictions and lesser freedom the state imparts, the less of 
the commodity that is privately controlled and the less value a private owner may see in obtaining it 
through trade.  Market forces act on traders’ desires for goods and services, so with reduced desire 
for commodities less trading will occur. In this case the government may take an active role to support 
trade and allocate the goods and services as required (see also Hanley and Splash 1993; Gilpin 2000; 
Martin and ver Beek 2006; Harris 2007). This is achieved through an extensive range of mechanisms 
such as rebates, taxes, levies, funds and programs with the potential for additional ones only limited by 
current creation (Gunningham and Young 1997).    
 
Alternatively, if the credit is highly privatised, demand is likely higher, allowing trade to be driven by 
market-forces and less by centralised direction. The government may still retain oversight and influence 
	   154	  
through imposing regulation.  Hickie (2010 un pub.) also discusses how the level of commodification 
and privatisation of a credit is dependant on the rights to compensation and rights to transfer. In the 
New South Wales Scheme, the Minister who issued the credit may cancel it under certain 
circumstances. Crucially, should this come to pass, no compensation is to be paid to the landowner79 
meaning the credits are not ‘indefeasible’ (Smith undated (a); TSA 1995; 2008), restricting the rights 
of private ownership that are conferred in the Biobanking credit.  
 
Rights of the credit-holder are further restricted though Ministerial rights of enforcement, extending to 
provisions that allow the Minister to seize the land should repeat non-compliance occur (TSA 1995; 
TSR 2008). The existence of third party standing rights is another aspect that impacts the rights of the 
owner. The provision of third party standing rights, makes it possible for a third party (anyone other 
than the Minister or the credit holder) to bring a claim of Agreement Breach to be settled in the Land 
and Environment Court (EDO 2009). This may also remove the right to privity of contract assumed in 
other circumstances, but has yet to be tested in New South Wales (Hickie 2010 un pub.). 
 
In summary, the New South Wales system offers an example of how taking into account many 
considerations and economic principles enables a trading commodity to be designed, supporting 
market mechanisms and ensuring adequate money is available for biodiversity conservation by 
Biobanking.  
 
5 .3  MANDATORY VERSUS VOLUNTARY APPROACHES TO PARTIC IPAT ING IN  OFFSET 
BANKING 
 
A market may deliver outcomes only with suitable participation in an adequate volume of trades. 
Irrespective of robust commodity and trade design, the desire of people to participate by supplying and 
demanding credits is essential. Insufficient participation underpins the risk there will be insufficient 
money directed to biodiversity conservation through offset banking. The issues of adequate 
participation are multi-faceted. Whether a system is mandatory or voluntary is the first consideration80.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 But note that this is not the case whereby the credit is cancelled because of the issuance of a petroleum title, or mining 
activities.  
80 A voluntary or mandatory system is distinguished by whether participation in biobanking is enforced or optional. This is 
established in regulation or legislation whereby defining if all development projects are required to purchase Biobanking 
credits. The scheme may be established voluntarily if all development projects must assess for mitigation, as is required by 
some projects, and other avenues for mitigation and/or impact assessment are available in addition to Biobanking.  
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5.3.1 Part ic ipat ion in  New South Wales  
 
Participation in the New South Wales scheme is voluntary. Developments requiring impact mitigation 
and satisfaction of the IMT (see Chapter 4, also the GLOSSARY) under the EPA (1979) may choose to 
take either the Threatened Species Assessment Procedure including a Species Impact Statement (SIS) 
under the TSA (1995)81, or participate in the Biobanking Scheme under the same act (DECC 2008a). 
Once a Biobanking statement has been issued however, credit purchase (i.e. participation) becomes 
mandatory.   
 
For landowners with biodiversity values, participation in Biobanking is voluntary. There are various 
options for landowners wanting to conserve biodiversity values. The most relevant option is the 
Property Vegetation Plan (PVP) under the Native Vegetation Act (NVA) (2003). The landowner 
establishes a PVP to conserve biodiversity values, potentially accessing grants and other financial 
assistance. It is a legally binding agreement between the landowner and the Catchment Management 
Authority (CMA; local government body). A Clearing PVP may also be enacted to enable the landowner 
to clear some land and establish commercial activities, keeping some of the land in an agreed upon 
conservation-based state to offset this (EDO 2010). Landowners may not purchase Biobanking credits 
in lieu of doing a PVP to satisfy NVA (2003) obligations.  
 
Some commentators criticize the current framework, advocating instead that rural landowners be able 
to purchase Biobanking credits to satisfy the NVA (2003) offset requirements either as an alternative 
to, or replacement of, the PVP process. They argue this would increase participation in the scheme and 
uptake in the rural sector, enabling the benefits of the Biobanking scheme to be better realized. 
Alternative positions suggest that the established robustness of the current NVA (2003) and PVP 
process achieves current conservation goals as intended and should not be modified.  
 
5 .3 .2 Part ic ipat ion in  Ca l i forn ia  
 
In California, while mitigation or compensation of development impacts is mandatory, the purchase of 
both conservation and mitigation bank credits for this purpose is essentially voluntary. Alternative 
mitigation options are available for both species and wetland impacts as recognized by varying 
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legislation82. The agencies who finalize whether the proposed form of mitigation satisfies requirements 
are guided by the latest documentation, (Federal Register/Vol. 73, No. 70/Thursday, April 10, 
2008/Rules and Regulations) which recognizes the continued role for all three forms of mitigation, but 
establishes a firm preference for purchasing bank credits (Gardner and Radwan 2005). Furthermore, 
other guidance and regulations provide the parameters for how decisions may be made, including 
situations where alternative options are not appropriate. While alternatives to mitigation banking exist, 
the discretion available to make these choices limits the extent to which participation is voluntary.  
 
5 .3 .3 Cons ider ing whether  systems should be mandatory  or  vo luntary   
 
                   What are the implications if participation is mandatory? 
 
Voluntary or mandatory frameworks have different outcomes for participation, which in turn has 
different outcomes for the system’s operation as a whole. Two arguments support a mandatory 
framework. From an economic perspective, without mandatory participation appropriate supply and 
demand will not be generated as participant may shift their ‘supply’ or ‘demand’ to alternative options. 
Supply and demand may either be inadequate or unbalanced, but either situation fails to deliver 
economic or conservation objectives.  
 
Environmentally speaking, by making alternatives to offsetting present (such as by not offsetting at all 
or through alternative offset mechanisms) degradation can be expected when less robust options are 
available for selection as these options may produce less favorable environmental outcomes and 
undermines the ultimate goal of biodiversity conservation. Upon consideration, if offset banking offers 
enough advantages to be adopted then incomplete implementation represents incomplete realisation 
of its advantages and by extension, preventable biodiversity loss.  
 
 What are the implications if participation is voluntary? 
 
Support for a voluntary scheme comes from practical caution regarding widespread adoption of a new 
approach with undemonstrated outcomes. Other economic arguments are presented, emphasising that 
it is the presence of choice that optimally incorporates incentives for behaviour (Hartig and Drechsler 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See Table A3.1, APPENDIX THREE. Most recent regulation in relation: Department of Defense and Environmental Protection 
Agency (2008) Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule. Federal Register/Vol. 73, No. 
70/Thursday, April 10, 2008/Rules and Regulations 
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2009). Economically, mandatory participation allows less competition. In a system of supply and 
demand, it is the presence of competition that maintains low market prices, typically close to 
production cost (Daly and Farley 2004). Within offset banking these are the management costs and an 
appropriate benchmark for price to ensure mitigation is not inefficiently expensive. The presence of 
competition within a voluntary system best achieves efficient mitigation pricing. Competition may also 
be derived from within a mandatory market where a credit purchaser may choose between multiple 
sellers. The specific nature of credits in both New South Wales and California currently appear not to 
produce the liquidity required for this to occur, so competition to regulate price must be external.  
 
The presence of choice in a voluntary system is suggested to have other advantages. If a course of 
action is imposed, the incentive exists to do the minimum possible, even avoidance (Gunningham and 
Young 1997). If given a choice, it is likely made with the intention of obtaining the best outcome 
possible. Because of the economics involved with offset banking, this equates to getting the most 
conservation possible from the money spent, or spending the least money to get the most gain. Less 
money spent may actually be most desirable. The less that one project absorbs the more remains to 
allocate elsewhere on other conservation perhaps, or back into the economy to support more banking 
and so more conservation. These incentives bring entrepreneurship and outside investment into offset 
banking, proven to critical for California’s success. Incentives for optimal choices exist because of 
opportunities and rewards within the system (or the perception of such) and so regulations still must 
create conducive conditions, ensuring incentives work in this manner (Gunningham and Young 1997; 
Agius 2001; Doremus 2003; Hartig and Drechsler 2009).  
 
The desire for maximum outcome is the origin of innovation. Innovation is pivotally important to 
achieving the financial (and biodiversity) aims of the system (Agius 2001). Innovation may be expected 
to generate improved systems in technology, ecosystem management, accountancy, market and legal 
mechanisms and other aspects to biodiversity conservation that could further the gains possible, in a 
more financially-advantageous manner. The strength of the voluntary system and entrepreneurialism in 
offset banking therefore offers the opportunity to secure improved conservation outcomes (see 
Gunningham and Young 1997). This may not however be realized without a voluntary framework 
encouraging innovation, and the risk of a lost opportunity may be realized.  
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5.4  A  FUNCT IONING OFFSET BANKING MARKET:  COMPONENTS OF ACHIEVING AND 
MAINTAIN ING DESIRED MARKET FUNCTIONING 
 
With a defined commodity, supply and demand, and a mechanism for trading, a market in biodiversity 
credits may establish (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). It then becomes necessary to ensure the market 
operation achieves desired objectives. Banking schemes in California and New South Wales have been 
adopted as it offers advantages over previous approaches. From a financial perspective success is 
achieved through offering the same if not better conservation, at a lower price. If, through operation, a 
market over-, under- or miss- allocates financial resources this creates risk that efficient, effective 
biodiversity may not occur. Therefore the task remains to ensure the market that has been established 
operates to achieve this goal. Ensuring optimal credits pricing and scheme participation is fundamental 
to this.  
 
5 .4 .1 The pr ice o f  cred i ts  
 
Supply and demand is balanced through traded commodity prices so proper regard must be given to 
the price of biodiversity credits. A credit priced too high will inhibit demand, and a price set too low will 
inhibit supply. A high credit price is counter-productive if the costs imposed to developers do not 
represent cost-effective biodiversity conservation. If the level of money involved with biodiversity 
conservation may achieve more gains under a different system, offset banking simply produces more 
expensive, not better, conservation. Expensive conservation is not aligned with sustainable 
development irrespective of where they money is generated from (Gunningham and Young 1997). 
 
In many societies, including New Zealand’s, reliance upon tax-payer funded government conservation 
programs is of particular concern, so additional, private income sources for conservation are desirable. 
However, this burden may fall back to the government and taxpayer if the credit price is too low: those 
destroying biodiversity values are likely not contributing adequate finances to ensure their long-term 
management. With concern for equity, those standing to profit from biodiversity destruction (by 
removing biodiversity values and generating profit from the cleared land) should be charged with 
greater financial responsibility. Offset banking intends to provide a mechanism to achieve this while 
also creating incentives to limit biodiversity destruction. Inexpensive impact mitigation via offset 
banking removes the incentive for developers to minimise impacts in the first place, widely recognised 
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as preferable to mitigation after the fact. This is why offsetting and banking is endorsed only as a final 
step in the mitigation hierarchy. Inexpensive mitigation undermines this.  
 
A lower and upper credit price is established with regard to these concerns. A cap may be created 
through regulation or government intervention83. Subsidies and taxes are often used in trading 
markets to maintain a commodity at a price that balances supply and demand in a specifically desired 
manner (Gunningham and Young 1997). While credits may be augmented with government subsidies 
and taxes, both California and New South Wales’ systems demonstrate that both upper and lower caps 
may be a product of the system’s design and serve this function without the need for subsidies and 
taxes and the disadvantages they may present (Gunningham and Young 1997)84. 
 
The lower and upper cap allows for a range of credit prices in the market, so that the forces of 
competition, supply and demand can achieve the most efficient outcome possible. The parameters set 
by the caps allow this to occur without jeopardising either the long-term maintenance of biodiversity 
values, or the judicious use of biodiversity conservation spending.  
 
5 .4.1.1  The lower pr ice cap in case stud ies 
 
The design of legal and financial instruments in both California and New South Wales requires a portion 
of the sales to be dedicated to long-term management. As credit-sellers in both systems are able to 
charge any price to any buyer, prices will reflect many considerations, primarily long-term management 
funding (Endowment or Trust Fund, in California and New South Wales respectively). Such requirements 
mean it is unlikely any bank owner would sell credits at a price lower than the cost of long term 
management. This ensures the price of credits will not impede long-term biodiversity objectives relating 
to management. Under pricing of credits in one transaction may be recouped in subsequent sales, 
maintaining the overall price required. As the lower cap reflects required contributions to long-term 
funding, decisions at the regulatory level must consider this when designing the regulations around the 
initial deposit. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Note the use of the term ‘cap’ here does not refer to a fixed cap as is present in a restricted cap and trade system, 
instead the term cap here refers to a limit or parameter existing as an emergent property of the design of a system. 
84 Reference is made to the role of taxes and subsidies in the following; Theeuwes 1991; Rietvled and Van Wissen 1991; in’t 
Veld and Kraan 1991; Gale Barg and Gillies 1997; Gilpin 2001; Daly and Farley 2004; Harris 2007.  
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5.4.1.2  The leve l  o f  the lower cap  
 
There are many possible levels for the lower price cap; the level determines whether the market can 
function as desired to support long-term management of values but also meet requirements of credit 
suppliers. As one of numerous influences, regulations may directly and indirectly affect cap level, so 
must be considered in the system’s design.  A credit seller is likely to desire to recoup costs incurred 
during bank establishment such as application and processing fees, charges from biological assessors 
or legal professionals, and direct costs incurred from restoration or protection of biodiversity values 
during bank establishment. Cost parameters are set by policy and regulation that may define how 
assessments are done or the structure of application and processing fees.  
 
Other costs sellers seek to recover may reflect opportunity costs from relinquishing all other profitable 
uses of the bank site, opportunity and interest losses for the money spent to date, and costs 
associated with the landowner’s time and money during the process. Any profit that the bank owner 
desires to make and that the market may bear (encompassing influences of competition, supply and 
demand), may be added after these costs are met. Regulation and policy may create a minimum cap, 
but this level may not represent an adequate incentive for landowners to participate as their interests 
favour a higher credit price, making this a necessary consideration regarding lower thresholds. 
 
5.4.1.3  The upper Cap 
 
Those purchasing credits will favour a lower credit price, so this demand will be decreased if credit 
prices are too high which introduces the risk that supply and demand becomes unbalanced. A 
maximum cap is therefore appropriate. From an environmental perspective, a high credit price may 
appear most advantageous as it generates increased revenue for biodiversity conservation for each 
project. Expensive mitigation may serve as the most powerful incentive for developers to refrain from 
negative biodiversity impacts but there are additional, counter-productive outcomes from an over-
inflated credit price.  
 
Prices are established after values have been defined so generating more money from a transaction 
does not directly translate into conserving more values. After long-term management funding 
requirements and establishment costs are met, additional return from the sale of credits represents 
higher profit margins only. Undesirably the same level of conservation is being achieved, but at a much 
higher cost. Where cost does not accurately represent the benefits, the incentive is to look for 
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alternatives such as other mitigation or to circumvent the mitigation process. Both options place the 
success of offset banking at risk.  
 
As an economy operates as an aggregation of transactions, market outcomes are a product of the 
system as a whole (the flow of money across all trades) rather than the outcome of an individual trade 
(flow of money from one trade). The economy favours a greater number of trades and wider 
participation with a more accessibly priced credit, rather than generating high prices from a limited 
number of buyers representing only the most profitable development projects. In a market-based 
system, more conservation of biodiversity values overall will occur when credit prices are not 
excessively high. Conversely, high credit prices have been observed as a factor deterring development 
(so reducing impacts and leaving values in tact) if mitigation or compensation requirements increase 
overall costs of the project beyond economic feasibility. The highlights the balance that credit prices 
impact and the risks that must be managed in designing a trading commodity and the prices it trades 
at.  
 
5 .4.1.4  Factors estab l ish ing an upper cap 
 
Various forms of competition are the main factors informing the upper price of credits. Purchasers are 
unlikely to buy bank credits priced higher than the cost of competing alternatives. Regulations may 
allow alternatives, also influencing their accessibility and cost (Robertson and Hayden 2008). 
Developers may choose to mitigate impacts in other ways, or not proceed with the project (or to 
relocate) to avoid mitigation requirements. Decisions to proceed or terminate will be made based on 
the economic balance of the project; costs of mitigation will only be acceptable if they are less than the 
potential profit of the project. A wide range of factors within the wider economy and society influences 
the economic balance of a development project.  
 
California 
 
In California, upper limit to credit price exists because of alternatives available to developers. While 
allowing alternatives (as above), regulations in California also direct when alternative mitigation is 
available, restricting such choice in specific cases. Developers may be required to purchase bank 
credits only, removing competitive influences. In this case, project economics have greater influence 
likely raising the price a developer is willing to pay.   
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Within a free-market, competition between credit sellers also reduces maximum prices possible. Given 
the choice between multiple credit sellers, a developer is expected to choose based on the lowest 
price, encouraging vendors to reduce their prices to achieve sales. Regulations may be used to control 
how much competition one bank or credit imposes on another, such as introducing restrictions by 
defining trading areas. Through application processing, agencies are able to control the characteristics 
and number of credits approved and therefore the number of vendors and level of competition in the 
market at one time.  
 
New South Wales 
 
Too few credit trades have accrued in New South Wales to reliably estimate upper limits to credit prices. 
Speculation from industry commentators concern the high land prices in the Sydney basin (a result of 
various social and economic issues) said to generate very high estimates of credit prices. The 
maximum credit price is an issue that is receiving much attention from observers and potential 
participants in the New South Wales markets and a clearer perspective on credit prices will only develop 
as trade volume increases.  
 
The seminal trade for the Sydney Basin region is available for price indication. The Sydney Growth 
Centres Biodiversity Offset Program purchased credits in a pre-arranged transaction85. Because of this 
specific department-assisted arrangement, many of the expected influences such as profit margins, 
perceived opportunity costs and competition were not able to impact the price in this case. The 
Brownlow Hill agreement processed earlier in 2011 is the first transaction to occur independently from 
the above Sydney Growth Centres Biodiversity Offset Program. Occurring between independent parties 
the nature of this trade may be more indicative of true market activity.  
 
The emergence of competition within Biobanking in the Sydney Basin is a cause for concern by some 
commentators. The specific nature of credit types available may leave developers with few remaining 
examples of the appropriate ecosystem to either purchase as their own mitigation (after following the 
alternative SIS process), or that have been issued with credits. A potential credit holder may be in a 
position to take advantage of the buyer’s limited position and sell credits in excess of all reasonable 
establishment costs, charging instead what the (restricted) market will bear. Alternatively, there may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Information regarding this trade may be found on the Public Biobanking Registries from 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/bimsprapp/BiobankingPR.aspx accessed 13/06/2011 
	   163	  
a very limited number of development projects that require such specific credits, and so sellers will 
reduce profit margins significantly to secure a sale, selling for a price much closer to the lower cap.  
 
5 .4 .2 The r ight  pr ice :  the importance o f  cost-e f fect ive b iod ivers i ty  
conservat ion 
 
In California, expensive mitigation has been reason for development projects to be abandoned, 
postponed or dramatically altered in come cases (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). This may a desirable 
conservation outcome if a high mitigation price was driven by rarity of values or extremely challenging 
management requirements, as the decision succeeded in preventing inappropriate loss of biodiversity 
values. If high prices reflect a lack of competition and inflated profit margins however, then the loss of 
the transaction may also be a lost opportunity to secure funding for conservation via banking. Such 
values may go without conservation if another project does not provide this financing. In this case, a 
lower credit price would have arguably produced desired biodiversity outcomes, along with any social 
benefits of the development. Hence excessively high credit prices potentially represent inefficient 
allocation of resources, reduction of biodiversity outcomes and therefore failure of the market to deliver 
desired outcomes. The appropriate balance represents cost-effective conservation, central to the 
overall success of credit trading and offset banking (Gunningham and Young 1997; Naumann, Vorwerk 
and Brauer 2008; Hartig and Drechsler 2009; eftec IEEP et al, 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010; see 
also Chapter 2: Sustainable development and the role of economics) 
 
Competition occurs through adequate participation, so is required to prevent over-inflated credit prices. 
Competition within mandatory and voluntary systems is discussed above. In the voluntary systems of 
California and New South Wales notable features of the schemes relate to participation, and mitigating 
risks if participation and competition is insufficient.  
 
5 .4 .3 Part ic ipat ion in  supply  
 
Participation will be encouraged when offset banking is seen as a valid alternative to other land uses. 
As landowners most commonly derive their sole income from productive land uses, the commercial 
viability of the scheme is of greatest importance. If participation is seen as too expensive, landowners 
will be discouraged. High initial costs increase the financial risk as greater investment represents 
greater opportunity cost and more significant consequences from an unsuccessful outcome.  
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This is an issue for participation in New South Wales currently (Hammond-Deakin, EDO 2009). Policy 
requires credit owners to supply 80% of the Trust Fund before receiving any income. Trust Fund 
deposits are necessarily large, potentially representing an insurmountable financial burden. Credit 
sellers therefore ordinarily rely on the sale of credits to achieve this, requiring an appropriate return to 
satisfy this. The lower the credit prices observed, the greater challenge supplying 80% of the initial 
deposit would be, and supply will falter. Should credit sales be insufficient to supply the required 
deposit, policy holds the credit seller accountable for the shortfall, and must assume this undesirable 
risk. 
 
The way the scheme is designed has a significant impact on the risks present to landowners and their 
participation in market supply (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). Altering regulations surrounding the Trust 
Fund deposit to present less risk to landowners may therefore increase supply.  Alternatively, should 
market prices for credits be demonstrated to be reliably sufficient to achieve the initial fund deposit, 
then perception is likely to change and participation will increase. Without participation generating 
supply, price indicators are not present to drive this process and there is some suggestion that this 
may be provided by government bodies, such as through regulated prices, economic modelling or 
direct creation and facilitation of examples of credit trading (Hammond-Deakin, 2009). 
 
Achieving adequate and effective participation is achieved via implementing the appropriate financial, 
economics-based incentives to ensure sustained supply (Hallwood 2007; eftec, IEEP et al., 2007). 
These require robust system design. Consideration must also be given to sustaining adequate demand, 
so the financial incentives introduced through alternative offset options are also relevant. If alternative 
offsetting options are available to developers, there is potential that these may be held to different 
standards and therefore represent different costs (Gardner and Radwan 2005). This may negatively 
affect offset banking participation as standards, and consequently costs, are lower so developers are 
less likely to see the advantages of participating in banking (McElfish and Nicholas 1996; eftec, IEEP et 
al., 2010). Demand for banking credits may also be reduced where regulations are not clear, or the 
manner in which they are implemented by agencies is unpredictable, and therefore presents a risk to 
traders that financial incentives are not guaranteed. Systems’ design including clear guidance and 
codes of practice can significantly reduce such problems (Gardner and Radwan 2005; eftec IEEP et al., 
2010).  
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5.5  ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION 
 
5 .5 .1 Ca l i forn ian success:  the ro le  o f  entrepreneur ia l ism 
 
Offset banking successfully balancing and managing the various financial risks has a smoothly and 
successfully operating credit market. It demonstrates ecologically successful impact mitigation, 
increasing volume of trades, and attracts an increasingly wide range of interests as the system 
expands. Such success may be observed within modern conservation and mitigation banking in 
California; the industry is currently buoyant. Having suffered minimally in recent negative global 
financial conditions with volume of trades, land area under conservation and flow of money through the 
system continues to expand. The industry shows increasing optimism for the financial future. Financial 
risks are mitigated adequately and the banking system is working positively.  
 
To understand how such success may be achieved elsewhere, commentators have highlighted the 
pivotal role the entrepreneurial sector has had in their process of mitigating risks and achieving 
successful offset banking operation. Their role is lauded by a number of commentators who see them 
as instrumental to the state’s success. Encouraging entrepreneurialism is one way to broaden 
participation, potentially attracting a wider scope of participants previously not engaged with 
biodiversity conservation. Further, entrepreneurship operates under a business model typically 
requiring robust practices in such areas as law, planning, financial accounting and biology. This 
business approach may offer superior risk mitigation as a product of requirements for expertise in 
personnel, systems and processes, along with the checks, balances and external scrutiny that is 
commonly present within a business model. As an example, entrepreneurship in California illustrates 
how appropriate entrepreneurialism has the potential to mitigate certain financial risks present, so is 
explored bellow. 
 
5 .5 .2 The Ca l i forn ian example  
 
The entrepreneurial banking sector is represented by a number of for-profit (and for-profit divisions of 
non-profit organisations) private companies who generate income from creating and selling mitigation 
and conservation credits. This is different from the private landowner who generates credits and sells 
them to create an income from conducting the long-term management. Entrepreneurial companies 
typically generate income from speculatively purchasing properties (or an interest in properties), 
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completing activities such as restoration, creation and enhancement to generate creditable values, and 
then selling credits for a profit (Robertson 2004). Companies do not assume long-term management 
or frequently, land title (these may be transferred to a specific division or association of the company). 
Therefore once credits are sold the company’s interests in the bank ceases and new projects are 
initiated.  
 
Some companies generate credits then sell them on the open market once a buyer has been found. 
Others generate credits in response to specific clients with development projects. Some companies 
operate under a consultancy framework where they create credits by employing the relevant third-party 
contractors for ecosystem assessment, legal documentation, financial planning and other tasks. Other 
companies operate a ‘full-service’ model, conducting all components of the banking process from land 
purchase, credit creation, sale and long-term management. The most established banking enterprise is 
Wildlands Inc. Sacramento, established in 1991. It offers a full mitigation banking service, with 28 
banks in its current catalogue, selling 12 different credit types. It has established over 50 mitigation 
projects and conserved over 35,000 acres (~14,160 hectares). 
 
5 .5 .3 On ba lance:  do entrepreneurs represent  more or  less r isk? 
 
The role of entrepreneurship in offsetting has not received unilateral endorsement. Entrepreneurial 
banking is an innovative and optimistic conservation approach, as the sector is able to generate 
enough revenue to sustain commercially successful ventures (Robertson 2004; for example see Lipper 
and Sagehorn 2007). The Californian industry may represent the most established, independent 
conservation-based industry, neither government-supported nor non-profit. There is some concern 
however, that the commercial framework of entrepreneurialism may undermine the objectives of 
biodiversity conservation. Such perspectives suggest conflict may prove unavoidable as aligning 
biodiversity priorities with commercial interests may prove impossible with decisions likely benefiting 
one interest, but not another (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). This suggests biodiversity conservation will 
be secondary to financial and business considerations, suffering as a result. As an industry leader, 
conclusions from California make the most valuable contributions to assessing the validity of these 
concerns. The observation of a number of advantages from entrepreneurial banking and the promotion 
of stringent, formalised standards by National Mitigation Banking Association members provides 
evidence that such predicted conflicts of interest are, in general, not materialising (e.g. Lipper and 
Sagehorn 2007). 
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5.5.4 Advantages o f  the entrepreneur ia l  system 
 
The power of entrepreneurship comes from the incentives created by the potential to generate private, 
sustainable profit for entrepreneurs. Generation of profit is one of society’s strongest driving forces. 
Active entrepreneurship addresses a fundamental risk within offset banking: limited flow of financial 
resources.  Entrepreneurial incentives increase participation, as the capacity to earn an income attracts 
a wider group of participants who otherwise could not afford or would not be interested in a 
biodiversity-based enterprise.  Most importantly however, entrepreneurship directly drives innovation, 
which is essential to biodiversity conservation (Albrecht and Wenzel 1996). 
  
5 .6  INNOVATION 
 
Innovation is critically important to sustainable development and improved management of 
environmental resources (see section 2.0.1, Chapter 2; Gunningham and Young 1997; Statistics New 
Zealand 2009; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010). Innovation relates closely to risk within offset 
banking: pursuing offset banking takes a risk that there are other financially superior alternatives for 
biodiversity conservation. Active innovation mitigates this as it provides a mechanism for such 
improvements to be discovered and adopted.  
 
Innovation represents new ways of doing things. Innovation in science and technology, use of economic 
theory and resources, the role of regulation and government, and social movements, attitudes, and 
changes have driven the development of society to date (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001). A field of 
study in its own right, Ecological Modernisation (see section 2.0.1 Chapter 2) represent these ideas 
and emphasises the role such innovation and novel development will have in the conservation of 
biodiversity and all environmental resources (Mol and Sonnefeld 2000; Editorial 2000; Fisher and 
Freudenburg 2001). Innovation largely produces new, increased outcomes from the use of the same 
or fewer resources. Recognising the finite natural resources available, likelihood of increased 
population growth, and associated pressure on biodiversity globally means future conservation 
depends on achieving more conservation through more efficient resource use.  
 
Offset banking is an innovative system, intending to achieve previously un-realised objectives regarding 
sustainable development. It represents innovation in a variety of ways:  
• Improved mechanisms for managing money such as endowments for conservation;  
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• Progress in the ecological sciences such as restoration and ecosystem management 
producing more certainty in outcomes, involving more efficient resource use, and the ability to 
expand the capabilities of conservation to values previously too challenging to attempt;  
• Technological innovation, for example in ecosystem measurement and monitoring, 
financial platforms for credit trading or design and operation of databases that register and 
track all aspects of the market; and  
• Innovation within the development sector allows projects to better avoid and reduce 
impacts on biodiversity and the environment86.  
 
Actively innovative systems provide better conservation in the face of uncertain processes and 
outcomes, and in response to changing conditions and states in knowledge. Innovation generates 
improved approaches, solutions and mechanisms for superior conservation outcomes (Gunningham 
and Young 1997). Within the extent of current knowledge and the dynamism of the biosphere 
innovation is critical to sustaining risk-mitigating solutions in continually changing contexts, and 
continued improvement in biodiversity outcomes. Where current approaches prove incorrect, innovation 
will likely bring forward necessary improvements to mitigate such new risks (Gunningham and Young 
1997).   
 
5 .6 .1 Innovat ion in  f inances:  pr ivate equ i ty  and investment  
 
An entrepreneur-based system drives innovation in a number of important ways. One is through 
generation of private equity and investment. As above, extremely high credit prices are unlikely to 
translate into increased biodiversity conservation as this money is generated following the 
establishment of values. Increased quantity and quality of biodiversity conservation is achieved when 
more money is available at the stage of selection, establishment and protection of values, at the 
initiation of the banking process. Increased revenue at this point in the system is necessary and may 
be generated if private investors are willing to inject equity and capital at this stage. Investors are 
willing to provide money required during bank establishment if profitable return on their investment is 
possible. This is the role of entrepreneurial banking.   
 
Offset banking revenue is generated through the development sector yet capacity for conservation 
could also be extended with revenue from additional sectors such as private investment (Crowe and ten 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 In reference to these points see Albrecht and Wenzel, 1996; Theeuwes, 1991; Robertson 2004; Saeed, 2004.  
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Kate 2010). In California and across a number of United States, private investment is showing 
increasing interest, as investors are able to generate positive returns from investment in 
entrepreneurial banking. It is attracting a greater number of new potential investors and a funding 
source for biodiversity conservation potentially greater than ever before (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
Money increasingly available from the private investment sector will allow the banking company to 
preserve more values over a larger area before locating buyers for the credits that result. Such 
investment actively supports increased credit supply, strengthening the banking system. It is one of the 
major successes of the banking industries in California; an infusion of hundreds of millions of private 
dollars has been invested in conservation.  
 
New businesses 
 
The investment of private equity is also occurring through various auxiliary enterprises and parallel 
industries established from the entrepreneurial base in California (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Revenue 
generated by these companies makes direct and indirect contribution to the flow of money within offset 
banking and towards biodiversity conservation. Novel business concepts include Mission Markets87 who 
provide a platform for industry network development and communication, facilitating the trade of 
credits on multiple levels from marketing to transaction. Similarly, MarkIt88 offers third-party credits 
registering, transfer and tracking support. Ecosystem Marketplace89 is a market-watchdog providing a 
portal for information exchange and integration, and monitoring and reporting of trading in ecosystem 
services across the board. All broadly focus on enabling trades and expanding exchanges. They 
respond to opportunities available for innovative products and services, with the creation of new jobs 
and income streams occupying slightly different market shares and business profiles. Current and 
future enterprises rely on increasing participation in banking and other ecosystem trading to support 
their own growth and success. Private equity within entrepreneurial systems such as California’s is 
pivotal, in addition to the achievement of conservation goals to sustain continued investment. A 
popular movement towards ‘sustainable’ or ‘green’ investment products and services is one driver, but 
across the board, investments returns cannot be made without successful conservation, so both 
private and biodiversity interests are aligned in this manner. Company profiles and current marketing 
provide evidence of this (for example see Lipper and Sagehorn 2007).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 see www.missionmarkets.com 
88 see www.markit.com 
89 www.ecosystemmarketplace.com 
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5.6.2 Improvement  o f  conservat ion methods 
 
Collaboration 
 
Innovative revenue streams generating more money for conservation is one way that the 
entrepreneurial sector contributes to increased biodiversity conservation. It also has a role facilitating 
important developments in the field, where superior conservation contributes to mitigating biological 
risks to conservation values discussed in the previous chapter. An emergent property of the 
entrepreneurial sector is the collaboration between multiple fields of expertise. Successful 
entrepreneurial companies in California bring together professional staff from the wide range of fields 
including the legal, ecological, biological, financial, economic, political, engineering, hydrological, 
managerial, marketing, administration, information systems technology, geographical, cartographical 
and business professions (Lipper and Sagehorn 2007). The close interaction and collaboration 
between these is needed to establish and close a bank.  This interdependence between these 
previously disconnected sectors requires knowledge and ideas to be combined in new ways and 
innovation to occur. There is likely feedback of this through the sectors themselves, contributing to 
developments across the board, extending society’s knowledge base and contributing significantly to 
broader sustainable development.  
 
Better ecology 
 
“Mitigation banking is just the mechanism to stimulate scientific progress, for the benefit of people and 
the environment alike.” 
p. 87 Albrecht and Wenzel (1996) 
 
Offset banking may further the progress of ecology and drive improvements in the conservation and 
restoration sciences when innovation can occur at a more direct, practice-based level within ecosystem 
management. The economics of offset banking create powerful financial incentives. This fosters 
innovation, as better conservation comes from improving existing systems or adopting new ones. 
Participants stand to make the largest financial gains by increasing the efficiency, economy and level of 
conservation they achieve and so requires successful mitigation from competent, effective restoration, 
enhancement or re-creation of biodiversity.  
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This may be observed in California where significant understanding of ecosystems has been developed 
though the sphere of offset banking. The desire to achieve successful mitigation of previously poorly-
understood species and ecosystems have necessitated building knowledge of their ecology. 
Manipulation of ecosystems such as vernal pools and other wetlands has seen vast increases in 
understanding and management capacity, as has the knowledge of species that banks intend to 
protect. Uncertainty of relevant biology or ecology makes conservation of threatened or rare species 
highly challenging. Bankers actively conserving these values feel the level of knowledge regarding 
these species is far greater than available when companies were first established.  For example, banks 
for species previously challenging to manage such as migratory fish are beginning to be established.   
Requirements of measurement, assessment and monitoring of biodiversity variables has increased 
expertise and skill-sets in related areas such as applied geography though mapping, surveying and GIS 
work. These auxiliary fields are predicted to experience beneficial flow-on effects in terms of 
knowledge-based capacity. This is possible as a result of greater experience in banking and incentives 
for innovation and development, which combines with the involvement of professionals in diverse fields 
who are seen to be in the best position to achieve maximal outcomes (Saeed 2004). Of these 
professions, long-term management of ecosystems has developed into an industry in its own right, 
accompanied by a similar expansion of associated knowledge. The research division of the CNLM 
demonstrates how increased research into the broad fields of conservation sciences is also enhanced 
by the presence of a banking industry. 
 
Observations and industry feedback demonstrates that entrepreneurial banking companies find 
economic and biodiversity objectives appropriately well aligned. The risk of entrepreneurship 
introducing a conflict of interest that jeopardises biodiversity values appears to have been avoided. The 
importance of future business opportunities necessitates the optimum conservation possible, for 
business reputation, market shares, relationships with the regulating bodies and general licence to 
operate. Good conservation is currently viewed the foundation of a good banking company. Potential 
remains that participants may choose to sacrifice the quality of biodiversity values if it is more 
economically advantages to do so, but it appears these opportunities are simply not available, or are 
not sustainable, and so appear absent in the current market.  
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5.6.3 In  support  o f  entrepreneursh ip :  mechanisms w i th in  the system’s 
des ign 
 
To achieve the risk mitigation entrepreneurial banking contributes, an offset banking system must be 
established in a manner allowing and supporting entrepreneurial banking success. The degree of 
entrepreneurial activity in offset banking is a function of the balance between numerous components 
within a system’s design, as discussed above. Additionally, there are some components of the schemes 
in California and New South Wales that expressly facilitate entrepreneurial involvement by removing 
some of the barriers within other design options.  
 
 5 .6.3.1  Cred i t  re lease schedule  
 
A notable feature of Californian conservation and mitigation banking is the credit release schedule (also 
see section 6.1.1.1, Chapter 6). Biological and conservation rationale favours the issuance and trading 
of credits after values have been established to an acceptable condition. However, the length of time 
that this takes may present unsurmountable barriers to entrepreneurial participation. To balance such 
concerns, a credit release schedule provides for a specified number of credits to be released in a 
sequential manner over time, once ecological requirements are satisfied. This provides increased 
surety to bank owners, addressing risk posed by uncertain credit returns with the large time and 
money inputs required (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). If values are not created adequately, it provides 
some minimisation of potential loss, as credits have not been prematurely sold for impact mitigation.  
 
In New South Wales, no formal credit release schedule is applied, as all credits are issued when the 
Banking Agreement is signed. Credits are issued based on current values and those predicted 
according to the prescribed management plan (see Chapter 3). This has been criticised as, following 
credit release no incentive exists for bank owners to achieve increased conservation on the site, as it 
cannot generate additional credits. Once issued, credits may be used for impact mitigation immediately, 
despite a portion of the credits pertaining to values expected in the future based on management 
plans yet to implemented or proven. A credit release schedule may respond to some of these concerns 
(Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
 
 
	   173	  
 5 .6.3.2  Severance of  land r ights  
 
Profit-making potential that attracts entrepreneurship is possible when the risks of participation are 
deemed to be smaller than the available benefits. Therefore, one way of encouraging entrepreneurship 
is reduce risks where possible. The ability to sever land rights in California is one important part of this. 
Bankers may be separate themselves the liabilities of land ownership, long-term management and 
funding, so can actively manage and minimise the risks these responsibilities entail. Retaining interest 
in these components represents liability and risk that detract from the benefits entrepreneurs may 
receive. Removal of such risks makes benefits more accessible. The transfer of liability possible does 
not detract from the important provision of these aspects, as they may be definitively ascribed to 
another entity. This does not detract from the scheme’s overall robustness, but are extremely 
important to attracting entrepreneurs. 
 
 5 .6.3.3  At t i tudes and soc iety   
 
Societal attitudes are a final barrier to achieving the risk-mitigation benefits available through effective 
entrepreneurship and innovation. To benefit from risk mitigation through entrepreneurial banking, 
firstly New Zealanders must see conservation on private land, generating private profits, as an 
appropriate and desirable mechanism of conservation. To date, the majority of New Zealand’s 
conservation has been done on behalf of and for the benefit of all New Zealanders, through 
government funded and operated programs and departments (Meurk and Swaffield 2000). Some 
notable conservation has been achieved through the QEII Land Trust, however government 
conservation jurisdiction over 1/3 of the land area greatly outweighs the much smaller 1% of New 
Zealand's land mass being protected under this Trust. Private land has been primarily viewed as a 
source of economic production, with land not used for urban development primarily occupied for 
pastoral and other agri-business land uses (Meuk and Swaffield 2000). Entrepreneurial banking 
necessitates a departure from this dichotomy, representing a significant contrast to the current 
paradigm and national psyche. Viewing non-government-based conservation as inappropriate, 
impossible or undesirable will significantly impede the success of entrepreneurial banking. Widespread 
endorsement of a shift towards conservation occurring on private land with profits directly attributing to 
private entities must be something New Zealand society as a whole embraces.  
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“We can collectively decide to integrate indigenous nature into our productive landscapes, or we can 
allow reinforcement of the historical dichotomy of nature and culture and continue the ambivalence and 
uneasy sense of displaced identity it brings.” 
p. 142, Meurk and Swaffield (2000) 
 
5 .7  SUMMARY:  F INANCIAL  R ISK AND THE ENTREPRENEUR 
 
The pivotal role of finance and economics in offset banking introduces many additional risks. These 
directly interact with the well-acknowledged biological risks, but present distinct issues that require 
specific and informed attention in the design of offset banking systems. Addressing financial risk is a 
crucial and foundational component of supporting successful biodiversity conservation. Encouragingly, 
there are a number of approaches that recognise such risks, and mechanisms are developing which 
provide a significant level of risk mitigation.  Common risk-mitigation approaches involve spreading risk. 
This is relevant to offset banking, as any system adopted will optimally exist in a framework where a 
portfolio of approaches addresses risks of biodiversity decline and environmental conservation more 
broadly. Offset banking represents one mechanism available. Encompassing multiple banks, multiple 
development projects and multiple layers of risk mitigation mechanisms also represent this portfolio 
approach. Therefore while financial risk is an equally significant component in addition to biological risk, 
operational experience and concentrated expert attention to such issues is providing valuable and 
successful risk mitigation. The nature of financial risk present, and mechanisms that increasingly 
assuring such risks can be overcome, become clearer and more attainable when informed expert 
attention is directed to these issues.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE THIRD RISK:  HUMAN AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
 
This thesis distinguishes a third form of risk within offset banking corresponding to the final component 
of the tripartite sustainable development framework: human society. Individuals within society introduce 
risk to offset banking. Because of the nature of human behaviour, human actions required in offset 
banking carry potential error in judgement, negligence or even malice and deceit. It is also through 
human nature that societies are formed, and it is important that human actions and the outcomes of 
offset banking they produce appropriately represent their wider society. In effect, this requires offset 
banking to deliver outcomes that are biologically and financially appropriate as discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5, but outcomes that are appropriate for the wider society as well. It is possible to mitigate both 
these human and social risks: risk that human actions and behaviour jeopardises offset banking 
outcomes, and risk that wider, socially appropriate outcomes are not achieved. A number of 
mechanisms are available to address these risks, and are described and analysed in this chapter. 
Appropriate provision for public participation is emphasised as central to mitigating these risks, and 
achieving desired biodiversity outcomes.  
 
6 .1  R ISK POSED BY HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND ACT IONS 
 
6 .1 .0 Misrepresentat ion and ‘cheat ing’  
 
Concerns have been voiced, and in some situations demonstrated, that individuals may act counter-
productively to conservation within offset banking: cheating or miss-representation may occur 
(Gunningham and Young 1997; Hallwood 2007; Walker et al., 2009). Offset banking relies on 
individuals completing certain actions to certain standards. If they fail, conservation is jeopardised as 
has been observed in the past (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.0.1). Potential problems include 
failing to complete, or even attempt, work required; misrepresenting (over-estimating) work conducted; 
or misrepresenting (exaggerating) the values involved and over-selling credits (Gardner and Radwan 
2005; Hallwood 2007; Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008). Over-selling credits refers to the 
situation whereby a credit is sold to offset an impact, but at a later date the credit is sold again to 
another purchaser for another impact, without any additional conservation work carried out; on balance 
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no more mitigation occurs. Over-selling may also occur if more credits are issued to a bank than there 
are values commensurate at the bank site. This can result from inaccurate measurement and 
assessment, or deliberately over-stating the values present in order to obtain more credits.  
 
Where offsets are used to make an objectionable development project more attractive to regulators or 
the wider public, the term ‘license to trash’ has been coined referring to offset trading being used to 
gain permission for destructive biodiversity impacts otherwise deemed inappropriate (Redmond et al., 
1996; Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008; Bekessy et al., 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010; eftec, 
IEEP et al., 2010). When used in this way, credit trading fails to produce conservation outcomes, 
misrepresenting the true achievement of offsetting negative environmental impacts.  
 
Undesirable behavior may be potentially observed in all offset banking parties including regulators 
where they approve, or fail to intervene in, deficient banks, projects or trades (Hallwood 2007; Walker 
et al., 2009). Intentional or otherwise, this may be caused by lack of knowledge, ability or other 
resources. Conflicting interests between present financial or personal incentives may also exsist, 
potentially outweighing and replacing stringent implementation of the scheme’s parameters (Walker et 
al., 2009; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
6 .1.0.1  Subject iv i ty  
 
Misrepresentation can also unintentionally occur through inherent variation in human behavior; actions 
by different people potentially produce different outcomes not equally advantageous to conservation. 
This is primarily introduced during the process of estimating values and applying assessment 
methodology; measurement processes are suggested to be particularly susceptible (EDO 2008b; 
2007b). Some degree of subjectivity can be expected when applying approaches such as indicies and 
benchmarks where operators are required to form opinions about the state or condition of biological 
systems and components (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.3.1). There may also be subjectivity introduced 
by operators themselves, based on educational or employment background or other interests they 
hold.  
 
Subjectivity is raised as a significant concern in New South Wales (EDO 2007b, 2008b). Decision-
making processes without defined protocols may also be subjective where the decision rests with an 
individual’s personal or professional assessment. This has been raised in relation to the red-flag 
variation system in New South Wales (see section 6.2.3 below). The Australian Centre of Excellence for 
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Risk Analysis (ACERA) studied and reported on this subject by investigating how observer error in field 
estimates of vegetation attributes translates to uncertainty in vegetation condition assessments and 
concludes that:  
 
“Uncertainty in assessment of vegetation condition may lead to poor decision or unexpected outcomes, 
including the loss of biodiversity…Observers’ estimates varied substantially across multiple scoring 
categories for all vegetation attributes on almost all sites…The results indicate that uncertainty in field 
estimates of site attributes may cause vegetation condition to be under or over estimated on all by 
highly degraded sites... It is recommended that: research is undertaken into methods fro reducing 
observer error; field observers estimate uncertainty around point estimates of vegetation condition; the 
sensitivity of index scoring structures to observer error is reviewed; and that decision makers explicitly 
incorporate uncertainty into the decision making processes and aim for outcomes that are robust to 
this uncertainty.” 
p. 8 Gorrod and Keith (2010) 
 
A variety of mechanisms and design elements in New South Wales and California reduce these sources 
of risk, making the schemes stronger and more successful as a result. Specifically, robust operating 
rules are requisite to establishing a trading system (Agius 2001; Doremus 2003; Crowe and ten Kate 
2010). Four such rules concern the misrepresentation and subjectivity risks above: approval or 
accreditation of personnel involved; use of bonds, insurance and sureties; mandatory credit 
registration; and compliance of rules via monitoring, enforcement and auditing processes. These 
mechanisms are discussed bellow 
 
6.1.0.2 Personnel  accred i tat ion  
 
Regulations in New South Wales restrict those allowed to operate within the Biobanking system, 
endeavoring to eliminate individuals intentionally or unintentionally misrepresenting values and 
jeopardizing outcomes (DECC 2009c). Assessors must be accredited to conduct assessment and 
measurement of biodiversity values on an impact or biobank site using the BAM and Credit Calculator 
(DECC 2008c). This person must have a suitable level of field-based and academic/industry experience 
in the relevant fields of biology and ecology and must also complete a Biobanking Assessors course to 
gain additional skills. With these criteria fulfilled, application is made to the appropriate Minister and 
accreditation is issued (s.42B TSA 1995). This process ensures that only those with appropriate 
knowledge and skills complete potentially subjective biodiversity and ecosystem assessments. It also 
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provides an avenue to identify those with potential to act out of accordance with the scheme, and 
limiting their involvement and potential risk associated. Secondly, potential bank owners must pass a 
‘fit and proper person’ test prior to bank establishment. This considers of standing of character, 
honesty and integrity to identify and therefore prevents individuals without the capacity to uphold 
scheme integrity, due to conflict of interest or potential misrepresentation (TSA 1995; TSA Reg. 2008; 
DECC 2008c).  
 
In California, no equivalent or similar process regulates who may be involved in wetland or conservation 
banking. Regulation less formally exists however through the continually developing basis of ‘social 
capital’ that has developed, providing a framework that promotes behavioral compliance and 
defendable scheme execution (see Pretty 2003).    
 
6 .1.0.3 Soc ia l  cap i ta l  
 
Human capital represents capacity required for work: a product of skills, knowledge, physical condition 
and motivation (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Gilpin 2000) Social capital supports this: bonds 
and relationships existing within social groups or communities foster trust and reciprocity facilitating 
successful production (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Gilpin 2000; Pretty 2002; Ballet, Sirven and 
Requiers-Desjardins 2007). To generate social capital, common rules, norms, and mutually agreed 
standards drive behavior and help align group with individual interests. The capacity for enforcement 
also has a significant impact (Feeny et al., 1998; Birner and Wittmer 2003).  
 
“As [social capital] lowers the costs of working together, social capital facilitates cooperation. People 
have the confidence to invest in collective activities, knowing that others will also do so. They are also 
less likely to engage in unfettered private actions that result in negative impacts, such as resource 
degradation. Four central aspects have been identified (Pretty and Ward 2001), namely (i) relations of 
trust; (ii) reciprocity and exchanges; (iii) common rules, norms and sanctions; (iv) connectedness, 
networks and groups.” 
p. 69 Pretty (2002) 
 
Social capital may exist through unions, associations and other co-operative organizations that 
facilitate group unity and cohesion (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Gilpin 2000; Pretty 2002). 
This may be observed in the California mitigation banking industry. The National Mitigation Banking 
Association (NMAB) has been established and holds highly patronized annual conferences, bringing 
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numerous stakeholders with a range of perspectives and interests in the management of biodiversity. 
Communication and information sharing occurs through social interaction, discussion and collaboration, 
unified by common goals (the success of the industry and sustaining livelihoods), building trust and 
reciprocity. This represents linking, boding and bridging, which Pretty et al., (2003) suggest forms 
social capital. As evidence, stakeholders at the 2010 event voiced strong preference for increased 
enforcement of rules, high standards of operation, and improved communication between differing 
parties. A culture of social relations and industry contacts, between regulators and development sector, 
are held key to industry success. This demonstrates the importance on the social capital within the 
Mitigation and Conservation Banking industry, suggesting optimism for its continued success:  
 
“…[social learning] is associated, when it works well, with participation, rapid exchange and transfer 
of information when trust is good ... Social learning leads to greater innovation as well as increased 
likelihood that social processes producing new practices will persist.” 
p. 75, Pretty (2002) 
 
To ensure individuals adhere to required standards of personal action a self-regulating system can 
develop, facilitating a normative expectation of positive (rather than negative) behavior from parties 
involved. Notably however the NMBA attendees continually advocate for strong agency oversight and 
enforcement, emphasizing that social capital is a complementary rather than replacement system to 
ensure compliance within the industry.  
 
6 .1 .1 F inanc ia l  assurance:  bonds,  insurance and suret ies 
 
It is a significant risk within offset banking that necessary conservation work will not be carried out, 
enhanced by the almost indisputable certainty that the impact will occur. A significant source of 
mitigation failure has been that work is not completed to an acceptable standard, and in some cases, 
not initiated at all (Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Brown and Veneman 2001; Gibbons and 
Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin et al., 2008).  
 
To provide some assurance that work will be completed, the Californian systems employ mechanisms 
such as bonds, insurances and sureties and require evidence these are in place before credits are 
issued (Hill 2008; Teresa 2008). These serve the dual purpose of creating an incentive to complete 
the work, and ease remediation by providing financial support to complete work not done (McElfish and 
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Nicholas 1996). A variety of financial assurances have been used to date (Redmond et al., 1996), but 
all designed to ensure amelioration if performance standards are not met, or operators default on their 
obligations by guaranteeing financial backing, or to directly conduct work required.   
 
Where bonds are used, money may be held in an escrow account and released only when performance 
criteria are met, or a surety cost may be met that provides the bond (McElfish and Nicholas 1996; 
Redmond et al., 1996; Hallwood 2007; Hill 2008; Teresa 2008). Alternatively, letters of insurance bind 
a third party to provide amelioration (Redmond et al., 1996; Hill 2008; Teresa 2008). The insurer may 
charge a fee for assuming liability, over and above cost recovery fees if amelioration work becomes 
necessary (Teresa 2008). A lending institution may also supply Letters of Credit, guaranteeing the 
finances required for additional work. 
 
Value of individual financial assurances is determined through negotiation, reflecting the variety of 
factors generating the specific risks, such as the values concerned. This also includes ‘human’ 
components such as experience, reputation or background. In California, some larger companies are 
able to take a consolidated approach whereby insurances and bonds may be taken out for multiple 
banks at a time, or simply employed on a revolving or transferable basis from one project to another, 
limiting costs to the company while still providing the necessary protection, and thereby efficiently 
reducing the overall costs of mitigation (McElfish and Nicholas 1996). 
 
6 .1.1.1 Credi t  re lease schedules 
 
Established within banking documents (CBA/MOA/BEI), credit release schedules ensure adequate and 
timely completion of work and encourage scheme participation (also see section 5.6.3.1, Chapter 5). 
The schedule stipulates when and how credits will be issued over time. Credits are estimated when the 
bank is created and as specific criteria are demonstrated, more or less credits may be issued to reflect 
the values actually established. Designing monitoring indicators, thresholds and criteria for a credit 
release schedule requires careful consideration (Nevel at al., 2004). They must accurately reflect 
effective conservation, align with financial assurances provided, while being achievable enough to 
ensure that overly-stringent criteria do not act as a disincentive, either deterring participation or 
encouraging cheating90 (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Also see discussion of monitoring, section 6.1.2 below 
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Using credit release criteria means the schedule does not provide a guarantee of credits but 
represents a balance between two main alternative credit issuing processes (Goldman-Carter and 
McCallie 1996; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). One option is to issue all credits when the bank is established 
under the assumption that work will be carried out (as is the case in New South Wales). This involves 
some risk that even if the work is carried out, the values may not be established as the credits reflect 
and so mitigation in ultimately inadequate (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). An alternative approach is to issue 
credits after establishing and demonstrating values91, yet requires significant financial input prior to 
any (uncertain) financial return, i.e. saleable credits.  The latter approach may ensure more robust 
conservation but carries uncertainty and risk for potential bankers unsure of the return on their 
investment, so is be expected to reduce participation in the scheme (Redmond et al., 1996; Gardner 
and Radwan 2005). A credit release schedule makes banking more practical for potential bank owners, 
while providing a mechanism ensuring work is timely and successfully completed (Hallwood 2007). 
 
6 .1.1.2 Assur ing work wi th in B iobank ing in New South Wales 
 
Comparable financial assurances and credit release schedules are not required under Biobanking. 
Instead, incentives and enforcement are used to increase compliance. Issued credits reflect values 
expected from agreed management actions (Currnow and Fitz-Gerald 2006; DECC 2008c). As part of 
the Biobanking Agreement, the management plan stipulates how and when this work is conducted. 
Outcomes are demonstrated via monitoring and annual reports. Management payments from the Trust 
Fund (i.e. a bank’s income) may be suspended if this is not completed; leveraging bank income is 
expected to be a powerful compliance incentive. In addition, a graduated system of enforcement 
mechanisms further ensures compliance (see section 6.1.2 bellow).  
 
Again, determining the criteria to meet management obligations is complex. A landowner could 
conceivably be expected to demonstrate a variety of things. Within Biobanking, landowners must report 
their completed actions (e.g. maintaining fences, weed-control, or abstinence from certain activities 
such as firewood harvesting). Arguably these could be adequately met despite only minimal 
conservation gains. Applying more biological criteria may better highlight actual conservation gains, yet 
criteria such as vegetation cover, species presence or certain measures of ecosystem functioning may 
be difficult to achieve despite concerted and well-intentioned management. If landowners expect 
meeting certain criteria will be excessively onerous, this will reduce their willingness to participate. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 A view-point favoured in literature e.g. Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Bekessy et al., 2010 
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Criteria must therefore balance concerns for biological authenticity and efficacy of implementation 
(eftec, IEEP et al., 2010).  
 
6 .1.1.3 Credi t  reg istry  
 
A comprehensive registry of credits, debits and trades contributes to offset banking in several crucial 
ways: most importantly preventing over-selling or misrepresentation (Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 
2008; Teresa 2008; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Compulsory credit transaction registration makes 
potentially over-selling credits to multiple buyers virtually impossible. Third party firms are developing 
increasingly powerful technology and software, tracing all aspects of banking, providing accurate and 
accessible credit information in real time, and significantly increasing the robustness of credit trades92. 
Registries also facilitate monitoring and compliance (DECC 2008c; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Physical 
inspection of site values may be easily aligned with credits registered, providing a smooth system of 
identifying and addressing inconsistencies and deterring bankers from over-stating values present. A 
central credit registry is an integral component of New South Wales Biobanking. In response to 
industry-wide promotion, a number of credit registries have developed in the USA and California, with 
the mandatory registration of credits expected.   
 
6 .1 .2 Compl iance:  moni tor ing,  enforcement  and aud i t ing 
 
Adequately assuring monitoring and enforcement presents complex challenges, yet the majority of 
current criticisms focus on whether or not compliance-ensuring systems are present at all (e.g. 
Redmond et al., 1996; Bekessy et al., 2010). Prioritization of enforcement programs, supported by 
comprehensive monitoring and auditing, is emphasized by many as the foundation of any offset 
banking system (Albrecht and Wenzel 1996; Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Nelson and Sharman 
2007; Gibbons and Lindenmayer 2007; Burgin 2008; Walker et al., 2009; Fleischer and Fox 2008; 
eftec, IEEP et al., 2010; Bekessy et al., 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). 
 
Monitoring 
 
Previous chapters have addressed the complexities and importance of monitoring the biological 
components of banking projects. Monitoring criteria require careful and informed selection, clearly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See Mission Markets www.missionmarkets.com and MarkIT www.markit.com  
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communicating what is being monitored and why (Nevel et al., 2004; EDO 2008b). For example, the 
requirement for annual management reports under the New South Wales system is a process where 
individual actions are recorded and monitored, as a proxy for the management of biodiversity at a 
offset bank site (as above) (DECC 2009c). Within this, it is also necessary to account for human risk, 
and individuals complying with the rules of the system (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; EDO 2008b). 
Biological and conservation criteria may be used as a proxy for indicating whether an individual has 
completed the work required; if the values are established and maintained then it is assumed the 
individual complied with requirements. However, it is recognized that both the actions taken, and the 
outcomes of such actions can be monitored independently (eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). This requires 
monitoring specifically for compliance with contractual obligations within the bank agreement and 
easement, if present (Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Hill 2008).  
 
Enforcement 
 
Monitoring and enforcement must directly interact: it is an important function of comprehensive 
monitoring that data collected can efficiently support enforcement by providing a link where compliance 
issues are identified and enforcement can be instigated. Enforcement also complements monitoring: 
value of monitoring programs is reduced without assurances that inadequacies will be effectively 
remedied (for example see DECC 2008c). The presence of stringent, clear enforcement procedures is 
necessary as a deterrent, reducing incentives for intentional non-compliance (Bekessy et al., 2010). 
Self-monitoring can be an important part of these links (McElfish and Nicholas, 1996): 
 
“…self monitoring can also make enforcement easier because the enforcing agency uses the 
permittee’s own data to prove non-compliance… can promote self-enforcement.” 
p. 25, McElfish and Nicholas (1996) 
 
There are also important interactions with civic involvement: publically available monitoring evaluations 
allow community-based auditing while providing essential facilitation for third-party enforcement of 
biodiversity outcomes (further discussed in section 6.1.2.1 below) (Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; 
Nelson and Sharman 2007). Enforcement processes in New South Wales and California demonstrate a 
selection of mechanisms, with programs varying in relation to respective legal environments. 
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Enforcement in California 
 
Banks are established in California by multi-party contracts (CBA/BEI) (US Army Corps of Engineers 
Alexandria 1996; Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008). This establishes signatories and liable parties, 
including regulatory agencies so any failure to uphold these contractual obligations is addressed in the 
relevant court. One party retains the right to sue the other for breech of contract, breech of duty of 
good faith and fair dealing or unjust enrichment (Gardner 2008). Litigation-based enforcement of 
banking objectives requires notable legal (and consequently, financial) resources such as collecting 
evidence and legal fees. It is therefore appropriate that state and federal departments retain this right 
as contractual partners, likely to have superior financial and personnel resources available than other 
potential signatories. Litigation is favoured also because the regulatory environment makes 
enforcement via legislation difficult. Predominantly, regulation is issued via guidance, but a statue or 
regulation must be directly violated for an agency to pursue enforcement non-contractually (Gardner 
2008). Easement enforcement is similarly used to achieve compliance in California (Teresa 2008; see 
Chapter 5, section 5.1.7).  
 
Enforcing compliance in New South Wales 
 
In New South Wales, there is a sequential hierarchy of actions that may be taken against bank owners 
or managers who fail to meet their obligations, escalating according to risk: threat that continued non-
compliance poses to biodiversity values; severity of the breech; ecological harm possible; and 
mitigating factors including intent or otherwise of the bank operator (DECC 2008c; EDO 2008b). The 
primary point of enforcement is the requirement for annual reports. Should these be absent or 
inadequate, annual maintenance payment may be withheld (DECC 2008c). As these represent the 
landowner’s income, the financial incentive to increase compliance is strong. Following from this, the 
minister may direct that action be taken and unsold credits may be suspended or cancelled (Currnow 
and Fitz-Gerald 2006). The Department may also enter the property to conduct the work, recovering 
these costs from the bank owner and seeking damages via prosecuting for breech of the Biobanking 
Agreement. The Department may launch an investigation should such additional enforcement via legal 
action be required (DECC 2008c). This supports an application to the Land and Environment Court 
where the land may be transferred to another more appropriate entity. 
 
The Department’s Compliance Assurance Strategy (DECCW 2008c) details how scheme infringements 
are detected and actions taken. It also addresses whether the scheme operates in legislative 
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compliance; is equitable and transparent; the adequacy of education and information provision; and 
how overall objective are being achieved. This is fundamental to support community confidence in The 
Department’s regulatory capacity. By clearly stating obligations, and options and mechanisms to 
improve compliance, it aims to reduce un-intentional breaches due to lack of knowledge. The strategy 
also offers assurance to credit purchasers, protecting their interests by better securing conservation 
outcomes and therefore strengthening the scheme’s operation in a number of ways (DECCW 2008c). 
 
In New South Wales, the wider public can also be involved with monitoring and enforcement. This is a 
result of the legal environment of the state as, in contrast to the litigation and contract-basis of 
California, New South Wales’ enforcement occurs via legislation because bank owner’s obligations are 
established via contracts under Acts of Government. Infringements are therefore considered a breach 
of an Act so may be brought to the Land and Environment Court (Currnow and Fitz-Gerald 2006; 
Nelson and Sharman 2007). This is referred to as the provision of standing rights and is extended to 
third parties (i.e. third party standing rights) where any member of the public may bring a case before 
the court. Providing broad, open rights has been seen by some such as the legal advocacy group 
Environmental Defenders Office New South Wales (EDO NSW) as important to ensure Biobanking meets 
its objectives (Gunningham and Young 1997; Nelson and Sharman 2007; Smith n.d.). Standing rights 
exist under the TSA (1995): 
“Section 127L(1) Enforcement of Agreements: 
Any person may bring proceedings in the Land and Environment Court for an order to remedy or 
restrain a breach of a biobanking agreement, whether or not any right of the person has been or may 
be infringed by or as a consequence of the breach.” 
p. 75 TSA (1995) 
 
Alternatively, members of the public are able to lodge a formal complaint (regarding suspected 
breaches), for The Department to address (Nelson and Sharman 2007; DECC 2008c).  
 
6 .1.2.1 The ro le of  the contract  
 
Despite varying legal contexts, contracts creating offset banks (both Biobanking Agreement in New 
South Wales and Conservation Bank Agreements in California) establish how compliance is assured, by 
specifying the financial assurances required, processes of monitoring, criteria to demonstrate 
compliance, and enforcement processes (e.g. TSA 1995; Hill 2008). Multiple signatories are bound in 
clear agreement, providing support necessary to enforce expectations. They may also specify remedial 
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action, and associated funding, so enforcement may led to any losses being remedied (Marsh, 
Sokolove and Rhodes 1996).  
 
As a foundation for enforcement and compliance, and a platform for redress as described above, 
contract design may also create incentives both for or against compliance (Marsh, Sokolove and 
Rhodes 1996; Curnow and Fitz-Gerald 2006; Hallwood 2007). Hallwood (2007) models the outcomes 
of contract design by considering ‘agents’ who takes responsibility for the work required and generates 
the credits, and ‘principles’ who oversees credit issuing, requiring the work to be completed93 (see 
also Gunningham and Young 1997). The contract stipulates contributions (inputs) required to achieve 
specified biological outcomes, credits associated, and agreed penalties if failure occurs - e.g. 
withholding credits until additional remediation occurs (Hallwood 2007). A positive return on the 
mitigation/conservation investment depends on the difference between cost of inputs and number of 
credits generated (Robertson 2004), so profit maximization occurs when agents invests the smallest 
amount possible to gain specified credits.  
 
Contract design therefore determines the incentives for the agent to reduce inputs and investment in 
work based on whether they expect this “shirking94” to be detected by the principle, and the costs that 
result from being detected; a function of the remedial action required in the contract and the likelihood 
of enforcement (Hallwood 2007). Hallwood (2007)’s model also demonstrates that the more 
expensive restoration is, and the more investment required, the greater the incentive to ‘shirk’ if 
agents believe detection is unlikely (Gunningham and Young 1997). Hallwood (2007) emphasizes 
contract enforcement is necessary, via site inspections by the principle. Contracts must balance the 
level of investment required with stipulation for remedial action and penalties for non-compliance, to be 
effective for enforcement.  
 
6 .1.2.2 Audi t ing 
 
Auditing is a final component of ensuring compliance (EDO 2008b; Bekessy et al., 2010; eftec IEEP et 
al., 2010), occurring at a higher level where offset banking systems and procedures are reviewed and 
investigated to ensure they are operating as intended. Auditing should be done extremely 
transparently and impartially, ideally involving a third party (EDO 2008b; Teresa 2008; Bekessy et al., 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 ‘Principles’ being agencies such as DECCW in NSW or USFWS or USACE in California; ‘Agents’ being offset bank owners. 
94 The term is used by Hallwood (2007) to represent cheating in the system - i.e. inadequate investment in conservation 
work, bellow that which is required of the agent. Page 448. 
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2010) such as the Commonwealth Government Department for New South Wales (Nelson and Sharman 
2007) or the EPA in California.  
 
Auditing may be done of individual banks, specific trades, and the operation of the scheme in general. 
Desktop audits ensure correct protocols have been followed, such as use of assessment criteria and 
maintenance of monitoring processes (EDO 2008b; Nelson and Sharman 2007). The finances of the 
system also require auditing, ensuring that the financial support of the bank remains solid, and 
financial transactions have occurred in-line with requirements (Fleischer and Fox 2008; Teresa 2008). 
Compliance auditing in multiple forms, is a component of the NSW Compliance Assurance Strategy 
addressed in the ‘Compliance Audit Handbook’ (DECC 2008c). 
 
More comprehensive auditing including site-visits is also required to assess how successfully processes 
such as monitoring are being implemented (EDO 2008b; Nelson and Sharman 2007). Whole schemes 
may also be subject to audits to determine if trades are meeting objectives, consistency is being 
achieved, and whether intended outcomes are occurring such as cost-effectiveness in implementation 
and enforcement and alignment with broader government objectives (DECC 2008; Bekessy et al., 
2010). For example, in NSW the Minister is obliged to report on the progress and operation of 
Biobanking and make this publically available (TSA 1995). The entire scheme, including the 
Assessment Methodology will be reviewed on a regular basis with opportunities for public submissions 
(DECC 2008c).  
 
6 .1.2.3 Resourc ing issues 
 
Significant resources are required to implement compliance assurance through mechanisms described 
above; if resources are inadequate, enforcement is sub-standard or unlikely as observed in prior early 
wetland mitigation (Goldman-Carter and McCallie 1996; Hallwood 2007; Nelson and Sharman 2007; 
Fleischer and Fox 2008; Walker et al., 2009). Time, money, personnel and expertise must be available 
and lack of such resources together with low prioritization of enforcement may prove more influential 
than specific enforcement mechanisms themselves (Hallwood 2007; Fleischer and Fox 2008). Hallwood 
(2007) emphasizes that contract design for successful enforcement depends on adequate resources, 
particularly for physical site inspections.  
 
Resourcing for enforcement and compliance must be directly addressed through a scheme’s design. 
Cost-effectiveness is an important factor. Costs for agencies to enforce contracts must be balanced 
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appropriately by the advantages of enforcement: i.e. social benefits from cost-effective, privately 
funded biodiversity conservation (Hallwood 2007). Both California and New South Wales therefore 
make provisions to resource enforcement from sources within the scheme itself. Endowments used in 
California can serve this function so should be large enough to support necessary agency enforcement 
(Fleischer and Fox 2008; Teresa 2008). When enforcement occurs through the easement, the 
easement holder must resource this. This may come from the endowment, insurance policies, or if held 
by an agency, department funding may be called upon if required (Teresa, per. comm. 2010).  
 
Under the Compliance Assurance Strategy in New South Wales, enforcement is primarily the 
responsibility of The Department (as above), raising resourcing issues. By design, costs associated 
with non-compliance may be recovered from the Biobanking Trust Fund, at the Direction of the Fund 
Manager (Currnow and Fitz-Gerald 2006). Monitoring to support enforcement must also be funded 
through the Trust Fund and associated long-term management plans (Nelson and Sharman 2007). 
Importantly, the scheme has been operating for a limited time so empirical evidence of success is not 
available. It is not yet clear whether The Department has adequate time, financial and personnel 
resources to successfully implement the strategy. Nelson and Sharman (2007) recognise a relevant 
role for third-party standing rights. Establishing such rights requires monitoring results, offset banking 
contracts and other relevant information to be publically available to facilitate effective oversight by 
interested parties within the community. The ability for individuals and groups to bring cases of 
potential breech to court directly helps to reduce demand on regulatory agencies and represents an 
additional source of resources for enforcement (Gunningham and Young 1997; Nelson and Sharman 
2007)95. 
 
Achieving compliance through financial assurances, monitoring and enforcement is essential for offset 
banking, ensuring individuals operate within the system to achieve overall biodiversity conservation 
goals, and mitigating a significant component of social risk. Additionally, as a collection of individuals 
and communities, mechanisms are also required to ensure that the outcomes of the offset banking 
system do not pose a risk to society on the whole. This is the topic of concern in the following section. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The importance of additional, private or non-governmental resourcing for enforcement is considered from the continuous 
viewpoint that adequate funding from regulatory agencies is unlikely, given the significant political pressure they are 
exposed to, to retain some flexibility in how robustly specifics of the scheme are upheld, by those with specific interests 
(Bonnie and Wilcove 2008; Walker et al., 2009) 
	   189	  
6.2  THE R ISK POSED TO SOC IETY AT LARGE,  BY OFFSET BANKING:  THE IMPORTANCE OF 
POLICY  AND REGULAT ION 
 
One reason offset banking is considered ‘risky’ is because of the risk offset banking produces 
unsuitable outcomes when measured by societal concerns, objectives and expectations; comprehensive 
failure then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. How offset banking policy and regulation is designed 
directly reflects valuation of biodiversity (Wissel and Watzold 2010; Vorhies, 2011). Biodiversity is 
valued for biological, scientific, and economic contributions. Individuals, communities and societies also 
derive distinguishable additional benefit, creating distinct goals and desires for biodiversity and 
conservation, having important implications for offset banking policy and regulation (Dobson 1999; 
Bishop et al 2011).  
 
One such goal for offset banking is economic efficiency, (established in Chapter 5): conserving 
biodiversity most cost-efficiently (Farrier, Kelly and Langdon 2007; Counsell, Evans and Mellsop 2010; 
eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). Additional financial objectives for offset banking include redirecting financial 
responsibility to those directly degrading biodiversity values (principally development activities) rather 
than from limited taxpayer resources (Bedward et al. 2009). Explained further by Agius (2001), where 
society and finances intercept, economic incentives and mechanisms adopted must be in line with 
community values and objectives and have a high level of community acceptance (see also 
Gunningham and Young 1997). How economic benefits and burdens are distributed through offset 
banking raises concerns a societal aspiration for social justice (Dobson 1999).  
 
The 1996 report96 by the Commonwealth Government of Australia echoes this: 
 
“…to conserve biodiversity it was necessary to find ways that are consistent with community values 
while at the same time encouraging ecologically sustainable use…preferences should be given to 
mixes that motivate communities and industry to conserve biodiversity… seek to reduce underlying 
[social] causes of threats to biodiversity… as well as the direct [biological] threatening processes.” 
p. 491 Agius (2001) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Reimbursing the Future: An evaluation of motivational, voluntary, price-based, property-right and regulatory incentives for 
the conservation of biodiversity, 
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Policy must therefore consider societies’ biodiversity objectives and perspectives around biodiversity 
decline (Dobson 1999; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). As in California and New South Wales, biodiversity 
conservation in New Zealand occurs within established frameworks of democratic society, making 
concerns for social justice relevant. This section focuses on how such egalitarian concerns for such 
equity and justice may be addressed within offset banking design.  
 
6 .2 .1 Just ice ,  equ i ty  and b iod ivers i ty  
 
A central social objective of offset bankin is achieving environmental justice, generally understood as  
 
“…the human right to a healthy and safe environment, a fair share of natural resources, the right not 
to suffer disproportionately from environmental policies, regulations or laws, and reasonable access to 
environmental information, alongside fair opportunities to participate in environmental decision-making’ 
(Centre for Sustainable Development, University of Westminster and the Law School, University of 
Strathclyde 2006: 8).” 
p. 427 Hillman and Instone (2010) 
 
Issue has been taken with economic approaches operating without concerns for justice, equity and 
welfare provision in society, as economic efficiency does not intrinsically consider these (Benton 1999; 
Daly and Farley 2004; Muller 2007). Questions regarding the sustainability of a traditional, 
economically efficient allocation were raised in Chapter 2; the inherent capacity for equity in allocation 
is also of concern to some (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1994; Daly and Farley 2004; Dobson 1999; 
Muller 2007). There is therefore distinct risk that as an economic policy, offset banking may produce 
socially inequitable outcomes in terms of environmental justice.  
 
An equitable allocation distributes resources fairly to all individuals in society because it is desirable 
and just to do so. Individuals desire different specific goods and services, but in some cases it is 
desirable to have a minimum level of equal access to certain goods and services provided to all in 
society, irrespective of individual want or desire (Fisk 2000). As examples, government healthcare, 
education and social welfare are provided as public goods, requiring alternative policies than for 
managing private goods by economic efficiency (Fisk 2000; Muller 2007). Offset banking is 
implemented because biodiversity is recognised as having some level of public good, requiring socially 
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and environmentally just management. Providing social equity and justice (together with economic 
efficiency) is therefore an important role for offset banking design and policy.  
 
6 .2.1.1 Generat ional  equi ty :  in tergenerat ional  
 
Social equity, justice and sustainable management are closely linked (Ekins 1993; Norton 1995; 
Dobson 1999; Daly and Farley 2004). Intergenerational equity means just distribution is sustained into 
the future, therefore current management and policy should not reduce the benefits and options 
available to those in the future (Norton 1995; Dobson 1999). For biodiversity conservation policies to 
be socially acceptable, they must be seen as equitable: no group, either present or future, is favoured 
or disadvantaged compared to the other (Agius, 2001). To mitigate such risks of inequity requires that 
biodiversity resources be managed sustainably, retaining the environment’s capacity to continue to 
produce benefit into the future. This is central to ecological economics (see Chapter 2) (Ekins 1993; 
Norton 1995; Muller 2007). Offset banking may enable appropriate development to continue so 
current generations may realise development benefits, yet the conservation components provides 
biodiversity and associated benefits into future.  
 
The balance between the level of current development against the level of perpetual biodiversity 
conservation via trading offset banking credits directly reflects to what degree the current generation 
sacrifices their own needs or wants in order to provide for future generations.  
“…the whole of the sustainability debate can be read, precisely in terms of ‘distributing something’ 
across generations, or, in other words, in terms of intergenerational distributive justice.” 
p. 4 Dobson (1999) 
 
Balancing such risks in a decision-making framework within offset banking trades is challenging given 
the needs, wants, perspectives and constraints of future generations are highly uncertain (Norton 
1995, 1999; Barry 1999). Holland (1999) suggests that achieving intergenerational equity is achieved 
not by specific outcomes challenging to define, but achieving equity and justice in systems operated by 
appropriate principles. This establishes a clear role for the policy that guides an offset banking system, 
in mitigating the risks of intergenerational inequity.  
 
Equity with previous generations is also of concern (Beckerman 1999; Dobson 1999). In the New 
South Wales context, Agius (2001) considers equity with past generations where earlier landowners 
have been able to destroy biodiversity and reap all associated economic benefit, largely without the 
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responsibility of environmentally offsetting such loss. Offsetting restrictions imposed on current 
landowners are a direct response to biodiversity loss caused previously; risking inequitable distribution 
of benefit and burden that may have bearing on how policies influence participation by current 
landowners. Despite the lack of clear resolution in literature or practice, New Zealand policy will 
deserve similar attention given such notable consideration by economists and environmentalists alike 
(Dobson 1999).  
 
6 .2.1.2 In t ragenerat ional  equi ty  
 
How biodiversity resources are managed impacts whether society’s members may have more or less 
access to biodiversity benefits, or if some are disproportionately burdened with financial or practical 
costs of biodiversity loss or amelioration (Naumann, Vorwerk and Brauer 2008; Dobson 1999). This 
makes intragenerational equity, between members of the same generation, important (Muller 2007).   
Biodiversity is spatially explicit; it is valuable because of its location within the landscape. Because 
offset trading may significantly spatially re-arrange values, important landscape processes may be 
altered. Depending how exchanges are managed, this can have either positive or negative effects on 
biodiversity. Similarly, effects on human communities can vary. Biodiversity loss may be greater in some 
areas, where the negative effects of biodiversity are felt more seriously. Alternatively, less development 
and greater biodiversity conservation in some locations may also be inequitable. How offset banking 
exchanges patches of biodiversity across a landscape must be managed with due regard for this 
distribution of social costs and benefits. 
 
6 .2 .2 Reg iona l  equ i ty  and d ispar i ty  
 
Regional disparity is a significant equitable concern: trading across wide geographic areas may 
potentially allow excessive loss of values from one region and excessive conservation in another. This 
may be a result of variation in the cost of biodiversity conservation across a landscape. Costs directly 
relate to management requirements, varying based on the type of biodiversity and ecosystems 
concerned and making some values less expensive to conserve. Regional governance structures (for 
example, determining labour costs) and varying opportunity costs for conservation land can create 
wide disparities in the cost-effectiveness of biodiversity conservation between regions. This may overly-
concentrate biodiversity in some areas, to the detriment of social equity, and comprehensive, 
representative conservation for biological integrity.  
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Communities may be concerned if offset banking replaces important local or social values specific to 
their area, conservation in another region and causing significant local decline. Alternatively, their 
region may be supporting other regions’ development by providing the biodiversity offsets, so 
sacrificing their own economic development and associated benefits and becoming somewhat of a 
‘biodiversity dump’. 
 
In New South Wales, inequitable disparity has been predicted between rural and urban communities 
regarding how biodiversity is valued, and so conserved, across rural and urban areas (Farrier, Kelly 
and Langdon, 2007; EDO NSW & TEC 2008b). Current processes of biodiversity assessment and 
exchange are viewed by some as favouring increased development in urban, coastal areas where 
pressure for land is higher and conservation is more costly and challenging. Biodiversity conservation 
may be therefore disproportionately concentrated in rural areas. Farrier, Kelly and Langdon (1997) 
conclude because Biobanking is not compulsory in New South Wales, but Property Vegetation Planning 
under the NVA (2003) makes offsetting compulsory in rural areas, there is a potentially conflicting 
interaction between Biobanking and other environmental legislation. To be equitable, the same 
restrictions and incentives must apply to all. Strategic, regional planning such as via the Biodiversity 
Certification97 process identifies potential spatial inequities timely enough to prevent or ameliorate risk 
of such negative outcomes (Farrier, Kelly and Langdon 1997).  
 
Other potentially disparities in New South Wales exist between new and existing homebuyers. The TSA 
(1995) requires new developments such as residential subdivisions to mitigate their impacts. This is an 
additional cost to developers absent in prior homebuilding. Project developers absorb this cost short 
term, but eventually pass it to the consumer - the new house or land purchaser. This may be 
inequitable as buyers of existing homes will not bear this costs (all things being equal) despite 
previously built houses arguably contributing to biodiversity loss on at least a commensurate level, but 
without the cost of mitigating the negative impacts. This may also concern intergenerational equity: 
those making purchases today experience greater costs due to activities and choices of individuals at 
an earlier time (Agius 2001).  
 
Geographic distribution and reallocation of biodiversity values under offset banking concerns many 
interests, making establishing trading rules a process of balancing a range of risk mitigation. 
Conservation of biodiversity values requires distribution to be equitable to communities, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 For more on NSW see http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biocertification/index.htm (accessed 18/06/2011); 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biocertification/GrowthCentres.htm (accessed 18/06/2011).  
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maintaining biological integrity, so regulating and restricting trades to minimise risk is challenging, yet 
pivotal within offset banking design (Agius 2001).  
 
6 .2.2.1  Trad ing ru les:  serv ice areas and l ike for  l ike restr ic t ions  
 
Trading rules are used to avoid these risks and maintain biological integrity and social equity (Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010). In California, bank sites are assigned service areas within which credits may be 
sold to provide mitigation for project impacts. Impacts outside a banks service area are not considered 
mitigated (under regulations) by purchasing its credits, although may be done philanthropically or 
speculatively. The specific area is described in the Bank Agreement, according to region, biology and 
conservation needs of the bank and its values, according to watersheds or hydraulic unit codes 
(HUC’S), species range, or geo-political contexts. Importantly, larger service areas are likely to facilitate 
more trades but risk greater spatial rearrangement of values. Smaller areas reduce this risk, yet may 
exclude some economically or biologically beneficial trades. Service area decisions can appropriately 
balance these risks.  
 
New South Wales does not specify service areas, instead trades must be between matching credit 
profiles (see section 4.2.4). With ecosystem credits ‘trading-up’ is permitted: exchanging lesser-valued 
credits for higher valued credits (DECC 2007; BAM 2008; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Geographic limits 
are not explicit, but it is intended that the spatial distribution of biodiversity values across New South 
Wales (with values being predominantly region-specific) will necessitate trading within appropriate 
regions, limit the out-of-region trading possible, and reduce risks of inequitable geographic 
rearrangement of biodiversity values.  
 
6 .2.2.2  The no-go area 
 
With areas or values of extremely high value, there is much greater risk of excessive or irreplaceable 
loss (EDO NSW & TEC 2008b). Offset banking may be inappropriate in this case: a ‘no-go area’ may be 
designated (Norton 2009; see also Bekessy et al., 2010). No-go area may be explicitly delineated, or 
provided for through a specified identification process. Either represents a consensus on the biological 
and/or importance and significance of certain values such that no benefit from development can 
outweigh the cost of associated impact and loss, rendering mitigation unachievable.  
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No-go areas may also be an emergent property of market mechanisms. Certain values are likely 
prevented from inappropriately trading and irreversible lost from a landscape because, if significant 
enough to warrant special protection, this is likely because the values are extremely rare or very costly 
or difficult to conserve. The cost of any credits generated would naturally be extremely high, increasing 
exponentially with scarcity or rarity. This can be expected to self-limit development projects unable to 
support such a high mitigation price. If mitigation is too expensive, the development project will not go 
ahead, so no impact will occur. Development may also be limited if, due to scarcity or extreme cost, 
there are no offset banks offering such specific biodiversity values. Again, the development will not 
likely go ahead, negative impacts not occur and a no-go area is effectively established.  
 
This may be insufficient for social equity so risks may remain. The point at which a development project 
and its impacts are prevented due to scarcity and cost may be misaligned with a level of conservation 
that is biologically or socially desirable. Values may not be scarce or rare enough to deter development 
because of mitigation costs, yet may have great social importance to preserve. Furthermore, the point 
of scarcity at which the mechanism takes effect, biological process may mean conservation can no 
longer prevent continued decline and eventual extinction. For this reason, additional quantifiers of the 
‘no-go’ area may be required to mitigate this risk, for example, the red flag variation system in New 
South Wales 
 
6 .2 .3 Red f lags in  New South Wales 
 
When a site is assessed for potential development, biodiversity present may raise a ‘red-flag’98. This 
identifies a no-go area of important biodiversity that cannot easily be replaced, so may be unsuitable 
for offsetting (BAM 2008; EDO 2008b). Criteria include over-cleared vegetation types, endangered 
ecological communities or being one of only a limited number of habitat or species populations the 
removal of which would jeopardize overall survival (DECC 2007). It is not possible to improve or 
maintain the values of a red flag area through Biobanking so an IMT cannot be passed and 
development is not permitted.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The Red Flag area is defined as “An area of land at the development site with high biodiversity conservation values where 
the impact of the development on biodiversity values cannot be offset by the retirement of biodiversity credits in order to 
improve or maintain biodiversity values, unless the Director General determines that strict avoidance of the red flag area is 
unnecessary in the circumstances.” Page 21 DECC 2009b 
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Red-flags may, however, be varied (the term used to allow removal) which subsequently allows 
development and Biobanking applications to proceed. Ministerial discretion may be requested to 
determine if retaining the red-flag would be unnecessary and unreasonable in the circumstances, 
according to established protocol (DECC 2007)99. Generally, variation is approved based on rational 
that highly fragmented, degraded patches require such intensive resource inputs and therefore greater 
biodiversity conservation is likely and rational where resources are directed towards another site - i.e. 
though a Biobanking trade. This process highlights additional risk: that incorrect decisions regarding 
no-go areas are made.  
 
The red-flag and accompanying variation process is a most prominent source of debate in New South 
Wales (Possingham et al., 2007; Angel and Wamsley n.d.; EDO NSW, TEC 2008b; EDO 2007b). 
Specifically, the methods and metrics used to identify red flags and the process for assessing variation 
are questioned regarding their alignment with the BAM, the transparency and objectivity of decision-
making, and their scientific and ecological validity (Angel and Wamsley n.d.; EDO NSW & TEC 2008b; 
EDO 2007b). The social value of small urban patches considered non-viable under current criteria 
(poor condition, size and surrounding land use) may not be properly captured. As it currently stands, 
they are eligible for red flag variation and clearance, despite having potentially significant value for the 
immediate community, and risking significant social loss (Angel and Wamsley n.d.). 
 
To finally address risks of inequality, the costs of biodiversity conservation must be distributed 
equitably. How much of the cost of biodiversity conservation should be borne by the community as 
compared to those directly impacting via development? If society at large benefits from biodiversity 
conservation and most development projects also directly or indirectly provide benefit to society, 
perhaps some of the costs of development, such as biodiversity offsetting, should be absorbed by 
society? Finding a system that suitably balances these concerns and addresses risk of inequality in 
biodiversity conservation is extremely challenging. Tradable credits are supported as offering a most 
equitable, if imperfect, risk-balancing solution (Agius 2001; Rose 2003; Tietenberg 2003; Crowe and 
ten Kate 2010).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Variation may be approved if all avoidance and minimization mechanisms have been considered, the contribution the 
patch makes to regional biodiversity must be low and the site’s values must be have extremely low or absent viability; a 
function of size, condition, tenure and surrounding land uses (DECC 2009b; 2007).  Other considerations may be 
considered, such as relationship to any regional plan or any additional environmental compensation offered by the 
development’s proponents (DEC 2007). 
 
	   197	  
6.2.4 The r isks o f  env i ronmenta l  management and Hard in ’s  Thes is  
 
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968) provides an influential contribution when approaching risks 
within environmental management: if resources held in common such as biodiversity are used by many 
without rules and regulation to govern, they will exploit resources the point of degradation. Establishing 
either government or private property rights addresses this risk (Ostrom 1999; Ostrom, Gardner and 
Walker, 1994; Burke 2001; Dietz et al., 2002). Property rights (the right to exclude others etc. see 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.1 - 4), such as established by offset banking, are institutions of rules and 
regulations restricting use of otherwise common resources to prevent long-term exploitation and 
degradation.  
 
Property rights may be public, private or a combination, so Kraan and in’t Veld (1991) explain it is 
possible to make environmental policy choices based either on private, individual choices addressed by 
economics and market operation, or through the public choice via democratic process and associated 
role of government. Criticism exists for both approaches (e.g. Lawton 2007; Sagoff 2004; Henley and 
Splash 1996; Ginn 2005). Sustainable development attempts to integrate both public and private 
concerns recognising both economics and societies’ egalitarian objectives (see Chapter 2). To properly 
address the risks characterised in the Tragedy of the Commons private property rights are key, yet 
democratic societies such as New Zealand also best consider society and provide democracy when 
designing any modern market-based conservation approaches.  
 
6 .2 .5 Democrat ic  invo lvement   
 
Democracy may be considered both deliberative and inclusive. It is deliberative where decision-making 
processes democratically represent all interests affected by decisions. Inclusive means that all 
individuals and groups have equal opportunity to contribute to decision-making (O’Riordan and Stoll-
Kleemann 2002).  Democratic involvement in biodiversity management is prioritised variously across 
literature (Ekins, Hillman and Hutchison 1993; Moote, McClaran and Chickering 1997; O’Riordan and 
Stoll-Kleemann 2002; Steelman 2002). Wide-ranging calls for democracy advocates involvement of 
stakeholder and civic-involvement groups, as management of biodiversity must regard the interests of 
the stakeholders with democracy being the mechanism to achieve this. (Gunningham and Young 1997; 
Agius 2001; Steelman 2002; Sagoff 2004; Ten Kate, Bishop and Bayon 2004).  
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“…’participative governance’ means that the civil society (nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], 
local associations, etc.) join with governments and industrial lobbies in a common decisional pattern to 
achieve agreements between the three parties… Local communities––as part of the civil society––are 
increasingly pointed up in the literature as the most efficient bottom organizations to minimize social 
costs and maximize social welfare.” 
p 356, Ballet, Sirven and Requiers-Desjardins (2007) 
 
O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann (2002) suggest such participation increases the ease and legitimacy of 
implementing management, while increased representation brings together improved knowledge and 
perspectives which better address complexities of biodiverse systems. Civic involvement and 
stakeholder participation may have a significant role addressing conflicts over regulatory management 
of environmental resources by centralised government that occurs in both the United States (Sagoff 
2004) and New Zealand. Reducing conflict over how to best conserve and utilise national biodiversity is 
a prime objective for offset banking in New Zealand.  
 
Regulations are used in both Californian and New South Wales to offer stakeholder involvement and 
civic participation in operation and decision-making, and for perspectives and concerns of civic groups 
to be expressed and considered. Although achieved differently in California and New South Wales, both 
systems share the similarity of operated under a democratic government. Subsidiarity is often 
promoted in literature: decision-making processes are allocated to the lowest organisational level 
possible. Conservation may be best at local and regional levels, reflecting the principle that the most 
effective policy operates at the scale the problems occur (Gunningham and Young 1997; Ekins, Hillman 
and Hutchison 1993; Agius 2001; Daly and Farley 2004). Regulations maintain a central role 
supporting and maintaining outcomes from stakeholder and civic processes, facilitating and 
strengthening democratic processes. This contrasts to command and control frameworks where 
regulations have previously driven focus towards divisive discussion and debate, potentially detracting 
from broader objectives (O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann 2002; Sagoff 2004). Establishing an 
appropriate role for democracy within offset banking therefore recognises current international 
practices and is informed by research into environmental conservation in the context of human systems 
and societies, discussed bellow (section 6.2.10).  
 
6 .2.5.1 Democracy in  case-study examples   
 
California 
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Policy in California supports participation by individuals, stakeholders or civic groups by allowing 
independent third party groups to hold easements, endowments and management responsibilities for 
specific banks100. Easement holders are directly involved with decision-making and implementation 
processes; some assuming direct management roles to achieve the conservation purposes of the 
easement (Easements see Chapter 5 Section 5.1.7.1). If meeting certain criteria, stakeholder or civic 
groups may alternatively manage a bank site’s endowment fund, becoming directly involved with 
financial accountability and long-term financial security. Long-term success relies on the endowment’s 
income stream, so its management has significant impacts on long-term outcomes (Endowments; see 
Chapter 5 Section 5.1.2). Both empower third-party groups with the rights and responsibilities to 
ensure the enduring integrity of the values in offset banks, allowing a range of society groups to 
maintain direct connections with conservation occurring through Mitigation and Conservation banking.   
Public consultation and public access to information is also required for democratic involvement. For 
example, in Mitigation Banking in California under the Compensatory Mitigation Rule Timeline for Bank 
or ILF Instrument Approval (EPA, USACE 2008) a 30-day public consultation period is required, 
disclosing relevant information such as values and potential credits involved, and long-term provisions 
such as endowment and management plans. Additionally, submissions can also be made to counties, 
states or Federal agencies to make additional species eligible for banking, under Acts such as the EPA 
and the ESA, or jurisdictions such as county plans.  
 
While offset banking may potentially offer a process including all society in decision-making regarding 
biodiversity values, delivering these outcomes remains questionable. Some argue merely providing an 
opportunity to represent groups’ opinions and interests corresponds weakly to contributing towards 
and influencing final decisions. This can result from short timeframes for public submissions (which may 
be time and resource intense) and policy gaps in processing and considering submissions. 
 
New South Wales 
 
The New South Wales Biobanking system includes extensive provision for public involvement in the 
policies guiding scheme operation. Under the TSA (1995) public notification and invitation for 
submission is provided for species listings and reviews, critical habitat determination and formation of 
conservation plans. Also, importantly, the creation and review of Biobanking Assessment Methodology, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Role subject to criteria-based agency approval. For more see Table 5.1 section 5.1, Chapter 5. 
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formal reviews of operation of the Biobaking Scheme and the process of review of the Act itself (TSA 
Reg. 2008).  
 
The Scheme’s open standing rights (see above Section 6.1.2.1) are central to increasing public 
participation in environmental law and environmental outcomes in Australia. It supports proper 
enforcement of government legislation, and reduces ability for individual entities to gain 
disproportionate levels of power in environmental issues, such as large corporations and development 
interests (Smith n.d.; EDO per. comm.). Legislatively stipulated public registers provide the necessary 
supporting information (see above 6.1.1.3). 
 
Finally, in both California and New South Wales, a variety of stakeholders and civil groups may purchase 
and generate (sell) credits. For example, the first transaction under the New South Wales Biobanking 
Scheme involved the creation of credits and the establishment of the bank site by the non-profit 
community church group, the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart. In terms of buying power however, 
credits are generally purchased directly from independent and private sellers who are able to charge 
whatever price acceptable to them at the time. As previously discussed, controls on this price exist 
within the system, however there is a potentially wide margin of discretion available to the credit seller 
(see Chapter 5 section 5.4.1). Credit sellers are not required to sell to any person and credit prices are 
usually expensive. This impacts the ability of individuals and groups within society to participate in 
buying and selling credits.  
 
6 .2 .6 Ef f ic ient  and opt imal  democracy  
 
Democracy and inclusive participation may be provided in offset banking in numerous ways, and at 
various levels as described. This has significant resource requirements, and therefore requires non-
trivial trade-offs for efficient use of resources. Broadest participation allows involvement in decision-
making, yet this requires significant time and money to distribute and then process information and for 
responses to be heard. This may take much longer if disputes need to be settled.  
 
Democratic involvement may be via rights to review or question decisions and plans once they are 
made, such as the in the third-party standing rights observed in the New South Wales system. A benefit 
of this may be more efficient decision-making time-frames, but once decisions made it is arguably more 
challenging for third-parties to alter outcomes and would be more resource-intense than making 
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changes within the decision-making process. If not, costs to change outcomes generally fall to under-
resourced communities or sections of society therefore limiting how inclusive and representative this is 
in reality.  
 
Democratic involvement is instrumental to successful and socially robust offset banking. California and 
New South Wales demonstrate the variety of mechanisms available, responding to the many risks that 
must be balanced to achieve this. Optimally integrating regulation for economic success and societal 
provision, together with ensuring efficiency and information provision are risks remaining for offset 
banking to balance and minimize.  
 
6 .2 .7 CPR research:  the ro le  o f  inst i tu t ions 
 
A number of disciplines investigate how regulations can mitigate human and social risks if they create 
economic incentives for desired individual behaviour, while avoiding conflict with community and society 
needs. Research on Common Pool Resource (CPR) and Human-Environment Interactions focuses on 
how interactions are mediated between individuals in economies, in societies, and with biodiversity 
values. Offset banking may better mitigate the risks of balancing such factors with insight from this area 
of research101. A most relevant contribution from this research is an emphasis on creating incentives 
through establishing institutions.  
“Solving CPR [Common Pool Resource] problems involves two distinct elements: restricting access and 
creating incentives” 
p. 279 (Ostrom 1999) 
 
Offset banking introduces exclusion and privatization, restricting access to incentivise management of 
biodiversity102. The right institutions are important for this (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Ostrom 
1999; Burke 2001; Agrawal 2003; Dietz et al., 2003; Moran and Ostrom, 2005; Tucker and Ostrom 
2005). Institutions are broadly defined as the rules and guidelines regulating individuals’ behaviour, 
for example created by policy, law and regulation (Martin and ver Beek 2006). Offset banking is an 
institution for biodiversity management; it establishes rules regulating who, when and how a resource is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Common Pool Resources (CPR) research builds upon Hardin’s Tragedy of Commons presenting alternatives to 
traditional private/public property rights structures. CPR are defined as are non-excludable (or very costly/impractically so), 
substractable (use and exploitation by one reduces resource availability for another) therefore distinguishing them from 
non-subtractable public goods (Ostrom 1999; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Burke 2001; Dietz et al., 2002).  
 
102 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.1 - 3 and 5.2.5 respectively for discussion of exclusion and privatization within Offset 
Banking. 
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accessed and how decisions regarding such access and distribution are made (Baden 1998; Dietz et 
al., 2003; Tietenberg 2003).  
 
Hardin (1968) and others consider these institutions require property rights; held privately as 
suggested by theorists such as Coarse103, or by centralised government (Ostrom 1999; Gilpin 2000; 
Burke 2001; Dietz et al., 2003; Sugden et al., 2003; Moran and Ostrom 2005; Donald 2003; Yang et 
al., 2009). Emerging research such as CPR highlights a more complex reality where a variety of 
property rights, outside this strict dichotomy may also offer successful solutions and supports 
biodiversity management via novel property rights structures with greater capacity for communities. 
(Feeny et al., 1998; Ostrom 1999; Agrawal 2003; Donald 2003; Dietz et al., 2003; Sugden et al., 
2003; Moran and Ostrom 2005; Ballet, Sirven and Requiers-Desjardins, 2007; Gadgil and Rao, 2005). 
Privatisation in the most complete sense may therefore be able to give way to novel, more community 
and socially advantageous institutional structures. The degree by which biodiversity is incompletely 
privatised by the New South Wales Biobanking scheme is one example (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.5).  
Debate over privatisation104 highlights how different property rights produce different incentives for 
behaviour. The degree of equity a property right entails generates incentives for or against 
environmental stewardship.  
 
“It is a general finding of the property rights literature that the degree of equity represented by a 
property rights regime helps create the incentive structure which either promotes or inhibits 
stewardship of environmental resources.” Hanna and Munasinghe (1995) 
 
Tradable permits are suggested to be institution that may introduce appropriate privatization to CPR 
management (Ostrom et al., 2003; Rose 2003; Tietenberg 2003), with previous applications 
suggesting that positive economic and environmental outcomes are possible105 (Gunningham and 
Young 1997).  As an institution, offset banking intends to create effective and efficient incentives that 
mitigate risks of unwanted individual or societal outcomes occurring through biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable development. Understanding this in the process of designing an offset banking system 
can make a positive contribution to mitigating risks through design and implementation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 See reference above (Footnote 5 Chapter 3a) regarding the work of Coase and discussion of private property rights 
(Excludability and privatisation section, Chapter 3a), such as the premise that private property rights internalize cost and 
benefits existing externally to the system (such as social costs/benefits in relation to ‘free-riders’), thereby facilitating 
efficient allocation.  
104 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.5  
105 For example, see literature concerning fisheries permits in Canada, sulfur trading in the United States and water-rights 
trading in Australia.  
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6 .2 .8 Incent ives :  l ink ing ind iv idua l  act ion w i th  soc ie ta l  outcomes 
 
Institutions are important because biodiversity conservation will succeed with the correct incentives 
(Agius 2001; Daily and Ellison 2002; Sagoff 2004; Doremus 2006; Gadgil and Rao 2005; Burke 2001; 
Darbi et al., 2009; Palmer and Filoso 2009). Aligning incentives offers a way to minimise the risk that 
offset banking and individuals’ associated actions produce unsatisfactory societal outcomes.  
 
“There are many instrumental approaches involving markets or regulation or other supports that hold 
out hope for improvement. All depend for their effectiveness on the quality and integrity of underlying 
institutions. All depend ultimately on patterns of resource allocation that makes [the incentives for] 
custodianship no less important than economic exploitation. If we can align our institutions and our 
rewards [incentives] systems, then we have means at our disposal to pursue growth without 
prejudicing future generations. If we cannot, then instruments will be inefficient, conflict and confusion 
will be pervasive and we will all lose.” 
p 8 Martin and ver Beek 2006 
 
Studies concerning CPR suggest that lack of incentives may explain observed inadequacies of 
command and control mechanisms. Agrawal (2003) argues that human subjectives must be altered in 
order to effectively alter individuals’ behaviour. This is achieved through incentives to change, rather 
than threats or fear of prosecution, as is the premise for command and control (Gunningham and 
Young 1997; see also Agius 2001). Market-based mechanisms are concerned with incentive structures 
that appeal to individuals’ self interest, and are the basis for the strength of economic approaches 
(Gunningham and Young 1997; Gilpin 2000; Heal 2000; Daly and Farley 2004; Doremus 2006; 
Christensen 2007; McDaniel 2007).  
“Many of the most helpful, cost-effective and sensible reforms in environmental policy have resulted 
from the suggestions of economists about how society, by altering incentive structures, can better 
reach its goals.” 
p 180, Sagoff (2004) 
 
Examples presented in “The New Economy of Nature” (Daily and Ellison, 2002) provide evidence of 
the results achievable when incentive structures appeal to inherent self-interest motivations of 
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individuals, as captured within economic assumptions. There is support for this also in New South 
Wales where: 
“The EDO and TCE strongly support providing incentives for biodiversity conservation on private land in 
NSW. Providing sufficient income for landholders to manage land for biodiversity conservation, an also 
[sic] potentially carbon sequestration and other ecosystem services, is essential in combating land 
degradation.” 
p 5 EDO NSW & TEC (2008b) 
 
6 .2 .9 Human-Env i ronment  in teract ions 
 
To apply institutional structures and the right incentives to best mediate and mitigate risks, current 
research does not support policies of broad, generalised approaches (Moran and Ostrom 2005). 
Interactions are highly complex and contextual, with different interactions being present at different 
tempo-spatial scales (Moran and Ostrom 2005; Dietz et al. 2003).  Consequently, policy (economic, 
technical, legal, social or political) is being called for that recognises the need for a mix of approaches, 
to reflect the contextual, scale-specific, highly complex reality of interactions (Feeny et al., 1998; Dietz 
et al., 2003; Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). One approach cannot be expected to mitigate risk in the same 
way in all contexts and the failure of one solution in one context is not grounds to assume no benefit 
can be gained from the approach elsewhere (Gunningham and Young 1997; Dolsak and Ostrom 
2003). Particularly, reliance or focus on one type of property-right regime as being optimal has been 
discredited; instead all regimes retain potential for success in the appropriate context (Gunningham 
and Young 1997; Feeny et al., 1998; Moran and Ostrom 2005).  
 
“A mix of for-profits, governments, bureaucracies and regulation, and innovative institutions such as 
public, nongovernmental boards of trusts allows us to address the particular circumstances of different 
common-pool goods.” 
p. 60 Baden (1998) 
 
To be a successful institution establishing effective incentives and reduce risks, offset banking will 
optimally sit within a context relevant to the ideas and research described here. With a paradigm of a 
range of offsetting approaches, under a wider umbrella of sustainable development mechanisms, offset 
banking may minimise these risks and make a significant contribution. 
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6.3  SUMMARY:  A  F INAL CONNECT ION BETWEEN SOCIAL  R ISK AND SOCIAL  L IAB IL ITY 
 
Within offset banking there are distinct human and social risks. Understanding how humans and society 
interact with biodiversity, conservation and the wider environment, particularly regarding institutions 
and incentives, is key to managing and minimizing these risks. Offset banking may also provide an 
appropriate vehicle to minimize and manage risks associated with recognizing both biodiversity’s social 
value, and the benefit from social biodiversity conservation. In acknowledging these aspects, it is 
further appropriate to question what level of liability society should assume regarding these risks and 
benefits, in the context of offset banking.  
 
This should be based on how a society such as New Zealand’s chooses to relate to biodiversity and 
likely requiring more active and direct debate to resolve. Concerns over economic efficient conservation 
and who should assume liability and cost of biodiversity destruction and conservation require similar 
evaluation. Even within the free-market principles of offset banking governments may introduce fees, 
subsidies and levies so more or less government and taxpayer money is directed to biodiversity 
conservation within offset banking. A consensus must therefore be reached regarding such options. 
Societal participation and debate, formal or informal is an accompanying part of designing offset 
banking to appropriately balances too much or not enough social risk and liability in biodiversity 
conservation.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
RESEARCH F INDINGS AND LESSONS TO BE TESTED IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
There are many ways to inform opinion and make recommendations as to how New Zealand should 
consider offset banking. A wide body of empirical and theoretical literature is available exploring the 
foundations of offset banking: ecological economics, tradeable permits for environmental management, 
long-term land stewardship, ecosystem measurement and assessment, environmental law and policy, 
and sustainable development. Working with this literature is an important step towards understanding 
how offset banking works and how it may work best in New Zealand. Familiarity and prior use of these 
concepts are naturally extrapolated into expectations for offset banking. An important complement to 
this is to investigate how such concepts play out in practice by analysing existing offsetting examples. 
This thesis focuses upon the latter approach: advancing what New Zealand can learn by analytically 
observing real-time overseas examples, irrespective of predictions supported by theory. My research 
approach (literary review juxtaposed by independent observations of case studies) can be expected to 
return conclusions inherently subjective, perhaps contentious, in nature. Issues and opportunities 
revelled may surprise and conflict with pre-existing understanding, nevertheless providing an 
important, pragmatic contribution.   
 
The findings I present here firstly emphasise that conservation and sustainable development has so far 
failed to highlighted any silver-bullet or universal, single solution or approach. Overseas examples do 
not offer a complete or perfect template and lessons they demonstrate are unlikely to apply in all future 
applications. My recommendations come from a line of observational enquiry and to make maximal 
contribution, should be combined with further New Zealand-specific analysis. Lessons learnt from 
overseas may be proved or disproved as a result. This process begins here: drawing conclusions from 
observations, to be tested further in the future.  
 
In this concluding chapter I therefore make recommendations for a New Zealand offset banking system 
drawing on the on the support and evidence of my literary and observational research.  
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7.0  CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A  NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM  
 
California and New South Wales demonstrate what is possible for offset banking. Analysing their 
differences and similarities assists the design of a New Zealand system, yet the diversity internationally 
in offset banking approaches reflects the reality that successful systems are distinctly context-specific. 
Design of New Zealand offset banking should be tailored as such (Doremus 2006; Crowe and ten Kate 
2010). Overseas experiences are not proof of concept, but examples by which advantages and 
disadvantages, opportunities and risks, may be explored. With this in mind, intent to achieve a ‘perfect’ 
system with exact and flawless mechanisms will only leave New Zealand disappointed and wanting for 
positive outcomes, while missing opportunities offset banking has to offer.  
 
To begin a design and implementation process, perfect or otherwise, five main concerns must be 
addressed to develop New Zealand’s offset banking system106, elaborated bellow: 
• Determining credit metric and methodology;  
• Fulfilling legislative requirements and establishing the role of regulating agencies;  
• Ensuring financial and economic conditions for successful trading;  
• Creating an enabling social and political environment; and 
• Position offsetting and offset banking within strategic biodiversity conservation  
 
The last point may be the fist step, and yet the most pivotal.  Primarily, offset banking must support 
conservation as a portfolio of approaches. All eggs should not be placed in the metaphorical offset 
banking basket. Not to be viewed as comprehensive, isolated or perfect, design must represent a 
synergistic and multi-disciplinary approach (Gunningham and Young 1997; Doremus 2003; eftec, IEEP 
et al., 2010; Ring 2010). Around the world it is increasingly recognised that offset banking is optimised 
when embedded within broader-scale strategic conservation. If a country such as New Zealand is to 
reap maximum efficiency and efficacy from offset banking then this must be in a framework where 
national and regional conservation priorities are clear. New Zealand must unanimously decide how to 
evaluate the merits of proposed projects, how best to address the limits of public conservation funding, 
and how the benefits of offset banking may be realised as a link between these. A codified strategy 
informs decisions and supports the evaluation of development projects, impacts and offsets. To begin 
achieving this, offset banking components such as site selection and credit definition must be viewed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 c.f. Agius 2001 p. 502 which highlights six points suggested to be necessary (in 2001) for NSW to develop a 
biodiversity trading system. See also Crowe and ten Kate, (2010), and Gunningham and Young 1(997) for additional 
principles for government policy and regulation for market-based systems of environmental management.  
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as representing the broader question of ‘what are we trying to conserve’, because sustainable 
development inherently questions which areas are to be developed and which are to be conserved.  
 
7 .1  THE METRIC:  DEF IN ING A  CREDIT  FOR TRADE  
 
Progressing from current offset practices requires definition of what kind of trading credit will be used, 
and how to measure this at a given location (Crowe and ten Kate 2010, c.f. eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). 
This represents two distinct challenges, requiring both a metric and a methodology (Robertson 2004). 
California and New South Wales have different metrics and methodologies as a reflection of the different 
underlying regulations, yet insight from both will inform the optimal design for New Zealand. California 
trades acres of wetland and endangered species, assessed using various techniques. New South Wales 
trades ecosystems and non-ecosystem specific species, defined within the comprehensive BAM. Basing 
offset banking on species or ecosystem approaches in New Zealand may be feasible, yet the New 
Zealand context may respond better and the system be more successful utilising alternatives to a 
species or ecosystem metric. 
 
When considering a species-based approach for New Zealand’s context, focus goes towards 
indigenous (and potentially native) flora and fauna. However assumptions should be made with caution 
as many indigenous species are rare, range-restricted or endangered, and a number may fail to 
provide the fungibility a tradable credit requires. Such characteristics may be intrinsic, due to past 
decline, or a result of the many subspecies, hybrids and under-studied species (for example see 
Miskelly et al., 2008; de Lange et al., 2009). Numerous highly specific credit types present potential 
supply and demand problems expected to impede market functioning (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). If 
too many species indeed prove inadequately wide-spread or abundant (intrinsically or otherwise), New 
Zealand species are unlikely to satisfy the supply needs of the banking system, cause a perilous and 
undesirable imbalance between species credit supply and demand from development (eftec, IEEP et 
al., 2010).   
 
Additionally, my research points to critically questioning how suitable it will be to apply ecosystem 
credits. Optimum metric systems enables comprehensive spatial mapping of the classifications used 
(Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Balancing supply and demand requires that commodities are well defined. 
Operation is far smoother if it is known where all the ‘commodities’ are and perhaps impossible without 
this. New Zealand’s spatial mapping system may indeed be of comparable international standard, 
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however observations of overseas offsetting examples suggest prudent questioning of how New 
Zealand’s environment will stand up within offset baking. Offset banking requires a replicable, definitive 
classification to be made at each site requiring New Zealand’s systems to respond with complete and 
unambiguous delineation specific to offset banking systems. New Zealand’s prevalence of locally unique 
ecosystems, altitudinal gradients, eco-tones and impacts of invasive species present a very real 
likelihood that numerous determinations carry subjectivity or specificity impeding fungibility required. 
New South Wales’ basis of Habitat Hectares was developed in Victoria, where all vegetation types had 
been classified and defined; a complete market was created making ecosystem trading possible. 
Whether the state of New South Wales’ environmental context proves conducive enough will only 
become clear as the system operates. As a result, adopting the Victorian and NSW methodology in New 
Zealand may inadequately capture ecosystem values, and not support smooth economic functioning of 
supply and demand.  
 
7 .1 .1 Towards New Zea land metr ics  
 
The Department of Conservation’s Biodiversity Offset Research Program is expected to bring New 
Zealand closer to a recommendation regarding metrics and methodologies to represent New Zealand 
best practice107. While research outcomes are pending, understanding overseas methodologies 
contribute to this evolving discussion.  
 
Also relevant is the Proposed National Policy Statement from the Ministry for the Environment108. 
Based on the version released for public consultation at the beginning of 2011, it is expected that this 
document will establish biodiversity as a ‘significant’ and therefore distinct concern under the RMA 
process of assessing and compensating for negative environmental effects. Potential trading metrics 
and methodology will be stronger if related directly to the policy, and therefore values (specifically, 
biodiversity), intended for conservation through credit trading. A ‘conservation credit’ specific to the 
New Zealand context may be favourable, potentially better serving biodiversity conservation purposes 
compared to a species or ecosystem-based approach. It may draw from a number of ecological 
concepts: key-stone or indicator species, ecological or functional communities, evolutionarily significant 
units, or specific process or functions are only some that may be designed. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 For details see: http://www.doc.govt.nz/publications/conservation/biodiversity-offsets-programme/ 
108 For more information see: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/biodiversity/indigenous-biodiversity/index.html 
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7.2  NEW ZEALAND METHODOLOGY:  POTENTIAL  FOR A ‘ CONSERVATION CREDIT’  
 
What would the methodology look like to define a conservation credit? 
 
Once a unit of trade is defined, a process of assessing these values at a given site is required (Crowe 
and ten Kate 2010). Metrics are best determined methodically and directly relating to the objectives of 
measurement, i.e. the ultimate intentions for conservation (Robertson 2004; Hillman and Instone 
2010). Compare the various regulatory drivers (and so methodologies) of conservation, mitigation and 
Biobanking, as discussed in sections 4.1.3.4 and 4.2.3. Advantages may be taken from the United 
States where private landowners are not discouraged from participation through onerous or risky 
methodologies and where trade is facilitated by the fungibility of an acre-based credit. This maybe 
combined with New South Wales’ more ecologically comprehensive methodology to produce a 
specifically designed ‘conservation credit’ for New Zealand that best provides both ecological and 
economical benefits.  
 
Conservation credits my be issued reflecting characteristics such as LENZ classification, species 
present, land area, surrounding land uses and other landscape factors. The additional conservation 
proposed by the active management under offset banking must also be accounted. Site scores against 
these factors could be then aggregated (and potentially weighted) resulting in an overall conservation 
credit score for a site. Similar to the New South Wales’ methods, this instead focuses on the 
conservation value of the site, rather than a given ecosystem classification.  
 
All offset banking sites would therefore sell a fungible form of credit, providing a streamlined, reliable 
process for those establishing a bank site: each bank owner can expect to be issued with conservation 
credits for their land. Site specificities are accounted when trading occurs, as in California where 
specific conservation values may be accommodated by requiring impacts to highly valuable areas 
purchase more credits (commensurately increasing conservation). The drawing on the ‘credit profile’ 
approach in New South Wales, a number of credits may also be required to match, potentially to 
varying degrees: i.e. credits must rate the same on 100, 80 or 50% of factors suggested above (LENZ 
classification, species present etc.) with remaining credits purchased from any available bank in 
defined, geographically proximate area. A given credit could therefore potentially be sold to those 
impacting exactly the same values, some of the same values, or a range of values in the geographic 
area.  
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Expanding the range of impacts and offset requirements a credit may be sold for, avoids restricting the 
seller to a limited market of identical species or ecosystem classifications. This is important as it 
supports the incentive to generate conservation values and makes offset banking more accessible to 
those wishing to generate conservation values and supply credits. Complementarily, this model also 
places greater requirements upon those impacting biodiversity, because credit purchase is more 
onerous that credit creation. This aligns with creating disincentives for activities with negative impacts 
and incentivising the creation and protection of conservation values. The importance of creating the 
right incentives is discussed in section 6.7.8 - 9.  
 
Bearing important influence upon the efficacy of methodologies and credits types is the capacity of the 
supporting knowledge bass, a reoccurring point common to both New South Wales and California 
despite their contrasting approaches. A uniform, comprehensive knowledge base is necessary to 
support how credits are valued and traded (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Difficulty conserving and 
including under-studied species notwithstanding, conflict within other schemes comes from lack of 
consensus on ecological and biological matters or the revision requirements to respond to a 
concurrently expanding knowledge base. Any recognised lack of knowledge regarding indigenous flora, 
fauna and ecosystems therefore compounds challenges to designing New Zealand's trading credit 
(Stephens 1999; Brockerhoff et al., 2008; Walker et al., 2008; de Lange 2009). Whether knowledge of 
New Zealand’s floral and faunal ecology, distribution and conservation needs has the capacity to 
support offset banking and the level of ecosystem measurement required must be critically reviewed 
(Stephens 1999; Doremus 2006; Crowe and ten Kate 2010). New Zealand’s floral, fauna and 
comprehensive biodiversity basis of knowledge may successfully support the country’s current 
conservation to a standard comparable or indeed superior to international standards (and the 
accuracy of this assumption is for discussion elsewhere). Any capacity under an offset banking 
approach however has not been tested. Again, observations from overseas examples suggest this is a 
point requiring a higher level of scrutiny and advises caution against unsubstantiated overconfidence.  
 
 7 .2 .1 The B iod ivers i ty  metr ic  
 
With the limitations underlying knowledge may represent, it is also important to appreciate the 
implications of a biodiversity-based measurement (Vorhies, 2011). Complex supporting methodologies 
necessary when applying such a complex and multi-faceted concept may potentially frustrate macro-
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level policy objectives (Hillman and Instone 2010). Even in New South Wales, where biodiversity 
conservation is central in policy, note that implementation is via ecosystem and species surrogates. 
 
Conservation of biodiversity is an increasingly favoured policy ambition, yet there are both advantages 
and disadvantages to focus on such a complex concept. Primarily such policy is based on the 
assumption that increased biodiversity will provide wider benefits such as enhanced functioning, 
processes, services or stability of ecosystems, and therefore greater intrinsic, psychological or 
aesthetic value. How accurately these relationships are understood determines how well biodiversity-
based offset banking fulfils expectations, so challenges are greater while understanding of biodiversity 
is actively changing and growing. As research continues, biodiversity represents a higher level of 
organisational complexity compared with species or ecosystems. There is danger this leads to a focus 
upon maximally comprehensive biological assessment likely detrimental to overall outcomes; a case of 
obscuring the forest with the trees and stagnating the system. For example, rarity, representativeness, 
threat, iconic status, or a specific ecosystem service may be relevant to conservation goals, in addition 
to overall biodiversity. Therefore, New Zealand must incorporate a balance of such concerns; in 
particular, objectively assess the implications of biodiversity-based policies.   
 
7 .3  THE ROLE FOR AGENCIES  AND LEGISLAT ION 
 
All offset banking systems require legislation; at a minimum to create the commodity that generates the 
market for trade. Regulation may further ensure the market functions within the confines desired by 
making provisions and giving legal strength to achieve requirements discussed here. Regulation may 
also serve to establish the roles and capacity for administrating bodies to provide necessary oversight 
(Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
In New South Wales, the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) is the sole administrative body 
regulating Biobanking, and the majority of regulations and framework under single legislation. Intended 
to offer a more streamlined approach, the OEH approves bank sites, credits, related development 
projects and credit trades. This sole-agency structure introduces conflicting interests, charged as a 
reason for the lack of confidence currently observed.  
 
In California, the number of administrating agencies involved in bank creation and credit trading is a 
function of the multiple layers of legislating and regulating documents involved. Coordinating the 
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interests and concerns of different agencies slowed the process early on. This frustrated participants 
and was viewed as inefficient. Through experience and cooperation these barriers have largely been 
resolved in California. Instead, involving various agencies provides a valuable balance of perspectives 
and accountability arguably lacking in New South Wales.  
 
In New Zealand, there is a primary need for a clear regulatory framework to enable offset banking 
(Crowe and ten Kate 2010). There is advocacy for this to occur at a national level, responding to 
current lack of direction from central Government (PCE 2010). New Zealand has legislation applicable 
to offset banking in the RMA and surrounding offsetting case law. To move this towards a credit trading 
system where offsets are implemented prior to impacts and credits are used to recognise conservation 
actions, the following provisions must be made with strength and clarity. Regulation may be used to 
require the following (see also Crowe and ten Kate 2010): 
 
• Land must be perpetually protected, potentially through a covenant such as through 
the QEII Trust or the Reserves Act. There is a distinction however between protecting the land 
and protecting the conservation values on the land. Some provisions below contribute to 
closing these gaps in current covenant tools.  
• Comprehensive and defensible long-term management plans are essential. They 
must be supported by a monitoring program, include clear liability and enforcement provisions 
and binding to the land, protected values and all future landowners yet is currently not the 
case.  
• A third-party endowment funding mechanism must be required to ensure financial 
support for effective perpetual protection.  
• A clear process of enforcement, including where the responsibility of enforcement lies 
and how enforcement will occur. Enforcement processes in California and New South Wales are 
discussed in section 6.1.2 and illustrates different approaches possible. Drawing from these 
examples and in conjunction with current enforcement under the RMA, the context of the New 
Zealand legal system and RMA legislation requires further assessment. The third-part 
easement system used in California and across the United States provides a powerful and 
efficient enforcement mechanism and so New Zealand would do well to examine this model 
further.  
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7.4  IMPLEMENTING REGULATION AND LEGISLAT ION 
 
Overseas, using planning legislation as a vehicle for the above regulation has been criticised. 
Environmental legislation instead directs greater emphasis to environmental outcomes; this smooths 
operation, coordination and planning yet better incorporates environmental perspectives. Arguably, the 
RMA combines both planning tools, guided by the intent to sustainably manage resources and protect 
environmental values. This may strengthen any offset banking system established within it.  
 
Greater regulation of biodiversity offsetting is predicted under the proposed National Policy Statement 
on Biodiversity. Unfortunately, the version released for public comment in early 2011 does not include 
the points suggested in sections above, nor does it provide policy specifically facilitating biodiversity 
offset banking. It does however make a number of important contributions towards them. Primarily, 
biodiversity is given ‘significant’ status under the RMA, further emphasising and clarifying biodiversity 
as something of distinct value. This is an important initial step towards the value required to create and 
trade credits for offset banking. The NPS also establishes a number of national priorities; potentially 
indicating which of the biodiversity ‘commodities’ are the most ‘valuable’. Policy 5 and the principles 
specified in Schedule 2 directly address biodiversity offsets. These may be viewed as an indicative of a 
future framework for creating and trading biodiversity credits.  
 
While not evident in the currently circulated version, a National Policy Statement document could 
establish roles for agencies potentially involved in offset banking, defining their appropriate 
responsibilities and liabilities (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). Currently, the Local Territorial Authorities 
(TLA’s: Councils at the District and Regional Levels) are responsible for maintaining biodiversity values 
under the Reserves Act, Local Government Act and the Biosecurity Act, as well as under sustainable 
development within the RMA. Such responsibilities may currently be delegated through Regional Policy 
Statements and District Plans, although a National Policy Statement has the capacity to provide 
national-level guidance and legislation (MfE 2001).  A policy could describe the parameters and 
regulatory consideration of the definition of an offset, establish the requirement to offset impacts to 
certain values and sanction the use of offset banking credits for this purpose (Crowe and ten Kate 
2010). While this is not included in the exhibited draft, optimistically, it does include the specific 
requirement of NNL (see section 4.1, Chapter 4) or net environmental benefit, and for the strict 
adherence to the mitigation hierarchy (Christensen and Burge 2010; PCE 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 
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2010). This could be strengthened however, by more explicit consideration of how the hierarchy is to 
be applied and enforced. 
 
As a National Policy Statement under the RMA, it has legislative standing, requiring TLA’s to comply 
with policy though regional and district plans. This may make it possible to establish a biodiversity or 
conservation credit-trading program to comply with the offsetting and conservation requirements of the 
NPS. This may be similar to the way in which conservation banking in California is administered through 
compliance with the ESA, without the ESA specifically creating the scheme. Irrespective of this, national-
level coordination is the optimal way to implement offset banking in New Zealand. Supply and demand 
is likely to be heavily constrained by the small geographic and economic size of individual TLA’s. Even 
with region-based administration, a nationally coordinated system would be much stronger though 
support possible from a structure incorporating a variety of existing national-level bodies.  
 
7 .5  DEVELOPING A  MULT I-AGENCY STRUCTURE 
 
Operation and administration of offset banking legislation will optimally occur within a multi-body 
framework where potential conflict of interest is minimised (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). When the body 
approving the bank also controls the metric used, how credits will be traded, and approves exchanges, 
consents and development projects potential conflict of interest is introduced, reducing participation 
and market confidence (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). There may be incentives for agencies to apply 
regulation and streamline processes to their advantage. It also exposes them to pressure from multiple 
conflicting sources, such as developers, bank owners and environmentalists (Crowe and ten Kate 
2010,). Dividing such interests and pressures, as in the multi-agency approach in California, is 
therefore advisable for New Zealand.  A multi-agency approach can enforce increased transparency, 
and more efficiently allocate time and resources so limiting potential political stagnation when functions 
are confined to one agency. These measures smooth market operation, in turn supporting improved 
environmental outcomes.  
 
For the operation of offset banking legislation, TLA’s are optimally positioned to be responsible for 
administering the legislation (and/or regulations) above. Important requirements include establishing 
exchange by the free-market and that participation in the scheme is voluntary109.  Responding to 
objectivity and concerns over conflicting interests, the authority approving consent for development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Whether or not to make a scheme voluntary is debated internationally. See section 5.3 for details, and support for a 
voluntary versus compulsory approach.   
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projects involving credit trading should remain separate from the authority establishing the parameters 
and rules of trade, administering the legislation and providing enforcement (Crowe and ten Kate 
2010). Division of such tasks between the Regional and District Council levels may therefore be 
considered.  
 
A body is required to approve banks, issue credits and may also define who conducts ecosystem 
assessment, defining what constitutes an offset bank and the exact definition of the credit traded. 
Another entity must be responsible for recording all scheme transactions in appropriate registries and 
provide this information publically (Crowe and ten Kate, 2010). This body may also administer 
monitoring and auditing, and operate as an approval or endorsement agency for assessors or 
assessment methodologies. The Ministry for the Environment and the recently created Environmental 
Protection Agency could both potentially fill such roles. Thought must be given as how to divide these 
tasks as jurisdiction may need to be specifically extended though regulatory mechanisms to provide 
them with the strength and efficiency required. Finally, provisions could be made so that The Office of 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment could be empowered to take an ombudsman role, 
providing an additional level of auditing and oversight.  
 
7 .6  F INANCE AND ECONOMICS  
 
Endowment - to ensure the viability of each trade 
 
Endowment systems are fundamental to ensure the long-term financial viability, supporting long-term 
biodiversity maintenance. The Californian template championed by the CNLM is highly regarded (see 
section 5.1.2 - 7, Chapter 5). Compared to New South Wales’ Trust Fund the separation from 
government control is a particular strength of the Californian system; necessary under free-market 
operation and for participant confidence. Regulatory oversight is involved in stipulating how payments 
are to be made in or out of the account, but without directly administrating or distributing the funds. 
New Zealand should adopt this Californian approach.  
 
Economic structure  - to ensure the viability of all trades 
 
 Regulation’s role within offset banking is distinct from existing regulation aimed at achieving 
environmental conservation. Appreciation of this distinction is vital, and requires significant attention 
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towards understand and acting upon it. Regulatory approaches suitable for the New Zealand system 
will depend on our economic and development profile and size of the country, population and 
economy, so must be designed specifically and carefully. Successful offset banking occurs via trade 
within an active free-market. The role of regulation is to create mechanisms that facilitate a conducive 
environment, such that supply and demand can take effect (Crowe and ten Kate 2010). It is not the 
role for government oversight and regulation to set credit prices, but to create and maintain the 
conditions for appropriate pricing to occur: 
“… There are compelling reasons why the role of central government, at least in respect to some 
instruments, should be that of steering the boat rather than rowing it…” 
p. 283 Gunningham and Young (1997) 
 
Minimum and maximum credit pricing is discussed in Chapter 5. Provided examples demonstrate how 
price is an emergent property of the Californian and New South Wales scheme design. This is a wise 
path for New Zealand to follow: stipulate the priority of free-market pricing, allow credit price to be 
based on long-term management, and facilitate competition in the market. Government intervention 
and regulation retains significant influence over competition’s determination of the price of offsetting, 
influencing entrance and participation in the scheme and alternatives (i.e. competition) available 
(Gunningham and Young 1997; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
As discussion accompanying Box 4.1 (Chapter 4) highlights, requirements for trade, and therefore 
trading ratios, must not be set at such a level as to counter-productively over-inflate credit prices. New 
Zealand must not be dominated by conservation-focused arguments advocating the highest possible 
price for offset banking credits. In attempts to strive for the maximum conservation benefit and reflect 
the paramount importance placed on biodiversity values, maximum credit price has been assumed to 
generate more money towards, and therefore achieve, more conservation: this represents an economic 
fallacy (see Chapter 5, section 5.4.1). Outside of augments surrounding discouragement of negative 
impacts (see discussion of incentives section 6.2.8 - 9), New Zealand must warily and critically 
understand the assumption that high costs of offsetting produce optimal conservation outcomes.  
 
7 .7  POLIT ICAL W ILL  AND THE NAT IONAL APPROACH TO B IODIVERSITY  CONSERVATION 
 
Once design decisions have been made, systems such as California and New South Wales mature and 
more nuanced issues may be observed. The tragedy of offset banking failure appears to lie less in the 
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risk posed by economic or ecological uncertainty, but instead in the potential that when established 
and resources committed, the system fails to attract participants and the benefits are never realised. 
These are concerns facing New South Wales, California and across other United States, despite the 
different stages of implementation and with different design and development processes. 
  
To achieve the desired outcomes for offset banking - expand access to conservation values through an 
alternative source of conservation for New Zealand - offset banking must be allowed to flourish once 
implemented. A strong offset banking system operates as a mechanism bringing in private capital to 
augment constrained public conservation systems. To realise this, both an economically and 
ecologically defensible system must be supported. Participation must be unrestrained by barriers such 
as high costs from highly complex or bureaucratic processes, or competitive challenges by those able 
to undercut a private credit supplier (potentially public, NGO or other directly or indirectly subsidised 
participants). This comes down to maintaining broad-scale respect not only for the biology of the 
system, but also the economics and social components, as reinforced here in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
There are a number a ways that regulation and policy may be used to foster this respect and avoid 
such pitfalls, but fundamentally, it is upon political will and social facilitation that success or failure 
depends. As such, the social and political context of a New Zealand offset banking system deserves 
attention.   
 
The rural landholder has a significant role in offset banking as they hold potential offset banks. 
Financial conditions must align to generate supply from this sector, engaging them both economically 
and socially (MfE 2001; Doremus 2006). Particular regard must be given to existing culture 
surrounding private land-rights and stewardship (Meurk and Swaffield, 2000). Any restriction upon 
freedom of use on adjacent land use or traditional practices (occurring through the scheme’s 
enforcement or regulations) will likely deter participation and reduce the supply of offset banks, 
regardless of the other advantages offered. Reliably interpreting the impact of NSW’s Biobanking on 
traditional rights is a speculative reason for limited uptake among the private, rural landholding sector 
across the State.  
 
Information supply and public community participation, together with appropriate regulations, offer key 
solutions to these issues (Gunningham and Young 1997; Stephens 1999; Doremus 2006). New 
Zealand’s history of active and engaged public participation in conservation points to the importance of 
comprehensive, publically available information (Stephens 1999; PCE 2010). A valuable example is 
provided by the numerous databases that comprise the Biobanking Registry in New South Wales. 
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Technical and resource support is vital, yet when adequate, registries are powerful tools supporting 
democratic operation. This is a suitable template for New Zealand to adopt. Across the United States 
the importance of such information capacity has been recognised for several years. The transformation 
from recognising this need to implementing tools has taken much longer. This has been partly due to 
the number of agencies from which information must be coordinated. It is also because establishing 
tracking and tracing systems such as RIBITS110 has occurred after much banking activity. As a result, 
entrenched processes need adjustment and existing information must be integrated; both involve time 
and resource commitments and challenges. Concurrent establishment of offset banking and information 
tracking registries have clear advantages and modern systems are near impossible without this 
approach.    
  
Society’s choice and involvement 
 
Regulations drive offset banking but how these manifest is a product of society’s attitude to how the 
environment should be managed - for development, resources and conservation. How New Zealanders 
choose to approach these decisions has direct implications for how successful offset banking, and 
required regulations, can be. Offset banking is a novel, innovative approach to environmental 
management and conservation, and so requires a departure from previous attitudes. 
 
To effectively implement offset banking New Zealanders must choose to participate because they 
recognise offset banking as an additional tool necessary. Government resources for biodiversity 
conservation are currently insufficient and the environment continues to suffer significant, on-going 
biodiversity loss as a result. Without such decisions, outcomes are limited because market-based 
systems operate according to human choice. Economic mechanisms will not be optimally designed 
without desire to do so. Robust scientific and financial backing for offset banking requires significant 
government and taxpayer support so issues must be prioritised, driven through consumer and voter 
traction.  
 
New Zealand will also choose to adopt offset banking as a result of reaching a consensus over how to 
manage development projects and resulting impacts. Rather than looking at a project and seeing if 
offset banking can reduce the negative environmental impacts, offset banking best responds where 
developments are seem as having distinct wider benefits and accounting for environmental negativities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See APPENDIX TWO: Summary table comparing the key components of New South Wales Biobanking, and Conservation Banking in 
California, USA. 
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are a necessary component of making overall benefits from development possible.  Offset banking is a 
process for aspiring to optimal environmental outcomes possible when development projects occur, 
inacted only after deciding where and how development projects should occur. This perspecitve 
potentially requires a shift in New Zealand’s prevailing attitudes and perspectives.  
 
Further analysis may shed light on how such shift occurred in California, and whether this shift can or 
will occur in New South Wales. In the absence of this, one observation stands out. In California, shifting 
focus towards the best conservation available through mitigation and conservation banking, and away 
from the debate over the merits of development projects has been possible because groups prioritising 
environmental concerns are actively engaged with achieving optimal conservation outcomes under 
offset banking. As well as potentially being bankers or landowners, environmental or conservation 
groups are able to hold easements, endowments and long-term management stewardship of banks. 
 
This direct involvement has many benefits but most importantly provides a channel that aligns with 
groups’ mandates for optimal conservation. It allows groups to assure the success of the systems’ 
conservation goals, while also a mechanism whereby potential conflicts and issues are resolved in a 
proactive, rather than reactionary or confrontational manner. Bringing varying interests together under 
a common goal has enabled cooperation and displaced earlier confrontational relationships and 
interactions. Tension between conservation groups and the banking industry is minimised in California 
and is a powerful example for New Zealand to follow.  
 
7 .8  THE ROLE OF H IGHER GOVERNANCE:  STRATEGIC  CONSERVATION IS  KEY 
 
Emphasising the importance of society’s attitudes and perspectives consequently invites questioning of 
the role for higher government. This is debated within New South Wales as Biobanking develops, and in 
California where focus has redirected towards the maintenance and expansion of established banking 
systems. Such debates contain numerous perspectives, yet one trend emerges even within the different 
positions and stages. Site selection is critical - for economics and ecology - and is only maximised 
under a broader strategy for conservation. Locating offsets and bank sites within the landscape to 
make maximum conservation contribution is only possible when specific conservation needs are 
understood and these goals are articulated. In Californian conservation banking, the recovery of the 
species is the overall objective so sites are identified and prioritised based on how best this can be 
achieved. This is difficult when viewing sites individually. It is stronger with comparisons between a 
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range of sites, options and combinations, and when the needs of the species and the threats and 
opportunities existing in the landscape are understood. This is where a strategic approach is required, 
and where selecting the best sites the guidance of a conservation strategy is necessary. A strategic 
approach may look at the needs of a species of specific environmental value, but also applies to 
critically assessing existing conservation goals, rationale behind (or existence of) prioritisation, how 
finances are allocated, how conservation decisions are made. Once these questions are answered 
through a strategy, it is possible to align offsets under this framework to achieve desired environmental 
and economic goals.  
 
This should be a primary step for New Zealand: expanding the 2000 Biodiversity Strategy so it may 
incorporate the needs of an offset banking system and actively contribute to delivering associated 
policy objectives. Approached from a basis of critically assessing New Zealand’s conservation priorities, 
current funding allocation frameworks, and how best to coordinate and utilise offsetting decisions to 
achieve new, optimal and defensible goals an effective Biodiversity Strategy is within reach. Upon 
establishing how offset banks are to be used to achieve conservation, a biological strategy may be 
formed to coordinate the conservation needs of specific species, ecosystems or other conservation 
values to inform specific site selection. There are examples of relevant strategic approaches in both 
New South Wales and California111.  
 
7 .9 In  summat ion  
 
Offset banking is a tool to complement existing conservation, yet introduces a fundamentally novel 
perspective to how conservation is approached and biodiversity decisions are made. If offset banking is 
implemented from a framework without regard for such differences, only tentative efforts will be made 
and the process will stall, consume counter-productive resources, or fail altogether. With a true society-
wide appreciation of, and desire for, sustainable development an offset banking system may be 
designed.  
 
From the basis presented here, New Zealand will do well to keep two further points in mind moving 
forward. Firstly, paying close attention to the successes ensures full awareness of both the potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 For more on NSW see http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biocertification/index.htm (accessed 18/06/2011); 
http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biocertification/GrowthCentres.htm (accessed 18/06/2011). For more on California see: 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/habcon/ (accessed 18/06/2011); http://www.fws.gov/sacramento/es/hcp.htm (accessed 
18/06/2011); http://www.ca-ilg.org/habitat (accessed 18/06/2011). 
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optimism and potential limits demonstrated by other successful offset banking systems (Crowe and ten 
Kate 2010). Perspectives from both inside and outside the Californian systems consider it highly 
successful; commanding support for New Zealand to continue active observation of such international 
successes.  
 
Secondly, when looking at the kind of guidance and examples overseas systems can provide us with, 
New Zealand should look not only to where they have come from, but where they are going in the 
future. It is with this in mind that the role of strategic planning is discussed here. Concerns for climate 
change are also discussed with equal frequency, if not ease of solutions. This is predicted to impact 
upon the conservation needs of species and ecosystems, so potentially having important implications 
for offset banking. Additionally, increasing efforts to mitigate changing climate via schemes such as 
carbon trading are speculated to have some impact or interaction with offset banking trading systems, 
but examples to prove potential opportunities remain to be tested (EDO 2008b; Bekessy et al., 2010; 
Ring 2010; Crowe and ten Kate 2010).  
 
In conclusion, New Zealand is in a position to improve current offsetting practices and how the national 
environment is conserved. What contribution can offset banking make? At a minimum, offset banking 
may be how New Zealand remains competitive with international best practice. Further, it may offer a 
mechanism for strengthening and expanding national capacity to conserve environmental resources 
and manage sustainable development. It may also be a process combining both aspirations. Both 
require many steps and decisions, informed by overseas examples as discussed in this thesis. In 
bringing this together, one lesson emerges most important: recognise that offset banking is a novel, 
unique and unprecedented approach to conservation. It presents both truly significant potential and 
inherent irreducible complexity; underestimating either ignores the greatest lessons pioneering 
overseas examples provide.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
As offsetting and related industries have developed so diversely and simultaneously around the world, 
giving rise to a wide volume of terms used. Terms variously take on different meanings in different 
jurisdictions and many terms frequently refer to the same concept. As a result it is frequently confusing 
discussing issues across and between regions. Terms are defined bellow in the context of this thesis, 
drawing from definitions in use elsewhere; not intended to represent a consensus for broader 
application but rather a guide to the contents of this thesis. A number of more general terms are also 
included here, as establishing common definitions is instrumental to effective discussions and 
outcomes.  
 
Words in italics are defined elsewhere in the GLOSSARY 
 
Addi t iona l i ty  -  Where a given set of conservation actions occur over and above existing 
conservation (or preservation) previously occurring or planned to occur. This principle is applied to 
ensure that the conservation actions that are being attributed to offset banking and credit trading are 
having ‘additional’ effect i.e. they are increasing the overall level of conservation occurring as 
compared to a the status quo, or the situation in the absence of the banking operation, rather than 
replacing existing conservation. 
 Amel iorat ion:  various actions that may be taken with the intent to minimise damage, or 
improve biodiversity outcomes. Used in a similar manner to minimisation, mitigation or remedy.  
Associated terms include: tradable emissions permits, tradable emissions quotas, tradable 
development rights (Drechsler and Watzold 2010).  
Author i ty :  Government (at Federal, National, State, Regional or Local level) with the 
responsibility, as given under the legislation that establishes and regulates an offset banking system, 
to administer the scheme and ensure the schemes’ rules are adhered to and outcomes are achieved.  
 Avo id :  “measures taken to avoid creating impacts from the outset, such as careful spatial or 
temporal placement of elements of infrastructure, in order to completely avoid impacts on certain 
components of biodiversity. This results in a change to a ‘business as usual’ approach113.” 
Bank114 -  An entity that creates values recognised through issuing offset banking credits to 
the bank, subsequently sold to another party. The term bank reflects the analogy to a traditional, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 BBOP OIH (2009d) 
114 Also Note: Crowe and ten Kate (2010) p. 28 of 41 “An aggregated offset is similar to a conservation bank except that 
the offset demand or requirement is known in advance and the aggregated offset can be specifically designed to 
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financial institution commonly called a ‘bank’ through which money and other units of exchange are 
held and traded. It may also be used to refer to a specific parcel of land for which offset banking 
credits are issued in relation to (see offset).  
Bank Sponsor -  see Banker above. The term is used in reference to the financial support 
the banker provides for the establishment of the bank. 
Banker -  an individual who conducts conservation work (or commissions such work) in 
order to have credits issued to them, for which they sell on to a third party.  
Benchmark:  An established point of reference (represented by specific measurement 
values, conditions or other qualifiers and quantifiers), against which differences across time and space 
may be compared and expressed. Commonly, a specific habitat or ecosystem, (potentially also a 
feature or component of a habitat or ecosystem) as described by specific conditions or parameters 
may be used as a benchmark to which other ecosystems, habitats, features or components are 
compared115.  
B ioBank A bank to which credits have been issued pertaining to a definition of biodiversity 
as established under enabling legislation and may be sold to satisfy ‘ biodiversity conservation’ 
requirements defined under specific legislation. This thesis uses this term to specifically refer to a bank 
within the New South Wales Biobanking Scheme (see Chapter 3) 
B iobanker -  See banker above. 
 B iobank ing Credi t  -  a credit as described above, which directly represents species or 
ecosystems credits as issued within the New South Wales Biobanking Scheme.  
 B iod ivers i ty  Cred i t  -  a credit as described above, which directly represents biodiversity 
values 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
compensate for a particular set of biodiversity impacts… draws together the offset requirements of a number of projects 
where the biodiversity losses are known and supplies the required credits from a large single site or series of connected 
sites… Over-the-counter schemes are similar to conservation banks but are designed to supply small offsets where it is 
particularly important to minimise transaction costs [often government operated].” 
 
115 BBOP (2009e) provide the following description: 
“A benchmark can be used to provide a reference point against which losses of biodiversity due to a project and gains 
through an offset can be quantified and compared consistently and transparently.  It usually comprises a number of 
representative and characteristic ‘attributes‘ used to represent the type, amount and quality of biodiversity which will be lost 
/ gained.  Comparing the observed level (or ‘score’) of each benchmark attribute at the impact site (before and as 
predicted after the impact) against the level at the benchmark can help to quantify the loss of biodiversity to be caused by 
the project.  Similarly, comparing the observed level (or ‘score’) of each benchmark attribute at the offset site (before the 
offset and as predicted after the offset intervention) against the level at the benchmark can help to quantify the gain in 
biodiversity caused by the offset. A benchmark can be based on an area of land that provides a representative example, in 
a good condition, of the type of biodiversity that will be affected by the proposed development project. A synthetic 
benchmark can also be used if no relatively undisturbed areas still remain.”  
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Biodivers i ty  resources -  Aspects of biodiversity from which goods and services are 
produced that are directly important valuable to humans.  
B iod ivers i ty :  The variation in biology at all organisational levels, at a given location. It 
includes diversity in genetics, species traits, form and function; habitat diversity, in species, structure, 
age, and biology; diversity in ecosystem process and function, and concepts of variety, distinctiveness 
and abundance. The Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) refers to “…the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems” Article two, p. 146. The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (2000) adopts this 
definition, and also recognises the distinction of genetic diversity, species diversity and ecological 
(ecosystem) diversity.  
B ioprospect ing: The exploration of biodiversity for genetic and bio- chemical resources of 
social or commercial value. 
Compensat ion116:  Often used in place of the term mitigation, in the context that offsetting 
is achieving compensation. Both compensation and mit igat ion may be taken to mean the process of 
addressing the negative environmental impacts (through offsetting or other actions) of a project so 
that the final outcome has minimal enduring effects of the overall condition of the environment, or 
specific aspects of the environment; measures which aim to reduce impacts to the point where they 
have no adverse effects. In some settings compensation may refer to a far broader collection of 
environment and conservation related activities (such as capacity building, research, education, 
financial payments etc.) outside of those considered within the scope of direct offsetting. In the United 
States the term compensation is used to refer to efforts (of which conservation banking is one) 
occurring to achieve the objectives of the ESA when development projects negatively impact 
endangered species. Compensation is distinguished from mitigation where mitigation is used to refer to 
the Mitigation Banking process and wetland impacts under the CWA. Is also considered the ‘European’ 
term for mitigation, where mitigation is the collection of activities of the mitigation hierarchy such as 
avoid, minimise (and/or other terms), that precede any offset and that this offset (of the residual 
impacts only) would be considered compensation.  
Conservat ion Act ions:  Activities conducted with the intention of conserving biodiversity, 
most commonly referring to one or a combination of preservation, restoration, creation, enhancement, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 For further clarification of the distinction between compensation and mitigation see Appendix Five: Table A5 Distinction 
of terms relating to compensation and mitigation, by geographic region. Taken from eftec, IEEP et al., 2010 Glossary of 
terms.  
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rehabilitation, remediation, establishment or re-creation to achieve the active, planned maintenance 
and management of natural resources and the environment, in order to secure their long-­‐term survival. 
Conservat ion Bank -  A bank to which credits have been issued that may be sold to satisfy 
‘conservation’ requirements defined under specific legislation. 
 Conservat ion Credi t  -  a credit as described above, which directly represents 
conservation, or conservation actions. 
 Creat ion:  See establishment bellow 
 Credi t  -an item of exchange in a trading system, issued in recognition of an increase in 
value, quantity or quality of some commodity or resource. C.f. debi t ,  which recognises a reduction in 
some value such as may occur when a development removes or degrades an environmental resource 
such as biodiversity.  
Cred i t - t rad ing system -  a system where credits are issued to individuals, and 
subsequently bought, sold or retained by the owner. A credit may reflect (depending on design) 
recognised increase in something, such as the amount or condition of a resource (c.f. a permit, which 
pertains to an action or inaction being permitted).  
Eco log ica l  Economics: “The union of economics and ecology, with the economy conceived 
as a subsystem of the earth ecosystem that is sustained by a metabolic flow or throughout from a back 
to the larger system117”. Recognises that market allocation is only one possible allocation process.  
Eco log ica l  L i f t  - an increase in the value of the ecosystem through increased functioning, 
area, protection, provision of environmental services or other metrics. 
Economics -  For a glossary of terms used in relation to economic theory in this thesis see 
Glossary Daly and Farley 2004.  
Ecosystem -  a dynamic, interacting network of biotic and biotic components of  
Ecosystem Credi t  -  a credit as described above, which directly represents ecosystem 
values, and may be used in relation to specific ecosystems as described in enabling legislation. The 
term is used in the New South Wales System in relation to a range of specifically defined ecosystems, 
and represents the conservation of a range of flora and fauna and other biotic and abiotic conditions.  
Ecosystem funct ions: “Functions or processes carried out or enabled by an ecosystem 
that are necessary for the self-maintenance of that ecosystem, such as seed dispersal, primary 
production, nutrient cycling and pollination… energy capture, production, decomposition, nutrient and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Daly and Farley 2004 
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energy cycling, dispersal, and pollination… Some ecosystem functions are often also ecosystem 
services because they are directly beneficial to people.118” 
Ecosystem process: “An intrinsic ecosystem characteristic whereby an ecosystem 
maintains its integrity. Ecosystem processes include de- composition, production, nutrient cycling, and 
fluxes of nutrients and energy119.” 
Ecosystem Serv ices -  Processes or functions of an ecosystem directly benefiting humans 
due to life-supporting or life-enhancing provisions such as food and water; flood and disease control; 
spiritual, recreational, and cultural benefits; and supporting services such as nutrient cycling that 
maintain the conditions for life on Earth.  
E f f ic iency: A state of being where no other state (be that distribution, price or allocation) 
would produce more desirable outcomes - i.e. more outcomes or more welfare/benefit to individuals. In 
an economic sense this is Pareto efficient allocation where no other allocation could make at least one 
person better off without someone else being made worse off.  
Enhancement :  Conservation actions that intend to reinstate the operation (in quality or 
quantity) of a specific function or process within an ecosystem, in order to increase the overall 
environmental condition of an area.  
Entrepreneur ia l  Banker/Entrepreneur ia l  Bank ing:  Commercial entity (person, 
company or corporation) that invests capital and/or resources into offset banking with the intention of 
making a commercial profit from selling credits generated. This may be distinguished from a private 
land-owner who engaged in offset banking as a way to make a profit from land that is owned and the 
management required to maintain credits as an alternative to previous or traditional land uses such as 
agriculture, horticulture or grazing - i.e. from a land uses perspective. Distinction can be made based 
on the perspective taken: a way of making profit (entrepreneur) vs. a way of managing land (traditional 
private land-owner).  
Env i ronmenta l  Economics:  A subset of earlier economics, recognising that welfare 
depends on ecosystem services, suffers from pollution, but that efficiency is still important. It focuses 
on using previously established economic techniques to assign market values that will allow them to be 
incorporated into the economic market and therefore allocated efficiently.  
Env i ronmenta l  L i f t  - increase in the environmental value of a site or area, which may occur 
through ecological lift or other broader aspects of the environment.  
 Estab l ishment :  The process of manipulating the biotic and abiotic (including, but not 
limited to, geomorphic and hydrological manipulation) conditions of a location so that an ecosystem or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 BBOP ODH (2009f) 
119 Ibid 
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set of biodiversity values not previously observed at that location are established from direct 
anthropogenic inputs.  
Habi tat :  The biotic and abiotic conditions (usually defined on the basis of geology, 
vegetation, and location) an organism utilises for existence, is normally found, and which individuals or 
populations of the same species are typically associated. Areas within a habitat occupied by a 
particular species or community are described as microhabitats. 
Habi tat  Bank:  A bank to which credits have been issued that may be sold to satisfy ‘ 
habitat conservation’ requirements defined under specific legislation. Conservation actions, monitoring 
and other aspects of the bank are designed around specific habitat definitions and conservation needs 
as defined by enabling legislation. Habitat bank is a term most commonly associated with European 
offset banking. Note also use of the term Habi tat  Bank ing referring to both species and habitats - 
therefore in context of this study it is analogous to ‘conservation banking’ and ‘biodiversity banking’”. 
 Habi tat  Credi t :  a credit as described above, which directly represents habitat values, such 
as a specific habitat, or specific characteristics of a habitat.  
Ind icator  (Bio log ica l) :  A level of biological organization (species, stand or ecosystem) of 
which features or elements provide information about other biological aspects that may be difficult to 
measure directly.  
Ind icator  spec ies:  A species whose presence or absence may be used to indicate or 
support a range of other species. Lambeck (1997) and Noss (1999) proposed a wide variety of 
potential indicators such as: 
– ‘Umbrella’ Species (area-limited/dispersal-limited/resource-limited/ process-limited): species that 
require certain resources (large area, specific resources, high-quality processes or conditions) to 
maintain viable populations and whose requirements for persistence are believed to encapsulate those 
of an array of associated species because such resource needs are so great i.e. if resources are 
present for these species, there will also be enough resources for a wide range of other species.  
– Flagship species: species that can easily attract public support for conservation so enable the 
conservation of a range of species in the associated ecosystem (e.g. Giant Panda, Ailuropoda 
melanoleuca; whales). 
– Keystone species: species whose strong interactions with other species generate effects that are 
large relative to their abundance.  
Inst i tut ions: The rules that guide how people within societies live, work, and interact with 
each other. Formal institutions are written (or codified) rules. Examples of formal institutions would be 
a constitution, judiciary laws, an organized market, and property rights. This thesis considers offset 
banking an institution for conserving biodiversity and other environmental values.  
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Market-based instruments (or  mechanisms): Mechanisms that create a market for 
ecosystem services in order to improving the efficiency in the way the service is used. The term is used 
for mechanisms (government managed or otherwise) that create new markets by creating incentive 
structures that put a price on environmental products, but also for responses such as taxes, subsidies, 
or regulations that affect existing markets120.  
 Min imise:  designing a project (or any activity or undertaking that is expected to cause 
negative impacts) in such a way that harm is reduced in terms of duration, intensity or extent, as far as 
practically feasible.    
Mi t igat ion Bank -  A bank to which credits have been issued that may be sold to satisfy 
‘mitigation’ requirements defined under specific legislation.  
Mi t igat ion Hierarchy:  a principle requiring that to properly offset negative environmental 
impacts, a sequential process of actions should occur, prior to undertaking offsetting and/or offset 
banking, specifically: (i) avoidance of impacts (ii) minimisation of impacts (iii) rehabilitation/restoration 
measures taken on the ecosystem impacted; and (iv) offset measures to compensate for significant 
adverse residual impacts. A number of different interpretations of the mitigation hierarchy may be 
observed, for example BBOP; eftec, IEEP et al., 2010 
No-Net-Loss/Ecologica l  L i f t /Env i ronmenta l  L i f t /Net  Ga in:  These terms are used 
to represent goals intended as outcomes from offsetting and credit trading, where some improvement 
in the environment occurs, directly as a result of the offsetting process. The degree and nature of the 
improvement may be noted in distinctions between the specific terms used across policy and systems. 
Note the use of this term in relation to conservation, by Drechsler and Watzold (2010 pg. 2) “Based 
on the concept of tradable permits, such a system would allow economic development of a formerly 
conservation area if a permit is submitted to the conservation agency which certifies that an area with 
previously no conservation value has been transformed back into a conservation area of ecological 
value equal to the area to be destroyed. There is no requirement that developers establish new 
habitats themselves, but the permit can be bought from other landowners. This allows a market for 
tradable development rights to emerge.”  
Net  ga in - term used to a desired outcome where after all activities and/or trades have 
occurred a positive overall benefit is achieved. This is commonly measured as the net environmental 
gain, but the term could be used to refer to a collection of forms of gain possible such as social, 
economic, or gain to specific components of the environment. 
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No Net  Loss -  “A target for a development project in which the impacts on biodiversity 
caused by the project are balanced or outweighed by measures taken to avoid and minimise the 
project’s impacts, to undertake on-site restoration and finally to offset the residual impacts, so that no 
loss remains121”. 
Of fset  (Biod ivers i ty ,  env i ronmenta l ,  habi tat  or  other)  - a specific offsetting 
project, specifically referring to the location at which offset activities occur.  
Of fset  Act iv i t ies : the set of activities identified to achieve specific outcomes for biodiversity 
or other concerns involved, specific to the context of the development project concerned. They may 
involve a mixture and broad range of activities. While often used and advocated for awareness 
campaigns, environmental education, research and capacity building are not normally considered part 
of the core offset, unless there is evidence of measureable on-the-ground conservation outcomes. 
Of fset  Bank -  see Bank above. Within this thesis this term refers to a more generalised or 
unspecified banking system, distinct from banks within specific mitigation, conservation, wetlands, 
species, habitats or biodiversity banking programs as above. The prefix ‘offset’ is used to denote the 
use of the bank for the purpose of offsetting negative impacts, as above.  
Of fset t ing -  a process where negative anthropogenic impacts are in some way reduced in 
severity, by actions taken after the impact. The term offset may be prefixed by words such as 
biodiversity, environment, species, habitat, vegetation, landscape or others to indicate the specific 
aspects of concern the actions intend to address i.e. a biodiversity offset intends to address impacts to 
biodiversity, whereas a species offset intends to address impacts to species etc. As a result these 
terms are used to refer to a wide variety of projects, programs, systems and actions around the world, 
and so the term is broad and loosely defined to encompass this. Emerging best practice emphasise the 
use of this term in reference to efforts occurring offsite of the impact and are directed at reducing 
residual negative impacts (not all negative impact), where residual impacts are those still remaining 
after following the mitigation hierarchy. 
Permit tee-responsib le/ locat ion-spec i f ic/s i te-spec i f ic/ in-
house/bespoke/trad i t iona l  o f fset  -  These terms all refer to development projects required to 
‘offset’ specific negative impacts and has done so (by choice or as a result of the framework present) 
via an offset project for this purpose. Offsetting occurs independently of an offset banking program; 
independently to any other development or offsetting project; and created in response to the specific 
need created as a result of the impact. It may be at the same location as the development project, 
directly adjacent to the impact site or some distance away. The term ‘permit tee-responsib le ’  is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 BBOP OIH (2009d) 
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used in California and elsewhere in the USA, to refer work being conducted by the entity (or on behalf 
of the entity) that is undertaking the offset in order to obtain a permit, as required in CWA and ESA 
legislation, for a given development project. This is how the term ‘permittee’ is involved. The term 
‘t rad i t iona l ’  is used where such one-off projects have most commonly been the first instances of 
offsetting in a region, preceding (chronologically) offset banking approaches.  
Precaut ionary pr inc ip le :  The management concept stating that in cases ‘‘where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation,’’ as defined in 
the Rio Declaration122.  
Preservat ion:  protective actions taken to ensure continued quality and quantity of 
conservation values through preventing threats that would cause loss of such values. Such actions may 
be physical, legal or financial in nature.  
Property  r ights :  The right to specific uses, perhaps including exchange in a market of 
ecosystems and their services. 
Re-creat ion:  The process of manipulating the biotic and abiotic (including, but not limited 
to, geomorphic and hydrological manipulation) conditions of a location so that a previously existing, 
but presently absent ecosystem or set of biodiversity values is established. 
 Rehabi l i ta t ion -  conservation actions to alter a degrading process or function occurring 
within an ecosystem (usually as a result of external negative impacts) to one which is making a positive 
contribution to the environmental values of the area.  
 Remediat ion: Actions aimed at recover of the damage environmental resource either on the 
site where damage occurs or on another site (off-site). While the terms ‘remediation’, ‘mitigation’ and 
‘clean-up activities’ are sometimes used interchangeably they can have specific legal meanings123. 
 Remedy:  A variety of actions that may account for (reduce or minimise) negative 
environmental impacts. Compare with amelioration.  
Res i l ience:  The ability of an ecosystem or components of an ecosystem to experience 
changes in conditions or inputs whereby the system responds by returning to pre-change conditions 
without effecting the overall functioning, operation or viability of the system over the long-term. 
Res istance:  The ability of an ecosystem or components of an ecosystem to withstand 
environmental perturbations without negatively impacting the functioning, operation or viability of the 
ecosystem or components within.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Millenium Ecosystem Assessment Board (2005), p. 897 
123 eftec, IEEP et al., 2010 p.12 - 13 
	   247	  
Restorat ion:  may include rehabilitation, reallocation, reconstruction actions which all 
contribute to returning to an environment to some previous condition of higher value.  
S ing le User/C l ient  Bank - a bank site created by an entity that intends to use all credits 
produced for their own mitigation uses i.e. the credits are not sold to a third party. This differs from 
permittee-responsible mitigation defined above. The process is identical to establishing any other 
mitigation or conservation bank and occurs within the offset banking process of the region: credit 
crediting and debiting occur as with other bank transactions.  
Spec ies Bank -  A bank to which credits have been issued that may be sold to satisfy 
requirements to offset or mitigate species impacts, defined under specific legislation requiring 
conservation actions, monitoring and other aspects of the bank to be designed around the 
conservation needs of one or more specific species. 
 Spec ies Credi t  -  a credit as described above, which directly represents species values, 
such as a specific number of a specific species. 
Steward (Stewardship) :  The role of protecting, managing and monitoring the 
conservation and environmental values (species, habitats, biodiversity or other) of a piece of land. 
Stewardship may be practiced irrespective of ownership for the land so is undertaken with the express 
purpose of the continued existence of these values for conservation purposes rather than any 
subsequent use of values through credit selling or other development. 
Surrogates:  Similar to an indicator or benchmark, it is a unit of measurement which the 
values of are assumed to represent or be commensurate with another unit or entity for which 
measurements are not made. A unit of measurement made in place of another.   
The biosphere (such as plant and animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living 
environment) interacting as a functional unit together producing emergent systems, functions and 
processes that are self-maintaining and evolutionary.  
Tradable Permits  -  a share of some resource which may be issued to individuals, the 
ownership of which may then be bought or sold between individuals or parties. The owner of the permit 
may therefore be permitted to use or access some resource, depending on the design of the permit or 
tradable entity so is a mechanism by which property rights are allocated. 
Wet land Bank -  A bank to which credits have been issued that may be sold to satisfy 
‘wetland mitigation’ requirements defined under specific legislation. Note also the synonymous use of 
the term ‘Wet land Mi t igat ion Bank’ . 
 Wet land Credi t  -  a credit as described above, which directly represents wetland values, 
such as a specific wetland type or condition. 
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CASE STUDIES 
Each scheme internationally, including New South Wales and California employs a variety of terms and 
definitions particular or unique to the area the operate in. Terms defined here are either used in New 
South Wales exclusively, or are used in a specific manner or definition in the scheme.  
 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Accredi ted Assessor: A suitable qualified and experienced person who is accredited by 
the Direct-General to undertake and prepare surveys and assessments for use in the Biobanking 
Scheme, under s. 142B of the TSA 1995. 
Benchmark At t r ibutes:  features (structural, compositional, functional) of a habitat (can 
also be species, community or landscape based) used to establish a benchmark representing the type, 
amount and quality of biodiversity present at a site.  
B iobanking Agreement : A legally binding document between the landowner establishing a 
biobank site on their land and the Government Department administering the Biobanking scheme, 
containing certain conditions that must be satisfied in order to obtain a specific number and kind of 
credits. It specifies management actions, reporting, long-term funding, monitoring and other 
obligations assumed by the bank owner.  
B iobank ing Assessment Methodology (BAM): Document establishing the operating 
rules of the Biobanking Scheme, specifying how biodiversity (ecosystems and species) values are 
assessed, credited and traded. The regulatory standing of the document is established in the TSA 
(1995) s. 127B, where (9) maintains that the Scheme may not operate prior to its creation and 
publication.  
B iobank ing Scheme:  System of offset banking operating in the state of New South Wales, 
Australia, according to the Threatened Species Conservation Act (1995) and the Threatened Species 
Conservation Biodiversity Banking Regulation (2008). 
B iobank ing Statement :  a document stating if the development will improve or maintain 
values and the nature and number of credits to be retired to meet these criteria. The statement 
satisfies the biodiversity assessment criteria and exempts the developer from needing an assessment 
of significance or species impact statement for the proposal.  
Catchment Management Author i ty  (CMA):  A division of local governance, whereby the 
State is geopolitically divided into regions defined as Catchments, and each is managed and 
administrated by a governing authority termed the Catchment Management Authority. They operate as 
a point of information and promotion between the Schemes’ administrators within The Department and 
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private landowners establishing banks, and developers pursuing Biobanking Statements and credit 
purchases.  
Cred i t  Ca lcu lator :  Computer software used by an Accredited Assessor to calculate the 
number and nature of credits to be issued based on outputs from the Biobanking Assessment 
Methodology.  
Cred i t  Prof i le : A description of the type (ecosystem or species) and specific nature of 
credits issued in a Biobanking Agreement, or required in a Biobanking Statement, including information 
on how such credits may be traded in order to meet the ‘improve or maintain’ requirements (see IMT 
bellow).  
Ecosystem Credi t :  A credit type acknowledging the conservation of an ecosystem type  
(faunal and flora values) defined through vegetation surrogates, types, classes and formations as 
defined by the Vegetation Types Database.  
Habi tat  Hectares:  An explicit, quantitative method for assessing the quality of vegetation 
by adding scores that are assigned to 10 habitat attributes and assessing the condition or nature of 
vegetation patches to allow comparison between different patches, developed for use in the State of 
Victoria (See Parkes et al., 2002). This statewide, standardised approach estimates vegetation/habitat 
quality on a scale from zero (complete loss) to one (complete retention of natural quality as described 
by benchmark characteristics). The quality measure is combined with area to create a “Habitat 
Hectares” score (habitat score x area) with the number needed for a given offset depending upon the 
conservation significance of the situation. 
Habi tat  Surrogates:  components of a habitat such as the biogeographic location and 
vegetation classifications, coverage, condition or area used to assess the habitat of a given site.  
Improve or  Mainta in (Test  - IMT see ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS):  Term used to reflect 
the overall intended outcome from trading and exchange of Biobanking credits, reflecting the 
prioritisation of minimally maintaining a commensurate level of biodiversity (of ecosystems and 
species) over time, but giving preference to improving (i.e. increasing in condition and frequency) of 
values over time.  
Management Act ions:  Actions required at the Biobanking site to create/maintain 
biodiversity (ecosystem and species) values and hence credits. These may be standard actions or 
additional management actions (where ecosystem credits are being created requiring the improvement 
in population, or habitat of a particular threatened species requiring ecosystem credits) 
Min ister :  The Minister of the New South Wales State Government Department that 
administers the TSA (1995 and reg. 2008) that enables, creates and regulates Biobanking in NSW.  
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Red F lag Area:  “An area of land at the development site with high biodiversity 
conservation values where the impact of the development on biodiversity values cannot be offset by 
the retirement of biodiversity credits in order to improve or maintain values, unless the Director General 
determines that strict avoidance of the red flag area is unnecessary in the circumstances.” Page 48 
Biobanking Assessment Methodology DECC 2008. See section 6.2.3 
Spec ies Credi t :  A credit type acknowledging the conservation of a species whose presence 
may not be accurately predicted by vegetation surrogates (typically because the inhabit a number of 
vegetation types).  Species that require species credits are listed in the Threatened Species Profile 
Database 
The Department : The New South Wales State Government Department that administers the 
TSA (1995 and reg. 2008) that enables, creates and regulates Biobanking in NSW. Between the 
creation of the legislation this department has been then Department of  Env i ronment ,  C l imate 
Change (DECC),  Department of  C l imate Change and Water  (DECCW),  and at the time of 
thesis submission, Of f ice of  Env i ronment and Her i tage (OEH).   
Tota l  Fund Deposi t :  The total amount, divided into scheduled payments, which must to 
deposited into the Trust Fund to meet legislative requirements and ensuring management financing 
from when the Biobanking Agreement is signed into perpetuity.  
Trust  Fund Manager - the person charged by the Minister of the Department to 
administer the Trust Fund and all aspects of its operation.  
Trust  Fund:  Money set aside, as a precent of credit sales and managed by a Trust Fund 
Manager to provide a perpetual income stream to the manager/owner of the Biobank site for perpetual 
management and the on-going maintenance of the biodiversity on the Biobank site. 
 
CAL IFORNIA 
See also ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS bellow 
 
Bank Enabl ing Instrument :  Documentation establishing the agreement between the 
parties to the bank (including land owner, banker, agencies, easement holder and other relevant 
parties on a case-specific basis) that formally creates the bank and operational components.  
  
Conservat ion Bank - a bank established to provide compensatory conservation as relating 
to the ESA and the impact to and recovery of listed endangered species under the same act.  
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Conservat ion Bank Agreement :  Similar to BEI’s, agreement between parties involved in 
a Conservation Bank’s creation that establishes the bank and defines operational components within 
the ESA-based conservation banking system.  
 Management P lan:  Agreed schedule of actions that must be taken in order to maintain the 
specific values of the bank (used in both Mitigation and Conservation Banking). 
Cred i t  Re lease Schedule : predicted, but not guaranteed, issuance of credits over time, in 
response to the meeting of specified criteria (used in both Mitigation and Conservation Banking). 
Serv ice Area:  Area within which credits may be sold that will be able to offer impact 
mitigation. If a project is located within the service area, then they may achieve mitigation by 
purchasing that bank’s credits, however if the project is not in the Service Area, then mitigation will not 
be satisfied but purchases may be made without the intention of mitigating or compensating impacts 
(used in both Mitigation and Conservation Banking). See section 6.2.2.1  
Endowment: A fund, or pool of money from which the interest generated from investing the 
capital, is drawn from over time to generate income, such as income for operation and maintenance of 
a bank (used in both Mitigation and Conservation Banking). See sections 5.1.2 -.7, 7.6. 
Non-wast ing Endowment: As above, however a portion of the interest is re-invested as 
capital, to maintain the earning capacity of the capital base, so that the steady income stream which is 
produced may retain its purchasing power indefinitely (used in both Mitigation and Conservation 
Banking). 
Endowment Holder : the legal entity that manages and has responsibility for the 
endowment fund, its investment and spending allocations. 
Easement :  Legal instrument documenting an agreement between a landowner and the 
easement holder that transfers specific rights and/or responsibilities from the landowner to the 
easement holder. In the context of banking, a conservation easement is used, whereby the easement 
holder assumes the rights and responsibilities of upholding, maintaining and protecting the 
conservation values of the bank that the land the easement it pertains to is located on.  
Easement Holder : the legal entity that manages and has responsibility for the easement.  
Permit tee: the holder of a permit to conduct development activities, as issued by legislation, 
such as the CWA or the ESA. See permittee-responsible above. 
Sequenc ing:   A term used similar to mitigation hierarchy where a sequence of actions must 
be taken in order, before final banking is deemed appropriate.  
(Bank) Manager :  A person charged with co-ordinating and supervising the completion of 
actions required on the bank site pertaining to the on-going conservation of the bank’s values. This 
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term may be used synonymously with the term steward or the steward may assign/delegate the 
management task accordingly.  
In  L ieu Fee Program: A program whereby money is collected from permittees and 
accumulated over time to a point where it is cost effective to conduct mitigation on behalf of a number 
of permittees in aggregate, where this options offers improved efficiency in time, costs and biology 
than individual banking or offsetting. A program may also be established in the case where there is not 
the upfront land or capital to fully support the establishment of a bank, enabling money to be collected 
as permits are issued, and providing a mechanism to accumulate the needed resources for mitigation. 
See section 3.2.1 
In L ieu Fee Holder :  The entity that receives this money, along with the responsibility for 
conducting the mitigation, and is authorised to do so by the relevant agency.  
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIAT IONS 
 
The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations commonly used in literature relevant to offset 
banking and adopted in this thesis. References to the regions/countries (commonly) of use follow in 
italics: NSW - New South Wales, CA - California, USA - (United States of America), NZ - New Zealand.  
 
BAM - BioBanking Assessment Methodology NSW 
BBOP - Business and Biodiversity Offsets Program - “The Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP) is a partnership between companies, governments, conservation experts and 
financial institutions that aims to explore whether, in the right circumstances, biodiversity offsets can 
help achieve better and more cost effective conservation outcomes than normally occur in 
infrastructure development, while at the same time helping companies manage their risks, liabilities and 
costs. BBOP has been researching and developing best practice on biodiversity offsets and testing it 
through a portfolio of pilot projects in a range of contexts and industry sectors, aiming to demonstrate 
improved and additional conservation and business outcomes.” OIH  
BEI  - Bank Enabling Instrument CA 
CBA - Conservation Bank Agreement - CA, USA 
CBD - Convention on Biological Diversity.  
CDFG - California Department of Fish and Game - CA 
CNLM - Centre for Natural Lands Management - CA 
COP - Conference of the Parties (to the CBD) 
CWA - Clean Water Act CA (USA) 
DECC - Department of Environment and Climate Change (disbanded in 2009) - NSW 
DECCW - Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water (11 July 2009 to Present) - NSW 
DOC - Department of Conservation -NZ 
EDO - Environmental Defenders Office - NSW 
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency -  (USA) 
ESA - Endangered Species Act - CA (USA) 
HCP - Habitat Conservation Plan CA, USA 
ILF - In-Lieu-Fee 
IMT - Improve or Maintain Test NSW 
ITP - Incidental Take Permit (within the ESA) - CA, USA 
MfE - Ministry for the Environment - NZ 
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NGO - Non-Governmental Organization  
NMFS - National Marine Fisheries Service (USA) 
NNL - No-Net-Loss 
NOAA - National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (USA) 
NRCS - Natural Resources Conservation Service (USA) 
NSW - The Australian State of New South Wales - NSW 
NZBS - New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy - NZ 
OEH - Office of Environment and Heritage NSW 
ODH -  Offset Design Handbook (BBOP 2009f) 
OIH - Offset Implementation Handbook (BBOP 2009d) 
PAR - Property Analysis Record  
PCE - Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment NZ 
RMA - Resource Management Act - NZ 
TSA - Threatened Species Conservation Act (1995) 
TSR - Threatened Species Conservation Act Biobanking Regulation (2008) aka “BioBanking Bill” NSW 
USACE - United States Army Corps of Engineers - USA 
USFWS - United States Fish and Wildlife Service - USA 
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APPENDIX ONE: THE PRINCIPLES OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETTING AS DESCRIBED BY VARIOUS SOURCES 
 
1 .1  DEVELOPMENTS AND D IVERSITY  IN  OFFSET PRINC IPLES 
 
A primary focus of developing offsetting, and by extension offset banking, is the identification of 
principles by which individual offset decisions can be made. Decision-making should be replicable and 
transparent in order to support robust and defensible offsetting. As noted in text, there is great 
diversity in offsetting and offset banking approaches around the world, so a variety of principles have 
been developed (BBOP 2009f). This partly reflects the variation in objectives across schemes, but also 
the different contexts and the specific conservation needs and issues of each region. Each set of 
principles may have relevant components that can contribute and inform the development of offsetting 
and offset banking in new regions such as New Zealand. Understanding the scope of principles 
adopted around the world provides an appropriate context to understand how offset banking may be 
practiced.  
 
1 .2  BBOP OFFSET PRINC IPLES 
 
The group Business and Biodiversity Offset Program (BBOP) has produced a set of principles from 
investigation and observation of a variety of offsetting applications around the world (endorsed in 
eftec, IEEP et al., 2010). A voluntary, independent, non-legally active group, BBOP has developed 
these principles with input and consultation from a variety of organisations from a number of countries. 
Therefore they are well placed to represent an overview of practical experience and multi-party 
consensus. This makes them highly valuable when designing methodologies and guiding principles for 
a banking system.  
 
 Principles on Biodiversity Offsets Supported by the BBOP Advisory Committee 
Biodiversity offsets are measurable conservation outcomes resulting from actions designed to 
compensate for significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project development after 
appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been taken. The goal of biodiversity offsets is to 
achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of biodiversity on the ground with respect to species 
composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and cultural values associated 
with biodiversity. 
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These principles establish a framework for designing and implementing biodiversity offsets and 
verifying their success. Biodiversity offsets should be designed to comply with all relevant national and 
international law, and planned and implemented in accordance with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and its ecosystem approach, as articulated in National Biodiversity Strategies and Action 
Plans. 
1. No net loss: A biodiversity offset should be designed and implemented to achieve in situ, 
measurable conservation outcomes that can reasonably be expected to result in no net loss and 
preferably a net gain of biodiversity. 
2. Additional conservation outcomes: A biodiversity offset should achieve conservation outcomes 
above and beyond results that would have occurred if the offset had not taken place. Offset design and 
implementation should avoid displacing activities harmful to biodiversity to other locations. 
3. Adherence to the mitigation hierarchy: A biodiversity offset is a commitment to compensate for 
significant residual adverse impacts on biodiversity identified after appropriate avoidance, minimization 
and on-site rehabilitation measures have been taken according to the mitigation hierarchy. 
4. Limits to what can be offset: There are situations where residual impacts cannot be fully 
compensated for by a biodiversity offset because of the irreplaceability or vulnerability of the 
biodiversity affected. 
5. Landscape Context: A biodiversity offset should be designed and implemented in a landscape 
context to achieve the expected measurable conservation outcomes taking into account available 
information on the full range of biological, social and cultural values of biodiversity and supporting an 
ecosystem approach. 
6. Stakeholder participation: In areas affected by the project and by the biodiversity offset, the effective 
participation of stakeholders should be ensured in decision-making about biodiversity offsets, including 
their evaluation, selection, design, implementation and monitoring. 
7. Equity: A biodiversity offset should be designed and implemented in an equitable manner, which 
means the sharing among stakeholders of the rights and responsibilities, risks and rewards associated 
with a project and offset in a fair and balanced way, respecting legal and customary arrangements. 
Special consideration should be given to respecting both internationally and nationally recognised 
rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. 
8. Long-term outcomes: The design and implementation of a biodiversity offset should be based on an 
adaptive management approach, incorporating monitoring and evaluation, with the objective of 
securing outcomes that last at least as long as the project’s impacts and preferably in perpetuity. 
9. Transparency: The design and implementation of a biodiversity offset, and communication of its 
results to the public, should be undertaken in a transparent and timely manner. 
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10. Science and traditional knowledge: The design and implementation of a biodiversity offset should 
be a documented process informed by sound science, including an appropriate consideration of 
traditional knowledge. 
 
1 .3  PRINC IPLES IN  NEW ZEALAND 
 
Principles to guide decision-making regarding offsets, and provide a framework for establishing a New 
Zealand offset banking system have emerged through case law and several pivotal cases brought 
before the Environment Court124. Of these, JF Investments Ltd. v Queenstown Lakes District Council saw 
the following ‘desiderata’ adopted in arriving at the final decision (J F Investments Ltd. v Queenstown 
Lakes District Council (Environment Court, Christchurch C 048/2006 27th April 2006 Judge Jackson); 
see also: Hinchey and Hogg 2009125; Christensen 2010): 
 
1. It should preferably be of the same kind and scale as work on-site or should remedy 
effects caused at least in part by activities on-site; 
2. It should be as close as possible to the site (with a principles of benefit diminishing 
with distance) so that it is in the same area, landscape or environment as the proposed 
activity; 
3.  It must be effective; usually there should be conditions (a condition precedent or 
bond) to ensure that it is completed or supplied; 
4. There should have been public consultation or at least the opportunity for the public 
participation in the process by which the environmental compensation is set’ 
5. It should be transparent in that it is assessed under a standard methodology, 
preferably one that is specified under a regional or district plan or other public document 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Other cases that Hinchey and Hogg (2009) state have also adopted these principles: Canterbury Museum Trust Board v 
Christchurch City Council (Environment Court, Christchurch C059/06 17 May 2006 Judge Jackson); Lakeview Properties Ltd 
v Queenstown Lakes District Council (Environment Court, Christchurch C 080/06 19 June 2006, Commissioners Manning 
and Grigg); Director-General of Conservation v Wairoa District Council (Environment Court, Wellington W 081/07, 19 
September 2007, Judge Thompson); Merton v Rodney District Council (Environment Court, Christchurch A 008/07, 2 
February 2007, Judge Jackson); Long Bay-Okura Great Park Society Inc. v North Shore City Council (Environment Court, 
Auckland A 078/08 16 July 2008 Judge Jackson). 
 
125 Hichey L., Hogg A. (2009) Env i ronmenta l  compensat ion  under  the  RMA:  An appropr ia te  too l  to  “avo id ,  
remedy or  m i t iga te”  adverse  e f fec ts  on the  env i ronment?  Resource Management Bulletin, July p. 45 - 48 
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1.3.1 Norton (2009) Pr inc ip les 
Subsequently, Norton (2009) put forward a further set of Offset Principles that were subsequently 
adopted in the case Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society Inc. v The Gisborne District Council 
(Hinchey and Hogg, 2009) as building upon and superseding the desiderata adopted in JF Investments 
above (Summary from Christensen 2010; Norton 2009): 
 
1. Biodiversity offsets should only be used as a part of a hierarchy of actions in which a 
development project must first seek to avoid impacts and then minimise the impacts that do 
occur. Biodiversity offsets should not be used to justify adverse impacts; rather they are the 
final step in a process that focuses first on avoidance and minimisation 
2. Some for a guarantee must be provided that the offset proposed will occur. One of 
the major criticisms of offsets, especially in North America, is that most approved offsets fail to 
meet their objectives or never actually occur. 
3. Biodiversity offsets are inappropriate for certain ecosystems (or habitat) types 
because their rarity or the presence of a particular species within them makes the clearance of 
these ecosystems inappropriate under any circumstances. Notwithstanding the hierarchy in 
principle one, it seems clear that there are some ecosystems or habitat types for which offsets 
are never going to be possible. These may be ecosystems that have already been diminished 
to such an extent that any further loss is unacceptable, or habitats of species whose loss 
would most likely lead to the extinction of the species as well. 
4. Biodiversity offsets can involve protection of existing habitat but most often involve 
the creation of new habitat, especially when existing habitat already enjoys a degree of 
protection.  
5. A clear currency is required that allows transparent quantification of value to be lost 
and values to be gained in order to ensure ecological equivalency between cleared and offset 
areas. Any biodiversity offset proposal must be founded on very good knowledge of the 
biodiversity value of both the site that is to be impacted and the offset site, including 
composition, structure and pattern, function as well as dynamics and resilience of the system. 
The development of a clear currency to quantify the vales at different sites being considered 
as part of biodiversity offsets is essential to ensure that clearance of high quality habitat or a 
rare ecosystem is not offset using an area of low quality habitat or common ecosystem and 
thus that biodiversity credits have credibility. 
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6. Determination of what is an appropriate offset must take into account both the 
uncertainty involved in obtaining the desired outcome for the offset area and the time lag that 
is often involved in reaching this point. Uncertainty relates primarily to the inability of 
ecologists to accurately predict what a system will be like at some point in the future as a 
result of management actions implemented as part of the offset (e.g. restoration).  
 
These principles were not designed to specifically apply to an offset banking system, yet are a useful 
guide to the ideals that a system would be advised to include. In particular, these principles are 
important from a legal continuity perspective as they are currently applied to New Zealand Resource 
Management legislation and development impact decisions.  
 
1 .4  ADDIT IONAL PR INC IPLES D ISCUSSED IN  L ITERATURE 
 
The following observations of how offsets are implemented around the world reflect a body of literature 
that has developed. Principles suggest how offsets can be more appropriately implemented and 
suggest how offsetting proceeses should be guided; for example, Bekessy et al., 2010. The following 
principles from this paper may be highlighted and summarised as follows:  
 
- Maintain a net-gain approach: “While we agree in principle with the use of offsetting and biobanking 
as instruments to conserve biodiversity, most offsetting schemes that use these two approaches are 
resulting in net losses of biodiversity. We recommend instead policies that are likely to provide net 
benefits for biodiversity.” P. 152 
 
- Preclude the use of existing ‘biodiversity assets’ as offsets: “If the objective of a vegetation 
management policy is to achieve not-net-loss [or net gain as above], then actions that merely place 
offsets into a different tenure or security arrangement should not be permitted.” P. 152 
 
- Do not ‘lend’ biodiversity values, instead adopt a ‘savings’ approach - “We propose that the only 
workable and equitable system is one in which assets [biodiversity values] are banked for the future 
and trading is only possible once it can be demonstrated that assets have matured (reached ecological 
equivalence with whatever losses they are being traded against). The value of biodiversity assets 
(savings) should be demonstrated before they can be used to offset loss of biodiversity elsewhere.” P. 
153 - 
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- Employ a metric that incorporates irreplaceability, spatial context and landscape dynamism, to reflect 
biological realities. “In order to achieve equity between biodiversity losses and offsets with high 
confidence, metric that better reflect the value of biodiversity are required…Metrics must incorporate 
irreplaceability…Metrics must reflect the dynamic nature of landscapes… Spatial context must be 
considered both in the valuation and planning of offsets [including] metapopulation dynamics and 
retaining landscape connectivity.” P. 154 - 155 
 
- Maintain clear provision for when offsetting is and is not appropriate: “Some things, such a critical 
habitat for listed threatened species are not tradeable. Offsetting is not a panacea for unbridled 
development and must be firmly established as the last and most costly step of the ‘avoid, mitigate and 
compensate’ hierarchy from the convention on Biological Diversity 9UNEP 1992).” P. 154 
 
- Implementation of biodiversity-offset schemes must be closely regulated and legally enforceable:  
“Offsetting schemes should be overseen by an independent authority such as the relevant environment 
protection agencies with the power to reject proposals that breach fundamental criteria… they must 
be attached to a regulatory framework that is legally enforceable and that provides sufficiently serious 
penalties as a disincentive to noncompliance.” P. 155 -156 
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APPENDIX THREE: ACTS AND OTHER OFFICIAL POLICY DOCUMENTS IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW SOUTH 
WALES CA.  
 
 
Table A3.1 California, USA: Sum
m
ary of relevant docum
ents pertaining to m
itigation and conservation banking in California and other United States of 
Am
erica. * Reference taken from
 Box 2.1 M
ead 2008. See Glossary for a list of abbreviations, particularly for Acts and corresponding agencies.  
Title 
Type 
Year 
Agency/ 
Authority 
Jurisdiction 
Form
 of 
Banking it 
pertains to  
Relevance 
National 
Environm
ental 
Policy Act of 1969 
Act 
1970 
Enforcem
ent 
via court 
system
 
All federal 
agencies in the 
executive 
branch 
Potential 
relevance to 
both system
s 
through 
jurisdiction over 
Environm
ental 
Im
pact 
Assessm
ents/St
atem
ents 
Am
ong other functions it (broadly) defines m
itigation 
as “everything from
 avoiding the im
pact through to 
com
pensating for the im
pact by replacing or 
providing substitute resources.” M
ead 2008 p. 15 
Federal Water 
Pollution Control 
Act. (aka “Clean 
Water Act”) 
Act 
1972 
USACE 
Federal 
Governm
ent - 
all United 
States of 
Am
erica 
M
itigation 
Banking 
“The CWA provides for protection of wetlands and 
waters of he US and is adm
inistered by the [USACE] 
with oversight from
 the [EPA]…
 require m
itigation 
for projects that will im
pact wetlands.” Mead 2008 p 
10. This Act established the platform
 for project-
specific offsetting and m
itigation that eventually gave 
rise to wetland and m
itigation banking, and indirectly, 
conservation and species banking. 
Endangered 
Species Act 
Act 
1973 
EPA 
Federal 
Governm
ent - 
all United 
States of 
Am
erica 
Conservation 
Banking 
Established legal constraints of ‘Species take’ ‘ITP’ 
and listing of threatened species, which form
s the 
basis of the tradable unit, and dem
and for 
conservation/species banking in California and all 
other States. 
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Section 10 
Am
endm
ent to the 
ESA 
Am
endm
ent 
1982 
EPA 
Federal 
Governm
ent - 
all United 
States of 
Am
erica 
Conservation 
Banking 
*”Section 10 of the ESA was am
ended to include the 
use of Habitat Conservation Plans (HCP), thus 
allowing m
itigated, incidental take of federally listed 
species by private land-owners.” P. 12 
 
Interim
 Guidance 
on Mitigation 
Banking (1983) 
Mem
orandum
 
(Interim
 
guidance) 
1983 
USFWS 
Regional 
Directors of 
USFWS (i.e. 
National) 
Mitigation 
Banking 
* “USFWS issued interim
 guidance on m
itigation 
banking through a m
em
orandum
 to its regional 
directors that recognised the potential for m
itigation 
banking.” P. 12 
 
 
Californian 
Endangered 
Species Act 
Act 
1984 
(effective 
1985) 
CDFG 
State of 
California 
Conservation 
Banking. 
* “It superseded the state’s original 1970 Act and 
now closely resem
bles the federal ESA” p. 12 This 
Act recognises som
e species/ conservation values as 
relevant for banking, that are not recognised at a 
national level, allowing som
e values to be banked at 
federal level, and som
e at a state level.  
 
 
“The Determ
inant 
of Mitigation under 
the Clean Water Act 
Section 404 (b)(1) 
Guidelines.” 
Mem
orandum
 
of Agreem
ent 
1990 
Between the 
Departm
ent 
of the Arm
y 
(USACE) 
and the EPA 
Federal level - 
with regional 
docum
ents 
issued 
subsequent 
Mitigation 
Banking 
* “USACE and EPA issued m
em
orandum
s of 
agreem
ent regarding m
itigation banking. A num
ber of 
regional guidance docum
ents from
 various federal 
agency offices clarified agency expectations 
regarding m
itigation banking and officially sanctioned 
their use.”  
 
 
California Natural 
Com
m
unity 
Conservation Plan 
(NCCP) Act 
 
Act 
1991 
CDFG 
State of 
California 
Conservation 
Banking 
Allowed/provided for the creation of NCCP’s and 
established a role for banking within this fram
ework. 
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“Official Policy on 
Conservation 
Banks” 
Policy 
Statem
ent 
1995 
California 
State 
Governm
ent 
State of 
California 
Conservation 
Banking 
From
 the Docum
ent: “The executive and legislative 
branches have endorsed the use of conservation 
banks as a m
eans to accom
plish im
portant resource 
m
anagem
ent goals. This docum
ent provides form
al 
policy guidance on how to achieve this directive.” It 
defines the concepts, including six aspects to a 
conservation bank, and 14 precepts to guide agency 
im
plem
entation.   
  
 
“Federal Guidance 
for the 
establishm
ent, use 
and operation of 
m
itigation banks.” 
Federal 
Guidance 
1995 
USACE, EPA, 
NRCS, 
USFWS and 
NOAA 
Fisheries.  
Nation-wide 
according to 
agency 
jurisdiction. 
M
itigation 
Banking 
From
 the Docum
ent: “[the Agencies] are issuing final 
policy guidance regarding the establishm
ent, use and 
operation of m
itigation banks for the purpose of 
providing com
pensation for adverse im
pacts to 
wetlands and other aquatic resources. The purpose 
of this guidance is to clarify the m
anner in which 
m
itigation banks m
ay be used to satisfy m
itigation 
requirem
ents of the Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 
404 perm
it program
 and the wetland conservation 
provisions of the Food Security Act (FSA) (i.e., 
‘‘Swam
pbuster’’ provisions). Recognizing the 
potential benefits m
itigation banking offers for 
stream
lining the perm
it evaluation process and 
providing m
ore effective m
itigation for authorized 
im
pacts to wetlands, the agencies encourage the 
establishm
ent and appropriate use of m
itigation 
banks in the Section 404” 
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“Guidance for the 
establishm
ent, use 
and operation of 
conservation 
banks” 
Guidance 
Docum
ent 
2003 
USFWS 
Federal 
level/Nation-
wide 
Conservation 
Banks 
From
 the Docum
ent: “The policies and procedures 
discussed herein are applicable to the establishm
ent, 
use, and operation of public conservation banks, 
privately sponsored conservation banks, and third 
party banks (i.e., entrepreneurial banks). The 
guidance they provide is intended to help Service 
personnel; (1) evaluate the use of conservation 
banks to m
eet the conservation needs of listed 
species; (2) fulfill the purposes of the ESA; and (3) 
provide consistency and predictability in the 
establishm
ent, use, and operation of conservation 
banks. In this regard, it is im
portant to apply 
consistent standards and principles of m
itigation 
whether m
itigating through conservation banks or 
through other m
eans. The purpose of this policy is 
not to se t the bar higher for conservation banks than 
for other form
 s of m
itigation, but articulate generally 
applicable m
itigation standards and principles and to 
explain how they are to be accom
plished in the 
special context of conservation banks.” P. 2 
 
“Guidance on the Use 
of Financial 
Assurances, and 
Suggested Language 
for Special Conditions 
for Departm
ent of the 
Arm
y Perm
its 
Requiring 
Perform
ance Bonds.” 
 
Regulatory 
Guidance 
Letter 
2005 
USACE 
Federal/Nation-
wide. 
M
itigation 
Banking 
From
 the Docum
ent: “The purposes of this guidance 
are: 1) to provide general guidance on the use of 
letters of credit, perform
ance bonds and other 
financial assurances, and 2) to provide specific 
guidance for the use of perform
ance bonds to ensure 
the com
pletion of com
pensatory m
itigation projects.”  
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“Im
plem
entation 
Guidance fort he 
Water Resources 
Developm
ent Act of 
2007 - Section 
2036(c) Wetlands 
M
itigation 
M
em
orandum
 
(for 
Com
m
anders, 
M
ajor 
Subordinate 
com
m
ands) - 
Policy 
Statem
ent 
2008 
USACE 
Federal, as per 
agency 
jurisdiction 
M
itigation 
Banking 
This docum
ent “directs the Secretary, where 
appropriate, to fist consider the use of a m
itigation 
bank to com
pensate for wetland im
pacts that occur 
within the service area of an existing, approved 
m
itigation bank. The m
itigation bank m
ust be 
approved in accordance reference…
This 
m
em
orandum
 provides guidance on the use of 
m
itigation banks for wetlands m
itigation…
” (From
 
the Docum
ent). 
 
“Com
pensatory 
M
itigation of 
Losses of Aquatic 
Resources; Final 
Rule.” 
Federal 
Ruling 
2008 
USACE, EPA 
Federal/Nation-
wide according 
to agency 
jurisdiction. 
M
itigation 
Banking 
(interpretive 
application to 
Conservation 
Banking) 
“The regulations establish perform
ance standards 
and criteria for the use of perm
ittee-responsible 
com
pensatory m
itigation, m
itigation banks, and in-
lieu program
s to im
prove the quality and success of 
com
pensatory m
itigation projects...This rule im
proves 
the planning, im
plem
entation and m
anagem
ent of 
com
pensatory m
itigation projects by em
phasizing a 
watershed approach in selecting com
pensatory 
m
itigation project locations, requiring m
easurable, 
enforceable ecological perform
ance standards and 
regular m
onitoring for all types of com
pensation and 
specifying the com
ponents of a com
plete 
com
pensatory m
itigation plan, including assurances 
of long-term
 protection of com
pensation sites, 
financial assurances, and identification of the parties 
responsible for specific project tasks. This rule 
applies equivalent standards to perm
ittee-
responsible com
pensatory m
itigation, m
itigation 
banks and in-lieu fee m
itigation to the m
axim
um
 
extent practicable…
” p. 19594 
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Public Notice 
num
ber 
200500420 
Public Notice 
2008 
USACE, 
USFWS, 
CDFG, 
California 
Resource 
Agency, 
NM
FS, EPA, 
NRCS.  
State of 
California 
M
itigation and 
Conservation 
Banking 
Notified the developm
ent of standardized tem
plates 
for Banking Agreem
ents (BEI’s, Conservation 
Easem
ents, M
anagem
ent Plans, checklist for 
conceptual bank subm
ittals, banking prospectus 
subm
ittal, and draft BEI’s). 
From
 the Docum
ent: “These tem
plates are to be 
used in the developm
ent of m
itigation banks which 
are being developed to provide m
itigation for im
pacts 
from
 projects which have received authorizations to 
proceed under the authorities of Section 10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 for structures or 
work in or affecting navigable waters of the United 
States and/or Section 404 of the Clean Water Act for 
the discharge of dredged or fill m
aterial in waters of 
the United States. Additionally, these tem
plates are to 
be used when those m
itigation banks would also 
propose to provide m
itigation for projects which have 
been required to provide m
itigation by USFWS, CDFG, 
NM
FS, and/or NRCS.”  
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Table A3.2 List of docum
ents and Acts pertaining to the Biobanking Schem
e in New South Wales, Australia. * denotes interaction with stated Act. All adm
inistered by The 
Departm
ent/The Minister (see GLOSSARY) unless specified. See also notes bellow. 
Title 
Type 
Year 
Jurisdiction 
Relevance 
Threatened Species 
Conservation  
(Biodiversity 
Banking) 
Regulation 
Regulatio
n 
2008 
“ 
Part 2 Provides for the establishm
ent of the assessm
ent m
ethodology; Provides additional 
prescription of the schem
e including Part 3 which addresses Biobanking Agreem
ents, Part 4 
which addresses Biodiversity Credits, Parts 5 and 6 addressing Biobanking Statem
ents, Part 7 
which addresses the Trust Fund. 
Biobanking 
Assessm
ent 
M
ethodology 
Legislatio
n under 
TSR 
2008 
2008 
Biobanking Schem
e in The 
State of New South Wales 
M
etrics for operating the Biobanking Schem
e including: determ
ining the ‘Im
prove or M
aintain’ 
test; assessm
ent and m
easurem
ent of biodiversity values; assessm
ent and m
easurem
ent of 
threatened species; calculation of ecosystem
 credits and species credits; credit profiles and offset 
rules for using credits 
Native Vegetation 
Act (no 103) 
Act 
2003 
Native vegetation 
(indigenous existing prior to 
European settlem
ent 
[1750]) on (non-urban) 
private land within The State 
of New South Wales. 
Not directly related to Biobanking as it provides for Offsetting within the Property Vegetation 
Planning fram
ework. Excludes certain lands from
 Biobanking. Establishes som
e relevant 
definitions, such as native vegetation.   
* TSA 1995;  
Environm
ental 
Protection and 
Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 
Act 
1999 
Com
m
onwealth Governm
ent 
- all Com
m
onwealth land and 
values of ‘com
m
onwealth 
significance’. 
Som
e species listed under this Act are also listed/included in the Biobanking Assessm
ent 
M
ethodology of the TSA 1995 and the TSR 2008 
Threatened Species 
Conservation Act 
(no 101) 
Act 
1995 
Flora and Fauna of the New 
South Wales 
Part 7A “Biodiversity banking…
 provides for the establishm
ent of a biodiversity banking and 
offsets schem
e.” 
Environm
ental 
Planning and 
Assessm
ent Act 
(No 203) 
Act 
1979 
The State of New South 
Wales 
Section 75JA; 96 (5)(a); 96AA (1B)(b); 111(2)(d). General guidance as to the application of the 
Biobanking Process as it pertains to developm
ent consents. Specifies  the requirem
ent for 
developm
ent consent.  
* TSA (1995). NB adm
inistered by the Departm
ent of Planning 
	   272	  
APPENDIX FOUR: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
 
Anna Lashko 
Acting Scientific Director 
Environmental Defenders Office New South 
Wales, Sydney Office 
Friday 20th August 
 
Dav id Nicholson 
Manager, Biodiversity and Vegetation 
Programs 
Department of Environment, Climate Change & 
Water  
Sydney Office, 
Wednesday 1st July 2009 
 
Derek Se l lar  
Coordinator of the Growth Centres Biodiversity 
Offset Program 
DECCW, Hurstville Office 
Wednesday 18th August 2010 
 
Domin ic  Fanning 
Director 
Environmental Insites, Sydney Office 
Thursday 19th August 2010 
 
K i rsty  Graham 
Scientific Officer 
Environmental Defenders Office New South 
Wales, Sydney Office 
Friday 20th August 
 
Natasha Hammond-Deakin 
Solicitor 
Environmental Defenders Office New South 
Wales, Sydney Office 
Friday 20th August 
 
Professor Paul  Mart in 
Director, Australian Centre for Agriculture and 
Law,	  
AgLaw Centre, 	  
University of New England, Armadale, NSW 
Thursday 19th August 2010  
 
 
 
 
 
Pete R idgeway 
Flora and Fauna Projects Officer 
The Sustainability Team,  
The Hills Shire Council, NSW 
 
Rob Humphr ies 
Ecological Consultant and Biobanking expert,  
EcoLogical, Sutherland Office 
Wednesday 18th August 
 
Scot t  H ick ie   
Advisor to Ian Cohen MCL 
Parliamentary Office of Ian Cohen The Greens, 
New South Wales Legislative Council 
Friday 20th August 2010 
 
Sy lv ie  E l lsmore 
Policy Coordinator 
Policy and Research Unit 
NSW Aboriginal Land Council  
Wednesday 18th August 2010 
 
T im Robertson 
General Manager, Policy 
The Urban Development Institute of Australia 
NSW, Sydney Office 
Thursday 19th  
 
Tom Grosskopf  
Director for the Landscapes and Ecosystems 
Conservation  
DECCW, Sydney Office 
Thursday 19th  
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CALIFORNIA 
 
Chr is topher Ther iot  
Manager of Conservation Programs 
Ducks Unlimited 
May 2009 
 
Cra ig Des inof f  
Vice President, 
Westervelt Ecological Services (Corporate), 
Rocklin, CA 
May 2009 
 
Deborah Mead 
National Conservation Banking Coordinator,  
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Arlington, Virgina 
May 2009 
 
Ed F lynn 
Mitigation Banker/Project Partner 
Elsie Gridley Mitigation Bank 
May 2009 
 
Gregg McKenzie 
Executive Vice President / Partner at 
Restoration Resources,  
Principal at The McKenzie Land Company, LLC 
Rocklin, CA 
May 2009 
 
Kar i  Hawkins and Er ik  Grot te  
Conservation Resources,  
Sacramento CA. 
May 2009 
 
Kat ie  Freas 
Regulatory Project Manager 
 US Army Corps of Engineers 
Savannah, Georgia Area,  
Georgia State, USA 
May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael  Horton 
National IPaC Program Coordinator 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Arlington, Virginia. 
May 2010 
 
Nathanie l  Carro l l  
Director of Ecosystem Marketplace, 
Forest Trends, 
Washington, D.C. 
May 2009 
 
Ryan Lopez 
Associate Conservation Planner/Biologist 
Wildlands Inc. Corporate Office, 
Rocklin, CA  
May 2009 
 
Sherry Teresa 
Eco-Logical Solutions Consulting 
Springdale, UT 
May 2009 
 
Todd Garner 
Manager, Conservation Incentives 
American Forest Foundation, 
Washington DC 
May 2009 
 
Trav is  Hemman 
Business and Market Development, 
Westervelt Ecological Services, 
Scaramento, CA 
May 2009 
 
Wayne Whi te 
Director of Business Development 
Wildlands, Inc 
May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   APPENDIX F IVE: Table comparing and distinguishing variation in definition of associated 
terms, across regions. 
Table A 5: Distinction of term
s relating to com
pensation and m
itigation, by geographic region. Taken from
 eftec, IEEP et al., 2010 Glossary of term
s. See also GLOSSARY 
this volum
e 
 E
URO
PEAN
 T
ERM
IN
O
LO
GY  
U
N
ITED
 S
TATES T
ERM
IN
O
LO
GY  
N
EW
 Z
EALAN
D, W
ITH
IN
 TH
E RM
A 
Avoid 
Sequencing (M
itigation Hierarchy) 
Avoid 
Section 5 (1)(c)/ current 
case-law: Com
pensation 
“avoid OR rem
edy OR m
itigate any 
adverse effects of activities on the 
environm
ent…
”  
M
itigate 
M
inim
ize 
 
M
inim
ize 
 
 
 
Rehabilitate/restore 
Rehabilitate/restore 
Com
pensate 
Offset 
M
itigate 
Perm
ittee-Responsible 
M
itigation 
In-kind  
On site 
‘Habitat’ banking - 
species and 
conservation 
Banking -m
itigation/ 
wetland/species/ 
conservation 
In-Kind  
Off site 
Com
pensate - M
em
on and 
Skelton 2004 
Restoration Com
pensation: on-site, 
in-kind environm
ental com
pensation 
of lost values 
Replacem
ent com
pensation: off-site 
and/or out-of-kind com
pensation of 
lost values.  
Additional 
M
easures 
Educational funding 
Com
pensation 
Educational funding 
Out-of-
kind  
Off site. 
 M
itigation - M
em
on and 
Skelton 2004 
Avoid, m
inim
ize, redesign 
Awareness increasing 
Awareness increasing 
Research Funding 
Research Funding 
NB: O
n-Site: com
pensatory m
itigation located on a portion of the project area or an adjacent 
parcel. [O
ff-site referring to a location geographically separate from
 the im
pact site]. In-kind: 
Preserving, enhancing, restoring or enhancing the sam
e type of habitat that was im
pacted by the 
project. O
ut-of-kind: com
pensating im
pacts with a different type of habitat or other natural 
resource from
 that which was im
pacted. Taken from
 M
ead 2008, in Carroll, Fox and Bayon 2008. 
 
NB.  See M
em
on and Skelton 2004, table 1 for sum
m
ary of definition 
and use of environm
ental com
pensation in district and regional plans 
around New Zealand, highlighting differences between them
.   
